LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


GIF*T  OK 


\-~ 


Class 


LIFE 


CAMPAIGNS 


GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN 


MAJOR-GENERAL  U.S.  ARMY. 


BY 

G.   S.   IIILLARD. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J.    B.   LIPPINCOTT   &    CO. 

18C4. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1864,  by 

J.  B.  LirPIXCOTT  &  CO. 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania. 


TO  THE 


0f 


WHOSE  COURAGE,  CONDUCT,  AND  PATRIOTISM 

BEAR    RECORD    ALIKE    TO    THEIR    OWN    GLORY    AND    TO 

THEIR  UNSHAKEN  DEVOTION  TO  THE 


WHO  WAS  PERMITTED,  FOR  A  TIME,  WITH  CONSUMMATE 

WISDOM    AND    ABILITY, 

TO  LEAD  THEM  ONWARD  IN  THE  PATHS  ALWAYS 
OF  HONOR  AND  OFTEN  OF  VICTORY. 


PREFACE. 


THE  purpose  of  this  work  is  to  exhibit  General 
McClellan's  title  to  the  gratitude  and  admiration 
of  his  countrymen  by  simply  telling  them  what 
he  has  done.  The  treatment  he  has  received  has 
made  it,  indeed,  necessary  sometimes  to  take  the  at 
titude  of  controversy,  and  to  assail  others  in  order 
to  do  him  justice.  But  this  has  been  done  no  more 
than  the  interests  of  truth  required. 

G.  S.  H. 
BOSTON,  August,  1864. 

1*  5 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

BIRTH  AND  PARENTAGE — EARLY  EDUCATION — WEST  POINT — 
ENTERS  THE  ARMY — SERVICES  IN  THE  MEXICAN  WAR...        9 


CHAPTER   II. 

FORT  DELAWARE — CAPTAIN  MARCY'S  EXPEDITION  TO  THE 
UPPER  RED  RIVER — TEXAS — PACIFIC  RAILROAD  SUR 
VEY — SECRET  EXPEDITION  TO  THE  WEST  INDIES 81 

CHAPTER  III. 

MILITARY  COMMISSION  TO  VISIT  EUROPE — REPORT  ON  THE 
ARMIES  OF  EUROPE — RETIREMENT  FROM  THE  ARMY 69 

CHAPTER   IV. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA  IN  1861 82 

CHAPTER  v. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 104 

dHAPTER  VI. 

COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN  OF  1802....  ir,3 


o  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEE   Til. 

PAGE 

SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN — BATTLE  OF  WILLIAMSBURG — MARCH 
TO  RICHMOND — MERRIMAC  AND  MONITOR — GENERAL  JACK 
SON'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH — 
BATTLE  OF  FAIR,  OAKS 109 

CHAPTEE  Till. 
"THE  SEVEN  DAYS" 232 

CHAPTER   IX. 

THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  WITHDRAWN  FROM  RICHMOND...  261 

CHAPTEE  X. 

CAMPAIGN  IN  MARYLAND — BATTLE  OF  SOUTH  MOUNTAIN — 
BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM 280 

CHAPTEE  XI. 

DIFFERENCES  WITH  THE  ADMINISTRATION — REMOVAL  FROM 
THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY 307 

CHAPTEE  XII. 

FAREWELL  TO  THE  ARMY — RECEPTION  AT  TRENTON — VISIT 
TO  BOSTON  IN  THE  WINTER  OF  1863 — ORATION  AT  WEST 
POINT  IN  JUNE,  18C4 330 

CHAPTEE  XIII. 
CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS 348 

APPENDIX. 

ORATION  AT  WF.ST  POINT 375 


LIFE 


OF 


MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAK 


CIIAPTEE  I. 

name  of  McClellan,  common  in  many  parts 
J-  of  the  United  States,  is  borne  by  the  descendants 
of  a  Scotch  family,  the  head  of  which  was  Lord 
Kirkcudbright.  The  last  nobleman  of  this  namo 
died  April  19,  1832,  when  the  title  became  ex 
tinct.  Three  brothers  of  the  name  emigrated  to 
America  about  the  middle  of  the  last  century. 
One  went  to  Maine,  one  to  Pennsylvania,  and  one 
to  Connecticut :  from  the  last  of  these  the  subject 
of  this  memoir  is  descended. 

GEORGE  BRINTON  MCCLELLAN  was  born  in  Phila 
delphia,  December  3, 1826.  lie  was  the  third  child 
and  second  son  of  Dr.  George  McClellan,  a  distin 
guished  physician,  a  graduate  of  Yale  College,  and 
the  founder  of  Jefferson  College,  who  died  in  May, 
1846.  His  mother,  whose  maiden  name  was  Eliza 
beth  Brinton,  is  still  living.  The  eldest  son,  Dr. 
J.  H.  B.  McClellan,  is  a  physician  in  Philadelphia; 

9 


10  WEST     POINT.  [1842. 

and  the  youngest.  Arthur,  is  a  captain  in  the 
army,  attached  to  the  staff  of  General  "Wright. 

The  first  school  to  which  George  was  sent  was 
kept  by  Mr.  Sears  Cook  "Walker,  a  graduate  of 
Harvard  College  in  1825,  and  a  man  of  distin 
guished  scientific  merit,  who  died  in  January,  1853. 
He  remained  four  years  under  Mr.  Walker's  charge, 
and  from  him  was  transferred  to  a  German  teacher, 
named  Schipper,  under  whom  he  began  the  study  of 
Greek  and  Latin.  He  next  went  to  the  preparatory 
school  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  which 
was  kept  by  Dr.  Crawford,  and  in  1840  entered 
the  University  itself,  where  he  remained  two  years. 
He  was  a  good  scholar,  and  held  a  high  rank  in  his 
class,  both  at  school  and  in  college;  but  he  was  not 
a  brilliant  or  precocious  lad.  His  taste  was  for 
solid  studies :  he  made  steady  but  not  very  rapid 
progress  in  every  thing  he  undertook,  but  he  had 
not  the  qualities  of  mind  that  make  the  show-boy 
of  a  school. 

In  June,  1842,  he  entered  the  Military  Academy 
at  West  Point,  being  then  fifteen  years  and  six 
months  old.  He  went  there  in  obedience  to  his 
general  inclination  for  a  military  life.  He  had  no 
particular  fondness  for  mathematical  studies,  and 
was  not  aware  that  they  formed  so  large  a  part  of 
the  course  of  instruction  at  the  Academy.  Having 
a  modest  estimate  of  his  own  powers  and  attain 
ments,  it  was  a  source  of  surprise  as  well  as  pleasure 
to  him  to  find,  at  the  examination  in  January,  1843, 
that  he  was  coming  out  one  of  the  best  scholars  in 
the  class. 


AGE  15.J         COURSE     AT     THE     ACADEMY.  11 

The  Academy  was  at  that  time  under  the  chargo 
of  Colonel  De  Russey.  Among  his  classmates  were 
several  persons  who  have  served  with  distinction 
in  the  army  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  some 
whose  mistaken  sense  of  duty  led  them  at  the 
breaking  out  of  the  civil  war  into  the  ranks  of  the 
Confederates.  Among  these  latter  was  that  remark 
able  man,  Thomas  Jonathan  Jackson,  better  known 
by  his  far-renowned  name  of  Stonewall  Jackson, 
who  in  his  brief  military  career  seems  to  have 
combined  all  the  dash  and  brilliancy  of  one  of 
Prince  Rupert's  Cavaliers,  wath  the  religious  en 
thusiasm  of  one  of  Cromwell's  Ironsides. 

Young  McClellan  was  a  little  under  the  pre 
scribed  age  when  he  entered  the  Academy;  but  his 
manly  character  and  sound  moral  instincts  wrere 
a  sufficient  protection  against  the  dangers  incident 
to  all  places  of  education  away  from  the  pupil's 
own  home,  and  from  which  the  vigilant  care  and 
absolute  power  of  the  Government  cannot  entirely 
guard  the  young  men  committed  to  its  charge  at 
West  Point.  He  showed  at  the  start  a  more  careful 
intellectual  training  than  most  of  the  youths  ad 
mitted  to  the  Academy.  His  conduct  and  bearing 
throughout  his  wrhole  course  were  unexceptionable. 
His  deportment  then,  as  always,  was  singularly 
free  from  that  self-assertion  which  is  frequently 
seen,  but  not  always  pardoned,  in  men  of  superior 
powers.  He  showed  perseverance,  a  strong  will, 
and  resolute  habits  of  application.  His  acquisi 
tions  were  not  made  without  hard  work,  but,  when 
made,  they  were  securely  held.  At  the  close  of 


12  PHYSICAL    CHARACTERISTICS.          [1SG4. 

the  course  at  AVest  Point,  he  stood  second  in  general 
rank  in  the  largest  class  which  had  ever  left  the 
Academy.  In  Engineering  and  Geology  he  was  first. 
The  highest  scholar  in  the  class  was  Charles  G-. 
Stewart,  now  a  major  of  engineers.  He  came  out 
first  because  he  was  more  uniformly  strict  in 
complying  with  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the 
Academy,  as  well  as  more  attentive  to  its  regular 
studies. 

McClellan  wras  graduated  in  the  summer  of 
1846,  before  he  had  completed  his  twentieth  year. 
Few  young  men  have  ever  left  West  Point  better 
fitted  by  mental  discipline  and  solid  attainments 
for  the  profession  of  arms  than  he.  He  had  also  a 
precious  gift  of  nature  itself,  in  that  sound  health 
and  robust  constitution  which  are  large  elements 
of  success  in  every  department  of  life,  but  without 
which  distinction  in  a  military  career  is  almost 
hopeless.  He  was  of  middle  height,  and  his  frame 
was  well  proportioned,  with  broad  shoulders  and 
deep  chest.  His  muscular  strength  and  activity 
were  very  great,  and  all  manly  exercises  came 
easy  to  him.  He  was  patient  of  heat  and  cold, 
capable  of  severe  and  long-continued  application, 
and  able  to  sustain  fatigues  and  exposures  under 
which  most  men  would  have  broken  down.  Such 
he  was  at  the  age  of  twenty,  and  such  he  is  now. 
Aided  by  strictly  temperate  habits,  his  body  has 
always  been  the  active  and  docile  servant  of  his 
mind.  In  all  the  toils  and  exposures  of  his  mili 
tary  life,  in  sickly  climes  and  at  sickly  seasons, 
he  has  preserved  uninterrupted  good  health.  He 


AGE  20.]  MEXICAN     WAR.  13 

could  to-day  discharge  with  ease  the  duties  of  a 
common  soldier  in  any  arm  of  the  service;  and  in 
the  shock  of  encountering  steel,  few  men  would 
be  more  formidable,  whether  on  horseback  or  on 
foot. 

At  the  close  of  his  student-life,  a  new  impulse 
had  been  given  to  the  military  spirit  of  the  coun 
try,  and  of  the  army  especially,  by  the  breaking 
out,  a  few  weeks  previously,  of  the  Mexican  War. 
The  brilliant  victories  of  Palo  Alto  and  Eesaca  de 
In  Palma  (May  8  and  9,  184(3),  gained  against  im 
mense  odds,  had  shed  new  lustre  upon  American 
arms,  and  opened  to  the  officers  of  the  army  the 
prospect  of  a  more  congenial  and  animating  em 
ployment  than  the  dreary  monotony  of  a  frontier 
post  or  a  harbor  fort.  McClellan  went  at  once 
into  active  service  as  brevet  second  lieutenant 
of  engineers,  and  was  assigned  to  duty  as  junior 
lieutenant  of  a  company  of  sappers  and  miners* 

*  Sappers  and  miners  form  a  part  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers. 
They  are  employed  in  building  and  repairing  permanent  forti 
fications,  in  raising  field  redoubts  and  batteries,  in  making  ga 
bions  and  fascines,  in  digging  trenches  and  excavating  galleries 
of  mines  during  sieges,  and  also  in  forming  bridges  of  rafts, 
boats,  and  pontoons.  Their  duties  require  higher  qualities, 
mental  and  physical,  than  those  of  the  common  soldier.  A 
sapper  and  miner  must  have  a  strong  frame,  a  correct  eye, 
steady  nerves,  and  a  certain  amount  of  education.  It  may  be 
well  to  add,  for  the  benefit  of  civilians,  that,  gabions  are  baskets 
made  of  twigs,  which  are  filled  with  earth  and  used  as  screens 
against  an  enemy's  fire;  that  fascines  are  bundles  of  twigs, 
fagots,  and  branches  of  trees  which  are  used  to  fill  up  ditches, 
form  parapets,  &c. ;  and  that  pontoons  are  a  kind  of  flat-bot- 

2 


14  SAPPERS     AND     MINERS.  [1846. 

then  in  the  course  of  organization  at  West  Point, 
under  charge  of  Captain  A.  J.  Swift.  The  first 
lieutenant  was  G.  "W.  Smith,  now  a  general  in  the 
service  of  the  Confederate  States.  Captain  Swift 
had  studied  the  subject  in  Europe ;  and  he  instructed 
his  lieutenants,  and  the  latter  drilled  and  exercised 
the  men.  The  summer  was  spent  in  training  the 
company,  and  in  preparing  their  equipments  and 
implements.  It  was  a  branch  of  service  till  that  time 
unknown  in  our  country,  as  since  the  peace  of  1815 
our  army  had  had  no  practical  taste  of  war,  except 
in  an  occasional  brush  with  the  Indians,  where  the 
resources  of  scientific  warfare  were  not  called  into 
play. 

The  duties  in  which  Lieutenant  McClellan  now 
found  himself  engaged  were  very  congenial  to  him, 
and  he  devoted  himself  to  them  with  characteristic 
ardor  and  perseverance.  In  a  letter  written  in  the 
course  of  the  summer  to  his  brother,  Dr.  McClellan, 
with  whom  his  relations  have  always  been  of  the 
most  affectionate  and  confidential  nature,  he  says, 
"  I  am  kept  busy  from  eight  in  the  morning  till 
dinner-time.  After  dinner,  I  have  to  study  sap 
ping  and  mining  until  the  afternoon  drill,  after 
which  I  go  to  parade.  After  tea,  we  (Captains 
Swift,  Smith,  and  myself)  generally  have  a  con 
sultation.  Then  I  go  to  tattoo.  The  amount  of 
it  is  that  we  have  to  organize  by  the  1st  of  Sep 
tember  the  first  corps  of  engineer  troops  that  have 


tomed  boat  carried  along  with  an  army  for  the  purpose   of 
making  temporary  bridges. 


AGE  20.]  T  AM  PICO.  15 

ever  been  in  the  country.  The  men  are  perfectly 
raw,  so  that  we  have  to  drill  them;  and  we  are  now 
(to-day)  commencing  the  practical  operations  to 
prepare  us  for  the  field.  Smith  and  I  have  been 
in  the  woods  nearly  all  the  morning,  with  the  men, 
cutting  wood  for  fascines,  gabions,  &c.  We  have 
now  fifty  men,  and  fine  men  they  are  too.  I  am 
perfectly  delighted  with  my  duties." 

Lieutenant  McClellan  sailed  with  his  company, 
seventy-one  strong,  from  New  York,  early  in  Sep 
tember,  1846,  for  Brazos  Santiago,  and  arrived  there 
immediately  after  the  battle  of  Monterey.  They 
then  moved  to  Camargo,  where  they  remained 
for  some  time.  Thence  they  were  transferred  to 
Matamoras  in  November,  and  from  this  point 
started  on  their  march  to  Victoria,  under  the 
orders  of  General  Patterson.  Before  leaving  Ma- 
tamoras,  Captain  Swift  was  taken  ill,  and  the 
company  was  left  under  command  of  Lieutenant 
Smith. 

At  Victoria  the  company  joined  the  forces  under 
General  Taylor,  and  were  assigned  to  the  division 
of  regulars  under  command  of  General  Twiggs, 
with  whom,  in  January,  1847,  they  marched  to 
Tampico.  The  distance  from  Matamoras  to  Tam- 
pico  is  about  two  hundred  miles.  The  intervening 
country  is  unfavorable  for  the  march  of  an  army; 
and  every  thing  necessary  for  the  support  of  the 
troops  had  to  be  carried  with  them.  The  sappers 
and  miners  found  frequent  occasion  for  the  exercise 
of  their  skill  in  making  and  repairing  roads  and 
bridges.  They  did  excellent  service,  and  were  as- 


16  V  ERA     CRUZ.  [18 17. 

sisted  by  men  detailed  from  other  corps,  for  that 
purpose,  from  time  to  time. 

The  company  arrived  at  Tampico  in  the  latter 
part  of  January,  and  remained  there  about  a  month, 
and  then  sailed  for  Yera  Cruz.  They  landed, 
March  9,  with  the  first  troops  which  were  disem 
barked,  and  immediately  began  to  take  an  active 
part  in  all  the  operations  of  the  siege.  The  officers 
and  men  did  a  large  part  of  the  reconnoitring 
necessary  to  determine  the  plan  of  the  siege,  the 
officers  reporting  immediately  to  Colonel  Totten, 
the  chief  of  engineers,  and  executing  in  detail  the 
works  subsequently  prescribed  by  orders  from 
head-quarters.  The  corps  of  engineers,  including 
the  company  of  sappers  and  miners,  encountered 
great  difficulties  in  drawing  the  lines  of  invest 
ment  and  in  constructing  batteries,  arising  from 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  which  was  broken  into 
innumerable  hills  of  loose  sand,  with  dense  forests 
of  chapparal  between.  In  common  with  all  the 
troops,  they  suffered  from  scarcity  of  water  and 
the  excessive  heat  of  the  weather.  But  nothing 

O 

could  exceed  the  zeal  of  the  officers  or  the  cheerful 
obedience  of  the  men.  Their  valuable  services 
were  duly  recognized  by  the  able  and  accomplished 
chief  of  the  department  of  the  service  to  which 
they  were  attached,  as  appears  by  a  letter  addressed 
to  the  commander-in-chief,  as  follows  : — 

CAMP  WASHINGTON,  BEFORE  YERA  CRUZ,  | 
March  28, 1847.  j" 

SIR; — Before   leaving   camp   with   the    despatches    in 
which  you  inform  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 


AGE  20.J  VERA    CRUZ.  17 

the  brilliant  success  which  has  attended  your  attack 
upon  this  city  and  the  Castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  I 
seize  a  moment  to  solicit  your  attention  to  the  merits  and 
services  of  the  officers  of  engineers  who  have  been  en 
gaged  in  that  attack. 

If  there  be  any  thing  in  the  position,  form,  and  arrange 
ment  of  the  trenches  and  batteries,  or  in  the  manner  of 
their  execution,  worthy  of  commendation,  it  is  due  to  the 
ability,  devotion,  and  unremitting  zeal  of  these  officers. 
By  extraordinary  and  unsparing  efforts,  they  were  en 
abled,  few  as  they  were,  to  accomplish  the  work  of  many  ; 
and,  so  far  as  the  success  of  your  operations  before  this 
city  depended  on  labors  peculiar  to  their  corps,  no  words 
of  mine  can  overrate  their  services. 

The  officers  thus  engaged  are  Major  John  L.  Smith, 
Captains  R.  E.  Lee  and  John  Sanders,  First  Lieutenants 
J.  L.  Mason,  P.  Gr.  T.  Beauregard,  and  I.  I.  Stevens,  Se 
cond  Lieutenants  Z.  B.  Tower  and  Gr.  W.  Smith,  Brevet 
Second  Lieutenants  G-.  B.  McClellan  and  J.  Gr.  Foster. 

The  obligation  lies  upon  me  also  to  speak  of  the  highly 
meritorious  deportment  and  valuable  services  of  the  sap 
pers  and  miners  attached  to  the  expedition.  Strenuous 
as  were  their  exertions,  their  number  proved  to  be  too 
few,  in  comparison  with  our  need  of  such  aid.  Had  their 
number  been  fourfold  greater,  there  is  no  doubt  the  labors 
of  the  army  would  have  been  materially  lessened  and  the 
result  expedited. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obe 
dient  servant,  Jos.  G.  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  and  Chief  Engineers. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  SCOTT, 

Commanding  the  Army  of  the  United  Slates,  Mexico. 

The  city  of  Vera  Cruz  and  Castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa  were  sin-rendered  to  the  American  forces 


18  CERRO     GORDO. 

on  the  29th  day  of  March,  1847,  the  articles  of 
capitulation  having  been  signed  two  days  before. 
On  the  8th  of  April,  the  army,  with  the  exception 
of  a  regiment  of  infantry  left  behind  to  serve  as  a 
garrison,  began  its  march  into  the  interior,  num 
bering  in  all  about  eight  thousand  five  hundred 
men.  They  were  soon  made  to  feel  that  their 
path  of  progress  was  not  without  difficulties  and 
dangers.  At  Cerro  Gordo,  sixty  miles  from  Vera 
Cruz,  a  Mexican  army,  thirty-five  thousand  strong, 
under  the  command  of  General  Santa  Anna, 
was  found  posted  in  a  mountain-pass,  a  position 
of  great  natural  strength,  fortified  and  defended 
by  powerful  batteries,  bristling  with  cannon.  But. 
in  spite  of  superior  numbers  and  of  almost  im 
pregnable  defences,  the  enemy's  position  was  as 
saulted  and  carried,  and  his  forces  utterly  routed, 
on  the  18th  of  April,  by  the  American  army,  in 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  battles  on  record,  in 
which  the  skilful  plans  of  the  commander-in-chief 
were  carried  out  and  crowned  with  success  by  the 
zeal  and  energy  of  all  the  subordinate  officers  and 
the  splendid  courage  of  the  men.  The  company 
of  sappers  and  miners  had  reached  the  place  on 
the  day  before  the  battle,  and  shared  in  the  dangers 
and  honors  of  the  field.  Lieutenant  McClelian, 
with  ten  of  his  men,  was  with  General  Pillow's 
brigade  on  the  left,  with  directions  to  clear  away 
the  obstacles  in  front  of  the  assaulting  columns. 
This  was  a  service  of  no  common  danger,  as  the 
heavy  and  well-served  Mexican  batteries  in  front 
swept  the  space  before  them  with  a  most  destructive 


AGE  20.  j  AMOZOQUE.  l!> 

fire,  under  which  Pillow's  command,  mostly  com 
posed  of  volunteers,  reeled  and  fell  into  confusion. 
General  Pillow,  in  his  official  report  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  says,  "Lieutenants  Tower  and 
McClellan,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  displayed 
great  zeal  and  activity  in  the  discharge  of  their 
duties  in  connection  with  my  command." 

After  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  Lieutenant 
McClellan  accompanied  the  advance  corps  under 
General  "Worth  on  the  march  to  Puebla,  passing 
through  Jalapa  and  Perote,  and  arriving  at  Aino- 
zoque,  a  small  town  twelve  miles  from  Puebla,  on 
the  13th  of  May.  Our  officers  did  not  dream  of 
finding  any  portion  of  the  enemy  here,  and  the 
usual  precautions  adopted  to  guard  against  surprise 
were  somewhat  relaxed.  On  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  the  soldiers  were  busily  occupied  in  cleaning 
their  arms  and  accoutrements,  in  order  that  they 
might  enter  Puebla  in  good  trim,  when  a  drummer- 
boy,  who  had  strayed  in  advance  of  the  pickets, 
ran  in  and  gave  the  alarm  that  the  enemy  was 
approaching  in  force.  The  staff-officers  mounted 
and  galloped  to  the  front,  and  discovered  the  ad 
vance  of  a  body  of  Mexican  lancers  from  twenty- 
five  hundred  to  three  thousand  in  number.  Tho 
long  roll  at  once  called  the  troops  to  arms,  and  the- 
different  regiments  were  quickly  paraded.  Lieu 
tenant  McClellan,  who  was  in  a  house  on  the  side 
of  the  towrn  nearest  the  enemy,  at  once  sprang 
upon  his  horse  and  rode  out  to  observe  them. 
After  riding  a  fewr  hundred  yards,  at  the  turn  of  a 
street  he  came  upon  a  Mexican  captain  of  cavalry 


20  PUEBLA.  [1847. 

riding  into  the  town  to  reconnoitre.  Each  was 
alone,  and  both  were  armed  with  sabres  and  pistols. 
The  Mexican  officer  turned;  but  his  opponent,  being 
better  mounted,  pursued,  overtook  him,  and  com 
pelled  him  to  surrender.  The  two  went  back  toge 
ther,  and,  while  on  their  way,  the  Mexican  officer 
suddenly  put  spurs  to  his  horse  and  attempted  to 
draw  his  pistol;  but  Lieutenant  McClellan  caught 
him  again,  and  gave  him  to  understand  that  if  he 
renewed  the  attempt  to  escape,  he  should  be  obliged 
to  put  a  bullet  through  him.  After  this  the  two 
rode  together  quietly,  and  Lieutenant  McClellan 
surrendered  his  prisoner  to  his  commanding  officer. 
The  Mexican  cavalry  were  checked  by  the  well- 
served  guns  of  our  artillery,  and  retired  without 
doing  us  any  damage. 

At  Puebla  a  pause  of  several  weeks  was  made 
in  the  progress  of  the  army,  in  order  that  its 
numbers  might  be  increased  by  reinforcements  and 
that  due  preparations  might  be  made  for  a  march 
upon  the  city  of  Mexico.  And  here  seems  a  fitting 
place  to  introduce  that  portion  of  the  official 
annual  report  of  Colonel  Totten  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  services  of  the 
company  of  sappers  and  miners  and  their  officers, 
though  it  was  not  drawn  up  until  a  somewhat  later 
period  : — 

"  The  law  adding  the  company  of  sappers,  miners, 
and  pontonniers  (otherwise  called  engineer  soldiers) 
to  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  was  passed  on  the  15th 
of  May,  1846.  On  the  llth  of  October  following, 
this  company,  seventy -two  strong,  landed  at  Brazos 


AGE  20.]    COLONEL  TOTTEN'S  REPORT.       L'l 

Santiago;  having  in  the  interim  been  enlisted  by 
great  exertions  on  the  part  of  several  engineer 
officers,  and  been  organized  and  drilled  by  Captain 
A.  J.  Swift  and  Lieutenants  G.  \V.  Smith  and  Mc- 
Clellan,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers.  The  captain 
being  disabled  by  sickness  at  Matamoras,  Lieu 
tenant  Smith  led  the  company,  as  part  of  Major- 
General  Patterson's  division,  in  the  march  from 
that  place  to  Tampico, — a  march  in  which  the 
services  of  the  company,  constantly  in  advance 
and  engaged  in  removing  impediments  and  making 
the  road  practicable,  wore  of  great  value.  The 
company  landed  with  the  first  line  on  the  beach  at 
Yera  Cruz,  being  then  again  under  the  command  of 
Captain  Swift;  who,  in  his  desire  to  lead  in  its  dan 
gers  and  toils,  strove  nobly,  but  vainly,  against  an 
inexorable  disease.  A  too  ardent  sun  prostrated 
him  at  once,  depriving  the  country  of  his  services 
at  a  moment  when  his  high  and  peculiar  attain 
ments  would  have  been  of  the  greatest  value. 
During  the  siege  of  Yera  Cruz,  I  was  a  witness  to 
the  great  exertions  and  services  of  this  company, 
animated  by,  and  emulating,  the  zeal  and  devotion 
of  its  excellent  officers,  Lieutenants  Smith,  Mc- 
Clellan,  and  Foster.  Since  the  surrender  of  that 
place,  we  have  no  official  accounts  giving  the  par 
ticular  employments  or  engagements  of  the  com 
pany.  We  know  only  that  it  has  been  on  the  march 
with  General  Scott's  army  to  the  city  of  Mexico. 
I  will  venture  to  say,  however,  that  the  oppor 
tunities  of  that  service  have  been  profited  of,  by 
the  sergeants  and  rank  and  file,  as  well  as  by  tho 


MARCH    TO    MEXICO.  [1847. 

commissioned  officers,  to  display  the  highest  qua 
lities  as  soldiers,  demonstrating,  at  the  same  time, 
the  great  advantage  to  armies,  however  engaged 
in  the  field,  of  possessing  troops  well  grounded  in 
the  peculiar  exercises  of  engineer  soldiers." 

On  the  7th  of  August  the  American  army,  num 
bering  not  quite  eleven  thousand  men,  began  their 
march  from  Puebla,  starting  upon  an  enterprise 
which  would  have  been  pronounced  extremely 
rash  had  it  not  been  crowned  with  success,  but 
which,  having  been  successful,  ranks  among  the 
most  daring  and  brilliant  in  the  annals  of  war. 
A  mere  handful  of  men,  volunteers  and  regulars, 
undertook  to  capture  a  city  of  nearly  two  hundred 
thousand  inhabitants,  strong  in  its  natural  defences, 
and  protected  by  numerous  works,  constructed  by 
able  engineers,  in  conformity  with  the  most  ap 
proved  rules  of  military  science.  Around  it  was 
distributed  an  army  of  thirty-five  thousand  men, 
composed  of  regular  troops  and  volunteers,  and 
comprising  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry.  These 
were  by  no  means  despicable  soldiers,  and  they 
often  fought  with  a  courage  which  extorted  the 
respect  of  their  enemies.  Their  artillery  in  par 
ticular  was  well  served  and  effective,  as  our  troops 
often  learned  to  their  cost.  The  weak  points  in 
the  Mexican  army  were  the  want  of  courage  and 
want  of  capacity  in  its  officers,  just  as  the  weak 
point  in  the  civil  history  of  that  unhappy  country 
has  been  the  want  of  rulers  who  were  at  once 
honest  and  able.  Had  the  Mexican  officers  been 
men  and  soldiers  like  our  own,  history  might  have 


AGE  20.]  VALLEY    OF    MEXICO,  23 

had  a  different  record  to  make  upon  the  event  of 
the  Mexican  War. 

Lieutenant  McClellan's  company  of  sappers  and 
miners  was  attached  to  the  second  division  of  re 
gulars,  under  command  of  General  Twiggs,  which 
formed  the  advance  of  the  army.  Soon  after 
leaving  Puebla,  they  were  joined  by  General  Scott, 
the  commander-in-chief.  Our  troops  entered  the 
Valley  of  Mexico  on  the  10th,  and  General  Scott 
fixed  his  head-quarters  for  the  time  at  Ayotla,  a  vil 
lage  on  the  northeastern  edge  of  the  Lake  of  Chalco, 
about  nine  miles  east  of  the  fortified  position  of 
El  Peiion,  which  was  carefully  reconnoitred  on  the 
12th  and  its  great  strength  fully  discovered.  On 
the  next  day,  another  reconnoissance  was  pushed 
upon  the  route  by  Mexicalcingo.  This  was  pro 
nounced  by  General  Scott  the  most  daring  recon 
noissance  of  the  whole  war,  as  the  small  corps  of 
observation  was  obliged  to  pass  close  by  the  strong 
position  of  El  Penon  and  to  leave  it  for  a  con 
siderable  space  in  the  rear.  In  both  of  these  re- 
connoissances  Lieutenant  McClellan  took  part;  and 
in  one  of  them  he  was  saved  from  probable  death 
or  captivity  at  the  hands  of  about  a  dozen  Mexican 
lancers  by  Lieutenant  Beauregard  and  three  dra 
goons. 

When,  in  consequence  of  the  great  strength  of 
the  defences  at  El  Peiion,  the  project  of  advancing 
upon  Mexico  by  the  great  road  from  Puebla,  and 
assaulting  it  upon  the  eastern  side,  was  abandoned, 
and  it  was  determined  to  march  round  the  south 
ern  shore  of  Lake  Chalco  and  attack  the  city  on 


21  BATTLE     OF     CONTRERAS.  [1847, 

the  south  and  west,  the  company  of  sappers  and 
miners  was  transferred  to  General  Worth's  divi 
sion,  which  now  took  the  lead,  and  the  company 
moved  at  its  head  to  San  Augustin,  occasionally 
repairing  the  roads  as  far  as  was  practicable.  As 
soon  as  General  Santa  Anna  learned  this  movement 
of  the  American  forces,  he  withdrew  the  greater 
portion  of  his  troops,  with  several  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  from  El  Penon  and  Mexicalcingo,  where  he 
had  been  expecting  the  first  shock  of  battle,  and, 
establishing  his  head-quarters  at  the  hacienda  (ham 
let)  of  San  Antonio,  began  to  labor  upon  the  lines 
of  defence  in  that  vicinity. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th,  General  Worth's 
division  was  moved  forward  a  couple  of  miles  on 
the  causeway  leading  from  San  Augustin  to  San 
Antonio,  and  took  up  its  position  in  front  of  the 
latter  place,  the  men  encamping  on  both  sides  of 
the  road.  Here  a  careful  reconnoissance  was  made 
of  the  defences  of  San  Antonio,  in  which  Lieu 
tenant  ]\IcClellan  took  part.  His  company  was 
then  transferred  to  General  Twiggs's  division,  and 
moved  at  its  head,  across  the  Pedregal,  to  Con- 
treras.  During  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Con- 
treras  (August  19),  Lieutenant  McClellan,  while 
reconnoitring,  ran  into  a  Mexican  regiment,  and 
had  his  horse  shot  under  him  by  a  musket-ball. 
On  the  same  day,  while  posting  Magruder's  bat 
tery,  he  had  another  horse  killed  under  him  by  a 
round  shot.  Still  later,  while  in  temporary  com 
mand  of  a  section  of  the  same  battery  whose  officer 
had  been  mortally  wounded,  he  was  knocked  down 


AGK  20. J  P  A  I)  I  E  R  N  A.  25 

by  a  grape-shot  which  struck  plump  upon  the  hilt 
of  his  sword.  "  Stonewall"  Jackson,  who  belonged  to 
Magruder's  battery,  relieved  Lieutenant  McClellan 
from  command  of  the  section,  and  the  latter  then 
took  charge  for  some  time  of  a  battery  of  mountain- 
howitzers  whose  officer  had  been  wounded,  and, 
after  a  day  of  severe  toil  and  great  exposure,  re 
joined  his  company,  which  was  at  San  Geronimo,  a 
small  village  on  the  western  edge  of  the  Pedregal,* 
a  little  north  of  Contreras. 

At  a  very  early  hour  the  next  morning  (August 
'20)  the  intrenched  camp  of  General  Valencia  at 
Padicrna  was  stormed  and  carried  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet  by  the  left  wing  of  the  American 
army,  under  the  command  of  General  P.  F.  Smith. 
This  was  the  battle  of  Contreras,  of  which  Gene 
ral  Scott  says,  in  his  official  report,  "I  doubt 
whether  a  more  brilliant  or  decisive  victory — 
taking  into  view  ground,  artificial  defences,  bat 
teries,  and  the  extreme  disparity  of  numbers, 
without  cavalry  or  artillery  on  our  side — is  to  be 
found  on  record."  In  this  battle  Lieutenant  Mc- 
Clellan's  company  of  sappers  and  miners  led  Gene 
ral  Smith's  brigade  of  regulars  in  its  attack  on  the 
flank  of  the  enemy,  and  is  thus  mentioned  in  the 
report  already  quoted  from  : — "  In  the  mean  time, 


*  The  Pedregal  is  a  field  of  broken  lava,  about  nine  miles 
south  of  Mexico,  nearly  circular  in  form,  and  about  two  miles  in 
diameter,  entirely  impracticable  for  cavalry  or  artillery  except 
by  a  single  mule-path,  and  only  practicable  for  infantry  at  a 
few  points. 


26  HE  PORT    OF    GENERAL    TWIGGS.  [1817. 

Smith's  own  brigade,  under  the  temporary  com 
mand  of  Major  Dimmick,  following  the  movements 
of  Biley  and  Cadwallader,  discovered  opposite  to 
and  outside  of  the  works  a  long  line  of  Mexican 
cavalry,  drawn  up  as  a  support.  Dimmick,  having 
at  the  head  of  the  brigade  the  company  of  sappers 
and  miners  under  Lieutenant  Smith,  engineer,  who 
had  conducted  the  march,  was  ordered  by  Bri 
gadier-General  Smith  to  form  line  faced  to  the 
enemy,  and,  in  a  charge  against  a  flank,  routed  the 
cavalry." 

In  the  reports  of  the  officers  immediately  com 
manding,  honorable  mention  is  made  of  Lieutenant 
McClellan  and  his  corps.  General  Twiggs  says, 
"  Lieutenant  G.  B.  McClellan,  after  Lieutenant 
Callender  was  wounded,  took  charge  of  and  managed 
the  howitzer  battery  (Lieutenant  Reno  being  de 
tached  with  the  rockets)  with  judgment  and  suc 
cess,  until  it  became  so  disabled  as  to  require 
shelter.  For  Lieutenant  McClellan's  efficiency  and 
gallantry  in  this  affair,  I  present  his  name  for  the 
favorable  consideration  of  the  general-in-chief." 
And  again,  "To  Lieutenant  G.  W.  Smith,  of  the 
engineers,  who  commanded  the  company  of  sappers 
and  miners,  I  am  under  many  obligations  for  his 
services  on  this  and  many  other  occasions.  When 
ever  his  legitimate  duties  with  the  pick  and  spade 
were  performed,  he  always  solicited  permission  to 
join  in  the  advance  of  the  storming-party  with 
his  muskets,  in  which  position  his  gallantly,  and 
that  of  his  officers  and  men,  was  conspicuously 
displayed  at  Contreras  as  well  as  Cerro  Gordo." 


Ac  E  20.]  C  H  A  P  U  L  T  E  P  E  C.  27 

General  P.  F.  Smith,  in  his  report,  says,  "Lieu 
tenant  G.  AV7".  Smith,  in  command  of  the  engineer 
company,  and  Lieutenant  McClellan,  his  subaltern, 
distinguished  themselves  throughout  the  whole  of 
the  three  actions.  Nothing  seemed  to  them  too  bold 
to  be  undertaken,  or  too  difficult  to  be  executed; 
and  their  services  as  engineers  were  as  valuable 
as  those  the}'  rendered  in  battle  at  the  head  of 
their  gallant  men." 

General  Smith,  it  will  be  noticed,  speaks  of  "  three 
actions"  in  which  the  officers  of  the  company  of 
sappers  and  miners  distinguished  themselves.  These 
include  the  battle  of  Churubusco,  which  was  fought 
on  the  same  day  (August  20)  with  the  battle  of 
Contreras,  and  in  which  the  company  took  part, 
both  in  the  preliminary  reconnoissances  and  in  the 
conflict  itself. 

After  the  battles  of  Contreras  and  Churubusco, 
hostilities  were  suspended  by  an  armistice  which 
lasted  till  September  7.  On  the  8th  the  severe 
and  bloody  battle  of  Molino  del  Iley  was  fought, 
at  which  Lieutenant  McClellan  was  not  present. 
On  the  13th  the  Castle  of  Chapultepec  was  taken 
by  assault,  in  which  also  he  did  not  take  part,  but 
during  the  night  of  the  llth,  and  on  the  12th,  he  built 
and  armed,  mostly  in  open  daylight  and  under  a 
heavy  fire,  one  of  the  batteries  whose  well-directed 
and  shattering  fire  contributed  essentially  to  the 
success  of  the  day. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Chapultepec,  and 
on  the  same  day,  the  company  of  sappers  and 
miners  was  ordered  to  the  front,  and  took  the  lead 


28  SAN     COS  ME     C1ARITA. 


of  General  Worth's  division  in  one  of  llio  most 
difficult  and  dangerous  movements  of  the  assault 
upon  the  city  of  Mexico, — the  attack  of  the  San 
Cosme  garita,  or  gate.  Of  the  nature  of  the  im 
portant  services  performed  by  the  company  and  its 
officers  at  this  point,  and  also  after  the  capture  of 
the  city,  a  correct  notion  may  be  formed  from  the 
statement  contained  in  the  report  of  Major  J.  L. 
Smith,  of  the  Engineer  Corps  : — 

"  Lieutenant  G.  "VV.  Smith,  commanding  the  sap 
pers,  arrived  on  the  ground  some  time  after  this, 
while  our  troops  were  in  front  of  the  battery  at 
the  garita, — the  other  batteries  on  the  road  up  to 
that  point  having  been  carried.  Being  the  senior 
engineer  present,  he  was  ordered  to  reconnoitre  in 
front  and  ascertain  the  state  of  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  particularly  whether  it  would  be  necessary  to 
move  our  heavy  artillery  forward.  lie  reported 
his  opinion  that  the  advancing  of  the  heavy  pieces 
should  be  suspended,  and  that  the  sappers  should 
advance  under  cover  of  the  houses,  by  openings 
made  in  the  walls  of  contiguous  houses;  and,  this 
being  approved,  he  proceeded,  in  the  manner  pro 
posed,  until  he  reached  a  three-story  house  about 
forty  yards  from  the  battery,  and  was  enabled 
from  the  roof  to  open  a  fire  upon  the  battery  which 
drove  away  the  enemy's  troops,  who  in  their  re 
treat  succeeded  in  carrying  away  one  of  the  guns. 
Part  of  his  force  then  descended  to  the  road  to 
secure  the  battery,  but  was  anticipated  by  a  body 
of  our  troops,  which  entered  on  the  right  as  the 
sappers  were  about  entering  on  the  left.  The  sup- 


Ac  K  20.]  S  T  R  E  E  T  -  F  I  O  II  T  I  N  f! .  29 

pers  were  then  moved  forward  until  they  reached 
strong  positions  on  both  Bides  of  the-  rear,  capable 
of  affording  shelter  to  our  troops,  although  the 
enemy  occupied  in  force  a  large  convent,  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  yards  in  advance,  and  had  batteries  on 
the  next  cross-street.  These  facts  being  reported, 
a  brigade  was  sent  to  occupy  the  strong  positions 
referred  to,  and  at  ten  P.M.  further  operations  were 
suspended  for  the  night. 

"  At  three  o'clock  next  morning,  a  party  of  the 
sappers  moved  to  the  large  convent  in  advance, 
and  found  it  unoccupied.  Lieutenant  McClellan 
advanced  with  a  party  into  the  Alameda,  and  re 
ported  at  daylight  that  no  enemy  was  to  be  seen. 
The  sappers  then  moved  forward,  and  had  reached 
two  squares  beyond  the  Alameda*  when  they  were 
recalled.  The  company  during  the  day,  until 
three  P.M.,  were  engaged  in  street-fighting,  and 
particularly  in  breaking  into  houses  with  crow 
bars  and  axes.  In  this  service  they  killed  a 
number,  and  made  prisoners  of  many  suspicious 
persons. 

"Lieutenant  McClellan  had  command  of  the  com 
pany  for  a  time  in  the  afternoon,  while  Lieutenant 
Smith  was  searching  for  powder  to  be  used  in 
blowing  up  houses  from  which  our  troops  had  been 
fired  upon,  contrary  to  the  usages  of  war.  During 
this  time,  while  advancing  the  company,  he  reached 
a  strong  position,  but  found  himself  opposed  to  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy.  He  had  a  conflict  with 
this  force,  which  lasted  some  time;  but  the  ad 
vantage  afforded  by  his  position  enabled  him  at 


30  SAN     COSME     GARITA.  [1847. 

length  to  drive  it  off,  after  having  killed  more  than 
twenty  of  its  number." 

A  few  words  may  here  be  added,  to  explain  a 
little  more  in  detail  the  proceedings  of  the  sappers 
and  miners  in  making  their  way  through  the  houses 
to  which  Major  Smith  refers.  At  the  gate  of  the 
city  a  powerful  and  well-served  battery  swept  the 
street  with  continued  discharges  of  grape-shot,  so 
that  it  was  impossible  to  move  down  directly  in 
front  of  it.  The  problem  was  to  take  the  battery  or 
to  drive  the  Mexicans  from  their  guns.  The  houses 
on  both  sides  were  built  mostly  in  continuous  blocks, 
with  an  occasional  interval  or  vacant  lot.  The  walls 
of  the  houses  were  of  adobe,  or  light  volcanic  stone. 
The  operation  of  breaking  through  them  was  thus 
conducted.  A  detachment  of  the  sappers  and  miners, 
led  by  an  officer,  entered  a  house  at  the  outer  end 
of  the  street,  with  the  proper  tools  and  implements, 
and  made  a  breach  in  the  party  or  division  wall  large 
enough  for  a  man  to  go  through  to  the  next  house, 
and  so  on  successively.  Lieutenant  McClellan  led 
the  party  on  one  side  of  the  street.  It  was  a  highly 
dangerous  service,  as  every  house  had  Mexican 
soldiers  in  it,  and  there  was  continuous  fighting 
until  the  Americans  drove  out  the  occupants.  It 
was  Lieutenant  McClellan's  duty — or  at  least  ho 
considered  it  to  be  so — to  pass  first  into  the  open 
ing.  In  one  instance,  where  it  was  necessary  to 
cross  a  vacant  space  between  two  houses  which 
did  not  join,  he  nearly  lost  his  life  by  falling  into 
a  ditch  of  stagnant  water.  The  party  at  length 
forced  their  way  through  the  houses  till  they 


AUK  21.]     CLOSE    OF    T  H  E     M  E  X  I  C  A  N     W  A  II.  T>1 

reached  those  which  overlooked  the  buttery,  and 
where  they  could  fire  upon  the  Mexicans  who 
manned  the  guns.  These  having  been  shot  or 
driven  away,  the  Americans  descended  from  the 
houses,  took  the  guns,  and  turned  them  on  the 
gate,  which  was  forced,  and  the  city  entered. 

On  the  14th  day  of  September,  1847,  General 
Scott,  with  six  thousand  live  hundred  men,  the 
whole  of  his  effective  army  remaining  in  the  field, 
entered  and  took  possession  of  the  city  of  Mexico. 
A\rith  the  exception  of  a  few  slight  skirmishes, 
this  was  the  close  of  the  war  in  that  part  of  the 
country. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Xo  minute  and  detailed  account  has  been  given 
of  those  military  operations  in  Mexico  in  which 
Lieutenant  McClellan  was  engaged, — which,  indeed, 
could  not  have  been  done  without  swelling  this 
part  of  the  memoir  to  a  disproportionate  bulk. 
Our  aim  has  been  merely  to  present  a  continuous 
and  intelligible  narrative  of  what  was  done  by  him. 
The  movements  of  the  campaign,  its  sieges,  assaults, 
and  battles,  were  planned  by  others;  and  he  can 
claim  no  higher  merit — though  this  is  not  incon 
siderable — than  that  of  having  faithfully  executed 
the  orders  received  from  his  superiors  in  rank.  Nor 
has  the  moral  element  involved  in  the  Mexican  War 
— the  question  how  far  it  was  provoked  or  unpro- 


TACTICS     OF    THE     MEXICAN     WAR.      [1347. 

voked,  or  how  far  we  were  right  or  wrong — been 
taken  into  consideration.  Such  an  inquiry  has  now 
become  as  obsolete  as  would  be  a  discussion  of  the 
moral  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  the  conspirators 
who  took  the  life  of  Julius  Gjesar.  But  no  candid 
person,  whatever  he  may  think  of  the  merits  of 
the  contest,  can  deny  that  the  conduct  of  the  war 
and  its  results  reflected  the  highest  honor  upon  the 
courage  of  the  American  army,  both  regulars  and 
volunteers,  as  well  as  upon  the  skill  and  accom 
plishments  of  our  officers.  Not  that  there  were  not 
grave  errors  committed,  both  at  Washington  and 
in  the  field;  not  that  the  volunteers  did  not  some 
times  show  the  infirmities  of  raw  troops;  but  these 
shadows  in  the  picture  were  as  nothing  to  its  lights. 
The  whole  campaign  was  especially  remarkable  for 
the  brilliant,  dashing,  and  reckless  courage  dis 
played  in  it, — for  that  quality  which  the  French 
call  elan,  which  is  so  captivating  to  civilians,  and 
for  the  want  of  which  so  much  fault  has  been  found 
with  our  officers  and  soldiers  in  the  present  civil 
war.  But  the  tactics  in  the  Mexican  War  were 
founded  upon  and  regulated  by  an  accurate  know 
ledge  of  the  enemy;  and  the  distinguished  and 
veteran  soldier  who  led  our  armies  in  that  cam 
paign  would  never  have  taken  the  risks  he  did  had 
the  Mexican  soldiers  been  like  those  in  the  South 
ern  army,  and  the  Mexican  officers  men  like  Lee, 
Johnston,  Jackson,  and  Beaurcgard. 

The  public  mind  judges  of  military  movements 
and  of  battles  by  the  event:  the  plan  that  fails  is 
a  bad  plan,  and  the  successful  general  is  the  great 


AGR  21.]    TACTICS     OF     THE     MEXICAN     WAR.         oo 

general.  Without  doubt,  this  is  a  correct  judgment 
io  the  long  run;  but  in  particular  cases  the  rule 
could  not  always  be  applied  without  injustice. 
Hannibal  was  defeated  by  Scipio  at  Zama,  and 
Napoleon  was  defeated  by  the  Duke  of  Welling 
ton  at  Waterloo;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  Scipio 
was  a  greater  general  than  Hannibal,  or  the  Duke 
of  Wellington  than  Napoleon.  Mexico  was  taken 
by  a  series  of  rapid  and  daring  movements,  and 
Eichmond  has  not  yet  been  taken;  and  thus  the 
inference  is  drawn  that,  had  the  latter  city  been 
assailed  in  the  same  way  as  the  former  was,  it  too 
would  have  fallen,  as  Mexico  did.  But  those  who 
reason  thus  forget  the  sharp  lesson  we  learned  at 
13ull  Eun, — a  disastrous  battle  forced  upon  the  army 
by  a  popular  sentiment  wThich  ignorantly  clamored 
for  the  dash  and  rapidity  which  accomplished  such 
brilliant  results  in  the  Valley  of  Mexico.  Nelson 
won  the  battle  of  Aboukir  by  a  very  daring  and 
dangerous  plan  of  attack,  which  had  the  good  for 
tune  to  be  successful.  Cooper,  in  his  preface  to  the 
last  edition  of  "The  Two  Admirals,"  says  that  had 
he  attacked  an  American  fleet  in  the  same  way  he 
w^ould  have  had  occasion  to  repent  the  boldness  of 
the  experiment;  but  then  Nelson,  who,  like  all  great 
commanders,  was  a  man  of  correct  observation  and 
sound  judgment,  would  probably  not  have  tried  such 
an  experiment  with  an  American  fleet. 

To  Lieutenant  McClellan  his  year  of  active  ser 
vice  in  Mexico  was  of  great  value  in  his  professional 
training;  for  it  wTas  a  period  crowded  with  rich  op 
portunities  for  putting  into  practice  the  knowledge 


84          LIEUT.  MCCLELLAN'S   CONDUCT.       [1848. 

he  Lad  gained  ut  West  Point,  and  which  was  still 
fresh  iii  his  mind.  The  corps  of  engineers  at 
tached  to  the  army  was  so  small  that  much  work 
was  of  necessity  exacted  from  each  officer,  and 
higher  responsibilities  were  devolved  upon  the 
younger  men  than  would  have  been  the  case  in 
any  European  army.  Lieutenant  McClcllan  had  an 
unusually  large  experience  both  of  field-work  and 
in  the  investment  of  fortified  places.  And  it  is  no 
more  than  just  to  him  to  add  that  he  proved  him 
self  equal  to  every  trust  laid  upon  him.  His  know 
ledge  of  his  profession  was  shown  to  be  thorough, 
exact,  and  ready,  and  his  coolness  and  self-possession 
on  "the  perilous  edge  of  battle"  was  like  that  of 
the  bronzed  veteran  of  a  hundred  fights.  The  num- 

o 

ber  of  men  in  our  country — indeed,  in  any  country 
— competent  to  pass  a  correct  judgment  upon  mili 
tary  measures  and  military  men,  is  not  large;  but 
upon  this  select  bod}'  Lieutenant  McCleilan  had 
made  his  mark  during  the  Mexican  War,  and  he 
was  recognized  by  them  as  a  soldier  upon  whose 
courage,  ability,  and  devotion  his  country  might 
confidently  repose  in  her  hour  of  need. 

Lieutenant  McCleilan  remained  with  his  com 
pany  in  the  city  of  Mexico,  in  the  discharge  of 
garrison-duty,  till  May  28,  1848,  when  they  were 
marched  down  to  Yera  Cruz  and  embarked  for 
home,  arriving  at  West  Point  on  the  22d  of  June. 
After  his  return  he  was  brevetted  first  lieutenant  for 
conduct  at  Contreras,  and  afterwards  captain  for 
conduct  at  Molino  del  Key,  which  latter  honor  he 
declined,  as  he  had  not  been  present  in  the  battle. 


AGE  24.]  RETURN     TO     WEST     POINT.  3,3 

He  was  afterwards  brevetted  captain  for  conduct 
in  the  capture  of  Mexico,  and  LIB  commission  was 
dated  back  to  that  period. 

Upon  his  return,  his  company  was  stationed  at 
West  Point,  and  he  remained  there  with  them  till 
June,  1851,  much  of  the  time  in  command.  His 
leisure  hours  were  spent  in  studies  connected  with 
his  profession.  Among  other  things,  he  prepared 
an  elaborate  lecture  upon  the  campaign  of  Napoleon 
in  1812,  which  was  read  before  a  literary  society. 
Of  this  discourse  he  thus  speaks  in  a  letter  to  his 
sister-in-law: — "Well,  it  is  over  at  last;  and  glad 
I  am  of  it.  I  read  the  last  part  of  my  Napoleon 
paper  last  night.  I  have  been  working  hard  at  it 
ever  since  my  return,  and  the  ink  was  hardly  dry 
on  the  last  part  when  it  was  read.  The  affair 
amounted  to  one  hundred  and  eleven  pages  in  all ; 
and  they  compliment  me  by  saying  that  it  gave  a 
cloar  explanation  of  the  campaign :  so  I  am  con 
tented.  I  hardly  know,  but  I  have  an  indefinite  idea 
that  we  have  had  fine  weather  since  I  returned.  I 
have  some  indistinct  ideas  of  sunshine,  and  some  of 
rain;  but  I  have  been  so  intently  occupied  with  the 
one  subject  that  I  have  thought  of  but  little  else. 
Now  I  must  go  to  work  with  my  company.  I've 
enough  to  do  to  occupy  half  a  dozen  persons  for  a 
while;  but  I  rather  think  I  can  get  through  it.  I 
have  had  no  time  to  read  any  of  Schiller;  but  now 
I  will  go  at  it.  I  have  some  thought  of  writing  a 
paper  on  the  Thirty  Years'  War  for  our  club." 

His  familiar  letters  breathe  a  strong  desire  for  a 
more  stirring  and  active  life  than  that  he  was  now 


SG  MANUAL     OF     BAYONET     EXERCISE.      [1849 

leading,  the  monotony  of  which  was  the  more 
keenly  felt  from  its  contrast  with  the  brilliant  ex 
citements  of  the  Mexican  campaign.  In  one  of  his 
letters  he  tells  his  correspondent  that  his  highest 
pleasure  is  to  fall  in  with  some  comrade  of  the  war, 
and  talk  over  its  hardships,  perils,  and  successes 
and  revive  their  impressions  of  the  glorious  scenery 
of  Mexico.  And  yet  he  was  never  idle.  Here  is  a 
specimen  of  his  hahits  of  work,  taken  from  a  letter 
to  his  brother,  Dr.  McClellan,  dated  January  10, 
1849: — -On  Christmas  day,  orders  were  received 
hero  from  the  Chief  Engineer,  requiring  plans  and 
estimates  for  several  buildings  to  be  furnished  him 
for  the  Military  Committee  of  the  House,  by  to 
day  at  latest.  Among  those  required  was  a  barrack 
for  our  company;  and  I  had  to  make  all  the  draw 
ings  :  the  barrack  had  to  be  planned  and  drawn  in 
the  short  time  allotted;  and  from  two  weeks  from 
to-day  until  last  Saturday  night  at  twelve  o'clock, 
I  drew  every  day,  morning,  afternoon,  and  night, 
working  Sundays,  New-Year's  day,  and  all.  I  had 
to  make  eight  different  drawings  on  the  same  large 
sheet,  fifty-two  inches  by  thirty-two,  all  drawn  ac 
curately  to  a  scale,  all  the  details,  &c.  painted:  so, 
you  may  imagine,  I  had  my  hands  full." 

In  the  winter  of  1849-50,  he  prepared  for  tho 
use  of  the  army  a  Manual  of  Bayonet  Exercise, 
mostly  taken  from  the  French  of  Gomard.  This 
was  submitted  by  General  Scott,  the  commander-in 
ch  ief,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  he  strongly 
recommended  its  being  printed  for  distribution  to 
the  army,  and  that  it  should  be  made,  by  regula- 


AGE  25.]  11  ED     RIVER     EXPEDITION.  37 

tion,  a  part  of  the  system  of  instruction.  The  re 
commendation  was  adopted  by  the  War  Depart 
ment,  arid  the  manual  was  officially  printed.  It 
forms  a  small  duodecimo  volume  of  about  a  hundred 
pages,  with  a  number  of  plates  in  outline. 

In  June,  1851,  Captain  McClcllan  was  ordered  to 
Fort  Delaware,  as  assistant  to  Major  John  Sanders 
in  the  construction  of  the  works  there.  Here  ho 
remained  till  near  the  close  of  the  ensuing  winter. 

o 

Early  in  March,  1852,  Captain  Randolph  B.  Marcy, 
of  the  Fifth  Infantry,  was  directed  by  the  War 
Department  to  make  an  exploration  of  the  country 
embraced  within  the  basin  of  the  Upper  Red  River; 
and  Captain  McClellan  was  assigned  to  duty  with 
the  expedition.  The  other  officers  accompanying 
it  were  Lieutenant  Updegraff  and  Dr.  Shumard. 
Captain  J".  II.  Strain,  of  Fort  Washita,  and  Mr.  J. 
R.  Suydam,  were  also  with  it,  but  not  in  any  offi 
cial  capacity.  The  private  soldiers  were  fifty-five  in 
number.  There  were  also  five  Indians,  serving  as 
guides  and  hunters.  Up  to  this  time  the  region 
round  the  head-waters  of  the  Red  River  had  been 
unexplored  by  civilized  man;  and  the  only  informa 
tion  we  had  as  to  the  sources  of  one  of  the  largest 
rivers  in  the  United  States  was  derived  from  In 
dians  and  semi-civilized  Indian  hunters. 

The  expedition  started  from  Fort  Belknap,  upon 
the  Brazos  River,  on  the  2d  of  May,  and  marched 
to  Reel  River  at  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Witchita, 
and  up  the  right  bank  of  the  latter  stream  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Big  TVitchita,  where  they  crossed  Red 
River.  Proceeding  westward,  between  Red  River 
4 


c ATTAIN  MARCY'S   REPORT.  [1352. 

and  a  branch  of  Cache  Creek,  they  struck  the  north 
fork  of  Red  River  at  the  west  end  of  the  Witchita 
Mountains,  and  followed  that  stream  to  its  source 
in  the  Llano  Estacado,  or  Staked  Plain.  Here  an 
excursion  was  made  to  the  valley  of  the  Canadian 
River,  at  Sand  Creek,  in  order  to  verify  the  position 
of  the  party  by  the  survey  which  had  been  made 
along  that  stream  by  Captain  Marcy  in  1849.  They 
then  travelled  south  to  the  Kech-ah-que-ho,  or  main 
lied  River,  and,  leaving  their  train  at  the  place 
where  the  river  comes  out  from  the  bluff  of  the 
Llano  Estacado,  ascended  it  to  the  spring  which 
forms  its  source.  From  this  they  returned  down 
the  left  bank  of  the  river  to  the  Witchita  Mountains, 
which  were  examined,  and  thence  they  proceeded  to 
Fort  Arbuckle,  on  the  Washita  River,  in  the  Indian 
Territory,  arriving  there  July  28.  Here  the  expedi 
tion  terminated. 

Captain  Marcy  brought  back  his  command  with 
out  the  loss  of  a  man.  In  his  Report  he  says,  (1I 
feel  a  sincere  regret  at  parting  with  the  company, 
as  the  uniform  good  conduct  of  the  men  during  the 
entire  march  of  about  a  thousand  miles  merits  my 
most  sincere  and  heart-felt  approbation.  I  have 
seldom  had  occasion  even  to  reprimand  one  of  them. 
All  have  performed  the  arduous  duties  assigned 
them  with  the  utmost  alacrity  and  good  will;  and 
when  (as  was  sometimes  the  case)  we  were  obliged 
to  make  long  marches,  and  drink  the  most  disgust 
ing  water  for  several  days  together,  instead  of  mur 
muring  and  making  complaints,  they  were  cheerful 
and  in  good  spirits.  I  owe  them,  as  well  as  the 


FORT     ARBUCKLE.  39 

officers  and  gentlemen  who  were  with  me,  my  most 
hearty  thanks  for  their  cordial  co-operation  with 
me  in  all  the  duties  assigned  to  the  expedition.  It 
is  probably  in  a  great  measure  owing  to  this  har 
monious  action  on  the  part  of  all  persons  attached 
to  the  expedition  that  it  has  resulted  so  fortunately." 
Of  Captain  McClellan  the  introduction  to  the  lleport 
speaks  thus : — "  The  astronomical  observations  were 
made  by  Captain  George  B.  McClellan,  of  the  En 
gineer  Corps,  who,  in  addition  to  the  duties  properly 
pertaining  to  his  department,  performed  those  of 
quartermaster  and  commissary  to  the  command. 
An  interesting  collection  of  reptiles  and  other  speci 
mens,  in  alcohol,  was  also  made  under  his  super 
intendence,  and  put  into  the  hands  of  Professors 
Bui rd  and  Girard,  of  the  Smithsonian  Institution, 
whose  reports  will  be  found  in  the  appendix.  For 
these  and  many  other  important  services,  as  well 
as  for  his  prompt  and  efficient  co-operation  in  what 
ever  was  necessary  for  the  successful  accomplish 
ment  of  the  uesign  of  the  expedition,  I  take  this 
opportunity  of  tendering  my  warmest  acknow 
ledgments." 

The  party  were  received  with  peculiar  warmth 
of  welcome  by  the  garrison  at  Fort  Arbuckle;  for 
they  were  supposed  to  have  been  ,all  massacred  i>y 
the  Comanche  Indians.  The  account  was  brought 
by  a  Keechi  Indian,  and  was  so  circumstantial  and 
minute  in  every  particular,  and  showed  so  perfect  a 
knowledge  of  the  movements  of  the  expedition,  as 
well  as  of  its  numbers  and  equipment,  that  it  was 
believed  to  be  true.  The  report  was  carried  to  the 


40  CAPTAIN  MARCY'S   REPORT.  [1352. 

United  States;  and  for  several  weeks  the  relatives 
of  Captain  McClellan  mourned  him  as  dead. 

Captain  Marcy's  Eeport  was  published  by  order 
of  Congress,  and  is  one  of  those  books  which  many 
receive,  but  few  read.  And  yet  it  is  well  worth 
reading;  for  it  has  that  fresh  and  spontaneous  charm 
of  style  which  we  so  often  observe  in  the  writings 
of  superior  men  who  are  not  men  of  letters  by 
training  and  profession,  and  who  tell  us  in  a  plain 
way  of  what  they  have  seen  and  done.  Besides  a 
graphic  and  animated  description  of  the  country 
traversed  by  the  expedition,  it  contains  an  excellent 
account  of  the  Indian  tribes  that  roam  over  it, — not 
that  impossible  creature,  "the  noble  savage"  of  the 
poet,  the  sentimental  red  man  of  the  novelist,  nor 
yet  the  degraded  outcast  that  withers  in  the  shadow 
cast  by  the  white  man  and  grafts  upon  his  own 
wild  stock  all  the  vices  of  civilization ;  but  the  In 
dian  as  he  really  exists, — a  mingled  web  of  virtues 
and  vices,  and  certainly  holding  no  low  place  upon 
the  scale  of  savage  and  nomadic  life. 

And  the  remark  which  has  just  been  made  as  to 
Captain  JVEarcy's  Eeport  may  be  further  extended; 
and  it  may  be  said  that  comparatively  few  persons 
know  any  thing  of  what  may  be  called  the  civil 
victories  of  the  American  army.  How  few  there 
are  who  are  aware  of  how  much  has  been  done 
for  science,  and  especially  for  geographical  science, 
during  the  last  thirty  or  forty  years,  by  the  able 
and  accomplished  officers  of  the  regular  army! — 
what  toils  and  hardships  they  have  endured,  what 
perils  they  have  met,  and  what  laurels,  unstained 


Ac  E  2  j.]  TEXAS     E  X  I'  E  D  1  T  I  0  X.  4 1 

by  blood  and  tears,  they  have  won  !  One  might 
feel  indignant  at  the  injustice  which  deals  out  what 
is  called  fame  with  so  unequal  a  hand,  were  it  not 
for  the  reflection  that  men  who  are  competent  to 
add  to  the  intellectual  wealth  of  the  world,  and  en 
large  the  domain  of  knowledge,  have  learned  to 
take  popular  applause  at  its  true  value,  and  to  find 
in  the  faithful  discharge  of  honorable  duty  a  satis 
faction  which  is  its  own  reward. 

After  his  duties  upon  Captain  Marcy's  expedition 
had  ceased,  Captain  McClellan  was  ordered  to 
Texas  as  chief  engineer  on  the  staff  of  General 
P.  F.  Smith.  lie  sailed  from  New  Orleans,  accom 
panying  General  Smith,  August  29,  and  arrived  at 
Galveston  on  the  31st.  In  a  letter  to  his  brother, 
dated  September  3,  he  says,  "  Galveston  is  pro 
bably  the  prettiest  and  most  pleasant  town  in 
Texas.  It  is  built  on  a  perfectly  level  island,  which 
forms  a  portion  of  the  harbor,  and  near  the  point. 
The  houses  are  all  of  frame,  with  piazzas,  and 
very  pretty  and  neat:  all  are  surrounded  with 
shrubbery.  They  have  there  the  most  beautiful 
oleanders  I  ever  saw:  they,  with  many  other 
flowers,  the  banana,  china-tree,  orange,  lemon, 
palm,  &c.  &c.,  present,  you  may  imagine,  a  charm 
ing  relief  to  the  monotony  of  the  level  site.  There 
is  almost  always  a  fine  breeze  and  an  elegant  surf. 
The  roads  were  excellent  when  we  were  there,  on 
account  of  the  frequent  rains,  which  pack  them 
down." 

From  Galveston  he  accompanied  General  Smith 
in  a  tour  of  military  inspection,  visiting  Indianola, 

4* 


42  CORPUS     CHRIS  T  I.  [1852. 

St.  Joseph's,  and  Corpus  Christi.  Of  this  last  place 
he  writes,  "  Corpus  is  about  two  miles  from  the  head 
of  Corpus  Christi  Bay,  which  is  separated  from 
Nueces  Bay  by  a  reef  of  sand.  The  shore  makes 
a  beautiful  curve,  near  one  end  of  which  the  town 
is  built.  The  old  camp  of  General  Taylor  was  on 
the  beach  where  the  town  stands,  and  extended  some 
mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  above  it.  The  positions 
of  the  tents  are  still  marked  by  the  banks  of  sand 
thrown  up  to  protect  them  against  the  Northers. 
It  is  a  classical  spot  with  the  army,  there  are  so 
many  old  associations,  traditions,  and  souvenirs  of 
many  who  are  now  no  more.  The  country  round 
Corpus  is  very  beautiful.  Below,  towards  the  bay 
(gulf,  rather),  it  is  a  rather  flat  country,  alternately 
prairie  and  chapparal,  the  prairies  interspersed  with 
'motts'*  of  live-oak  and  mesquite,f  covered  withal 
by  a  luxuriant  growth  of  grass.  The  chapparal  is 
the  prettiest  growth  of  that  nature  I  remember  to 
have  seen.  It  is,  of  course,  tropical,  —  that  is,  com 
posed  of  the  cactus  and  the  stiff  thorn-covered 
bushes  peculiar  to  the  Southern  latitudes;  but  the 
ground  even  now  is  covered  with  a  great  variety 
of  beautiful  flowers,  and  the  whole  makes  up  a  very 
pretty  country.  " 

From  Corpus  Christi  they  proceeded  to  Fort 
Merrill,  thence  to  San  Antonio,  and  from  there  to 
Camp  Johnston,  on  the  Concho  Eiver,  where  they 
arrived  October  24. 


*  "Mott,"  a  local  word,  meaning  a  grove,  or  clump,  of  trees. 
•j-  "Mcsqnite,"  an  indigenous  tree  of  tire  acacia  kind. 


AGE  20.]  COAST     SURVEY.  4') 

Hero  Captain  McClellan  found  orders  relieving 
him  from  duly  on  General  Smith's  staff,  and  as 
signing  him  the  charge  of  the  surveys  for  the  im 
provement  of  the  harbors  on  the  coast  of  Texas 
from  Indianola  to  Rio  Grande,  embracing  Brazos 
Santiago,  Corpus  Christi,  Lavacca,  and  the  San 
Antonio  River.  This  change  of  employment,  trans 
ferring  him  from  the  land  to  the  sea,  was  not  ex 
actly  to  his  wish;  but  he  set  about  his  new  duties 
with  his  usual  promptness  and  energy.  We  find 
him  at  Corpus  Christi  in  January,  1853,  diligently 
at  work  upon  estimates  and  reports;  and  on  the 
13th  of  that  month  he  addressed  to  the  Chief 
Engineer,  General  Totten,  a  letter  giving  a  general 
description  of  the  bars  on  the  coast.  For  the 
rest  of  the  winter  and  far  into  the  spring  ho  was 
hard  at  work.  Here  is  a  taste  of  his  experiences, 
taken  from  a  letter  dated  Corpus  Christi,  March 
9,  1853:— "I  left  hero  on  the  22d  of  February, 
one  of  the  most  beautiful  mornings  I  ever  saw, 
bright,  clear,  and  mild,  with  a  nice  breeze  just  in 
the  right  direction.  I  congratulated  myself  on  the 
fine  start  I  made,  and  felt  in  fine  spirits.  Things 
went  on  finely  for  an  hour  or  so.  Then  the  breeze 
became  so  strong  that  I  had  to  double-reef  all  my 
sails,  and  on  we  went,  still  handsomely.  But  pre 
sently  the  breeze  changed  into  the  most  violent 
gale  of  the  winter.  The  sea  ran  in  young  moun 
tains.  Down  we  brought  the  mainsail;  and  if  ever 
a  boat  did  run  under  a  foresail,  I  rather  think 
mine  did  that  day.  How  it  did  blow!  The  spray 
dashed  in  your  face  like  hail.  The  boat  is  a  mag- 


44  A     GALE     OF     WIND. 


nificcnt  sailer,  and  a  splendid  sea-boat:  so  we  still 
kept  on  beautifully,  though  it  was  slightly  humid. 
Just  as  we  were  about  to  anchor,  before  reaching 

O 

the  mud-flats,  we  lost  the  way;  for  the  spray  flew 
so  that  we  could  not  see,  and  the  first  thing  we 
knew  we  were  driven  about  four  hundred  yards 
up  on  one  of  the  aforesaid  flats,  and  rather  halted. 
Nothing  could  be  done:  so  we  turned  in  as  best 
we  could,  and  waited  for  morning.  When  morning 
came,  there  was  not  an  inch  of  water  within  three 
hundred  yards, — could  not  even  float  the  skiff.  A 
sand  island  some  six  hundred  yards  off  was  the 
nearest  dry  place,  and  in  walking  to  it  you  would 
sink  over  the  knee  in  mud.  In  that  delightful 
place  my  boat  remained  about  ten  days.  After  the 
first  three,  I  went  on  board  the  Government  steamer 
at  Aranzas,  some  four  miles  off,  and  went  to  work 
at  the  bar  in  her  whale-boat.  When  I  got  through, 
I  found  there  was  no  use  in  waiting  for  the  water 
to  rise  :  so  I  took  the  steamer's  crew  and  dug  a  canal, 
through  which,  after  two  days'  hard  work,  we  floated 
the  Alice  into  deep  water.  I  then  at  once  ran  down, 
by  the  outside  passage,  the  Gulf,  to  Corpus  Christi 
Pass,  satisfied  myself  very  quickly  of  its  utter 
worthlessness,  and  came  here,  with  flying  colors, 
yesterday.  I  have  finished  this  harbor  and  its  two 
passes:  by  the  end  of  the  month  I  shall  have  com 
pleted  the  Brazos  survey,  and  will  then  run  up 
towards  Indianola,  finishing  the  inland  channel  and 
the  San  Antonio  and  Guadalupe  Rivers  by  the  end 
of  April,  if  I  have  any  thing  like  ordinary  good 
luck.  In  May  I  shall  finish  Paso  Cavallo  Harbor, 


AGE  20.]        PACIFIC    RAILROAD     SURVEY.  4,r) 

and  hope  to  finish  the  field-work  by  the  end  of  that 
month  at  furthest.  Then  I  shall  sell  out  my  boats, 
and  go  to  Galvestoii  and  make  out  my  reports  and 
maps." 

On  the  18th  of  April,  Captain  McClcllan  ad 
dressed  to  General  Tot  ten  a  report  of  the  result 
of  the  surveys  on  the  coast  of  Texas,  as  far  as  they 
had  then  been  completed.  It  embraces  the  bars 
along  the  coast  from  Paso  Cavallo  to  the  mouth  of 
the  liio  Grande,  the  harbors  of  Brazos  Santiago, 
Corpus  Christi,  Aranzas,  and  Paso  Cavallo,  and  the 
inland  channel  from  Matagorda  Bay  to  Aranzas 
Bay.  It  is  printed  in  the  Executive  Documents 
of  the  first  session  of  the  Thirty-Third  Congress, 
• — a  brief  and  business-like  document,  containing 
plans  and  suggestions  for  improving  the  harbors 
designated,  with  estimates  of  the  probable  ex 
penses. 

But  before  the  date  of  his  Report  he  had  received 
information  of  his  having  been  assigned  to  a  more 
congenial  field  of  duty ;  for  in  a  letter  to  his  brother, 
dated  Indianola,  April  7,  1853,  he  tells  him  that  he 
has  been  offered  the  charge  of  a  portion  of  one 
of  the  Pacific  Railroad  surveys  recently  author 
ized  by  Congress,  to  start  from  Puget  Sound 
and  to  go  through  the  Cascade  Mountains  to 
St.  Paul  on  the  Mississippi,  and  adds,  "As  the 
results  of  the  surveys  are  to  be  presented  to 
Congress  during  the  ensuing  February,  the  time 
will  be  limited;  and  I  can  never  have  a  better  op 
portunity  of  seeing  California  and  Oregon :  so  1 
did  not  hesitate  a  moment  in  determining  to  accept 


40  PACIFIC     RAILROAD     SURVEY.  [1853. 

the  position.  I  am  told  that  'the  exploration  is 
arduous,  and  will  bring  reputation.'  Hard  work 
and  reputation  will  carry  me  a  long  way." 

The  expedition  to  which  he  was  attached  was 
under  the  general  supervision  of  Governor  Isaac  I. 
Stevens,  of  Washington  Territory,  formerly  of  the 
army,  who,  to  the  great  loss  of  his  country,  met  a 
glorious  death  in  the  battle  near  Chant-illy,  Fair 
fax  county,  Virginia,  September  1,  1862.  It  was 
charged  with  the  duty  of  examining  the  lines  of 
the  forty-seventh  and  forty -ninth  parallels  of  north 
latitude;  and  the  special  object  of  the  exploration 
was  the  determination  of  a  railroad-route  from  the 
head-waters  of  the  Mississippi  to  Puget  Sound. 
One  party,  under  the  immediate  direction  of  Gov 
ernor  Stevens,  was  to  proceed  from  the  Mississippi 
westward,  survey  the  intermediate  country,  and 
examine  the  passes  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Cap 
tain  McClellan,  at  the  head  of  a  separate  party,  was 
to  explore  the  Cascade  Range  of  mountains. 

Immediately  on  receiving  official  news  of  his  ap 
pointment,  he  set  out  for  the  Pacific  coast,  via  the 
Isthmus,  arrived  at  Fort  Vancouver  on  the  27th 
of  June,  began  to  make  preparations  for  the  expedi 
tion,  and  started  on  the  24th  of  July.  His  party 
consisted  of  Lieutenant  Duncan,  Third  Artillery, 
astronomer,  topographer,  and  draughtsman;  Lieu 
tenant  Hodges,  Fourth  Infantry,  quartermaster  and 
commissary;  Lieutenant  Mowry,  Third  Artillery, 
meteorologist;  Mr.  George  Gibbs,  ethnologist  and 
geologist;  Mr.  J.  F.  Minter,  assistant  engineer,  in 
charge  of  courses  and  distances;  five  assistants  in 


AGE  2(5.]  FIELD     OF     EXPLORATION.  47 

observations,  carrying  instruments,  &c.;  two  ser 
geants,  two  corporals,  and  twenty-four  privates 
of  the  Fourth  Infantry.  Two  chief  packers,  threo 
hunters  and  herders,  and  twenty  packers,  completed 
the  party.  There  were  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
three  animals  with  the  command, — seventy-three 

for  the  saddle,  one  hundred  for  packing 

i  & 

The  field  of  Captain  McClellan's  exploration 
lies  in  the  western  part  of  "Washington  Territory. 
The  river  Columbia  from  Fort  Okinakane,  at  about 
the  forty-eighth  degree  of  north  latitude,  flows  in 
a  southerly  direction,  a  little  inclining  to  the  east, 
till  it  reaches  Fort  Walla- Walla.  Then  it  makes 
a  sudden  turn  to  the  west,  and  runs  to  the  Pacific 
in  a  course  nearly  at  right  angles  to  its  former 
current.  The  space  enclosed  between  these  two 
arms  of  the  river  on  the  south  and  east  respect 
ively,  and  the  ocean  on  the  west,  is  partly  filled 
up  by  the  Cascade  Mountains,  a  continuation  of  the 
Sierra  Xevada  Eange  in  California,  and  deriving 
their  name  from  the  fact  that  the  Columbia  breaks 
through  them  in  a  series  of  falls  in  its  passage 
to  the  ocean.  Captain  McClellan's  course  from 
Fort  Vancouver  was  in  a  northeasterly  direction, 
along  the  dividing  line  between  the  stream  flow 
ing  westwardly  into  the  Pacific  and  eastwardly 
to  form  the  Yakima,  which  is  an  affluent  of  the 
Columbia. 

The  party,  starting  from  Fort  Vancouver  July 
24,  as  has  been  said,  reached  the  river  Wenass 
on  the  20th  of  August,  having  travelled  one  hun 
dred  and  sixty-two  miles.  Hero  a  pause  of  some 


48  Y  A  KIM  A    PASS.  [1853. 

days  was  made.  Lieutenant  Hodges  was  despatched 
to  Fort  Steilacoom,  to  procure  provisions,  exchange 
their  pack-horses  for  mules,  if  possible,  and  examine 
the  intermediate  route.  Lieutenant  Duncan  was 
directed  to  cross  to  the  main  Yakima,  examine  tho 
upper  part  of  that  valley,  and  obtain  all  possible 
information  in  relation  to  the  surrounding  country, 
especially  towards  the  north.  Mr.  Gibbs  was  in 
structed  to  examine  the  valley  of  the  Yakima  to 
its  junction  with  the  Columbia.  Captain  McClellan 
himself,  with  Mr.  Minter  and  six  men,  made  an 
examination  of  the  Nahchess  Pass.  Lieutenant 
Mo  wry  was  left  in  charge  of  the  camp  at  Wenass. 

By  the  31st  of  August  all  these  separate  parties, 
except  that  under  Lieutenant  Hodges,  had  accom 
plished  their  tasks  and  returned  to  the  camp.  Here 
Captain  McClellan  determined  to  reduce  the  num 
ber  of  his  party;  and,  accordingly,  on  the  2d  of 
September  Lieutenant  Mowry  was  sent  back  to 
the  Dalles,  on  Columbia  River,  with  seventeen  men, 
of  whom  but  two  were  to  return  with  him.  He 
took  with  him  the  collections  made  up  to  this  time, 
and  every  thing  that  could  be  dispensed  with. 

On  the  3d  of  September  the  depot  camp  was 
moved  from  the  AVcnass  to  Ketctas,  on  the  main 
Yakima.  On  the  4th,  Captain  McClellan  left  the 
camp,  with  Mr.  Gibbs,  Mr.  Minter,  and  six  men,  to 
examine  the  pass  at  the  head  of  the  main  Yakima, 
and  returned  to  the  camp  on  the  12th.  While  on 
this  separate  examination,  he  wrote  a  letter  to  his 
mother,  dated  September  11,  from  which  an  extract 


Ac  E  15(5.]        V  A  L  L  E  V     0  F     T  II  E     N  A  II  C  II  E  S  S.  40 

is  here  made,  giving  an  account  of  his  movements 
for  the  previous  fortnight : — 

"On  about  the  23d  of  August  I  started  from  the  main 
camp  on  the  Wenass  Elver,  to  examine  what  is  called  the 
Nahchess  Pass,  having  on  the  previous  clay  sent  in  some 
fifty  pack-animals  by  the  same  pass  to  Steilacoom,  for  pro 
visions,  so  that  I  might  start  from  this  vicinity  (after  ex 
amining  the  passes)  with  three  months'  provisions.  I  took 
with  me  my  assistant,  Minter,  three  hunters,  one  packer, 
one  of  my  Texas  men  to  carry  the  barometer,  and  my 
Mexican  boy  Jim.  The  first  day's  work  wras  of  no  par 
ticular  interest :  we  travelled  some  six  miles  up  the  valley 
in  which  we  were  camped,  and  struck  over  the  divide  to 
the  southwest  into  the  valley  of  the  Nahchess,  where  we 
camped,  after  a  hot  march  of  some  eighteen  miles  over  a 
rough,  mountainous  country, — the  last  fifteen  without 
water.  Next  day  wre  travelled  about  seventeen  miles  up 
the  valley  of  the  Nahchess, — that  is,  wherever  there  was 
any  valley ;  for  the  stream,  frequently  running  through 
caiions,  often  threw  us  back  into  the  mountains,  where 
the  trail  was  very  rough,  stony,  and  steep.  These  canons 
are  generally  through  masses  of  basaltic  rock,  varying  in 
height  from  fifty  to  five  hundred  feet,  and  generally  per 
fectly  vertical, — the  whole  width  occupied  by  the  bed  of 
the  stream.  The  scenery  here  is  singularly  wild  and  bold. 
Most  of  the  hills  and  mountains,  being  of  volcanic  rocks, 
have  the  sharp,  bold  outlines  peculiar  to  the  formation. 
Our  next  march,  of  about  equal  length,  and  over  a  rather 
worse  country,  brought  us  to  the  divide, — that  is,  the  point 
where  the  waters  run  in  one  direction  towards  the  Sound, 
in  the  other  towards  the  Columbia  above  Walla-Walla. 
By  ascending  a  high,  bare  mountain,  called  by  the  In 
dians  Aiqz,  we  had  a  fine  view  of  the  mountains.  The 
range  had  nowr  become  exceedingly  rough,  and  the  moun 
tains  Urcre.  We  were  but  a  short  distance  from  Mount 


50  SI  N  All  0  MIS    PASS.  [1853. 

Ranier, — a  magnificent  snow  peak, — and  could  count 
around  us  some  tliirty  mountains,  with  more  or  less  snow 
upon  them.  Wo  remained  one  day  at  the  divide,  exa 
mining  the  country  on  foot,  and  then  returned  by  about 
the  same  route  we  had  before  taken.  The  day  after  I 
reached  the  main  camp  I  received  an  express  from  the 
officer  I  had  sent  into  Steilacoom,  informing  me  that  most 
of  his  animals  (horses)  had  broken  down,  and  that  there 
were  no  mules  at  Steilacoom  to  replace  them.  Therefore 
I  at  once  determined  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  party.  I 
sent  in  the  whole  escort,  and  others  the  next  day,  so  as 
to  reduce  the  number  from  sixty-nine  to  thirty.  I  have 
mules  enough  to  carry  ninety  days'  provisions  for  this  num 
ber,  and  can  now  travel  much  more  rapidly.  The  day 
after  the  escort  left,  I  moved  camp  from  the  Wenass  River 
to  the  main  Yakima, — about  fourteen  miles  northward, — • 
and  started  the  next  day,  with  the  same  party  as  before 
(with  the  addition  of  Mr.  Gibbs),  to  examine  the  Sina- 
homis  Pass.  Our  first  two  marches  were  of  no  peculiar 
interest, — passing  through  a  rather  wide  valley  covered 
with  an  open  growth  of  pines.  In  the  third  march  wo 
struck  the  mountains,  (the  valley  giving  out),  and  had  a 
terrible  road,  much  obstructed  by  fallen  timber  and 
brush,  and  with  some  very  respectable  mountains  to  pass 
over.  We  passed  by  the  foot  of  a  beautiful  lake  (Kitchc- 
las)  in  which  this  river  heads:  it  is  some  four  or  five  miles 
long,  and  about  one  mile  wide,  surrounded  by  very  lofty 
mountains.  About  two-thirds  of  the  way  up  the  last  moun 
tain  we  ascended,  we  passed  between  two  small  lakes,  and, 
looking  clown  from  the  top,  saw  at  our  feet,  some  one 
thousand  feet  below  us,  still  another, — Willailootzas.  We 
passed  over  the  mountain  and  encamped  some  distance 
down  on  the  farther  side,  in  the  bed  of  an  old  lake.  You 
may  imagine  what  kind  of  weather  there  is  among  the 
mountains,  when  I  tell  you  that  nearly  every  morning  at 
sunrise  the  thermometer  stands  at  32°.  We  remained  at 


AGE  26.]  MOUNTAIN     LAKES.  51 

tliis  mountain  one  day,  trudging  around  on  foot.  Next  day 
I  sent  the  animals  back  by  the  trail,  and  started  on  foot 
to  examine  the  dloide  and  Willailootzas.  I  had  a  very 
rough  climb  for  some  six  hours,  discovered  another  small 
and  very  pretty  lake,  from  which  the  water  runs  both 
ways,  and  found  my  mule  waiting  for  me  on  the  trail  at 
about  two  o'clock. 

A  ride  of  about  sixteen  miles,  over  a  horrible  trail, 
brought  me  into  camp  just  before  dark  and  fully  pre 
pared  for  a  respectable  cup  of  coffee.  Next  day  we  went 
back  about  three  miles  on  the  trail,  and  then  struck  off 
to  visit  the  largest  lake  of  all, — Kahchess, — about  eight 
miles  long.  It  is  very  beautiful,  situated,  like  the  others, 
in  the  midst  of  the  mountains.  Yesterday  we  travelled 
about  sixteen  miles,  to  visit  another  large  and  beautiful 
lake, — Kleallum.  These  are  all  in  tliV)  mountains,  and 
on  the  heads  of  different  branches  of  the  main  Sahawa, 
— most  of  them  fully  as  beautiful  and  picturesque  as 
many  celebrated  in  the  fashionable  world.  I  doubt 
whether  any  whites  ever  saw  any  of  them  before:  cer 
tainly  they  were  unknown  to  the  settlers.  "Whether 
steamboats  will  ever  run  on  them,  or  Saratogas  be  estab 
lished  in  their  "icinity,  is  with  me  a  matter  of  exceeding 
doubt.  The  only  things  we  have  seen  of  much  interest 
are  the  mountains  and  the  lakes, — both  fine  in  their 
way,  but  rather  hard  to  get  at.  To-morrow  I  shall  go  into 
the  main  camp,  and  hope  to  find  things  about  ready  for 
me  to  start  into  the  town  incognito  to  the  northward.  I 
shall  send  an  express  in  a  day  or  two  with  reports  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  this  at  the  same  time.  I  hope  to 
reach  Mt.  Baker  in  about  twenty  days  from  here.  Where 
I  will  go  to  then,  circumstances  must  determine, — I  think 
to  Colville, — perhaps  thence  to  the  Rocky  Mountains." 

Lieutenant  jlowry  had  returned  from  the  Dalles 
on  the  2d  of  September,  and  on  the  IGtli  Lieutenant 


52  R  E  T  IT  R  \     T  O     F  0  II  T     V  A  \  C  O  U  V  E  R . 

Hodges  arrived  from  Steilacoom,  bringing  twenty- 
nine  pack-horses  loaded  with  provisions.  Prepara 
tions  were  now  made  to  move  northward:  thirty- 
two  broken-down  horses  were  sent  back,  under 
charge  of  three  men,  to  the  Dalles,  and  the  com 
mand  was  reduced  to  thirty-six  persons,  with  forty- 
two  riding-animals  and  fifty-two  pack-animals. 
They  started  on  the  20th,  and  moved  in  a  north 
easterly  direction.  On  the  9th  of  October  they 
reached  their  most  northerly  camp,  about  thirteen 
miles  south  of  the  "  Great  Lake,"  in  latitude  49°  26'. 
They  then  moved  west  to  the  Columbia  River, 
which  they  crossed  at  Fort  Colville.  Thence  they 
proceeded  southerly  across  the  Great  Plain  of  the 
Columbia  River,  and  arrived  at  Walla-Walla  on  the 
7th  of  November,  at  Fort  Dalles  on  the  15th.  From 
Fort  Dalles  they  went  down  by  water  to  Fort  Van 
couver,  which  they  reached  on  the  18th.  An  extract 
from  a  letter  to  his  brother,  dated  November  28, 
may  be  here  appropriately  introduced : — 

"From  that  place  [the  Yakima  valley]  we  crossed  a 
rather  high  mountain-ridge  (running  nearly  east  and 
west),  and  struck  the  Columbia  not  far  above  Buck- 
land's  Eapids,  and  a  little  distance  below  the  mouth  of 
the  Pischas.  My  journal  written  that  night  says,  'Soon, 
descending  a  little,  you  arrive  at  the  edge  of  the  sudden, 
precipitous  descent  that  borders  the  valley  of  the  Colum 
bia.  Words  can  hardly  convey  an  idea  of  the  view  from 
this  mountain.  Somewhat  to  the  north  of  west  is  a  hand 
some  snow  peak,  part  of  a  long  snow  ridge.  This  has  no 
name,  and  is  probably  seen  by  whites  for  the  first  time. 
To  the  north  of  that  the  Cascade  Range  is  in  full  view,  the 
main  range  coming  directly  to  the  Columbia,  and  crossing 


AGE  20. J        V  A  L  L  E  Y     0  F     T  II  E     C  0  L  U  M  B  I  A ,  f>3 

it,  until  it  sinks  towards  the  oast  into  a  vast,  elevated  table 
land.  In  tins  distance,  to  the  north,  is  seen  a  long  blno 
range,  at  the  foot  of  which  the  Columbia  runs  from  Col- 
ville  to  Okonogan.  To  the  northeast  and  east,  as  far  as 
the  eye  can  reach,  extends  the  bcau-id'cd  of  the  sublimity 
of  desolation,  a  vast  plain  (as  it  appears  from  the  height 
and  distance),  without  one  indication  of  water,  one  spot 
of  green  to  please  the  eye.  It  is  generally  of  a  dead  yel 
lowish  hue,  with  large  "clouds"  of  black  blending  into 
the  general  tinge.  It  must  be  a  sage-desert,  with  dry 
burnt  grass  and  outcroppings  of  basalt.  Not  a  tree  or 
bush  is  to  be  seen  upon  it.  The  valley  of  the  Columbia 
is  very  deep  and  exceedingly  narrow:  it  is  connected 
with  the  great  plain  by  steps  of  basaltic  rock, — most  of 
them  narrow  ledges,  and  varying  in  height  from  fifty  to 
three  hundred  or  four  hundred  feet.  The  great  river 
looks  like  a  narrow  blue  thread  or  ribbon.  It  seems  as  if 
our  only  means  of  travelling  farther  to  the  north  would 
be  to  follow  the  valley  of  the  river  until  it  leaves  the  moun 
tains.  Forward  we  must  go :  the  means  will  perhaps  pre 
sent  themselves  when  we  reach  the  valley/  Sure  enough, 
we  were  obliged  to  follow  the  valley  six  days,  at  the  end 
of  which  we  reached  Okonogan.  During  this  time  we 
had  some  very  bad  and  dangerous  places  to  pass  over.  On 
one  occasion  we  made  but  one  and  three-quarter  miles 
from  morning  till  night, — had  two  mules  instantly  killed 
by  falling  off  a  precipice,  and  two  others  badly  hurt. 

"Mt.  Okonogan  (Okinakane)  is  delightfully  situated  on 
a  gravel  flat,  without  a  blade  of  grass  or  any  thing  else 
for  some  distance  from  it.  A  little  Frenchman  is  the  only 
apology  for  a  white  man  there.  He  was  very  kind  to  us; 
and  he  and  I  misunderstood  each  other  most  beautifully 
in  all  our  conversations.  From  there  I  went  westward 
into  the  mountains,  in  vain  hopes  of  finding  another  pass, 
nnd  finally  returned  to  Okonogan,  whence  I  went  as  far 
north  as  the  Groat  Lake  Okonogan.  There  is  little  or  no 

5* 


:J4  OLYMPIA. 


timber  in  the  valley:  small  parts  of  it  are  tolerably  good, 
but  the  greater  part  worthless.  From  the  forks  up  to  the 
Great  Lake  it  is,  in  fact,  nothing  but  a  series  of  lakes  of 
different  sizes.  The  Great  Lake  is  some  two  miles  wide 
and  about  seventy  in  length.  The  scenery  around  it  is 
more  remarkable  for  its  desolation  than  its  beauty.  In 
fact,  the  whole  of  this  region  has  something  very  lonely  and 
dispiriting  about  it:  you  see  a  very  few  miserably  squalid 
Indians,  and  no  other  signs  of  animal  life:  an  occasional 
wolf,  with  now  and  then  a  lonely  badger,  are  all  you  see. 
From  the  forks  we  struck  over  to  the  Colville  River,  and 
followed  it  down  to  the  Columbia  opposite  Fort  Colvillo. 
The  valley  of  this  little  river  was  about  the  prettiest  wo 
saw, — fine  larch  timber,  and  a  good  deal  of  yellow7  pine, 
the  valley  very  narrow,  the  stream  a  bold  and  pretty  one  ; 
no  Indians ;  and  not  even  any  salmon  in  it.  At  Colville 
we  crossed  the  Columbia,  swimming  the  animals,  arid 
ferrying  ourselves  and  'traps'  in  canoes." 

At  Fort  Vancouver  the  party  was  broken  up, 
and  the  portion  required  for  office-work  was  sent 
to  Olympia,  where  Captain  McClellan  arrived  on 
the  16th  of  December.  On  the  23d  he  started  with 
a  small  party  to  endeavor  to  complete  the  barome 
trical  profile  of  the  main  Yakima  Pass  and  examine 
the  approaches  on  the  western  side;  but  he  was 
obliged  to  return  without  having  accomplished  his 
purpose,  mainly  on  account  of  the  great  depth  of 
snow  and  the  impossibility  of  procuring  Indian 
guides. 

Some  weeks  were  spent  in  office-work  at  Olym 
pia.  From  that  place,  on  the  8th  of  February, 
1854,  Captain  McClellan  addressed  to  Governor 
Stevens  a  brief  report  on  the  railroad-practicability 


RKTUKN     HOME. 


of  the  passes  examined  by  him;  and  his  general 
report,  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  bears  the  date 
of  February  25.  Both  of  these  reports  appear 
in  the  first  volume  of  the  official  publications  on 
the  Pacific  Railroad  route,  made  by  order  of 
Congress.  His  general  conclusions  were  that  be 
tween  the  parallels  of  45°  30'  and  49°  north  lati 
tude  there  are  but  two  passes  through  the  rango 
practicable  for  a  railroad, — that  of  the  Columbia 
River  and  that  of  the  Yakima  River;  that  the  latter 
was  barely  practicable,  and  that  only  at  a  high 
cost  of  time,  labor,  and  money,  while  the  former 
was  not  only  undoubtedly  practicable,  but  remark 
ably  favorable. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  report  to  Congress, 
dated  February  27,  1855,  says,  "The  examination 
of  the  approaches  and  passes  of  the  Cascade  Moun 
tains,  made  by  Captain  McClellan,  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers,  presents  a  reconnoissance  of  great  value, 
and,  though  performed  under  adverse  circumstances, 
exhibits  all  the  information  necessary  to  determine 
the  practicability  of  this  portion  of  the  route,  and 
reflects  the  highest  credit  on  the  capacity  and  re 
sources  of  that  officer." 

In  addition  to  his  duties  upon  the  railroad-survey, 
Captain  McClellan  had  been  directed  by  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  to  superintend  the  construction  of 
the  military  road  from  Walla-Walla  to  Steilacoorn. 
This  road  was  built  after  he  had  left  the  Pacific 
region;  but  the  contracts  and  arrangements  were 
made  by  him  before  his  departure. 

ITe  returned  home  in  the  spring  of  1854.     In  the 


50  SAM  AN  A.  [1854. 

Bummer  of  th.it  year  he  was  sent  on  a  secret  ex 
pedition  to  the  West  Indies,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  select  a  harbor  and  procure  a  site  suitable 
for  a  coaling-station.  It  was  a  service  of  some 
danger,  as  it  exposed  him  to  the  influences  of  a 
tropical  climate  in  the  hottest  season  of  the  year. 
He  went  out  in  a  United  States  vessel  under  the  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant  Eenshaw,  a  gallant  and  excel 
lent  officer,  who  was  killed  at  Galveston,  January  1, 
18G3,  by  the  blowing  up  of  the  "Westfield.  Captain 
McClellan  selected  the  bay  and  promontory  of 
Samana,  on  the  northeast  coast  of  the  island  of 
Hayti,  as  the  most  desirable  site  for  the  object  pro 
posed.  It  is  a  spot  of  much  historical  interest. 
Columbus,  returning  to  Spain  after  his  first  disco 
very  of  the  New  World,  anchored  in  this  bay, 
having  first  sailed  round  the  promontory  and  given 
names  to  two  of  its  headlands.  Here  some  of  his 
crew  had  an  affray  with  the  natives,  in  the  course 
of  which,  much  to  the  grief  of  the  great  navigator, 
two  of  the  hitter  were  wounded, — the  first  time  that 
native  blood  was  shed  by  white  men  in  the  New 
World.  At  a  later  period,  the  peninsula, — which 
in  the  old  maps  is  laid  down  as  an  island, — as  well 
as  the  rocky  islets  in  the  harbor,  of  which  there 
were  several,  became  haunts  of  the  buccaneers.  On 
one  of  these  islets,  or  cays,  Jack  Banister,  a  cele 
brated  English  pirate,  at  the  close  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  defended  himself  successfully  against  two 
English  frigates  sent  to  capture  him, — in  conse 
quence  of  which  the  name  of  Banister  Cays  was 
given  to  the  group.  Upon  the  promontory  arc 


AGE  27.]  SCHOMBURQK'S     MEMOIR.  57 

some  negro  villages,  occupied  by  the  descendants 
and  survivors  of  a  colony  of  free  colored  persons 
who  went  from  New  Jersey  under  JBoyer's  adminis 
tration.* 

*  Part  of  the  information  in  the  text  is  taken  from  a  memoii 
on  the  peninsula  and  bay  of  Samana  in  the  "Journal  of  the 
London  Geographical  Society"  for  1853,  by  Sir  R.  H.  Schom- 
burgk,  II.  B.  M.  Consul  at  the  Dominican  Republic.  The  con 
cluding  paragraphs  are  as  follows : — 

"I  have  purposely  dwelt  long  and  in  detail  \ipon  this  narrow 
strip  of  land,  called  the  Peninsula  of  Samanii,  and  upon  its 
adjacent  magnificent  bay.  In  its  geographical  position  its 
greatest  importance  is  centred.  The  fertile  soil  is  fit  for  the 
cultivation  of  all  tropical  productions;  its  spacious  bays  and 
anchoring-places  offer  a  shelter  to  the  navies  of  the  world  ; 
and  its  creeks  afford  facilities  for  the  erection  of  arsenals  and 
docks,  while  the  adjacent  forests  yield  the  requisite  woods 
for  naval  architecture:  still,  its  chief  importance  does  not  con 
sist  in  these  advantages  alone,  but  in  its  geographical  position, 
forming,  as  it  does,  one  of  the  principal  keys  to  the  isthmus 
of  Central  America  and  to  the  adjacent  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Mr. 
Lepclletier  de  Saint-Remy  says,  'Samanii  is  one  of  those  mari 
time  positions  not  often  met  with  in  a  survey  of  the  map  of 
the  woi-ld.  Samanii  is  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  what  Mayotta  is 
to  the  Indian  Ocean.  It  is  not  only  the  military,  but  also 
the  commercial,  key  of  the  Gulf;  but  the  latter  is  of  infinitely 
greater  importance,  under  the  pacific  tendencies  of  European 
politics.' 

''The  Bay  of  Samana  being  placed  to  the  windward  of 
Jamaica,  Cuba,  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  lying,  moreover, 
almost  due  northeast  of  the  great  isthmus  which  now  so  power 
fully  attracts  the  attention  of  the  world,  the  French  author 
just  quoted  may  well  call  it  '/a  tele-du-pont'  to  the  highway 
from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific." 

Captain  McClellan  had  never  seen  or  heard  of  this  memoir 
at  the  date  of  his  visit  to  the  West  Indi  e;  and  it  is  creditable 


58  RAILWAY     REPORT. 


Captain  JMcClellan  drew  up  two  reports,  one  on 
the  harbor  and  its  defences,  and  one  forming  a 
general  memoir  on  the  island.  They  have  never 
been  printed,  and  are  probably  still  on  file  in  the 
archives  of  the  War  Department.  Our  Govern 
ment  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Dominican 
.Republic  for  the  cession  of  the  bay  and  peninsula; 
but  they  were  not  crowned  with  success.  It  may 
be  surmised  that  the  influence  of  France  and  Eng 
land,  exerted  through  their  representatives,  may 
have  prevented  it. 

After  returning  home  from  the  West  Indies, 
Captain  McClellan  was  stationed  at  Washington, 
employed  on  duties  connected  with  the  Pacific  Rail 
road  surveys.  In  the  autumn  of  1854,  he  drew  up 
a  very  elaborate  memoir  on  various  practical  points 
relating  to  the  construction  and  management  of 
railways,  which  was  published  in  the  same  volume 
with  the  reports  of  his  explorations.  The  Secre 
tary  of  War  remarks  upon  it  as  follows: — ''Cap 
tain  ]\IcClellan,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  after 
the  completion  of  his  field-operations,  was  directed 
to  visit  various  railroads,  and  to  collect  informa 
tion  of  facts  established  in  the  construction  and 
working  of  existing  roads,  to  serve  as  data  in  de 
termining  the  practicability  of  constructing  and 
working  roads  over  the  several  routes  explored. 
The  results  of  his  inquiries  will  be  found  in  a  very 
valuable  memoir,  herewith  submitted/' 

to  his  sagacity  to  have  selected,  as  the  result  of  his  own  un 
aided  observation,  a  site  which  so  competent  an  authority  as 
Sir  Robert  II.  Schomburgk  speaks  of  in  such  terms  as  the  above. 


AGE  28.]  CRIMEAN    WAR.  59 

Iii  the  spring  of  1855,  Captain  McClellan  received 
the  appointment  of  captain  in  the  First  Cavalry 
Eegiment,  then  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Sumncr. 


CHAPTER  III. 

IN  the  spring  of  1855,  while  the  Crimean  Wai- 
was  raging,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
determined  to  send  a  military  commission  to 
Europe,  to  observe  the  warlike  operations  then  in 
progress,  to  examine  the  military  systems  of  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe,  and  to  report  such  plans 
and  suggestions  for  improving  the  organization  and 
discipline  of  our  own  army  as  they  might  derive 
from  such  observation.  The  officers  selected  for 
this  trust  were  Major — now  Colonel — Delaficld,  of 
the  Engineers,  Major  Mordccai,  of  the  Ordnance, 
and  Captain  .McClellan.  The  last  was  by  some 
years  the  youngest  of  the  three,  Colonel  Delafield 
having  been  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1818,  and 
Major  Mordecai  in  1S23.  The  selection  of  so  young 
a  inan  for  such  a  trust  is  a  proof  of  the  high  reputa 
tion  he  had  made  for  himself  in  the  judgment  of 
those  by  whom  the  choice  was  made;  and  it  may 
be  here  mentioned  that  he  was  in  the  first  instance 
designated  for  the  commission  by  President  Pierce 
himself,  who  had  had  an  opportunity  in  the  Mexican 
War  to  observe  what  manner  of  soldier  and  man  ho 
wa^.  Of  the  three  officers,  he,  too,  was  the  only 
one  who  had  seen  actual  service  in  the  field. 


GO  SECRETARY'S   LETTER.  [iS55, 

The  exact  nature  of  the  duties  assigned  to  the 
commission  may  be  learned  from  the  letter  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  essential  parts  of  which  are 
as  follows  : — 

"AVAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  April  2,  1855. 

"GENTLEMEN: — You  have  been  selected  to  form  a  com 
mission  to  visit  Europe,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  in 
formation  with  regard  to  the  military  service  in  general, 
and  especially  the  practical  working  of  the  changes  which 
have  been  introduced  of  late  years  into  the  military  sys 
tems  of  the  principal  nations  of  Europe. 

"Some  of  the  subjects  to  which  it  is  peculiarly  desirable 
to  direct  your  attention  may  be  indicated  as  follows: — 

"  The  organization  of  armies  and  of  the  departments  for 
furnishing  supplies  of  all  kinds  to  the  troops,  especially 
in  field-service.  The  manner  of  distributing  supplies. 

"The  fitting  up  of  vessels  for  transporting  men  and 
horses,  and  the  arrangements  for  embarking  and  disem 
barking  them. 

"The  medical  and  hospital  arrangements,  both  in  per 
manent  hospitals  and  in  the  field.  The  kind  of  ambu 
lances,  or  other  means,  used  for  transporting  the  sick  and 
wounded. 

"  The  kind  of  clothing  and  camp  equipage  used  for  ser 
vice  in  the  field. 

"The  kind  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  accoutrements 
used  in  equipping  troops  for  the  various  branches  of  ser 
vice,  and  their  adaptation  to  the  purposes  intended.  In 
this  respect,  the  arms  and  equipments  of  cavalry  of  all 
kinds  will  claim  your  particular  attention. 

"The  practical  advantages  and  disadvantages  attending 
the  use  of  the  various  kinds  of  rifle  arms  which  have  been 
lately  introduced  extensively  in  European  warfare. 

"The  nature  and  efficiency  of  ordnance  and  ammuni 
tion  cmploj'ed  for  field  and  siege  operations,  and  the 


AGE  28.]  ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE.  Gl 

practical  effect  of  the  late  changes  partially  made  in  the 
French  field  artillery. 

"  The  construction  of  permanent  fortifications,  the  ar 
rangement  of  new  systems  of  sea-coast  and  land  defences, 
and  the  kind  of  ordnance  used  in  the  armament  of  them, 
— the  Lancaster  gun,  and  other  rifle  cannon,  if  any  are 
used. 

"  The  composition  of  trains  for  siege-operations,  the  kind 
and  quantity  of  ordnance,  the  engineering  operations  of 
a  siege  in  all  its  branches,  both  of  attack  and  defence. 

"The  composition  of  bridge-trains,  kinds  of  boats, 
wagons,  &c. 

"  The  construction  of  casemated  forts,  and  the  effects 
produced  on  them  in  attacks  by  land  and  water.  The 
use  of  camels  for  transportation,  and  their  adaptation  to 

cold  and  mountainous  countries. 

####•### 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
"JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 
"Major  R.  DELAFIELD, 
"Major  A.  MORDECAI, 
'•'Captain  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  United  Slates  Army." 

The  officers  composing  the  commission  sailed 
from  Boston  on  the  llth  of  April.  On  arriving 
in  England,  they  were  courteously  received  by 
Lord  Clarendon,  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Foreign 
Department, — Lord  Panmure,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
being  disabled  by  illness, — and  furnished  with 
letters  of  introduction  to  Lord  Eaglan,  Sir  Edward 
Lyons,  the  admiral  of  the  Baltic  fleet,  and  the  offi 
cers  in  command  at  Constantinople.  In  France  a 
difficulty  arose  on  account  of  an  imperative  rule  in 
the  French  military  service  that  no  foreign  officer 

6 


62  WARSAW.  [1855. 

could  be  permitted  to  go  into  their  camp  and  after 
wards  to  pass  into  that  of  the  enemy,  and  that, 
therefore,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  members  of 
the  commission  to  give  a  promise  that  they  would 
not  go  from  the  French  camp  to  any  other  part  of 
the  Crimea,  even  although  they  might  first  go  to  St. 
Petersburg.  This  pledge  the  commission  were  not 
prepared  to  give,  and  the  matter  remained  for  some 
time  in  abeyance.  But  the  most  ample  facilities 
were  extended  to  them  for  visiting  such  military 
and  naval  establishments  as  they  desired  to  inspect. 

On  the  28th  of  May,  the  commission  left  Paris, 
intending  to  proceed  to  the  Russian  camp  in 
the  Crimea  by  the  way  of  Prussia,  starting  first  for 
Berlin,  in  order  to  confer  with  the  Russian  Minister 
in  that  city,  Baron  de  Budberg,  to  whom  the 
Russian  Minister  at  "Washington  had  given  them  a 
letter.  Their  object  was  to  go  from  Berlin  to  the 
Crimea  by  the  way  of  Warsaw  and  Kiev,  on  the 
Danube;  and  Baron  de  Budberg  gave  them  pass 
ports  and  letters  to  Baron  Krusentein,  a  Russian 
official  at  "Warsaw.  But  on  arriving  at  Warsaw 
they  learned  that  no  person  there — not  even  the 
veteran  hero  Paskievitch,  with  whom  they  had  an 
interview,  and  who  treated  them  with  much  courtesy 
— had  the  power  to  grant  them  permission  to  go  from 
Warsaw  direct  to  the  Crimea,  and  that  there  was 
nothing  to  be  done  but  to  proceed  to  St.  Petersburg. 
During  their  stay  in  Warsaw,  they  examined  the 
fortifications  of  that  city  and  of  Modlin. 

It  was  very  annoying  to  the  officers  of  the  com 
mission  to  find  their  progress  blocked  by  ceremo- 


AGE  28.]  POLAND.  (>» 

nials  and  formalities  which  they  might  have  escaped 
if  they  had  heen  civilians  and  private  citizens  and 
gone  direct  from  Constantinople  to  Sebastopol,  as 
so  many  idlers  and  amateurs  had  done;  but,  having 
presented  themselves  in  an  official  capacity,  they 
could  do  no  less  than  bear  its  burdens  and  encum 
brances;  and  so  they  went  on  to  St.  Petersburg, 
where  they  arrived  June  19.  A  few  extracts  from 
a  letter  written  by  Captain  McClellan  to  his  younger 
brother — now  Captain  Arthur  McClellan — the  day 
after  his  arrival  in  the  Russian  capital,  give  some 
of  his  first  impressions  of  the  country  and  people  : — • 

"  We  loft  Warsaw  at  six  P.M.  on  the  evening  of  the  13th, 
and  reached  here  at  about  the  same  hour  last  evening, 
having  travelled  constantly  day  and  night,  merely  stop 
ping  a  few  minutes  for  meals. 

"In  Poland  the  country  is  either  flat  or  slightly  rolling, 
the  soil  improving  as  you  approach  the  Niemen,  but  in 
many  places  very  poor.  There  arc  no  towns  of  any  con 
sequence  on  the  road,  which,  you  will  observe,  passes  near 
the  Prussian  frontier,  but  many  villages,  which  are  gene 
rally  of  wood  and  presenting  a  dirty,  squalid  appearance. 
The  villages  are  mostly  inhabited  by  Jews, — as  dirty 
and  wretched  a  race  as  you  ever  saw, — worse  than  any 
yon  ever  saw.  The  appearance  of  the  Poles  is  any  thing 
but  favorable ;  they  look  like  a  stupid,  degraded  race, — 
are  dirty  and  ugly.  It  is  difficult- to  imagine  how  they 
ever  fought  as  they  have  done  in  the  past.  Ostrolinha 
was  the  site  of  a  great  battle  in  the  revolution  of  1831. 
It  is  a  small  wooden  town  on  the  Narew  (Narcjf],  which  is 
here  a  rapid  stream  some  fifty  yards  wide.  A  large  monu 
ment  commemorates  the  victory  gained  by  the  Russians. 
Kouno  is  a  town  of  good  size,  mostly  built  of  plastered 
brick.  A  portion  of  it  is  very  old,  while  the  new  suburbs 


C4  RUSSIA.  [1855. 

are  handsome  and  well  built.  It  presents  the  appearance 
of  a  flourishing  place,  there  being  many  small  vessels  in 
the  Niemen,  and  immense  trains  of  carts  constantly  ar- 
viving  here  from  the  interior  of  Russia.  They  bring  down 
tallow,  hemp,  &c.,  and  carry  back  cotton,  groceries,  &c. 
As  the  Niemen  empties  in  Prussian  territory,  a  glance  at 
the  map  will  show  you  the  importance  of  this  place 
whilst  the  Russian  ports  are  blockaded.  The  Niemen  is 
here  two  hundred  and  twenty  yards  wide, — a  bold  and  rapid 
stream,  crossed  by  a  raft-bridge.  It  was  near  and  at  this 
place  that  the  great  mass  of  the  French  army  crossed  the 
Niemen  in  June,  1812;  and  it  was  at  the  gate  of  this 
same  town  that  in  the  retreat  Marshal  Ney  fought  so 
desperately,  forming  in  his  own  person  the  rear-guard  of 
the  Grand  Army.  Of  course  I  went  to  the  spot  during 
the  short  time  we  remained  here.  You  now  enter  the 
great  forests  of  Russia.  As  far  as  Vilkomir  there  is  but 
little  cultivation,  the  country  being  mostly  covered  by  pine 
and  beech  forests.  I  should  have  mentioned  that  in  the 
public  square  of  Kouno  there  is  a  huge  iron  monument, 
bearing  in  Russian  an  inscription  to  the  effect  that  out  of 
seven  hundred  thousand  French  who  crossed  the  Niemen 
in  June,  1812,  but  seventy  thousand  recrossed  in  December. 
As  far  as  Dunaburg  (on  the  river  Duna,  or,  as  some  of  the 
maps  have  it,  Dwina)  the  country  is  quite  rolling, — almost 
broken ;  very  different  from  the  idea  I  had  formed  of  it. 
You  pass  through  a  number  of  small  towns  and  villages. 

"  Dunaburg  appears  to  be  a  small  town,  presenting  no 
thing  of  peculiar  interest.  There  are  some  defensive  works 
here. 

"  Before  reaching  Dunaburg,  we  passed  through  one  town 
(a  small  one,  perhaps  hardly  deserving  the  name  of  more 
than  a  village),  called  Novo  Alexandrowsky,  which  is  re 
markably  pretty.  It  is  situated  on  the  high  banks  of  a 
large  and  handsome  lake  broken  by  little  green  islets. 
The  houses  and  people  were  remarkably  good-looking. 


AGB  2*.J  j  T.    }'  E  T  K  11  S  li  V  H  (j.  Go 

Rigitza  is  also  a  pretty  little  place:  there  is  hero  a  ruined 
castle  of  long,  long  ago.  Country  now  not  so  much 
roiling  as  near  Dunaburg,  but  still  by  no  means  flat:  it  is 
fertile  and  well  cultivated.  Ostroil'  is  another  handsome 
little  place:  the  road  here  crosses  the  river  on  a  very  fine 
suspension-bridge  ;  and  on  an  island  in  the  river  is  a  very 
extensive  ruined  castle,  perhaps  of  some  of  the  Teutonic 
knights.  Pscov,  near  which  we  passed,  seems  to  be  espe 
cially  blessed  with  churches,  the  gilded  domes  of  which 
shone  from  afar.  The  country  near  here,  and,  in  fact,  from 
here  to  St.  Petersburg,  is  low  and  level,  the  soil  generally 
good, — sometimes  poor,  and  sometimes  very  fertile. 

"  Pscov  is  the  capital  of  a  province,  and  at  the  head  of  a 
large  lake.  Near  Ploosa  is  a  swampy  district  of  consider 
able  extent,  and  many  large  lakes.  Nothing  of  very  great 
interest  until  one  reaches  Gratchina,  where  is  the  hunting- 
palace  of  the  Emperor:  it  seems  to  be  a  very  grand  es 
tablishment.  From  there  to  this  city  the  country  is  very 
flat,  the  soil  not  very  good,  but  settlements  increasing 
as  you  draw  near. 

"The  general  appearance  of  the  portion  of  Russia  I  have 
seen  is  much  superior  to  that  of  Poland;  and  I  like  the 
appearance  of  the  people  very  much. 

#  -/-  #  -x-  -H-  -x-  -x- 

"  This  is  truly  a  most  magnificent  city, — wide  streets,  fine 
private  houses,  magnificent  public  buildings.  Thus  far 
I  have,  of  course,  merely  had  a  glance  at  the  exterior  of 
things,  and  will  not  pretend  to  describe  any  tiling,  more 
than  to  say  that  it  fully  equals  my  expectations.  A\re  are 
very  comfortably  fixed  at  the  Hotel  de  Russie. — good 
rooms,  good  meals,  plenty  of  ice,  &c. 

"The  road  from  Warsaw  here  is  truly  a  magnificent  one, 
— especially  the  portion  of  it  in  Poland.  It  is  all  mac 
adamized ;  and  they  are  now  hard  at  work  improving  the 
Russian  part,  so  that  in  a  couple  of  months  it  will  be 
throughout  as  fine  a  rond  as  any  in  the  world.  Think  of 


60  ST.    PETERSBURG.  [1855. 

the  immense   length, — one    thousand    and    seventy-four 
versts,  or  seven  hundred  and  sixteen  miles! 

"So  great  is  the  traffic  upon  it  at  present  that  it  is  lite 
rally  covered  from  one  end  to  the  other  with  trains  of 
wagons  passing  in  both  directions.  The  trade  which 
formerly  passed  down  the  Baltic  now  seeks  its  outlet  into 
Prussia  by  this  route. 

"  So  great  is  this  now  that  it  seems  hardly  possible  that 
Russia  can  feel  the  effect  of  the  blockade  very  sensibly. 
New  channels  are  opened,  and  immense  additional  num 
bers  of  men,  animals,  and  capital  are  now  employed  in 
the  land-transportation. 

*  -x-  *  #•  •* 

"June  20  and  21,  MidnigM. — I  write  this  paragraph  in  my 
room  by  the  natural  light, — no  candle  or  any  thing  what 
ever  :  you  may  imagine  the  darkness  of  the  night  here." 

During  their  residence  at  St.  Petersburg,  the 
officers  of  the  commission  were  treated  with  much 
courtesy  by  the  civil  and  military  authorities, 
and  all  possible  facilities  were  afforded  to  them  for 
examining  the  various  military  establishments  in 
the  vicinity.  They  were  presented  to  the  Emperor, 
at  his  request,  and  graciously  received  by  him.  But 
they  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  permission  to  go 
to  Sebastopol,  because  the  officers  in  command  there 
Lad  requested  that  no  strangers  should  be  per 
mitted  to  come  thel'e,  as  such  visits  occasioned  them 
a  great  deal  of  embarrassment;  and  though  the 
Emperor,  of  course,  might  overrule  such  objections, 
yet  he  felt  bound  to  defer  to  the  strongly-expressed 
wishes  of  officers  placed  in  such  responsible  posi 
tions.  Nothing  could  be  urged  in  reply  to  this; 
and,  disappointed  as  they  were,  they  could  not,  as 


AGE  28.]  BALAKLAVA.  67 

military  men,  fail  to  respect  the  Emperor's  defer 
ence  to  the  views  of  his  subordinates. 

On  the  19th  of  July  the  commission  proceeded  to 
Moscow,  and  examined  whatever  was  of  interest 
in  a  military  point  of  view  there.  Hastening  back 
to  St  Petersburg,  they  left  that  city  on  the  2d  of 
August,  and  arrived  at  Berlin  on  the  25th,  having 
in  the  interval  observed  the  fortifications  and  de 
fences  at  Konigsberg,  Dantzig,  Poscn,  and  Schwedt. 
At  Berlin  the  various  military  establishments  in 
that  city  and  at  Spandau  were  carefully  inspected. 

From  Berlin  they  determined  to  go  to  the  Cri 
mea  by  the  way  of  Dresden,  Laybach,  Trieste,  and 
Smyrna,  and  found  themselves  at  last  on  the  line  of 
operations  of  the  allied  army  at  Constantinople, 
on  the  16th  of  September.  To  the  courtesy  of  the 
English  naval  authorities  they  were  indebted  for  a 
passage  in  the  first  steamer  that  sailed  for  Bala- 
klava,  where  they  arrived  on  the  morning  of  Oc 
tober  8.  Here  every  possible  facility  and  kindness, 
official  and  personal,  was  extended  to  them  by  the 
officers  of  the  English  army,  including  Sir  George 
Simpson,  the  commander.  It  was  hoped  that  the 
French  Government  would  relax  the  rule  they  had 
laid  down  in  the  spring;  but  the  new  authorization 
to  visit  their  camps  and  army,  received  at  Bala- 
klava,  contained  substantially  the  same  condition 
as  had  been  before  exacted,  and  the  commission 
could  not  avail  themselves  of  the  permission  to 
which  such  terms  were  attached.  The  result  was 
that  they  confined  their  examination  to  the  camps, 
depots,  parks,  workshops,  &c.  of  the  English,  Sar- 


OS  TOULON.  [l«i»C. 

dinian,  and  Turkish  armies,  never  entering  the 
French  camps  in  the  Crimea  except  on  visits  of 
courtesy. 

On  the  2d  of  November  they  left  Ealaklava  in  an 
English  steamer,  and  spent  some  days  in  Constan 
tinople  and  Scutari,  inspecting  the  hospitals  and 
depots  of  the  allies.  From  Constantinople  they 
proceeded  to  Vienna,  examining  on  their  route  the 
defences  of  Varna  and  the  remarkable  triumphs 
of  civil  engineering  in  the  works  on  the  Scemmer- 
ing  Railroad. 

On  the  16th  of  December  they  reached  Vienna, 
and  spent  some  days  in  a  careful  observation  of  the 
Austrian  military  establishments,  and,  after  leaving 
Vienna,  went  to  Venice,  Verona,  Mantua,  and  Milan, 
examining  the  military  and  naval  establishments  in 
each  place.  At  Verona  they  were  most  kindly  re 
ceived  by  the  veteran  hero  Marshal  Eadetzky,  who 
contributed  in  every  way  to  the  attainment  of  their 
wishes  as  well  as  to  their  personal  gratification. 
Colonel  Delafield — from  the  introduction  to  whose 
[Report  this  account  of  the  movements  of  the  com 
mission  is  abridged — speaks  in  the  warmest  terms 
of  the  peculiar  and  uniform  courtesy  extended  to 
them  by  the  authorities  and  functionaries  of  Austria. 
That  Government  seemed  to  have  quite  forgotten 
the  Martin  Koszta  affair. 

On  the  2d  of  February.  1850,  they  arrived  at 
Toulon,  and,  with  the  authority  previously  obtained 
from  the  French  Government,  examined  the  mili 
tary  and  naval  defences  of  that  important  depot. 
But  the  only  facility  extended  to  them  was  that 


AGE  29.]  RETURN     HOME.  69 

afforded  by  a  printed  ticket  of  admission  trans 
mitted  from  Paris,  which  did  no  more  than  com 
mand  the  services  of  a  porter  to  conduct  them 
through  the  buildings,  docks,  and  vessels,  and  gave 
them  no  opportunity  to  converse  with  any  of  tho 
officers.  From  Toulon  they  visited  in  succession 
Marseilles,  Lyons,  Belfort,  Strasbourg,  Eastadt, 
Coblentz,  and  Cologne,  observing  their  fortresses 
and  defences, — in  tho  last  three  places,  however, 
without  the  advantage  of  any  special  authority. 

The  24th  and  25th  of  February  were  spent  at 
Liege,  wThere  their  time  was  occupied  at  the  na 
tional  foundry  for  artillery  and  another  for  small- 
arms,  both  on  a  more  extended  scale  than  any  cor 
responding  establishments  in  Europe  at  that  time. 

On  the  1st  of  March  the  commission  was  at  Paris 
again.  Two  days  were  devoted  to  an  examination 
of  the  fortress  at  Yincennes;  and  several  of  the  mili 
tary  establishments  in  Paris  were  also  inspected. 
They  were  unable,  however,  to  obtain  the  requisite 
authority  for  seeing  those  relating  to  the  artillery. 

On  the  18th  of  March  the  commission  proceeded 
to  Cherbourg  and  examined  the  works  there.  On 
the  24th  of  March  they  arrived  at  London,  and 
afterwards  visited  the  arsenal  and  dockyards  at 
Woolwich,  the  vessels  at  Portsmouth,  and  the  de 
fences  near  Yarmouth,  on  the  Isle  of  Wight,  receiv 
ing  every  courtesy  and  facility  they  could  desire 
from  the  military  and  naval  officers  at  those  sta 
tions  in  furthering  the  object  of  their  visit.  On 
the  19th  of  April  they  embarked  for  home. 

The  above  is  a  brief  record  of  the  labors  of  a 


70  MCCLELLAN    S     UEl'ORT.  [ISiG. 

very  busy  year,  in  which,  however,  much  precious 
time  was  lost  from  delay  in  obtaining  the  necessary 
official  permissions  to  inspect  military  establish 
ments.  And  it  must  be  added  that  in  many  cases 
the  commission  failed  to  receive  those  facilities 
which  assuredly  would  have  been  extended  in  our 
country  to  a  similar  board  sent  from  any  Govern 
ment  in  Europe.  It  may  be  too  much  to  expect 
that  nations  should  be  governed  in  their  relations 
towards  each  other  by  the  precepts  of  Christian 
morality,  but  surely  it  is  not  too  much  to  ask  that 
they  should  conform  to  the  code  of  courtesy  and 
good  breeding  recognized  among  gentlemen  in  the 
intercourse  of  social  life. 

After  their  return,  each  of  the  officers  upon  the 
commission  made  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
of  the  results  of  their  tour  of  observation;  and 
these  reports  were  in  due  time  officially  published 
by  Congress  in  a  quarto  form,  and  pretty  widely 
distributed.  They  were  recognized  by  all  compe 
tent  judges  as  productions  of  great  merit,  reflect 
ing  the  highest  credit  upon  their  respective  authors, 
and  amply  vindicating  the  sagacity  of  the  Govern 
ment  which  selected  them.  In  October,  1861,  Cap 
tain  McClellan's  report  was  republished  by  the  pub 
lishers  of  the  present  work,  in  an  octavo  volume, 
with  illustrations,  with  the  title,  "  The  Armies  of 
Europe:  comprising  Descriptions  in  detail  of  the 
Military  System  of  England,  France,  Eussia.  Prus 
sia,  Austria,  and  Sardinia,  adapting  their  Advan- 
ti  ges  to  all  Arms  of  the  United  States  Service, 
and  embodying  the  Report  of  Observations  in 


SE15ASTOPOL.  71 


Europe  during  the  Crimean  War.  as  Military  Com 
missioner  from  the  United  States  Government  in 
1855-50." 

Its  contents  are  as  follows.  The  first  thirty-five 
pages  are  occupied  with  an  able  and  interesting 
summary  of  the  warlike  operations  in  the  Crimea, 
in  which  the  plans  and  movements  both  of  the 
.Russians  and  the  allies  are  criticized  without  a 
touch  of  arrogance,  and  yet  with  a  manly  decision 
of  tone  which  reveals  a  sound  military  judgment 
and  thorough  military  training.  Its  merits  can 
be  fully  perceived  only  by  a  professional  reader ; 
but  the  general  reader  cannot  fail  to  recognize  in 
it  the  marks  which  show  the  writer  to  be  a  man  of 
vigorous  understanding  and  excellent  powers  of 
observation,  as  well  as  an  accomplished  officer.  The 
style  is  simple,  perspicuous,  and  direct,  the  style 
of  Washington,  Collingwood.  and  Wellington; — in 
other  words,  that  good  style  which  a  man  of  sense 
will  always  write  who  has  something  to  say  and 
writes  on  without  thinking  about  his  style  at  all. 
As  the  work,  from  the  nature  of  its  contents,  can 
never  have  been  generally  read,  two  extracts  from 
tli is  portion  of  the  volume  are  here  appended. — 
enough,  it  is  believed,  to  justify  the  commendation 
which  has  been  bestowed  upon  it.  The  first  is  a 
brief  criticism -of  the  defences  of  Sebastopol  : — 

"  From  the  preceding  hasty  and  imperfect  account  of 
the  defences  of  Sebastopol,  it  will  appear  ho\v  little  found 
ation  there  was  for  the  generally  received  accounts  of  the 
stupendous  dimensions  of  the  works,  and  of  new  systems 
of  fortifications  brought,  into  play.  The  plain  truth  is 


72  ATTACK    OP    THE    REDAN.  [1856, 

that  these  defences  were  simple  temporary  fortifications 
of  rather  greater  dimensions  than  usual,  and  that  not  a 
single  new  principle  of  engineering  was  there  developed. 
It  is  true  that  there  were  several  novel  minor  details, 
such  as  the  rope  mantelets,  the  use  of  the  iron  tanks, 
&c. ;  but  the  whole  merit  consisted  in  the  admirable 
adaptation  of  well-known  principles  to  the  peculiar  locality 
and  circumstances  of  the  case.  Neither  can  it  be  asserted 
that  the  plans  of  the  various  works  were  perfect.  On 
the  contrary,  there  is  no  impropriety  in  believing  that, 
if  Todtleben  were  called  upon  to  do  the  same  work  over 
again,  he  would  probably  introduce  better  close-flanking 
arrangements. 

"These  remarks  are  not  in  tended  to,  nor  can  they,  detract 
from  the  reputation  of  the  Russian  engineer.  His  labors 
and  their  results  will  be  handed  down  in  history  as  the 
most  triumphant  and  enduring  monument  of  the  value 
of  fortifications,  and  his  name  must  ever  be  placed  in  the 
first  rank  of  military  engineers.  But,  in  our  admiration 
of  the  talent  and  energy  of  the  engineer,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  the  inert  masses  which  he  raised  would 
have  been  useless  without  the  skilful  artillery  and  heroic 
infantry  who  defended  them.  Much  stronger  places  than 
Sebastopol  have  often  fallen  under  far  less  obstinate  and 
well-combined  attacks  than  that  to  which  it  was  subjected. 
There  can  be  no  danger  in  expressing  the  conviction  that 
the  siege  of  Sebastopol  called  forth  the  most  magnificent 
defence  of  fortifications  that  has  ever  yet  occurred." 

The  next  is  a  description  of  the  final  assault: — 

"  A  few  minutes  later  than  the  assault  upon  the  MalakofY, 
the  English  attacked  the  Redan.  The  Russians  being 
now  upon  the  alert,  they  did  not  pass  over  the  open  space 
before  them  without  loss ;  but  the  mass  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  ditch  and  gaining  the  salient  of  the  work. 


AGE  2'J.J  ENGLISH     A  N  D     FRENCH     A  S  S  A  U  L  T  S.       73 

Finding  themselves  entirely  unsupported,  they  at  once 
took  shelter  behind  the  traverses,  whence  the  example 
and  efforts  of  their  officers  did  not  avail  to  draw  them,  in 
order  to  occupy  the  work  closing  the  gorge.  Having  in 
vain  used  every  effort,  having  despatched  every  officer 
of  his  staff  to  the  rear  urging  that  supports  should  be 
at  once  sent  up,  and  seeing  that  the  Eussians  were  now 
beginning  to  assemble  in  force,  the  commander  of  the 
English  storming  party  reluctantly  determined  to  pro 
ceed  himself  to  obtain  reinforcements.  Scarcely  had  he 
reached  the  trenches,  and  at  last  obtained  authority  to 
move  up  the  required  succor,  when,  upon  turning  to  lead 
them  forward,  he  saw  the  party  he  had  left  in  the  work 
rapidly  and  hopelessly  driven  out  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.  No  further  effort  was  made  to  carry  the  work. 
It  would,  in  all  probability,  have  failed,  and  would  only 
have  caused  a  useless  sacrifice  of  men. 

"The  failure  of  the  English  assault  may  be  attributed 
partly  to  the  fact  that  their  advanced  trenches  were  too 
small  to  accommodate  the  requisite  force  without  confu 
sion,  in  part  to  their  not  being  pushed  sufficiently  near  the 
Redan,  but  chiefly  to  that  total  absence  of  conduct  and 
skill  in  the  arrangements  for  the  assault  which  left  the 
storming  party  entirely  without  support.  Had  it  been 
followed  at  once  by  strong  reinforcements,  it  is  almost 
certain  that  the  English  would  have  retained  possession 
of  the  work. 

' '  The  two  French  attacks  on  the  west  of  the  central  ravine 
were  probably  intended  only  as  feints:  at  all  events,  the 
parties  engaged  were  soon  driven  back  to  their  trenches 
with  considerable  loss,  and  effected  nothing.  Their  at 
tempts  upon  the  Little  Redan,  and  the  works  connect 
ing  it  with  the  Malakoff,  met  with  even  less  success  than 
the  English  assault.  The  Russians  repulsed  the  French 
with  great  loss,  meeting  with  the  bayonet  the  more  ad 
venturous  men  who  reached  the  parapet.  Thus,  in  five 
7 


71  FRENCH     ASSAULT.  [1S56. 

points  out  of  six,  the  defenders  were  fully  victorious ;  but, 
unfortunately  for  them,  the  sixth  was  the  decisive  point. 

"  In  their  admirable  arrangements  for  the  attack  of  the 
Malakoff,  the  French  counted  on  two  things  for  success: — 
first,  they  had  ascertained  that  the  Russians  were  in  the 
habit  of  relieving  the  guard  of  the  Malakoff  at  noon,  and 
that  a  great  part  of  the  old  guard  marched  out  before  the 
new  one  arrived,  in  order  to  avoid  the  loss  which  would 
arise  from  crowding  the  work  with  men  ;  in  the  second 
place,  it  was  determined  to  keep  up  a  most  violent  verti 
cal  fire  until  the  very  moment  of  the  assault,  thus  driving 
the  Russians  into  the  bomb-proofs,  and  enabling  the  storm 
ing  party  to  enter  the  work  with  but  little  opposition. 
The  hour  of  noon  was  therefore  selected  for  the  assault. 
and  the  strong  columns  intended  for  the  work  were  at  an 
early  hour  assembled  in  the  advanced  trenches,  all  in  ad 
mirable  order,  and  furnished  with  precise  instructions. 

"The  mortars  maintained  an  unremitting  fire  until  the 
moment  appointed.  The  very  instant  the  last  volley 
was  discharged,  the  storming  party  of  Zouaves  rushed 
over  the  thirty  paces  before  them,  and  were  in  the  work 
before  the  astonished  Russians  knew  what  had  happened. 
It  was  stated  that  this  party  lost  but  eleven  men  in  enter 
ing  the  work.  Other  troops  advanced  rapidly  to  the  sup 
port  of  the  storming  party,  a  bridge  was  formed  by  rolling 
up  five  ladders  with  planks  lashed  to  them,  a  communi 
cation  was  at  once  commenced  between  the  advanced  trench 
and  the  bridge,  brigade  after  brigade  passed  over,  the  re 
doubt  was  at  once  occupied  by  the  storming  party,  and  thus 
the  Malakoff,  and  with  it  Sebastopol,  was  won.  The  few 
Russians  remaining  in  the  work  made  a  desperate  resist 
ance.  Many  gallant  attempts  were  made  by  Russian 
columns  to  ascend  the  steep  slope  in  rear  and  regain  tJio 
lost  work ;  but  the  road  was  narrow,  difficult,  and  ob 
structed,  the  position  strong,  and  the  French  in  force. 
All  their  furious  efforts  were  in  vain,  und  the  Malakoff 


AGE  29.]  LENGTH     OF    THE     SIEGE.  75 

remained  in  the  possession  of  those  who  had  so  gallantly 
and  skilfully  won  it.  With  regard  to  the  final  retreat 
to  the  north  side,  it  can  only  be  said  that  a  personal  ex 
amination  of  the  locality  merely  confirms  its  necessity, 
and  the  impression  so  generally  entertained  that  it  was 
the  finest  operation  of  the  war:  so  admirably  was  it 
carried  out  that  not  a  straggler  remained  behind ;  a  few 
men  so  severely  wounded  as  to  be  unfit  for  rough  and 
hurried  transportation  were  the  sole  ghastly  human 
trophies  that  remained  to  the  allies. 

"The  retreat,  being  a  more  difficult  operation  than  the 
assault,  may  be  worthy  of  a  higher  admiration ;  but  the 
Russian  retreat  to  the  north  side  and  the  French  assault 
upon  the  Malakoff  must  each  be  regarded  as  a  master 
piece  of  its  kind,  deserving  the  closest  study.  It  is  difficult 
to  imagine  what  point  in  cither  can  be  criticized;  for  both 
evinced  consummate  skill,  discipline,  coolness,  and  cou 
rage.  With  regard  to  the  artillery,  I  would  merely  remark 
that  the  Russian  guns  were  not  of  unusual  calibre,  con 
sisting  chiefly  of  twenty-four-,  thirty-two-,  and  forty- 
two-pounders,  and  that  the  termination  of  the  siege  was 
mainly  due  to  the  extensive  use  of  mortars  finally  re 
sorted  to  by  the  allies.  If  they  had  been  employed  in 
the  beginning  as  the  main  reliance,  the  siege  would  have 
been  of  shorter  duration. 

"The  causes  of  the  unusual  duration  of  this  siege  natu 
rally  resolve  themselves  into  three  classes :  the  skilful 
disposition  of  the  Russians,  the  faults  of  the  allies,  and 
natural  causes  beyond  the  control  of  either  party.  Among 
the  latter  may  be  mentioned  the  natural  strength  of  the 
position  and  the  severity  of  the  winter.  In  the  first  class 
there  may  be  alluded  to: — the  skill  with  which  the  Rus 
sian  engineers  availed  themselves  of  the  nature  of  the 
ground  ;  the  moral  courage  which  induced  them  to  un 
dertake  the  defence  of  an  open  town  with  a  weak  garri 
son  ;  the  constant  use  they  made  of  sorties,  among  which 


70  FRENCH     ZOUAVES.  [IS'.fi. 

may  properly  be  classed  tho  battles  of  Balaklava,  Inker- 
mann,  and  the  Tchernaya;  the  ready  ingenuity  with 
which  they  availed  themselves  of  the  resources  derived 
from  the  fleet;  the  fine  practice  of  their  artillery  ;  their 
just  appreciation  of  the  true  use  of  field-works,  and  the 
admirable  courage  they  always  evinced  in  standing  to 
their  works,  to  repel  assaults  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  ; 
the  employment  of  rifle-pits  on  an  extensive  scale  ;  finally, 
the  constant  reinforcements  which  they  soon  commenced 
receiving,  and  which  enabled  them  to  fill  the  gaps  made 
in  their  ranks  by  disease  and  the  projectiles  of  the  allies. 
"  The  evidences  of  skill  on  the  part  of  the  allies,  as  well 
as  the  apparent  faults  on  all  sides,  having  been  already 
alluded  to,  it  is  believed  that  the  means  have  been  fur 
nished  to  enable  any  one  to  draw  his  own  conclusions  as 
to  the  history  of  this  memorable  passage  of  arms." 


after  the  observations  on  the  Crimean  War 
follow  twenty  pages  on  the  European  engineer 
troops,  to  which  succeed  twenty-eight  pages  on  the 
French,  Austrian,  Prussian,  and  Sardinian  infantry. 
A  brief  description  of  the  French  Zouave  will  be  of 
interest  to  the  reader  :  — 

"  The  dress  of  the  Zouave  is  of  the  Arab  pattern  :  the 
cap  is  a  loose  fez,  or  skull-cap,  of  scarlet  felt,  with  a  tassel  ; 
a  turban  is  worn  over  this  in  full  dress  ;  a  cloth  vest  and 
loose  jacket,  which  leave  the  neck  unencumbered  by 
collar,  stock,  or  cravat,  cover  the  upper  portion  of  his 
body,  and  allow  free  movement  of  the  arms;  the  scarlet 
pants  are  of  the  loose  Oriental  pattern,  and  are  tucked 
under  gaiters  like  those  of  the  foot  rifles  of  the  guard  ; 
the  overcoat  is  a  loose  cloak,  with  a  hood  ;  the  chasseurs 
wear  a  similar  one.  The  men  say  that  this  dress  is  the 
most  convenient  possible,  and  prefer  it  to  any  other. 

"  The  Zouaves  are  all  French  ;  thev  are  selected  from 


Ac K  29.]  FRENCH     ZOUAVES.  77 

among  the  old  campaigners  for  their  fine  physique  and 
tried  courage,  and  have  certainly  proved  that  they  are 
what  their  appearance  would  indicate, — the  most  reck 
less,  self-reliant,  and  complete  infantry  that  Europe  can 
produce. 

"  With  his  graceful  dress,  soldierly  bearing,  and  vigilant 
attitude,  the  Zouave  at  an  outpost  is  the  beau-ideal  of  a 
soldier. 

"  They  neglect  no  opportunity  of  adding  to  their  personal 
comforts:  if  there  is  a  stream  in  the  vicinity,  the  party 
marching  on  picket  is  sure  to  be  amply  supplied  with 
fishing-rods,  £c. ;  if  any  thing  is  to  be  had,  the  Zouaves 
are  quite  certain  to  obtain  it. 

"Their  movements  are  the  lightest  and  most  graceful  I 
have  ever  seen ;  the  stride  is  long,  but  the  foot  seems 
scarcely  to  touch  the  ground,  and  the  march  is  apparently 
made  without  effort  or  fatigue. 

"  The  step  of  the  foot  rifles  is  shorter  and  quicker,  and 
not  so  easy  and  graceful. 

"The  impression  produced  by  the  appearance  of  the 
rifles  and  of  the  Zouaves  is  very  different:  the  rifles  look 
like  active,  energetic  little  fellows,  who  would  find  their 
best  field  as  skirmishers ;  but  the  Zouaves  have,  combined 
with  all  the  activity  and  energy  of  the  others,  that  solid 
ensemble  and  reckless  dare-devil  individuality  which  would 
render  them  alike  formidable  when  attacking  in  mass,  or 
in  defending  a  position  in  the  most  desperate  hand-to- 
hand  encounter.  Of  all  the  troops  that  I  have  ever  seen, 
I  should  esteem  it  the  greatest  honor  to  assist  in  defeating 
the  Zouaves.  The  grenadiers  of  the  guard  are  all  large 
men,  and  a  fine-looking,  soldierly  set." 

Two  hundred  and  ten  pages — nearly  one-half  of 
the  whole  volume,  the  Appendix  included — are  next 
to  the  Russian  army,  its  organization,  recruit- 
rations,  &<-. 


OORS  ACKS. 


The  following  is  a  description  of  the  Russian 
Cossacks : — 

"  There  are  two  peculiarities  which  cannot  fail  to  arrest 
the  attention  and  command  the  reflection  of  the  observer 
of  the  Russian  cavalry :  these  are,  the  general  division  of 
the  cavalry  into  regulars  and  irregulars;  and  the  corps 
of  dragoons. 

"The  irregulars  may  be  comprehended  in  the  general 
name  of  Cossacks.  Yet  their  peculiarities  of  armament, 
costume,  and  action  are  as  varied  as  their  origin ;  while 
the  sources  of  the.  latter  are  as  multifarious  as  the  tribes 
which  compose  the  mass  of  Russian  nationality,  and  the 
circumstances  which,  through  centuries  of  warfare,  have 
finally  united  into  one  compact  whole  a  multitude  of  con 
flicting  and  heterogeneous  elements.  But,  with  all  this 
diversity,  there  are  important  and  peculiar  characteristics 
which  pervade  the  mass,  and  are  common  to  every  indi 
vidual,  with  as  much  uniformity  and  certainty  a-s  that  with 
which  the  firm  government  of  the  Czar  is  now  extended 
over  them.  These  peculiarities  are:  intelligence,  quick 
ness  of  vision,  hearing,  and  all  the  senses;  individuality  ; 
trustworthiness  on  duty ;  the  power  of  enduring  fatigue, 
privation,  and  the  extremes  of  climate ;  great  address  in 
the  use  of  weapons ;  strong  feeling  for  their  common 
country ;  caution,  united  with  courage  capable  of  being 
excited  to  the  highest  pitch:  in  short,  the  combination 
of  qualities  necessary  for  partisan  troops.  The  events  of 
more  than  one  campaign  have  proved,  besides,  that  these 
irregulars  can  be  used  successfully  in  line  against  the  best 
regular  cavalry  of  Europe. 

"  Circumstances  of  geography  and  climate  have  given 
to  these  men  a  race  of  horses  in  every  way  adapted  to 
their  riders ;  the  Cossack  horse  is  excelled  by  none  in 
activity  and  hardiness. 

"The  Cossack  neglects  no  opportunity  of  feeding  his 


COSSACKS. 


horse;  during  short  halts,  even  under  fire,  he  gives  him 
whatever  is  to  be  had;  the  horse  refuses  nothing  that  is 
offered  him,  and  eats  whenever  he  has  the  opportunity, 
for  he  has  not  acquired  the  pernicious  habit  of  eating 
only  at  regular  hours.  Some  idea  may  be  formed  of  the 
power  of  endurance  of  the  Cossacks  and  their  horses 
from  the  fact  that,  in  a  certain  expedition  against  Khiva, 
there  were  three  thousand  five  hundred  regular  Russian 
troops  and  twelve  hundred  Cossacks :  of  the  regulars  but 
one  thousand  returned,  of  the  Cossacks  but  sixty  perished. 

"The  tendency  of  events,  during  the  present  century, 
lias  been  to  assimilate  the  organization  of  the  Cossacks 
to  that  of  the  regulars,  to  a  certain  extent :  whether  the 
effect  of  this  has  been  to  modify  or  destroy  their  valuable 
individual  characteristics  may  yet  remain  to  be  proved  in 
a  general  war;  the  events  of  the  campaign  of  Hungary 
are  said  to  indicate  that  more  regularity  of  action  has  by 
no  means  impaired  their  efficiency. 

"This  brief  description  of  the  qualities  of  the  irregular 
cavalry  indicates  at  once  the  use  made  of  them  in  war : 
they  watch  while  the  regulars  repose.  All  the  duty  of 
advanced  posts,  patrols,  reconnoissances,  escorting  trains, 
carrying  despatches,  acting  as  orderlies,  &c.,  is  performed 
in  preference  by  the  Cossacks:  the  consequence  is,  that, 
on  the  day  of  battle,  the  regular  cavalry  are  brought  upon 
the  field  in  full  force  and  undmrinished  vigor.  Under 
cover  of  these  active  irregulars,  a  Russian  army  enjoys 
a  degree  of  repose  unknown  to  any  other;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  difficult  for  their  antagonists  to  secure 
their  outposts  and  foil  their  stealthy  movements. 

"The  rapidity  and  length  of  their  marches  are  almost 
incredible;  a  march  of  forty  miles  is  a  common  thing: 
they  will  make  forced  marches  of  seventy  miles  ;  in  a 
thickly-settled  country  they  have,  in  two  days,  made  six 
marches  of  ordinary  cavalry  without  being  discovered. 

"  In  concluding  this  subject,  it  is  impossible  to  repress 


80  CAVALRY.  [1856. 

the  conviction  that  in  many  of  the  tribes  of  our  frontier 
Indians,  such  as  the  Delaware*,  Kickapoos,  &c.,  we  pos 
sess  tlie  material  for  the  formation  of  partisan  troops  fully 
equal  to  the  Cossacks:  in  the  event  of  a  serious  war  on 
this  continent,  their  employment,  under  the  regulations 
and  restrictions  necessary  to  restrain  their  tendency  to 
unnecessary  cruelty,  would  be  productive  of  most  import 
ant  advantages. 

"In  our  contests  with  the  hostile  Indians,  bodies  of 
these  men,  commanded  by  active  and  energetic  regular 
officers  and  supported  by  regular  troops,  would  undoubt 
edly  be  of  great  service." 

The  cavalry  of  Prussia,  Austria,  France,  England, 
and  the  United  States  are  next  considered,  the 
whole  occupying  about  one  hundred  pages;  and  an 
Appendix,  of  the  same  extent,  contains  a  system  of 
regulations  for  the  field  service  of  cavalry  in  time 
of  war.  This  arm  engages  the  author's  particular 
attention,  naturally  enough,  as  he  was  a  captain  of 
cavalry  at  the  time. 

Besides  its  other  merits,  the  volume  is  a  record 
of  the  most  faithful  and  persevering  industry,  and 
contains  the  results  of  an  immense  amount  of  hard 
work.  It  embraces  accounts  of  military  schools, 
forts,  museums,  camps,  hospitals,  and  garrisons. 
The  arms,  dress,  and  accoutrements  of  the  men, 
and  the  equipments  of  the  horses,  are  minutely 
described,  down  to  the  most  exact  details.  It  is  il 
lustrated  with  several  hundred  engravings,  making 
every  thing  plain  to  the  eye  where  a  visible  repre 
sentation  is  needed.  In  short,  no  one  can  look  at  this 
volume  without  seeing  that  the  author  has  one  of 
those  happily  constituted  minds  which  neither  over- 


AGE  30.]  LEAVES     THE    ARMY.  81 

looks  nor  despises  details,  and  yet  is  not  so  hampered 
by  them  as  to  be  incapable  of  wide  views  and  sound 
generalizations.  JSTo  man  can  be  a  great  officer  who 
is  not  infinitely  patient  of  details;  for  an  army  is  an 
aggregation  of  details,  a  defect  in  any  one  of  which 
may  destroy  or  impair  the  whole.  It  is  a  chain  of 
innumerable  links;  but  the  whole  chain  is  no  stronger 
than  its  weakest  link. 

In  January,  1857,  Captain  McClellan  resigned  his 
commission  and  retired  from  the  army.  He  had 
then  been  fifteen  years  in  the  service, — years  of busy 
activity  and  energetic  discharge  of  professional 
duty.  We  may  suppose  him  to  have  been  moved 
to  this  step  by  the  consideration  that  the  future 
held  out  no  promise  of  congenial  employment  and 
seemed  to  open  no  adequate  sphere  to  honorable 
ambition.  A  dreary  life  upon  some  distant  frontier, 
the  monotonous  discharge  of  routine  duty,  a  re 
nunciation  of  all  the  attractions  of  civilized  life 
without  the  excitement  of  ennobling  adventure  or 
heroic  struggle,  presented  an  uninviting  prospect  to 
a  man  like  him,  in  the  prime  of  early  manhood, 
and  writh  unworn  energies  alike  physical  and  in 
tellectual,  lie  thought,  too,  that  in  case  of  war  his 
chances  of  occupation  and  promotion  would  be 
quite  as  good  in  civil  life  as  if  he  had  remained 
in  the  army.  The  rapid  growth  and  material  de 
velopment  of  the  country  created  a  demand  for 
capacities  and  accomplishments  like  his;  and  im 
mediately  upon  his  resignation  he  was  appointed 
chief  engineer  of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad, 
then  just  opened,  and  went  to  Chicago  to  reside. 


FORT     SUMTER.  [1861. 

In  a  few  weeks  he  was  made  vice-president  of 
the  corporation,  and  took  general  charge  of  all  the 
business  of  the  road  in  Illinois.  In  this  capacity 
he  first  made  the  acquaintance  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  now 
President  of  the  United  States,  then  a  practising 
lawyer  in  Springfield,  Illinois,  and  occasionally  em 
ployed  in  the  conduct  of  suits  and  other  professional 
services  on  behalf  of  the  company. 

In  May,  1860,  Captain  McClellan  was  married  to 
Miss  Ellen  Marcy,  daughter  of  General  E.  B.  Marcy, 
his  former  commander  in  Texas,  and  the  chief  of 
his  staff  during  the  Peninsular  campaign. 

In  August,  1860,  he  resigned  the  vice-presidency 
of  the  Illinois  Central  Road,  in  order  to  accept 
the  presidency  of  the  Ohio  &  Mississippi  Eailroad, 
which  post  he  held,  residing  in  Cincinnati,  till  the 
war  broke  out. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  guns  which  opened  upon  Fort  Sumter  on 
the  memorable  12th  of  April,  1861,  did  not  merely 
crumble  the  wails  of  that  fortress,  but  they  also 
shattered  all  hopes  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the 
problems  which  were  then  before  the  country. 
Civil  war  was  now  a  sad  necessity.  The  Presi 
dent's  proclamation  of  the  15th  called  forth  the 
militia  for  objects  entirely  lawful  and  constitu 
tional;  and  it  was  responded  to  with  a  patriotic 
fervor  which  melted  down  all  previously  existing 


AGE  31.]  CIVIL     WAR.  83 

party  lines.  This  "uprising  of  a  great  people,"  as 
it  was  well  termed  by  a  foreign  writer,  was  a  kin 
dling  and  noble  spectacle.  The  heart  of  the  whole 
land  throbbed  like  the  heart  of  one.  But  we  can 
not  now  look  back  upon  that  brilliant  and  burning 
enthusiasm  without  a  touch  of  sadness,  because 
there  was  mingled  with  it  so  much  ignorance,  not 
merely  of  the  magnitude  of  the  contest  before  us, 
but  of  the  nature  of  war  itself.  The  spirited 
young  men  who,  at  the  call  of  patriotic  duty, 
thronged  to  swell  the  ranks  of  our  volunteer  force, 
marched  off  as  gayly  as  if  they  had  been  going  to  a 
hunting-party  or  a  picnic  excursion.  The  rebellion 
was  to  be  put  down  at  once,  and  by  little  more  than 
the  mere  show  of  the  preponderating  force  of  the 
loyal  States;  and  the  task  of  putting  it  down  was 
to  be  attended  with  no  more  of  danger  than  was 
sufficient  to  give  to  the  enterprise  a  due  flavor 
of  excitement.  War  was  unknowTn  to  us  except 
by  report :  the  men  of  the  Ilcvolution  had  passed 
away,  and  even  the  soldiers  of  the  War  of  1812  had 
become  gray-haired  veterans.  We  had  read  of 
battles;  we  had  seen  something  of  the  pride  and 
pomp  of  holiday  soldiers;  but  of  the  grim  realities 
of  war  we  were  absolutely  ignorant.  Indeed,  not 
a  few  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  war  was  a 
relic  of  barbarism,  which  the  world  had  outgrown, 
and  that  modern  civilization  could  dispense  with 
the  soldier  and  his  sword. 

It  need  hardly  be  added  that  we  were  wholly  un 
prepared  for  the  gigantic  struggle  that  was  before 
us.  Our  regular  army  was  insignificant  in  nuin- 


84  OHIO.  [1S61. 

bers,  and  scattered  over  our  vast  territory  or 
along  our  Western  frontier,  so  that  it  was  impossi 
ble  to  collect  any  considerable  force  together.  Our 
militia  system  had  everywhere  fallen  into  neglect, 
and  in  some  States  had  almost  ceased  to  have  any 
real  existence.  The  wits  laughed  at  it,  and  the  plat 
form-orators  declaimed  against  it,  to  such  a  degree 
that  it  required  some  moral  courage  to  march 
through  the  streets  at  the  head  of  a  company. 

The  South  had  been  wiser,  or,  at  least,  more  pro 
vident,  in  this  respect.  The  military  spirit  had 
never  been  discouraged  there.  Many  of  the  political 
leaders  had  long  been  looking  forward  to  the  time 
when  the  unhappy  sectional  contests  which  were 
distracting  the  country  wTould  blaze  out  into  civil 
war,  and  preparing  for  it.  In  some  of  the  States 
there  had  been  military  academies,  where  a  mili 
tary  education  had  been  obtained:  so  that  they 
had  a  greater  number  of  trained  officers  to  put  into 
their  regiments.  This  gave  them  a  considerable 
advantage  at  the  start.  Happily  for  us,  graduates 
of  West  Point  were  scattered  all  over  the  North: 
to  them  the  civil  authority  looked  for  assistance, 
and  they  rendered  an  assistance  which  cannot  bo 
too  highly  estimated. 

Ohio  was  as  unprepared  as  other  States.  There 
was  a  small  force  of  militia  nominally  organized; 
but  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  State  provided 
that  all  its  officers  should  be  elected  by  the  men, 
and  the  Governor  was  limited,  in  his  selection  of 
officers  in  case  the  militia  was  called  out,  to  tho 
parties  so  chosen.  In  an  emergency  like  this,  it  was 


AGE  34.]  G  0  V  E  R  N  0  R     D  E  X  X  I  S  0  N.  85 

fortunate  that  Ohio  bad  so  efficient  a  Governor  as 
Mr.  William  Dennison.  He  at  onee  turned  to  Cap 
tain  McClellan  for  assistance,  arid  sent  a  request  to 
Washington  that  the  latter  might  be  restored  to 
bis  old  rank  in  the  army  and  the  duty  of  organizing 
the  Ohio  volunteers  assigned  to  him.  To  this  re 
quest  no  answer  was  received :  indeed,  the  commu 
nications  with  Washington  were  generally  inter 
rupted,  and  the  several  Governors  were  thus  left 
to  their  own  resources. 

Governor  Dennison  summoned  Captain  McClellan 
to  Columbus;  and  he  at  once  applied  himself  to  the 
work  of  organizing  the  numerous  regiments  offered. 
A  bill  was  also  introduced  into  the  Legislature,  and 
rapidly  passed,  authorizing  the  Governor  to  select 
officers  for  the  volunteers  outside  of  the  State  militia. 
Under  this  act,  on  the  23d  of  April,  1861,  Captain 
McClellan  was  commissioned  major-general  of  the 
Ohio  "Militia  Volunteers." 

Under  the  proclamation  of  the  President  of  April 
15,  calling  out  the  militia,  thirteen  regiments  of 
infantry  were  demanded  from  Ohio  for  three 
months,  and  afterwards  the  same  number  for 
three  years.  To  obtain  men  was  then  easy  enough, 
but  to  find  suitable  officers  was  exceedingly  difficult; 
and  arms  and  equipments  were  entirely  wanting. 
A  "Department  of  the  Ohio"  was  formed  on  the 
3d  of  May,  consisting  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois, 
and  placed  under  General  McClellan's  command, 
who  thus  had  under  his  charge  the  forces  of  two 
other  States  besides  his  own.  Ho  organized  his 
troops  in  spite  of  all  obstacles,  and  within  two 


86  VIRGINIA     AND     SECESSION.  [1861. 

months  of  the  time  of  his  leaving  his  peaceful 
avocations  he  took  the  field  for  the  first  campaign 
of  the  war. 

Secession  placed  no  State  in  so  embarrassing  a 
position  as  the  great  Commonwealth  of  Virginia. 
Separated  from  the  capital  only  by  a  river,  and  ex 
tending  from  the  ocean  to  the  Ohio,  it  lay  mid 
way  between  the  two  contending  parties,  and  early 
promised  to  be  what  it  has  since  become.— the 
Belgium  of  the  war.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
great  body  of  its  citizens  were  opposed  to  the 
State's  seceding;  but  they  were  equally  opposed 
to  the  coercion  of  the  States  which  had  already 
seceded,  and  sympathized  with  many  of  their 
alleged  grievances.  A  State  convention  at  Kich- 
mond,  on  the  17th  of  April,  when  it  was  evident 
that  war  must  ensue,  passed  an  ordinance  of  se 
cession.  Although  this  was  not  to  go  into  force 
until  it  had  been  ratified  by  the  people,  the  in 
habitants  of  the  eastern  and  southern  portions  of 
the  State  immediately  began  hostilities. 

In  the  portion  of  the  State  lying  west  of  the 
Alleghany  Mountains,  and  known  as  Western  Yir- 
ginia,  the  feelings  of  the  people  were  very  different. 
They  owned  but  few  slaves,  and  their  soil  and 
climate  were  unfitted  for  those  branches  of  indus 
try  in  which  slave-labor  is  profitable.  While  dis 
approving  of  the  slavery  agitation  in  the  ]S"orth, 
they  had  no  particular  interest  in  the  extension 
of  that  institution,  and  were  strenuously  opposed 
to  secession  for  its  sake;  and  they  also  had  some 
grievances  regarding  alleged  inequalities  of  taxa- 


AGE  34.]  C  A  MP    DEN  N  I  SO  N.  87 

tion  between  Eastern  and  Western  Virginia,  which 
had  probably  caused  many  of  them  already  to  look 
forward  to  the  organization  of  a  separate  State. 
In  this  conjuncture,  a  convention  of  the  people  of 
Western  Virginia  was  called  to  assemble  at  Wheel 
ing  on  the  llth  of  June,  to  consider  the  alarming 
condition  of  public  affairs. 

Early  in  May,  General  McClellan  received  applica 
tions  for  protection  from  the  people  of  this  region, 
but  was  not  then  prepared  to  accede  to  their  wishes. 
Afterwards,  however,  it  became  evident  that  the 
Virginia  authorities  contemplated  occupying  this 
country,  and  to  secure,  by  so  doing,  the  command 
of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  the  importance 
of  which  was  appreciated  by  both  parties.  Gov 
ernor  Letcher  had  already  called  out  the  State 
militia,  and  not  only  Western  Virginia,  but  Southern 
Ohio  also,  might  soon  be  invaded  by  them. 

A  small  body  of  Virginia  militia  had  actually 
advanced,  and  were  encamped  at  Grafton,  on  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad.  On  the  24th  of  May, 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Scott  tele 
graphed  to  General  McClellan,  informing  him  of 
this  camp,  and  asking  him  whether  its  influence 
could  not  be  counteracted.  General  McClellan 
replied  in  the  affirmative.  This  was  the  sole  order 
which  he  received  from  Washington  regarding  a 
campaign  in  Virginia. 

General  McClellan  had  formed  his  principal  ren 
dezvous  at  Camp  Dennison,  near  Cincinnati;  while 
bodies  of  troops  were  also  at  Gallipolis,  Bellaire, 
and  Marietta,  on  the  Ohio  River,  opposite  Vir- 


88  PROCLAMATION.  [1861. 

giuia.  At  Wheeling  the  loyalists  were  organizing 
a  regiment  under  Colonel  B.  F.  Kelley.  The  men 
were  wretchedly  provided  for,  having  nothing  but 
muskets;  but  they  did  good  service  before  the  end 
of  summer.  On  the  26th  of  May,  intelligence  was 
received  at  Camp  Dennison  that  the  enemy  were 
advancing  from  Grafton  upon  Wheeling  and  Par- 
kersburg,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  railroad. 
General  McClellan  at  once  telegraphed  to  Colonel 
Kelley  to  move  his  regiment  (since  known  as  the 
First  Virginia)  early  the  next  day  along  the  line  of 
railroad  towards  Fairmount,  in  order  to  prevent 
any  farther  destruction  of  the  bridges  and  to  pro 
tect  the  repair  of  those  already  injured.  Two  Ohio 
regiments,  under  Colonels  Irwin  and  Stedman.  were 
also  directed  to  cross  over  into  Virginia,  one  to  co 
operate  with  Colonel  Kelley  and  the  other  to  occupy 
Parkersburg.  On  the  same  day,  General  McClellan 
issued  the  following  proclamation  and  address  :— 


"  HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 
May  26,  1861. 

"  To  the  Union  Men  of  Western  Virginia. 

"  VIRGINIANS  : — The  General  Government  has  long  enough 
endured  the  machinations  of  a  few  factious  rebels  in  your 
midst.  Armed  traitors  have  in  vain  endeavored  to  deter 
you  from  expressing  your  loyalty  at  the  polls.  Having 
failed  in  this  infamous  attempt  to  deprive  you  of  the  exer 
cise  of  your  dearest  rights,  they  now  seek  to  inaugurate  a 
reign  of  terror,  and  thus  force  you  to  yield  to  their  schemes 
and  submit  to  the  yoke  of  the  traitorous  conspiracy 


AGF.  3-1.]  PROCLAMATION.  89 

dignified  by  the  name  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
They  are  destroying  the  property  of  citizens  of  your 
State  and  ruining  your  magnificent  railways.  The  Gene 
ral  Government  has  heretofore  carefully  abstained  from 
sending  troops  across  the  Ohio,  or  even  from  posting  them 
along  its  banks,  although  frequently  urged  to  do  so  by 
many  of  your  prominent  citizens.  It  determined  to  await 
the  result  of  the  late  election,  desirous  that  no  one  might 
be  able  to  say  that  the  slightest  effort  had  been  made 
from  this  side  to  influence  the  free  expression  of  your 
opinions,  although  the  many  agencies  brought  to  bear 
upon  you  by  the  rebels  were  well  known.  You  have  now 
shown,  under  the  most  adverse  circumstances,  that  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  of  Western  Virginia  are  true 
and  loyal  to  that  beneficent  Government  under  which  we 
and  our  fathers  have  lived  so  long.  As  soon  as  the  result 
of  the  election  was  known,  the  traitors  commenced  their 
work  of  destruction.  The  General  Government  cannot 
close  its  ears  to  the  demand  you  have  made  for  assistance. 
I  have  ordered  troops  to  cross  the  Ohio  River.  They 
come  as  your  friends  and  brothers, — as  enemies  only  to 
the  armed  rebels  who  are  preying  upon  you.  Your 
homes,  your  families,  and  your  property  are  safe  under 
our  protection.  All  your  rights  shall  be  religiously  re 
spected,  notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said  by  the 
traitors  to  induce  you  to  believe  that  our  advent  among 
you  will  be  signalized  by  interference  with  your  slaves. 
Understand  one  thing  clearly.  Not  only  will  we  abstain 
from  all  such  interference,  but  we  will,  on  the  contrary, 
with  an  iron  hand,  crush  any  attempt  at  insurrection  on 
their  part.  Now  that  we  are  in  your  midst,  I  call  upon 
you  to  fl}r  to  arms  and  support  the  General  Government. 
Sever  the  connection  that  binds  you  to  traitors ;  pro 
claim  to  the  world  that  the  faith  and  loyalty  so  long 
boasted  by  the  Old  Dominion  are  still  preserved  in 


90  ADDRESS.  [1801. 

Western  Virginia,  and  that  you  remain  true  to  the  Stars 
and  Stripes. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  U.  S.  A.,  Com'd'g  Dep't." 

"HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO,  j 
CINCINNATI,  May  26,  1861.  j 

"SOLDIERS: — -You  are  ordered  to  cross  the  frontier  and 
enter  upon  the  soil  of  Virginia. 

"  Your  mission  is  to  restore  peace  and  confidence,  to  pro 
tect  the  majesty  of  the  law,  and  to  rescue  our  brethren 
from  the  grasp  of  armed  traitors.  You  are  to  act  in  con 
cert  with  Virginia  troops,  and  to  support  their  advance. 
1  place  under  the  safeguard  of  your  honor  the  persons 
and  property  of  the  Virginians.  I  know  that  you  will  re 
spect  their  feelings  and  all  their  rights. 

' '  Preserve  the  strictest  discipline.  Remember  that  each 
one  of  you  holds  in  his  keeping  the  honor  of  Ohio  and 
the  Union.  If  you  are  called  upon  to  overcome  armed 
opposition,  I  know  that  your  courage  is  equal  to  the  task ; 
but  remember  that  your  only  foes  are  the  armed 
traitors, — and  show  mercy  even  to  them  when  they  are 
in  your  power,  for  many  of  them  are  misguided.  When, 
under  your  protection,  the  loyal  men  of  Western  Virginia 
have  been  enabled  to  organize  and  arm,  they  can  protect 
themselves ;  and  you  can  then  return  to  your  homes  with 
the  proud  satisfaction  of  having  saved  a  gallant  people 
from  destruction. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"  Major-General  U.  S.  A.,  Com'd'g." 

General  McClellan  also  wrote  full  particulars  to 
the  President  of  what  he  had  done,  but,  receiving 
no  reply,  inferred  that  his  course  was  approved  of. 

Colonel  Kelley  reached  Grafton  on  the  13th  of 
May.  The  enemy  retreated  at  his  approach,  and  he 


Ao  R  3-1.]  BATTLE     OF     PHILIP  P  I.  9 1 

repaired  the  bridge,  and  established  railroad-com 
munications  with  Wheeling.  Soon  after,  Colonel 
Stedman  occupied  Clarksburg,  and  established  com 
munications  with  Colonel  Kellcy.  The  enemy  fell 
back  from  Graf  ton  upon  Philippi,  on  the  high-road 
from  Wheeling  to  Staunton,  in  Central  Virginia. 
General  McClellan  in  the  mean  time  had  despatched 
three  Indiana  regiments,  under  Brigadier-General 
Morris,  to  Grafton.  They  arrived  on  the  31st  of 
Ma}r;  and  General  Morris  at  once  assumed  the  chief 
command.  Hardly  six  weeks  had  elapsed  since 
Captain  McClellan  had  been  first  called  upon  by 
Governor  Dennison  for  assistance;  and  in  that  time 
he  had  actually  created  an  army  and  begun  the  first 
campaign ! 

The  first  encounter  of  the  war  took  place  at 
Philippi,  a  small  town  two  hundred  and  ten  miles 
from  Eichmond.  On  the  2d  of  June,  General 
Morris  determined  to  endeavor  to  drive  from  this 
town  the  rebel  force  there,  under  Colonel  Porter- 
field.  The  attacking  force  consisted  of  five  regi 
ments,  formed  in  two  columns, — the  first  under 
Colonel  Kellcy,  the  second  under  Colonel  Dumont, 
accompanied  by  Colonel  (afterwards  the  lamented 
General)  Lander.  Colonel  Kelley's  column  moved 
towards  Philippi  by  way  of  Thornton,  a  distance 
of  twenty-seven  miles,  partly  by  railroad.  The 
other  column  moved  directly  on  Philippi  in  front. 
This  one  reached  its  destination  early  on  the  3d, 
notwithstanding  deep  mud  and  heavy  rain,  and 
at  once  opened  fire  from  two  pieces  of  artillery 
upon  the  enemy,  who  began  a  retreat,  which  was 


i)2  PROVISIONAL    GOVERNMENT.  [1861. 

turned  into  a  complete  rout  when  Colonel  Kelley, 
(who  had  been  greatly  impeded  by  the  state  of  the 
roads)  came  up  and  joined  in  the  attack.  The 
enemy  left  behind  them  their  camp-equipage, 
seven  hundred  stand  of  arms,  and  several  horses. 
They  lost  about  fifteen  men  killed  and  wounded. 
On  the  Federal  side,  Colonel  Kelley  was  severely 
wounded,  but  recovered. 

General  jVIcClellan  now  pushed  the  Ohio  regi 
ments  on  into  Virginia  as  rapidly  as  they  could  be 
decently  equipped.  But  the  great  deficiency  which 
still  existed  in  all  military  necessaries  much  re 
tarded  him.  The  loyalists,  on  the  13th  of  June, 
formed  a  provisional  government  at  Wheeling,  with 
the  Hon.  Francis  II.  Pierpoint  as  Governor,  But  Old 
Virginia  was  determined  not  to  lose  the  fine  country 
beyond  the  Alleghanies  without  a  struggle.  Large 
reinforcements  arrived  at  Beverly,  on  the  Staunton 
road,  the  head-quarters  of  the  enemy;  and  with 
them  came  Gfencral  Eobert  Selden  Garnett,  the 
former  commandant  at  West  Point,  and  an  officer 
of  high  reputation,  to  assume  the  chief  command. 
Upon  learning  this,  General  McClellan  thought  it 
time  to  move;  and,  his  preparations  being  so  far 
advanced  as  to  justify  it,  he  left  Cincinnati  on  the 
20th  of  June,  and  arrived  at  Grafton  on  the  22d. 

He  still  received  no  orders  from  Washington,  and 
was  even  left  ignorant  of  the  plan  for  the  campaign 
in  Eastern  Virginia.  His  own  department  was  very 
extensive,  and  the  simple  administrative  cares  con 
nected  with  it  extremely  arduous.  Besides,  not  only 
in  Virginia,  but  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  the 


AGE  34.]  WESTERN     VIRGINIA.  9H 

enemy  were  very  active,  and  it  could  not  be  known 
how  soon  he  might  be  called  upon  to  plan  a  cam 
paign  for  the  defence  of  the  Union  interests  in  those 
States. 

The  country  which  now  became  the  scene  of  ope 
rations  was  that  part  of  Western  Virginia  lying 
between  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Eailroad  on  the 
north,  the  Ohio  River  on  the  west,  the  Little  Ka- 
nawha  River  on  the  south,  and  the  Cheat  River  on 
the  east.  The  region  is  broken  and  mountainous, 
and  cut  into  numerous  ravines  and  valleys  by  the 
many  little  streams  which  form  the  hea^d-waters  of 
the  Monongahela,  Great  Kanawha,  Little  Kanawha, 
and  other  rivers.  The  roads  are  few  in  number 
and  very  indifferent  in  quality;  the  valleys  only  are 
cultivated,  the  rest  of  the  country  being  covered 
with  dense  forests,  and  a  luxuriant  growth  of 
bushes  which  makes  the  woods  almost  impassable. 
A  turnpike  road  runs  from  Wheeling  southeasterly 
to  Staunton,  through  Philippi,  Leedsville,  Beverly, 
and  Huttonsville.  From  Beverly  another  turnpike 
runs  westerly,  at  an  acute  angle  with  the  Wheeling 
road,  to  Buckhannon,  where  it  branches  oif  to  Clarks 
burg  on  the  north  and  Weston  on  the  west.  A 
mountainous  ridge  crosses  the  two  roads  from  Bev 
erly  to  Philippi  and  Buckhannon;  and  at  the  inter 
section  the  enemy  were  strongly  intrenched, — Gene 
ral  Garnett  commanding  in  person  at  Laurel  Hill, 
on  the  Philippi  road,  a  little  north  of  Leedsville 
and  fifteen  miles  north  of  Beverly,  and  Colonel 
Pegram  at  Rich  Mountain,  on  the  Buckhannon 
road,  five  miles  west  of  Beverly.  General  Gar- 


t)4  GENERAL     MCQLELLAN's    PLANS.        [ISfil. 

nett's  force  was  about  ten  thousand  men,  and  Colo 
nel  Pegram's  about  four  thousand.  Their  natural 
retreat  was  by  way  of  Beverly  and  Huttonsville 
through  the  Cheat  Mountain  Pass,  as  it  is  called. 
North  of  this  there  is  no  road  over  the  Alleghanies 
passable  for  artillery  until  the  circuitous  road  run 
ning  northeasterly  from  Leedsville  through  St. 
George  and  West  Union  to  Moorfield  is  reached. 
If,  therefore,  by  the  capture  of  Beverly  the  road  by 
Cheat  Mountain  Pass  (and  with  it  any  other  road 
south  of  it)  were  cut  off,  this  north  road  was  the 
only  retreat  open  to  General  Garnett. 

General  McClellan's  plans  are  best  described  in 
his  own  language.  On  the  23d  of  June  he  wrote 
a  letter  to  General  Scott.  "  I  stated,"  says  he, 
"that  it  wras  now  certain  that  the  enemy  had  a 
force  of  some  kind  near  Huttonsville,  with  a 
strong  advanced  party  intrenched  near  Laurel  Moun 
tain,  between  Philippi  and  Beverly,  and  that  their 
chief  object  seemed  to  me  to  be  to  furnish  arid  pro 
tect  guerrilla  parties,  which  were  then  doing  much 
mischief;  also  that  the  apprehensions  which  had  ex 
isted  on  the  part  of  our  people  of  an  attack  by  this 
party  of  the  enemy  were  not  well  founded;  that, 
as  soon  as"  my  command  was  well  in  hand  and  my 
information  more  full,  I  proposed  moving  with 
all  my  available  force  from  Clarksburg  on  Buck- 
hannon,  thence  on  Beverly,  to  turn  entirely  the  de 
tachment  at  Laurel  Hill,  the  troops  at  Philippi  to 
advance  in  time  to  follow  up  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy  in  their  front.  That,  after  occupying  Bev 
erly,  I  would  move  on  Huttonsville  and  drive  the 


ACE  34.  J  PRO  CLAM  AT  I  OX.  95 

enemy  into  the  mountains,  whither  I  did  not  pur 
pose  to  follow  them  unless  certain  of  success." 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  the  main  body  of  his 
army,  numbering  about  ten  thousand  men,  were 
transferred  to  Clarksburg.  It  consisted  of  two 
brigades,  under  Brigadier-Generals  Rosecrans  and 
Schleich,  with  a  small  body  of  cavalry,  a  company 
of  regular  artillery,  and  two  batteries  of  volunteer 
artillery.  Another  body,  under  General  Morris, 
was  stationed  at  Philippi,  and  a  body  of  reserve, 
under  Brigadier-General  Hill,  of  the  Ohio  militia, 
was  stationed  at  Grafton.  Before  leaving  Graft  on, 
General  McClellan  issued  the  following  proclama 
tion  and  address : — 

"IlKAD-QlTARTERS,   DEPARTMENT  OF  THK    OHIO,  1 

GKAFTOX,  VA.,  June  23,  1861.  j 

"To  the  Inhabitants  of  Western  Virginia, 

"The  army  of  this  department,  headed  by  Virginia 
troops,  is  rapidly  occupying  all  Western  Virginia.  This 
is  done  in  co-operation  with  and  in  support  of  such  civil 
authorities  of  the  State  as  are  faithful  to  the  Constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States.  The  proclamation  issued 
by  me  under  date  of  May  20,  1801,  will  be  strictly  main 
tained.  Your  houses,  families,  property,  and  all  your 
rights  will  be  religiously  respected:  we  are  enemies  to 
none  but  armed  rebels  and  those  voluntarily  giving  them 
aid.  All  officers  of  this  army  will  be  held  responsible 
for  the  most  prompt  and  vigorous  action  in  repressing 
disorder  and  punishing  aggression  by  those  under  their 
command. 

"To  my  great  regret,  I  find  that  enemies  of  the  United 
States  continue  to  carry  on  a  system  of  hostilities  pro 
hibited  by  the  laws  of  war  among  belligerent  nations, 
and,  of  course,  far  more  wicked  and  intolerable  when  di- 


06  ADDRESS.  [1861, 

rected  against  loyal  citizens  engaged  in  the  defence  of 
the  common  government  of  all.  Individuals  and  maraud 
ing  parties  are  pursuing  a  guerrilla  warfare, — firing  upon 
sentinels  and  pickets,  burning  bridges,  insulting,  injuring, 
and  even  killing  citizens  because  of  their  Union  senti 
ments,  and  committing  many  kindred  acts. 

"I  do  now,  therefore,  make  proclamation,  and  warn  all 
persons,  that  individuals  or  parties  engaged  in  this  species 
of  warfare, — irregular  in  every  view  which  can  be  taken  of 
it, — thus  attacking  sentinels,  pickets,  or  other  soldiers, 
destroying  public  or  private  property,  or  committing  in 
juries  against  any  of  the  inhabitants  because  of  Union 
sentiments  or  conduct,  will  be  dealt  with,  in  their  persons 
and  property,  according  to  the  severest  rules  of  military 
law. 

"All  persons  giving  information  or  aid  to  the  public 
enemies  will  be  arrested  and  kept  in  close  custody;  and 
all  persons  found  bearing  arms,  unless  of  known  loyalty, 
will  be  arrested  and  held  for  examination. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAX, 

"  Major-General  U.  S.  A.  Com'd'g." 

"HEAD-QUARTERS     DEPARTMENT    OF    THE    OHIO,} 

GRAFTOX,  VA.,  June  25,  1861.  j 

"  To  the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  West. 
"You  are  here  to  support  the  Government  of  your 
country,  and  to  protect  the  lives  and  liberties  of  your 
brethren,  threatened  by  a  rebellious  and  traitorous  foe. 
No  higher  and  nobler  duty  could  devolve  upon  you ;  and 
I  expect  you  to  bring  to  its  performance  the  highest 
and  noblest  qualities  of  soldiers, — discipline,  courage,  and 
mercy.  I  call  upon  the  officers  of  every  grade  to  enforce 
the  strictest  discipline ;  and  I  know  that  those  of  all  grades, 
privates  and  officers,  will  display  in  battle  cool  heroic 
courage,  and  will  know  how  to  show  mercy  to  a  disarmed 
enemy. 


AGE  34.]  ADDRESS.  97 

"  Bear  in  mind  that  you  are  in  the  country  of  friends, 
not  of  enemies, — that  you  are  here  to  protect,  not  to  de 
stroy.  Take  nothing,  destroy  nothing,  unless  you  are 
ordered  to  do  so  by  your  general  officers.  Remember 
that  I  have  pledged  my  word  to  the  people  of  Western 
Virginia  that  their  rights  in  person  and  property  shall 
be  respected.  I  ask  every  one  of  you  to  make  good 
this  promise  in  its  broadest  sense.  We  come  here  to 
save,  not  to  upturn.  I  do  not  appeal  to  the  fear  of  pun 
ishment,  but  to  your  appreciation  of  the  sacredness  of 
the  cause  in  which  we  are  engaged.  Carry  with  you  into 
battle  the  conviction  that  you  are  right  and  that  God  is 
on  your  side. 

"Your  enemies  have  violated  every  moral  law:  neither 
God  nor  man  can  sustain  them.  They  have  without  cause 
rebelled  against  a  mild  and  paternal  Government;  they 
have  seized  upon  public  and  private  property ;  they  have 
outraged  the  persons  of  Northern  men  merely  because 
they  came  from  the  North,  and  of  Southern  Union  men 
merely  because  they  loved  the  Union;  they  have  placed 
themselves  beneath  contempt,  unless  they  can  retrieve 
some  honor  on  the  field  of  battle.  You  will  pursue  a 
different  course.  You  will  be  honest,  brave,  and  merci 
ful  ;  you  will  respect  the  right  of  private  opinion ;  you 
will  punish  no  man  for  opinion's  sake.  Show  to  the 
world  that  you  differ  from  our  enemies  in  the  points  of 
honor,  honesty,  and  respect  for  private  opinion,  and  that 
we  inaugurate  no  reign  of  terror  where  we  go. 

"Soldiers,  I  have  heard  that  there  was  danger  here. 
I  have  come  to  place  myself  at  your  head  and  to  share 
it  with  you.  I  fear  now  but  one  thing, — that  you  will  not 
find  foemen  worthy  of  your  steel.  I  know  that  I  can 
rely  upon  you. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"  Major- General  Com'd'g." 


98  K  I  C  II     M  0  U  X  T  A  I  y.  [1 361. 

Buckhaunon  was  occupied  on  the  30th  by  Gene 
ral  Rosecrans,  and  a  regiment  was  sent  to  take 
possession  of  Weston.  General  McClellan  and 
staff  and  General  Schleich's  brigade  reached  Buck- 
hannon  on  the  2d  of  July.  Before  advancing  on 
the  enemy,  General  McClellan  had  to  give  direc 
tions  regarding  an  independent  portion  of  his.  de 
partment.  Generals  Wise  and  Floyd  had  invaded 
the  country  south  of  the  Little  Kanawha  River, 
with  a  large  force.  To  meet  these,  General  Mc 
Clellan  directed  Brigadier-General  J.  Dolson  Cox 
to  proceed  thither  from  Ohio  with  five  regiments, 
and  assigned  to  him  the  district  between  the  Great 
and  Little  Kanawha  Eivers. 

On  the  9th,  the  main  column  of  the  army  reached 
Eoaring  Fork,  beyond  Buckhanuon,  and  two  miles 
from  Colonel  Pegram's  intrenchrnents.  A  bridge 
which  had  been  destroyed  had  to  be  rebuilt.  On 
the  10th,  Lieutenant  Poe  was  sent  out  with  a  de 
tachment  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy's  position.  This 
reconnoissance  was  pushed  within  two  hundred 
yards  of  the  enemy's  works.  Colonel  Pegram,  it 
was  found,  was  strongly  intrenched  near  the  foot 
of  Rich  Mountain  and  on  the  west  side  of  it.  The 
position  was  surrounded  by  dense  forests,  and  its 
natural  strength  had  been  increased  by  rough  in- 
trenchments  and  by  felling  trees. 

As  an  attack  in  front  would  be  followed  by  a  serious 
loss  of  life,  and  its  success  with  raw  troops,  to  say 
the  least,  was  doubtful,  General  McClellan's  plan 
was  to  turn  Colonel  Pegram's  position  to  the  south, 
endeavor  to  cut  off  his  retreat,  and,  should  he  sue- 


Ao E  3  I.  j  R I  C  H     M  0  U  N  T  A  1  N.  99 

cecd  in  so  doing,  to  push  on  to  Beverly  and  cut  off 
General  G-arnett's  retreat  by  Staunton,  forcing  him 
to  retire  by  th.e  northeasterly  road  to  Moorfield- 
The  duty  of  turning  the  enemy's  works  was  as 
signed  to  General  Rosecrans.  His  instructions  were 
to  make  a  circuit  to  the  south  and  endeavor  to 
reach  and  occupy  the  top  of  the  mountain,  get 
command  of  the  turnpike  road  from  Beverly  to 
Buckhannon,  and  then  move  on  the  rear  of  Pe- 
gram's  defences.  His  farther  order,  constantly  to 
communicate  with  General  McClellan,  General  Rose 
crans  does  not  seem  to  have  been  able  to  carry  out. 
General  Rosecrans  set  out,  with  a  force  of  eigh 
teen  hundred  infantry  and  a  small  body  of  cavalry, 
at  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  of  July, 
to  execute  these  orders.  After  a  fatiguing  march 
through  a  country  saturated  with  rain  and  covered 
with  dense  woods,  he  reached  the  summit  of  Rich 
Mountain  about  one  o'clock.  The  enemy  had  in 
tercepted  some  letters,  and  thus  obtained  intimation 
of  this  movement,  and  had  stationed  a  considerable 
force,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  at  the  top  of  the 
mountain,  where  some  rude  intrenchments  had  been 
thrown  up.  Rosecrans  formed  his  command,  and 
had  proceeded  a  short  way  towards  the  turnpike, 
when  he  came  upon  a  party  of  skirmishers,  who 
were  driven  back  upon  the  main  body.  The  enemy 
now  opened  fire  from  their  artillery.  A  spirited 
attack  soon  carried  the  intrenchments,  and  the 
rebels  retreated  in  confusion  upon  Colonel  Pegram, 
leaving  their  artillery  in  possession  of  the  Federals. 
The  success  of  the  movement  was  complete;  but 


100      DESPATCH    FROM    RICH     MOUNTAIN.    [1861. 

his  troops,  unused  to  such  exertions,  being  greatly 
fatigued,  General  Rosecrans  halted. 

No  communication  was  received  at  head-quarters 
from  Rosecrans  after  eleven  o'clock.  The  firing  at 
Rich  Mountain  was  distinctly  heard;  but  great 
fears  were  entertained  that  the  attack  had  failed. 
"Soon  after  the  cessation  of  the  distant  firing," 
says  General  McClellan,  "an  officer  was  observed 
to  ride  into  the  intrenchments  and  address  the 
garrison.  We  could  not  distinguish  the  words  he 
uttered,  but  his  speech  was  followed  by  prolonged 
cheering,  which  impressed  many  with  the  belief 
that  it  had  fared  badly  with  our  detachment/' 

General  McClellan  determined  to  attack  the  enemy 
in  front,  and  Lieutenant  Poe  was  sent  to  select  a 
proper  position  for  the  artillery.  Upon  his  report 
ing  one,  a  party  was  despatched  to  cut  a  road  to  it. 
It  was  now  too  late  in  the  day  to  begin  an  attack; 
but  one  was  resolved  upon  early  the  next  morning, 
in  hopes  of  relieving  Rosecrans  if  he  were  hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy.  The  next  morning,  how 
ever,  the  pickets  reported  that  Colonel  Pegram  had 
deserted  his  works  and  fled  over  the  mountains. 
Leaving  Rosecrans  at  Rich  Mountain,  General 
McClellan  pushed  on  to  Beverly.  He  thus  effectu 
ally  cut  off  General  Garnett's  communications  with 
Staunton.  His  despatch  was  as  follows: — 

"  RICH  MOUNTAIN,  VA.,  9  A.M.,  July  12. 
"  COLONEL  E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant-General; — 

"We  are  in  possession  of  all  the  enemy's  works  up  to 
a  point  in  sight  of  Beverly.  We  have  taken  all  his  guns, 
a  very  large  amount  of  wagons,  tents,  &c.,  every  thing  ha 


AGE  3-l.j  BEVERLY.  101 

had,  and  also  a  large  number  of  prisoners,  many  of  whom 
are  wounded,  and  amongst  whom  are  several  officers. 
They  lost  many  killed.  We  have  lost  in  all  perhaps 
twenty  killed  and  forty  wounded,  of  whom  all  but  two 
or  three  were  in  the  column  under  Colonel  Rosecrans, 
which  turned  the  position.  The  mass  of  the  enemy 
escaped  through  the  woods,  entirely  disorganized.  Among 
the  prisoners  is  Dr.  Taylor,  formerly  of  the  army.  Colonel 
Pegram  was  in  command. 

"Colonel  Rosecrans's  column  left  camp  yesterday  morn 
ing  and  marched  some  eight  miles  through  the  moun 
tains,  reaching  the  turnpike  some  two  or  three  miles 
in  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  He  defeated  an  advanced 
force,  and  took  a  couple  of  guns.  I  had  a  position  ready 
for  twelve  guns  near  the  main  camp,  and  as  the  guns 
were  moving  up  I  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  re 
treated.  I  am  now  pushing  on  to  Beverly, — a  part  of 
Colonel  Rosecrans's  troops  being  now  within  three  miles 
of  that  place.  Our  success  is  complete,  and  almost  blood 
less.  I  doubt  whether  Wise  and  Johnston  will  unite  and 
overpower  me.  The  behavior  of  our  troops  in  action 
and  towards  prisoners  was  admirable. 

"  G.  B.  McC/LELLAN, 

"  Majoi'- General  commanding." 

On  the  night  of  the  llth,  General  Garnett,  learn 
ing  of  the  disaster  at  Rich  Mountain,  fell  back  on 
Beverly;  but.  finding  his  retreat  that  way  cut  off', 
he  retraced  his  steps,  and  took  the  northern  road 
by  St.  George  and  West  Union.  In  accordance  with 
orders.  General  Morris  followed  him,  and  overtook 
him  at  Carrick's  Ford,  on  the  main  fork  of  Cheat 
River.  The  enemy  were  posted  in  a  tolerably 
strong  position,  but  did  not  withstand  the  attack, 

led  by  Captain  Bonham,  and  retreated  in  confusion. 

y» 


102  ADDRESS.  [1881. 

General  Garnett  was  himself  killed  while  endeavor 
ing  to  rally  his  troops.  With  soldier-like  generosity, 
General  Morris  directed  the  remains  to  be  carefully 
removed,  and  afterwards  forwarded  them  to  the 
family  in  Virginia. 

The  enemy  lost  in  these  engagements  about  two 
hundred  killed,  besides  wounded  and  prisoners, 
seven  or  eight  pieces  of  artillery,  and  large  military 
stores.  General  Hill  failed  to  carry  out  the  direc 
tions  sent  to  him  to  pursue  General  Garnett's  force, 
and  they  escaped.  Colonel  Pegram,  however,  find 
ing  that  Garnett  had  retreated,  fell  back  on  Beverly, 
and  was  compelled  to  surrender  at  discretion,  on 
the  13th,  with  about  six  hundred  men.  General 
McClellan  occupied  Huttonsville  and  the  Cheat 
Mountain  Pass,  thus  gaining  the  key  to  Western 
Virginia.  On  the  19th  of  July  he  issued  the  fol 
lowing  address  to  the  army : — 

"SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  WEST: — 

"  I  am  more  than  satisfied  with  you.  You  have  anni 
hilated  two  armies,  commanded  by  educated  and  expe 
rienced  soldiers,  intrenched  in  mountain-fastnesses,  and 
fortified  at  their  leisure.  You  have  taken  five  guns, 
twelve  colors,  fifteen  hundred  stand  of  arms,  one  thou 
sand  prisoners,  including  more  than  forty  officers.  One 
of  the  second  commanders  of  the  rebels  is  a  prisoner; 
the  other  lost  his  life  on  the  field  of  battle.  You  have 
killed  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  enemy, 
who  has  lost  all  his  baggage  and  camp-equipage.  All  this 
has  been  done  with  the  loss  of  twenty  brave  men  killed 
and  sixty  wounded  on  your  part. 

"  You  have  proved  that  Union  men  fighting  for  the  pre 
servation  of  onr  Government  are  raor^  than  »  match  for 


AGE  34.]        SUMMONS     TO     WASHINGTON.  10<> 

our  misguided  and  erring  brothers.  More  than  this,  you 
have  shown  mercy  to  the  vanquished.  You  have  made 
long  and  arduous  marches,  with  insufficient  food,  fre 
quently  exposed  to  the  inclemency  of  the  weather.  »  [ 
have  not  hesitated  to  demand  this  of  you,  feeling  that  I 
could  rely  on  your  endurance,  patriotism,  and  courage. 
In  the  future  I  may  have  still  greater  demands  to  make 
upon  you,  still  greater  sacrifices  for  you  to  offer.  It  shall 
be  my  care  to  provide  for  you  to  the  extent  of  my  ability  ; 
but  I  know  now  that  by  your  valor  and  endurance  you 
will  accomplish  all  that  is  asked. 

"Soldiers,  I  have  confidence  in  you,  and  I  trust  you 
have  learned  to  confide  in  me:  Remember  that  discipline 
and  subordination  are  qualities  of  equal  value  with  cou 
rage.  I  am  proud  to  say  that  you  have  gained  the  highest 
reward  that  American  troops  can  receive, — the  thanks  of 
Congress  and  the  applause  of  your  fellow-citizens. 

"G-EO.  B.  McC/LELLAN,  Major- General.'" 

In  the  mean  time,  affairs  looked  perilous  in  Gene 
ral  Cox's  department,  south  of  the  Little  Kanawha 
River.  General  McClellan  was  preparing  to  take 
command  there  in  person,  when,  on  the  22d  of  July, 
he  received  orders  to  hand  over  his  command  to 
General  Rosecraus  and  report  at  Washington,  where 
a  wider  field  awaited  him. 

Thus  ended  the  campaign  in  Western  Virginia. 
It  seems  insignificant  by  the  side  of  some  of  the 
bloody  contests  which  have  since  taken  place;  but 
its  moral  effect  was  remarkable.  It  was  the  first 
trial  that  the  raw  troops  of  the  J^orth  were  put 
to,  and  its  success  was  most  encouraging.  This  is 
shown  by  the  general  satisfaction  with  wThich,  in  the 
midst  of  the  gloom  created  by  the  battle  of  Bull 


1 04  W  A  S  H  I  N  G  T  0  N .  [1861. 

Run,   the  intelligence  was   received  that  General 
McClellan  was  summoned  to  Washington. 

In  organizing  the  Western  Army,  General  Me- 
Clellan's  services  were  of  great  value.  No  pre 
parations  had  been  made  beforehand  for  the  strug 
gle;  and  it  is  his  deserved  honor  that,  finding  the 
West  unprepared,  he  organized  the  germ  of  that 
brave  army  which  has  since  gained  such  renown 
in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Mississippi, 


CHAPTER  V. 

WHEN  General  McClellan  assumed  command  in 
Washington,  on  the  27th  of  July,  the  whole  number 
of  troops  in  and  around  the  city  was  a  little  over 
fifty  thousand,  of  whom  less  than  a  thousand  were 
cavalry,  and  about  six  hundred  and  fifty  were  ar 
tillery-men,  with  nine  imperfect  field-batteries  of 
thirty  pieces.  They  were  encamped  in  places  se 
lected  without  regard  to  purposes  of  defence  or 
instruction;  the  roads  were  not  picketed,  and  there 
was  no  attempt  at  an  organization  into  brigades. 
The  works  of  defence  were  very  limited  in  number 
and  very  defective  in  character.  There  was  nothing 
to  prevent  the  enemy's  shelling  the  city  from 
heights  within  easy  range,  and  very  little  to  pre 
vent  their  occupying  those  heights  had  they  been  so 
disposed.  The  streets  of  Washington  were  crowded 
with  straggling  officers  and  disorderly  men,  absent 
from  their  stations  without  authority,  whose  be- 


Ai;E34.j    LABORS    OF    GENERAL    MCCLELLAN.     105 

havior  indicated  a  general  want  of  discipline,  aggra 
vated  by  the  demoralizing  influences  of  the  recent 
disaster  at  Bull  Eun,  July  21,  1861. 

The  task  of  the  commanding  officer  was  one  of 
no  common  magnitude.  He  had  the  materials  for 
an  army, — and  excellent  materials,  too,  but  still  only 
materials.  He  had  no  more  than  the  block  out 
of  which  an  army  was  to  be  carved.  There  were 
courage,  patriotism,  intelligence,  physical  energy, 
in  abundance;  and  to  these  invaluable  qualities 
were  to  be  added  discipline,  the  instinct  of  obe 
dience,  precision  of  movement,  and  the  power  of 
combination.  A  tumultuary  military  assemblage 
was  to  be  organized  into  brigades,  divisions,  and 
corps,  and  brought  into  proper  relations  with  their 
commanders.  An  adequate  artillery  establishment 
was  to  be  created,  and  a  sufficient  force  of  engineers 
and  topographical  engineers  was  to  be  provided. 
The  medical  department,  the  quartermaster's,  the 
subsistence,  the  ordnance,  the  provost-marshal's 
departments,  were  all  to  be  set  in  movement.  A 
signal  corps  was  to  be  formed,  and  instructed  in 
the  use  of  flags  by  day  and  lights  by  night;  and,  to 
keep  pace  with  the  march  of  scientific  improvement, 
a  body  of  telegraphic  operators  could  not  be  for 
gotten. 

To  these  gigantic  labors  General  McClellan  ad 
dressed  himself  with  unwearied  diligence;  and  he 
was  ably  seconded  by  a  most  efficient  staff,  with 
numbers  increased  from  time  to  time  as  necessity 
required.  The  new  levies  of  infantry,  upon  ar 
riving  in  Washington,  were  formed  into  provi- 


106  MEMORANDUM     ON     THE     WAR.  [1861. 

Bional  brigades,  and  placed  in  camp  in  the  suburbs 
of  the  city  for  equipment,  instruction,  and  discipline. 
Cavalry  and  artillery  troops  reported  to  officers 
designated  for  that  purpose.  Order  was  restored 
in  Washington  by  a  military  police  bureau,  at  the 
head  of  wThich  were  a  provost-marshal  and  a  body 
of  efficient  assistants.  New  defensive  works  were 
projected  and  thrown  up.  Everywhere  the  hum 
of  active,  organized,  and  harmonious  industry  was 
heard.  A  preliminary  organization  was  made  of 
the  troops  on  hand  into  twelve  brigades.  These 
were  all  volunteers,  except  two  companies  of 
cavalry  and  four  of  artillery;  but  all  the  com 
manding  officers  had  been  educated  at  West  Point, 
with  the  single  exception  of  Colonel  Blenker,  who 
had  had  a  good  military  training  in  Europe. 

On  the  4th  of  August,  1861,  General  McClellan 
addressed  to  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
at  his  request,  a  memorandum  upon  the  objects  of 
the  war,  the  principles  on  which  it  should  be  con 
ducted,  and  the  operations  by  which  it  might  be 
brought  to  a  speedy  and  successful  termination. 
As  this  is  an  important  document  in  the  history  of 
the  war,  which  should  be  carefully  read  by  all  who 
desire  to  understand  its  subsequent  course,  and  still 
more  by  those  who  would  do  justice  to  a  command 
ing  officer  whose  military  capacity  and  even  whose 
loyalty  and  patriotism  have  been  called  in  question 
in  high  places,  it  is  here  inserted  in  full : — 

"The  object  of  the  present  war  differs  from  those  in 
which  nations  are  usually  engaged  mainly  in  this:  that 


A<;:;  o  i.J       M  E  M  (>  II  A  X  D  U  M     O  X     T  IT  K     V,"  A  R.  ]  07 

the  p«rpo.se  of  ordinary  war  is  to  conquer  a  peace  and 
make  a  treaty  on  advantageous  terms ;  in  this  contest  it 
lias  become  necessary  to  crush  a  population  sufficiently 
numerous,  intelligent,  and  warlike  to  constitute  a  nation. 
We  have  not  only  to  defeat  their  armed  and  organized 
forces  in  the  field,  but  to  display  such  an  overwhelming 
strength  as  will  convince  all  our  antagonists,  especially 
those  of  the  governing  aristocratic  class,  of  the  utter  im 
possibility  of  resistance.  Our  late  reverses  make  this 
course  imperative.  Had  we  been  successful  in  the  recent 
battle  (Manassas),  it  is  possible  that  we  might  have  been 
spared  the  labor  and  expense  of  a  great  effort. 

"  Now  we  have  no  alternative.  Their  success  will 
enable  the  political  leaders  of  the  rebels  to  convince  the 
mass  of  their  people  that  we  are  inferior  to  them  in  force 
and  courage,  and  to  command  all  their  resources.  The 
contest  began  with  a  class;  now  it  is  with  a  people:  our 
military  success  can  alone  restore  the  former  issue. 

"By  thoroughly  defeating  their  armies,  taking  their 
strong  places,  and  pursuing  a  rigidly  protective  policy  as 
to  private  property  and  unarmed  persons  and  a  lenient 
course  as  to  private  soldiers,  we  may  well  hope  for  a  perma 
nent  restoration  of  a  peaceful  Union.  But  in  the  first 
instance  the  authority  of  the  Government  must  be  sup 
ported  by  overwhelming  physical  force. 

"Our  foreign  relations  and  financial  credit  also  impera 
tively  demand  that  the  military  action  of  the  Govern 
ment  should  be  prompt  and  irresistible. 

"The  rebels  have  chosen  Virginia  as  their  battle-field; 
and  it  seems  proper  for  us  to  make  the  first  great  struggle 
there.  But,  while  thus  .directing  our  main  efforts,  it  is 
necessary  to  diminish  the  resistance  there  offered  us,  by 
movements  on  other  points,  both  by  land  and  water. 

"Without  entering  at  present  into  details,  I  would  ad 
vise  that  a  strong  movement  be  made  on  the  Mississippi, 
and  that  the  rebels  be  driven  out  of  Missouri. 


108  MEMORANDUM    ON     THE     WAR.  [1861. 

"As  soon  as  it  becomes  perfectly  clear  that  Kentucky 
is  cordially  united  with  us,  I  would  advise  a  movement 
through  that  State  into  Eastern  Tennessee,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  assisting  the  Union  men  of  that  region,  and  of 
seizing  the  railroads  leading  from  Memphis  to  the  East. 

"The  possession  of  those  roads  by  us,  in  connection 
with  the  movement  on  the  Mississippi,  would  go  far 
towards  determining  the  evacuation  of  Virginia  by  the 
rebels.  In  the  mean  time,  all  the  passes  into  Western 
Virginia  from  the  east  should  be  securely  guarded ;  but 
I  would  advise  no  movement  from  that  quarter  towards 
Richmond,  unless  the  political  condition  of  Kentucky 
renders  it  impossible  or  inexpedient  for  us  to  make  the 
movement  upon  Eastern  Tennessee  through  that  State. 
Every  effort  should,  however,  be  made  to  organize,  equip, 
and  arm  as  many  troops  as  possible  in  Western  Virginia, 
in  order  to  render  the  Ohio  and  Indiana  regiments  avail 
able  for  other  operations. 

"  At  as  early  a  day  as  practicable,  it  would  be  well  to 
protect  and  reopen  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 
Baltimore  and  Fort  Monroe  should  be  occupied  by  garri 
sons  sufficient  to  retain  them  in  our  possession. 

"The  importance  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  line  of 
the  Potomac  in  the  direction  of  Leesburg  will  be  very 
materially  diminished  so  soon  as  our  force  in  this  vicinity 
becomes  organized,  strong,  and  efficient ;  because  no  capa 
ble  general  will  cross  the  river  north  of  this  city,  when 
we  have  a  strong  army  here  ready  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 

"  To  revert  to  the  West.  It  is  probable  that  no  very 
large  additions  to  the  troops  now  in  Missouri  will  be  ne 
cessary  to  secure  that  State. 

"I  presume  that  the  force  required  for  the  movement 
down  the  Mississippi  will  be  determined  by  its  com 
mander  and  the  President.  If  Kentucky  assumes  the 
right  position,  not  more  than  twenty  thousand  troops  will 
be  needed,  together  with  those  that  can  be  raised  in  that 


AGE  34.]       MEMORANDUM     ON     THE     WAR.  109 

State  and  Eastern  Tennessee,  to  secure  the  latter  region 
and  its  railroads,  as  well  as  ultimately  to  occupy  Nash 
ville. 

"The  Western  Virginia  troops,  with  not  more  than  five 
or  ten  thousand  from  Ohio  and  Indiana,  should,  under 
proper  management,  suffice  for  its  protection. 

"When  we  have  reorganized  our  main  army  here,  ten 
thousand  men  ought  to  be  enough  to  protect  the  Balti 
more  &  Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Potomac,  five  thousand 
will  garrison  Baltimore,  three  thousand  Fort  Monroe,  and 
not  more  than  twenty  thousand  will  be  necessary  at  the 
utmost  for  the  defence  of  Washington. 

"For  the  main  army  of  operations  I  urge  the  following 
composition: — 

250  regiments  of  infantry,  say." 225,000  men. 

100  field-batteries,  600  guns 15,000     " 

28  regiments  of  cavalry 25,500     " 

5  regiments  engineer  troops 7,500     " 

Total 273,000     " 

"The  force  must  be  supplied  with  the  necessary  en 
gineer  and  pontoon  trains,  and  with  transportation  for 
every  thing  save  tents.  Its  general  line  of  operations 
should  be  so  directed  that .  water-transportation  can  be 
availed  of  from  point  to  point,  by  means  of  the  ocean 
and  the  rivers  emptying  into  it.  An  essential  feature  of 
the  plan  of  operations  will  be  the  employment  of  a  strong 
naval  force  to  protect  the  movements  of  a  fleet  of  trans 
ports  intended  to  convey  a  considerable  body  of  troops 
from  point  to  point  of  the  enemy's  sea-coast,  thus  either 
creating  diversions  and  rendering  it  necessary  for  them 
to  detach  largely  from  their  main  body  in  order  to  pro 
tect  such  of  their  cities  as  may  be  threatened,  or  else 
landing  and  forming  establishments  on  their  coast  at  any 
favorable  places  that  opportunity  might  offer.  This  naval 

10 


110  MEMORANDUM     OX     THE     WAR,  [1861. 

force  should  also  co-operate  with  the  main  army  in  its 
efforts  to  seize  the  important  seaboard  towns  of  the  rebels. 

"It  cannot  be  ignored  that  the  construction  of  railroads 
has  introduced  a  new  and  very  important  element  into 
war,  by  the  great  facilities  thus  given  for  concentrating 
at  particular  positions  large  masses  of  troops  from  remote 
sections,  and  by  creating  new  strategic  points  and  lines 
of  operations. 

"It  is  intended  to  overcome  this  difficulty  by  the  par 
tial  operations  suggested,  and  such  others  as  the  parti 
cular  case  may  require.  We  must  endeavor  to  seize  places 
on  the  railways  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  points  of  con 
centration,  and  we  must  threaten  their  seaboard  cities, 
in  order  that  each  State  may  be  forced,  by  the  necessity 
of  its  own  defence,  to  diminish  its  contingent  to  the  Con 
federate  army. 

"The  proposed  movement  down  the  Mississippi  will 
produce  important  results  in  this  connection.  That  ad 
vance  and  the  progress  of  the  main  army  at  the  East  will 
materially  assist  each  other,  by  diminishing  the  resistance 
to  be  encountered  by  each. 

"The  tendency  of  the  Mississippi  movement  upon  all 
questions  connected  with  cotton  is  too  well  understood 
by  the  President  and  Cabinet  to  need  any  illustration 
from  me. 

"There  is  another  independent  movement  that  has 
often  been  suggested,  and  which  has  always  recommended 
itself  to  my  judgment.  I  refer  to  a  movement  from 
Kansas  and  Nebraska,  through  the  Indian  Territory,  upon 
Red  River  and  Western  Texas,  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
tecting  and  developing  the  latent  Union  and  free-State 
sentiment  well  known  to  predominate  in  Western  Texas, 
and  which,  like  a  similar  sentiment  in  Western  Virginia, 
will,  if  protected,  ultimately  organize  that  section  into  a 
free  State.  How  far  it  will  be  possible  to  support  this 
movement  by  an  advance  through  New  Mexico  from  Cali- 


AGE  3-1.1       MEMORANDUM     ON     THE     WAR.  Ill 

fornia,  is  a  matter  which  I  have  not  sufficiently  examined 
to  be  able  to  express  a  decided  opinion.  If  at  all  practi 
cable,  it  is  eminently  desirable,  as  bringing  into  play  the 
resources  and  warlike  qualities  of  the  Pacific  States,  as 
well  as  identifying  them  with  our  cause  and  cementing 
the  bond  of  union  between  them  and  the  General  Govern 
ment. 

"If  it  is  not  departing  too  far  from  my  province,  I  will 
venture  to  suggest  the  policy  of  an  intimate  alliance  and 
cordial  understanding  with  Mexico :  their  sympathies  and 
interests  are  with  us, — their  antipathies  exclusively  against 
our  enemies  and  their  institutions.  I  think  it  would  not 
be  difficult  to  obtain  from  the  Mexican  Government  the 
right  to  use,  at  least  during  the  present  contest,  the  road 
from  Guaymas  to  New  Mexico:  this  concession  would 
very  materially  reduce  the  obstacles  of  the  column 
moving  from  the  Pacific.  A  similar  permission  to  use 
their  territory  for  the  passage  of  troops  between  the 
Panuco  and  the  Rio  Grande  would  enable  us  to  throw 
a  column  of  troops  by  a  good  road  from  Tampico,  or 
some  of  the  small  harbors  north  of  ifc,  upon  and  across 
the  Rio  Grande,  without  risk  and  scarcely  firing  a  shot. 

"To  what  extent,  if  any,  it  would  be  desirable  to  take 
into  service  and  employ  Mexican  soldiers,  is  a  question 
entirely  political,  on  which  I  do  not  venture  to  offer  an 
opinion. 

"The  force  I  have  recommended  is  large;  the  expense  is 
great.  It  is  possible  that  a  smaller  force  might  accomplish 
the  object  in  view;  but  I  understand  it  to  be  the  purpose 
of  this  great  nation  to  re-establish  the  power  of  its  Govern 
ment,  and  to  restore  peace  to  its  citizens,  in  the  shortest 
possible  time. 

"The  question  to  be  decided  is  simply  this:  shall  we 
crush  the  rebellion  at  one  blow,  terminate  the  war  in  one 
campaign,  or  shall  we  leave  it  for  a  legacy  to  our  de 
scendants? 


112  MEMORANDUM     ON     THE     WAR.  [1861. 

"When  the  extent  of  the  possible  line  of  operations  is 
considered,  the  force  asked  for  the  main  army  under 
my  command  cannot  be  regarded  as  unduly  large.  Every 
mile  we  advance  carries  us  farther  from  our  base  of  opera 
tions,  and  renders  detachments  necessary  to  cover  our 
communications,  while  the  enemy  will  be  constantly  con 
centrating  as  he  falls  back.  I  propose,  with  the  force 
which  I  have  requested,  not  only  to  drive  the  enemy  out 
of  Virginia  and  occupy  Richmond,  but  to  occupy  Charles 
ton,  Savannah,  Montgomery,  Pensacola,  Mobile,  and  New 
Orleans ;  in  other  words,  to  move  into  the  heart  of  the  ene 
my's  country  and  crush  out  the  rebellion  in  its  very  heart. 

"By  seizing  and  repairing  the  railroads  as  we  advance, 
the  difficulties  of  transportation  will  be  materially  di 
minished.  It  is  perhaps  unnecessary  to  state  that,  in 
addition  to  the  forces  named  in  this  memorandum,  strong 
reserves  should  be  formed,  ready  to  supply  any  losses  that 
may  occur. 

"In  conclusion,  I  would  submit  that  the  exigencies  of 
the  treasury  may  be  lessened  by  making  only  partial  pay 
ments  to  our  troops  when  in  the  enemy's  country,  and 
by  giving  the  obligations  of  the  United  States  for  such 
supplies  as  may  there  be  obtained. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAX, 

"  Major-  General." 

General  McClellan,  speaking  of  this  memoran 
dum  in  his  Eeport,  written  two  years  after,  says, — 

"I  do  not  think  the  events  of  the  war  have  proved 
these  views  upon  the  methods  and  plans  of  its  conduct 
altogether  incorrect.  They  certainly  have  not  proved  my 
estimate  of  the  number  of  troops  and  scope  of  operations 
too  large.  It  is  probable  that  I  did  underestimate  the 
time  necessary  for  the  completion  of  arms  and  equip 
ments.  It  was  not  strange,  however,  that  by  many  civi- 


AoF.31.]    CHARACTER  OF  THE  MEMORANDUM.     113 

lians  intrusted  with  authority  there  should  have  been  an 
exactly  opposite  opinion  held  in  both  these  particulars." 

This  simple  and  modest  statement  is  read  with 
melancholy  interest  by  the  light  of  the  events 
which  have  transpired  since  the  date  of  the  memo 
randum.  Arid  that  portion  of  the  American  people — 
we  believe,  the  larger  portion — which  is  willing  to 
hear  before  it  judges,  will  not  fail  to  recognize  in 
the  memorandum  itself  the  sagacious  and  compre 
hensive  views  of  a  man  who  has  carefully  studied 
the  problem  before  him,  and  believe  that  he  had 
found  a  solution  for  it.  It  steers  clear  of  the  safe 
generalities  in  which  mediocrity  takes  refuge,  as 
well  as  the  wild  predictions  that  rash  self-confidence 
is  apt  to  make.  His  conclusions  are  drawn  from  a 
wide  and  patient  survey  of  the  field  before  him. 
Here  is  a  plan  broad  in  its  scope  and  well  con 
sidered  in  its  details.  It  may  be  that  the  event 
might  not,  under  any  circumstances,  have  responded 
to  his  expectations;  it  may  be  that  the  soldier  might 
not  have  had  the  means  to  execute  what  the  states 
man  had  conceived :  it  is  enough  to  know  that  the 
opportunity  was  never  given  him  to  try  the  experi 
ment  fairly.  When  he  spoke  of  the  possibility  of 
ending  the  war  by  a  single  campaign,  he  perhaps 
underestimated  both  the  moral  and  material  forces 
arrayed  against  him ;  but,  in  the  multitude  of  pre 
dictions  as  to  the  duration  of  the  war  which  have 
not  come  to  pass,  an  anticipation  like  this  will  not 
be  treasured  up  against  him. 

For   some  weeks    after   the    date  of  the    above 
memorandum,  the  work  of  organizing  and  arranging 


114  BALL'S   BLUFF.  [isci. 

the  troops  went  on  diligently  and  uninterruptedly, 
and  on  the  15th  of  October  the  grand  aggregate  of 
the  forces  in  and  around  Washington  was  one  hun 
dred  arid  fifty-two  thousand  and  fifty-one,  of  whom 
one  hundred  and  thirty-three  thousand  two  hundred 
and  one  were  present  and  fit  for  active  duty.  The 
infantry  was  arranged  in  brigades  of  four  regiments 
each,  and  divisions  of  three  brigades  each  were 
gradually  formed,  with  artillery  and  cavalry  at 
tached  to  each  division  as  far  as  was  practicable. 
The  formation  into  corps  was  to  be  postponed  until 
the  army  had  been  for  some  time  in  the  field,  as 
were  recommendations  for  the  promotion  of  officers 
to  the  rank  of  major-generals  till  actual  trial  in  ser 
vice  had  shown  who  were  best  fitted  for  these  im 
portant  posts. 

On  the  15th  of  October,  the  main  body  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  Washington,  with  detachments  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river  as  far  down  as  Liverpool  Point  and  as 
far  up  as  Williamsport  and  its  vicinity.  General 
Dix  was  at  Baltimore,  General  Banks  at  Darnes- 
town,  and  General  Stone  at  Poolesville. 

On  the  21st  of  October,  the  disastrous  engage 
ment  at  Ball's  Bluif  took  place.  Efforts  have  been 
made  to  connect  the  name  of  General  McClellan 
with  this  affair;  but  the  facts  in  the  case,  and  es 
pecially  the  testimony  taken  by  the  Congressional 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  show  that  the 
reconnoissances  directed  by  him  had  been  brought 
to  a  close  during  the  preceding  day,  and  that  the 
movements  which  led  to  the  battle  of  the  21st  were 


A.;i::U.]  GENERAL     SCOTT.  115 

not  ordered  by  him.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
responsibility  of  the  day  does  not  rest  upon  General 
McClellan,  without  going  further  and  inquiring  to 
whom  it  does  belong;  but  it  may  bo  added  that 
the  battle  of  Bail's  Bluff  is  one  of  the  many  enter 
prises  of  this  war  which  are  held  to  be  brilliant  if 
successful,  and  rash  if  unsuccessful.  The  praise 
in  one  event  and  the  blame  in  the  other  are  alike 
exaggerated.  A  great  stake  is  played  for,  but  the 
rule  of  the  stern  game  of  war  requires  that  in  such 
cases  a  great  stake  must  be  laid  down. 

On  the  31st  clay  of  October,  1861,  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  in  which  he  requested  that,  on  account  of 
his  increasing  infirmities  and  the  necessity  of  re 
pose  of  mind  and  body,  his  name  might  be  placed 
on  the  list  of  army  officers  retired  from  active  ser 
vice.  The  letter  was  laid  before  a  Cabinet  meeting, 
and  General  Scott  was  placed  on  the  retired  list  of 
the  army,  with  the  full  pay  and  allowance  of  his 
rank;  and  on  the  same  day  the  President,  accom 
panied  by  the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  proceeded 
to  his  residence  and  read  to  him  the  official  order 
which  gave  to  the  decision  the  force  of  law.  The 
venerable  commander-in-chief  expressed  his  ac 
knowledgments  in  words  and  with  a  manner  which 
betokened  strong  emotion,  and  the  President  an 
swered  in  appropriate  terms.  In  the  official  order 
announcing  General  Scott's  retirement,  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  said,  in  language  the 
justice  and  propriety  of  which  were  universally 
felt  — 


116  GENERAL     ORDER.  [1SC1. 

"  The  American  people  will  hear  with  sadness 
and  deep  emotion  that  General  Scott  has  withdrawn 
from  the  active  control  of  the  army,  while  the 
President  and  unanimous  Cabinet  express  their  own 
and  the  nation's  sympathy  in  his  personal  affliction, 
and  their  profound  sense  of  the  important  public 
services  rendered  by  him  to  his  country  during  his 
long  and  brilliant  career,  among  which  will  ever 
be  gratefully  distinguished  his  faithful  devotion  to 
the  Constitution,  the  Union,  and  the  flag,  when  as 
sailed  by  parricidal  rebellion.'' 

Upon  the  retirement  of  General  Scott,  General 
McClellan,  by  a  general  order  dated  November  1, 
was  directed  to  assume  the  command  of  the  army 
of  the  United  States,  with  his  head-quarters  at 
Washington,  and  on  the  same  day  the  new  coin- 
mander-in-chief  issued  the  following  order: — 

"  General  Order  No.  19. 

"HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

"WASHINGTON,  D.C.,  Nov.  1,  1861. 

"In  accordance  with  General  Order  No.  94,  from  the 
War  Department,  I  hereby  assume  command  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States. 

"  In  the  midst  of  the  difficulties  which  encompass  and 
divide  the  nation,  hesitation  and  self-distrust  may  well 
accompany  the  assumption  of  so  vast  a  responsibility; 
but  confiding,  as  I  do,  in  the  loyalty,  discipline,  and  cou 
rage  of  our  troops,  and  believing,  as  I  do,  that  Providence 
will  favor  ours  as  the  just  cause,  I  cannot  doubt  that  suc 
cess  will  crown  our  efforts  and  sacrifices. 

"The  army  will  unite  with  me  in  the  feeling  of  regret 
that  the  weight  of  many  years,  and  the  effect  of  increasing 
infirmities,  contracted  and  intensified  in  his  country's 


AUR  '•'•  1.  J  C:  I  F  T     OF     A     S  W  0  R  D.  117 

service,  should  just  now  remove  from  our  head  the  great 
soldier  of  our  nation, — the  hero  who,  in  his  youth,  raised 
high  the  reputation  of  his  country  on  the  fields  of  Canada, 
which  he  sanctified  with  his  blood ;  who,  in  more  mature 
years,  proved  to  the  world  that  American  skill  and  valor 
could  repeat,  if  not  eclipse,  the  exploits  of  Cortez  in  the 
land  of  the  Montezumas;  whose  whole  life  has  been  de 
voted  to  the  service  of  his  country ;  whose  whole  efforts 
have  been  directed  to  uphold  our  honor  at  the  smallest 
sacrifice  of  life; — a  warrior  who  scorned  the  selfish  glories 
of  the  battle-field,  when  his  great  qualities  as  a  statesman 
could  be  employed  more  profitably  for  his  country;  a 
citizen  who,  in  his  declining  years,  has  given  to  the  world 
the  most  shining  instance  of  loyalty  in  disregarding  all 
ties  of  birth  and  clinging  to  the  cause  of  truth  and  honor. 
Such  has  been  the  career  of  Winfield  Scott,  whom  it  has 
long  been  the  delight  of  the  nation  to  honor  as  a  man 
and  a  soldier. 

"While  we  regret  his  loss,  there  is  one  thing  we  cannot 
regret, — the  bright  example  he  has  left  for  our  emulation. 
Let  us  all  hope  and  pray  that  his  declining  years  may  be 
passed  in  peace  and  happiness,  and  that  they  may  be 
cheered  by  tho  success  of  the  country  and  the  cause  he 
has  fought  for  and  loved  so  well.  Beyond  all  that,  let  us 
do  nothing  that  can  cause  him  to  blush  for  us.  Let  no 
defeat  of  the  army  he  has  so  long  commanded  embitter 
his  last  years,  but  let  our  victories  illuminate  the  close  of 
a  life  so  grand. 

"GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"  Major- General  commanding,  U.  tS.  A." 

On  the  next  day,  November  2,  General  McClellan 
received  a  sword  which  had  been  voted  to  him  by 
the  City  Councils  of  Philadelphia,  a  deputation  of 
which  went  to  Washington  and  gave  the  sword  to 


118  LETTERS     OF     INSTRUCTION.  [ISfil. 

him  in  person,  at  his  house.  In  a  very  brief  reply 
to  the  complimentary  address  which  accompanied 
the  gift,  he  said,  "I  ask  in  the  future  forbearance, 
patience,  and  confidence.  "With  these  we  can  ac 
complish  all." 

On  the  7th,  llth,  and  12th  days  of  November, 
1861,  respectively,  letters  of  instruction  were  ad 
dressed  by  the  commander-in-chief  to  General  Buell, 
in  charge  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  and  Gene 
ral  Halleck,  in  that  of  the  Department  of  Missouri. 
These  were  general  in  their  scope,  rather  indicating 
what  it  was  desirable  to  accomplish,  and  pointing 
out  certain  principles  of  government  and  adminis 
tration,  than  going  into  details  which  had  been 
matters  of  oral  discussion  between  him  and  these 
officers.  A  brief  extract  from  the  letter  to  Gene 
ral  Buell,  of  the  date  November  7,  will  give  an 
impression  of  their  spirit  and  purpose : — 

"It  is  possible  that  the  conduct  of  our  political  affairs 
in  Kentucky  is  more  important  than  that  of  our  military 
operations.  I  certainly  cannot  overestimate  the  import 
ance  of  the  former.  You  will  please  constantly  to  bear 
in  mind  the  precise  issue  for  which  we  are  fighting:  that 
issue  is  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  the  restora 
tion  of  the  full  authority  of  the  General  Government 
over  all  portions  of  our  territory.  We  shall  most  readily 
suppress  this  rebellion  and  restore  the  authority  of 
the  Government  by  religiously  respecting  the  constitu 
tional  rights  of  all.  I  know  that  I  express  the  feelings 
and  opinions  of  the  President  when  I  say  that  we  are 
fighting  only  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  Union  and 
the  constitutional  authority  of  the  General  Govern 
ment." 


AGK  T.4.]   CAPTURE  OF  X  E  W  ORLEANS.       119 

These  letters  of  instruction  should  be  read  in 
connection  with  two  others  written  subsequently 
by  General  McClellan,  one  dated  February  14,  1862, 
addressed  to  General  Sherman,  commanding  at 
Port  Royal,  giving  directions  as  to  movements 
against  Fort  Pulaski,  Fernandina,  Savannah,  Fort 
Sumtcr,  and  Charleston,  and  one  dated  February 
28,  1862,  addressed  to  General  Butler,  containing 
instructions  as  to  military  movements  in  the  South 
west.  From  this  letter  an  extract  is  here  sub 
joined: — 

"The  object  of  your  expedition  is  one  of  vital  import 
ance, — the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  The  route  selected 
is  up  the  Mississippi  Kiver,  and  the  first  obstacle  to  be 
encountered  (perhaps  the  only  one)  is  in  the  resistance 
offered  by  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson.  It  is  expected 
that  the  navy  can  reduce  these  works :  in  that  case,  you 
will,  after  their  capture,  leave  a  sufficient  garrison  in 
them  to  render  them  perfectly  secure ;  and  it  is  recom 
mended  that,  on  the  upward  passage,  a  few  heavy  guns 
and  some  troops  be  left  at  the  pilot-station  (at  the  forks 
of  the  river),  to  cover  a  retreat  in  the  event  of  a  disaster. 
These  troops  and  guns  will,  of  course,  be  removed  as  soon 
as  the  forts  are  captured. 

"Should  the  navy  fail  to  reduce  the  works,  you  will 
land  your  forces  and  siege-train,  and  endeavor  to  breach 
the  works,  silence  their  fire,  and  carry  them  by  assault. 

"The  next  resistance  will  be  near  the  English  Bend, 
where  there  are  some  earthen  batteries.  Here  it  may  be 
necessary  for  you  to  land  your  troops  and  co-operate  with 
the  naval  attack,  although  it  is  more  than  probable  that 
the  Navy,  unassisted,  can  accomplish  the  result.  If  these 
works  are  taken,  the  city  of  New  Orleans  necessarily  falls. 
In  that  event,  it  will  probably  be  best  to  occupy  Algiers 


120  NEW     ORLEANS.  [1861. 

with  the  mass  of  your  troops,  also  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  river  above  the  city.  It  may  be  necessary  to  place 
eome  troops  in  the  city  to  preserve  order ;  but,  if  there 
appears  to  be  sufficient  Union  sentiment  to  control  the 
city,  it  may  be  best,  for  purposes  of  discipline,  to  keep 
your  men  out  of  the  city. 

"After  obtaining  possession  of  New  Orleans,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  reduce  all  the  works  guarding  its  approaches 
from  the  east,  and  particularly  to  gain  the  Manchac  Pass. 

"Baton  Rouge,  Berwick  Bay,  and  Fort  Livingston  will 
next  claim  your  attention. 

"A  feint  on  Galveston  may  facilitate  the  objects  we 
have  in  view.  I  need  not  call  your  attention  to  the  ne 
cessity  of  gaining  possession  of  all  the  rolling  stock  you 
can  on  the  different  railways,  and  of  obtaining  coiito'ol 
of  the  roads  themselves.  The  occupation  of  Baton  Rouge 
by  a  combined  naval  and  land  force  should  be  accom 
plished  as  soon  as  possible  after  you  have  gained  New 
Orleans.  Then  endeavor  to  open  your  communication 
with  the  northern  column  by  the  Mississippi,  always 
bearing  in  mind  the  necessity  of  occupying  Jackson, 
Mississippi,  as  soon  as  you  can  safely  do  so,  either  after 
or  before  you  have  effected  the  junction.  Allow  nothing 
to  divert  you  from  obtaining  full  possession  of  all  the  ap 
proaches  to  New  Orleans.  When  that  object  is  accom 
plished  to  its  fullest  extent,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make 
a  combined  attack  on  Mobile,  in  order  to  gain  possession 
of  the  harbor  and  works,  as  well  as  to  control  the  railway 
terminus  at  the  city.  In  regard  to  this,  I  will  send  more 
detailed  instructions  as  the  operations  of  the  Northern 
column  develop  themselves. 

"I  may  briefly  state  that  the  general  objects  of  the  ex 
pedition  are— -first,  the  reduction  of  New  Orleans  and  all 
its  approaches;  then  Mobile  and  its  defences;  then  Pen- 
sacola,  Galveston,  &c.  It  is  probable  that  by  the  tinio 
New  Orleans  is  reduced,  it  will  be  in  the  power  of  the 


AGE  34.]  COMPREHENSIVE    PLAN.  121 

Government  to  reinforce  the  land  forces  sufficiently  to 
accomplish  all  these  objects.  In  the  mean  time,  you  will 
please  give  all  the  assistance  in  your  power  to  the  army 
and  navy  commanders  in  your  vicinity,  never  losing  sight 
of  the  fact  that  the  great  object  to  be  achieved  is  the  cap 
ture  and  firm  retention  of  New  Orleans/' 

The  remarkably  sagacious  foresight  shown  in  the 
instructions  to  General  Butler  as  to  the  mode  of 
attack  upon  New  Orleans  can  be  fully  apprehended 
only  after  reading  in  detail  the  account  of  the 
brilliant  capture  of  that  city,  by  the  combined 
military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States, 
a  few  weeks  later. 

The  several  letters  above  referred  to  are  given  in 
full  in  General  McClellan's  Heport,  and,  when  read 
together,  will  be  found  to  indicate  a  plan  which 
embraced  in  its  scope  all  the  armies  of  the  Union 
and  the  whole  region  occupied  by  the  Confederates. 
It  was  the  purpose  of  the  commander-in-chief  that 
the  various  parts  of  the  plan  should  be  carried 
out  simultaneously,  as  far  as  was  possible,  and  in 
co-operation  along  the  whole  line  of  movement. 
In  this  general  scheme  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  to  bear  its  part, — a  leading  part,  it  is  true,  but 
still  a  part  in  concert  with  other  forces  of  the 
Union.  This  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  order  to 
explain  and  justify  the  delay  which  was  necessary 
to  enable  that  army  to  perform  its  share  in  the 
execution  of  the  whole  work. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  easy  to  see  how 
trying  was  the  position  of  General  McClellan  during 
the  closing  weeks  of  the  year  18G1,  and  how 


122  DIFFICULT    POSITION.  [LS61. 

painful  was  the  weight  of  responsibility  resting 
upon  him.  He  was  a  young  man,  whose  name 
until  recently  had  been  unknown  to  the  public, 
suddenly  set  at  the  head  of  military  operations 
which  extended  over  a  space  and  were  upon  a 
scale  to  tax  the  strategical  skill  and  vast  organiz 
ing  genius  of  Napoleon  himself.  The  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  which  was  immediately  under  him,  was 
ten  times  larger  than  any  army  that  had  ever  been 
under  the  command  of  one  man  upon  the  soil  of 
the  United  States  since  the  Revolution;  and  the 
difficulty  of  commanding  armies  increases  in  much 
more  than  a  direct  ratio  with  their  numbers, — or, 
in  other  words,  it  does  not  follow  that  among  ten 
men  fit  to  command  ten  thousand  men  there  will 
always  be  found  one  fit  to  command  a  hundred 
thousand.  Even  the  Duke  of  Wellington  never  led 
an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men.* 

His  position  was  thus  in  itself  one  of  great  respon 
sibility;  but  there  were  extrinsic  elements  which 
added  to  its  burdens.  The  American  people  are 
easily  elated  and  easily  depressed,  and  they  had 
passed  through  both  of  these  states  of  feeling 
during  the  eventful  year  1861.  At  the  breaking- 
out  of  the  war,  amidst  the  magnificent  uprising. of 
the  nation  to  sustain  the  Government,  we  had  ex 
ulted  in  the  confident  expectation  that  the  rebellion 


*  "Napoleon  was  of  the  opinion  that  he  and  the  Archduke 
Charles  were  the  only  men  in  Europe  Avho  could  manoeuvre 
one  hundred  thousand  men:  he  considered  it  a  very  difficult 
thing." — GENERAL  HEINTZELMAX.  (Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  Part  I.  p.  118.) 


AGE  31.]  PUBLIC     IMPATIENCE.  123 

would  at  once  be  crushed  and  broken  into  fragments 
by  the  irresistible  force  arrayed  against  it.  But 
the  disastrous  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  the  untoward 
affair  of  Ball's  Bluff  had  blighted  these  fervid 
hopes,  and  a  despondency  had  taken  possession  of 
the  public  mind  which  was  as  unreasonable  as  the 
previous  assurance  had  been.  This  rising  and  sink 
ing  of  our  spirits  had  tended  to  aggravate  that  im 
patience  which  must  be  admitted  to  be  one  of  our 
national  traits;  and  in  the  autumn  of  1861  a  strong 
desire  had  taken  possession  of  the  public  mind  that 
some  decisive  step  should  be  taken,  some  vigorous 
blow  should  be  struck.  The  people  murmured  and 
chafed  at  the  delay  that  clogged  the  movements  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  the  press,  with  its  myriad 
voices,  gave  utterance  to  the  feeling,  and  the  cry 
'•  On  to  Richmond !"  became  the  symbol  and  motto 
of  the  hour.  This  was  a  very  natural  sentiment, 
and,  to  some  extent,  commendable, — because  it 
caught  its  warmth  in  part  from  the  patriotism  of 
the  people  and  their  earnest  wish  to  have  the 
Union  restored.  They  desired  to  see  some  re 
sults  commensurate  with  their  efforts  and  sacrifices. 
But  strong  feeling  is  apt  to  be  unjust,  especially 
when  it  is  general  as  well  as  strong;  and  our  igno 
rance  of  war — that  happy  clement  in  our  lot — had 
an  influence  in  the  same  direction.  We  had  read 
of  armies,  but  practically  we  knew  nothing  about 
them.  The  battles  of  the  War  of  1812  and  of  the 
war  with  Mexico  had  been  fought  with  small  and 
manageable  bodies  of  men ;  but  so  immense  an  army 
as  that  which  was  encamped  in  and  around  Wash- 


124  IGNORANCE     OF    WAR.  [1861. 

ington  was  a  wholly  new  thing  to  us.  We  knew 
nothing  of  the  vast  amount  of  transportation  ne 
cessary  to  supply  a  hundred  thousand  men  with 
food, — especially  on  the  bountiful  scale  upon  which 
our  troops  are  fed, — how  dependent  such  a  body 
is,  in  a  country  like  Eastern  Virginia,  on  its  base 
of  operations,  and  how  it  must  keep  up  an  unin 
terrupted  connection  with  a  navigable  stream  or  a 
railway.  We  knew  little  or  nothing  of  the  obstacles 
presented  to  the  advance  of  a  great  army  by  the 
nature  of  the  country, — its  woods,  its  swamps,  its 
streams,  and  its  mud.  From  some  of  the  articles 
which  appeared  in  the  Xorthern  papers,  one  would 
have  thought  that  the  writers  supposed  the  soldiers 
had  wings  and  could  live  without  food.  Their  ex 
perience  would  have  been  enlarged,  and  their  judg 
ment  corrected,  had  they  been  required  to  trans 
port  a  single  battery  of  siege-guns  over  the  roads 
of  Eastern  Virginia  in  a  rainy  December** 


*  "Again,  the  public  treat  the  army  as  a  man  or  a  horse,  to 
whom  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  '  go'  and  motion  follows. 
They  fancy  that  a  fight  can  be  witnessed  from  a  hill-top,  as 
a  boxing-match  can  be  viewed  from  a  third-story  window. 
They  forget  that  this  army,  say  of  sixty  thousand  men  only, 
must  eat  at  least  one  hundred  thousand  meals  a  clay,  and,  if 
the  army  is  to  be  kept  in  prime  order,  must  sleep  at  least  six 
hours  out  of  the  twenty-four.  Where  there  are  turnpike  roads, 
artillery  can  get  along  very  well.  Where  there  arc  no  turnpikes, 
and  the  weather  is  wet,  the  last  carriage  of  a  single  company 
of  artillery — the  thirteenth — often  mires  Avhere  the  first  car 
riage — a  gun,  technically — has  found  no  difficulty.  What,  then, 
must  it  be  when  two  or  three  hundred  pieces  of  artillery, 
each  one  accompanied  by  a  caisson,  or  ammunition- wagon, 


AGE  ;M.]    GEN.  MCCLELLAN'S  FRIENDS  NOT  WTSK.     125 

And  it  must  bo  admitted  that  the  friends  of  Gene 
ral  McClellan  themselves,  or  some  of  them,  were 
unwise  in  the  lavish  praise  they  heaped  upon  him, 
by  which  they  awakened  such  wild  hopes  and  im 
possible  expectations.  He  was  commended  not  for 
what  he  had  done,  but  for  what  he  was  about  to  do; 
and  what  he  did  and  said,  and  still  more  what  he 
was  going  to  do,  was  paraded  before  the  public 
gaze  in  a  way  that  to  no  one  could  be  more  dis 
tasteful  than  to  him,  an  essentially  modest  man, 
who  knew  better  than  anybody  else  the  weight  of 
the  burden  that  was  upon  him.  The  highest  kind 
ness  to  him  at  that  time  would  have  been  to  let  him 
alone  and  say  as  little  about  him  as  possible.  To 
a  manly  and  truthful  nature,  nothing  is  less  wrelcome 
than  undeserved  praise.  Undeserved  blame  is 
bitter,  but  undeserved  praise  is  sickening.  Besides, 


and  every  six  with  a  forge, — making  six  hundred  and  fifty  car 
riages  that  go  into  a  battle, — have  to  be  carried,  in  wet  weather, 
through  a  swampy  country,  like  that,  for  example,  on  the 
Chickahominy  ?  This  is  mere  fighting-material;  to  which  add 
two  or  three  thousand  wagons  for  feeding-purposes,  and  you 
begin  to  have  an  idea  of  what  has  to  be  moved  Avhen  an  army 
moves,  to  say  nothing  of  the  cattle  by  thousands  that  have  to 
be  driven  along,  and  a  horde  of  camp-followers  of  all  kinds. 
I  am  not  speaking  now  of  a  corps  of  ten  or  twenty  thousand 
men  who  start  on  a  foray  with  nothing  but  their  shirts,  panta 
loons,  and  boots  to  carry,  besides  their  arms,  but  of  an  army 
which,  when  a  victory  is  gained,  is  prepared  to  retain  what  is 
won  in  an  enemy's  country, — just  such  an  army  as  McClellan 
had  in  the  Peninsula.'' — From  "Three  Great  Battles"  (a  pam 
phlet  printed,  but  not  published),  by  J.  IT.  B.  Latrobe,  Esq. 


126  POLITICS.  [1861. 

extravagant   commendation  is  sure    to   produce  a 
reaction,  sooner  or  later. 

The  newspaper-correspondents  who  bedaubed 
him  with  flattery,  who  described  his  person  and 
features  with  the  minuteness  of  a  passport,  who 
chronicled  all  his  movements,  who  named  him  the 
Young  Napoleon, — he  being  of  the  same  age  as  the 
Emperor  was  at  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Austerlitz, — 
were  moved  by  a  friendly  spirit,  mingled  with  that 
hero-worship  which  is  so  decided  an  American  trait; 
but  they  were  doing  him  any  thing  but  a  kindness. 
Indeed,  they  were  playing  directly  into  the  hands 
of  his  enemies  and  ill-wishers,  political  and  per 
sonal. 

Nor  was  this  all.  General  McClellan  was  as  little 
of  a  politician  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
well  can  be.  The  subject  of  politics  had  never  oc 
cupied  his  mind.  His  time  and  attention  had  been 
wholly  given  to  the  duties  of  his  profession  while 
he  remained  in  the  army,  and  afterwards  to  the 
duties  of  his  business.  It  had  so  happened  that 
he  had  never  but  once,  since  reaching  the  legal 
age,  been  in  a  position  to  exercise  the  right  of 
voting.  But  he  had  opinions  upon  the  political 
issues  of  the  time;  and  these  opinions  were  not 
those  of  the  party  into  whose  hands  the  people 
had  committed  the  government  of  the  country;  and 
the  only  time  he  had  ever  voted  was  in  the  memora 
ble  contest  in  Illinois  between  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr. 
Douglas,  when  he  had  preferred  the  latter;  but  in  our 
country,  sooner  or  later,  every  thing  is  swept  into 
the  gulf  of  politics;  and  thus  General  McCIellan's 


AGE  3-1.]       C  O  N  ti  R  E  S  S  I  O  N  A  L     C  O  M  M  I  T  T  E  E.  1  tl 

military  capacity,  bis  courage,  even  his  patriotism, 
began  to  be  looked  at  from  a  political  point  of  view, 
and  to  be  called  in  question  by  heated  political  par 
tisans. 

When  Congress  assembled,  in  December,  18G1, 
President  Lincoln  announced  the  appointment  of 
General  McClellan  to  the  post  of  commander  of 
the  army,  in  these  terms,  which  were  generally  re 
ceived  as  expressing  no  more  than  the  exact  truth : — 

"  With  the  retirement  of  General  Scott  came  the  exe 
cutive  duty  of  appointing  in  his  stead  a  general-in-chief 
of  the  army.  It  is  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  neither 
in  council  nor  country  was  there,  so  far  as  I  know,  any 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  proper  person  to  be  selected.  The 
retiring  chief  repeatedly  expressed  his  judgment  in  favor 
of  General  McClellan  for  the  position ;  and  in  this  the 
nation  seemed  to  give  a  unanimous  concurrence.  The 
designation  of  General  McClellan  is,  therefore,  in  a  con 
siderable  degree,  the  selection  of  the  country,  as  well  as 
of  the  Executive;  and  hence  there  is  better  reason  to 
hope  there  will  be  given  him  the  confidence  and  cor 
dial  support  thus,  by  fair  implication,  promised,  and 
without  which  he  cannot  with  so  full  efficiency  serve  the 
country." 

Within  a  few  days  after  the  meeting  of  Congress, 
the  vague  discontent  and  restless  impatience  of  the 
community  found  expression  in  the  shape  of  a  Con 
gressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
consisting  of  three  members  of  the  Senate  and  four 
members  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
first  motion  towards  the  formation  of  the  com 
mittee  was  made  in  the  Senate  on  the  9th  day  of 


128  CONGRESSIONAL     COMMITTEE.  [1SC1. 

December,  and  the  first  meeting  of  the  committee 
was  held  on  the  20th  of  the  same  -month.  From 
that  time  until  the  close  of  April  they  sat  nearly 
every  day;  and  there  were  several  meetings  during 
the  months  of  May.  June,  and  July.  Had  the  com 
mittee  confined  their  inquiries  and  investigations 
to  past  transactions,  and  considered  themselves  as 
charged  with  the  duty  of  collecting  and  recording 
testimony  to  be  used  by  future  historians  of  the 
war,  their  labors  might  have  been  of  value  to  the 
country;  but  they  did  not  take  this  limited  view 
of  the  scope  and  sphere  of  their  operations.  In 
their  judgment,  the  future  as  well  as  the  past  was 
committed  to  their  trust.  For  instance,  the  very 
first  witness  examined  before  them  was  General 
I.  E.  Richardson,  and  the  second  was  General  S.  P. 
Hcintzelman,  and  both  were  examined  on  the  same 
day,  December  24.  General  Eichardson's  examina 
tion  was  short,  and  not  very  important.  The  first 
question  put  to  General  Hcintzelman  by  the  chair 
man  began  thus  : — "  We  have  inquired  a  little  about 
the  past :  now  we  want  to  inquire  a  little  about  the 
present  and  the  future,  which  is,  perhaps,  more 
important.  As  you  are  a  military  man  of  great 
experience,  we  want  some  of  your  opinions  on 
some  matters."  As  to  the  "  opinions"  of  the  wit 
ness  which  they  wanted,  one  or  two  questions  and 
answers  may  suffice  to  show : — 


"  Qucs. — '  I  would  inquire  whether  there  has  been  any 
council  of  war  among  your  officers  and  the  commander- 
in-chief.' 


AGE  3-1.]      CONGRESSIONAL    COMMITTEE.  129 

"Ans. — 'I  have  never  been  consulted  upon  any  military 

subject/ 

*  *  *  #  #  -x- 

"Ques. — 'You  think  a  council  of  war  among  the  chief 
officers  might  be  beneficial?' 

"Ans. — '  I  thought  so.  Certainly  it  would  be  very  satis 
factory  to  some  of  them,  I  know.  We  have  been  very 
anxious  to  know  what  is  proposed  to  be  done.  I  should 
act  with  more  confidence  if  I  knew/ 

"Ques. — 'Is  there  any  feeling  among  officers  that  they 
are  not  consulted, — that  they  are  slighted?' 

"Ans. — 'Yes,  sir:  I  suppose  there  is  some/  "  &c.  &c.* 

This  particular  grievance — the  reserve  of  the 
commander-in-chicf,  and  his  not  consulting  with 
his  inferior  officers — was  a  frequent  point  of  inquiry 
on  the  part  of  the  committee  during  the  winter 
months,  but  by  no  means  the  only  one.  The  gene 
ral  plan  of  the  campaign,  the  policy  which  delayed 
a  forward  movement,  the  organization  of  the  army, 
the  proportion  of  cavalry  to  the  other  arms,  the 
defences  about  Washington,  the  number  of  men 
requisite  to  make  it  secure,  were  also  among  the 
subjects  to  which  the  inquiries  of  the  committee 
were  directed.  Their  investigations  were  moulded 
and  colored  by  a  spirit  not  friendly  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief.  Day  after  day,  general  officers, 
and  sometimes  those  of  inferior  rank,  were  called 
before  them,  and  invited,  not  to  say  encouraged, 
to  give  their  opinions  upon  the  plans  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  his  military  views,  and  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  discharged  his  duties,  and  thus  to 


*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Tart  I.  pp.  117-121. 


L'>0  CONGRESSIONAL     COMMITTEE.  [1861. 

enter  upon  a  line  of  discussion  which,  if  not  di 
rectly  forbidden  by  the  Army  Regulations,*  was 
unfavorable  to  discipline  and  tended  to  injure  the 
relations  between  the  Commander-in-chief  and  his 
subordinates. 

*  The  following  is  the  26th  Article  of  the  Revised  Regula 
tions  for  the  Army: — • 

"Deliberations  or  discussions  among  any  class  of  military 
men,  having  the  object  of  conveying  praise  or  censure  or  any 
mark  of  approbation  toward  their  superiors  or  others  in  the 
military  service,  .  .  .  are  strictly  prohibited." 

Some  of  the  officers  examined  seemed  conscious  of  the  diffi 
cult  position  in  which  they  stood  between  their  duty  as  sub 
jects  and  their  duty  as  officers.  General  Lander,  for  instance, 
was  asked  this  question:  — 

"  'If  you  will  give  us  your  opinion  as  a  military  man  on 
that  subject  [the  plan  of  the  campaign],  I  will  be  obliged  to 
you.' 

"Ans. — 'It  is  against,  the  Army  Regulations  and  laws  of 
Congress  to  discuss  the  views  and  plans  of  your  superior  offi 
cer.  In  answering  this  question,'  "  &c. — Report  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,  Part  I.  p.  100. 

General  Fitz-John  Porter  was  asked, — 

"'Should'  the  army  'retire  into  winter  quarters,  or  should 
it  attempt  an  enterprise  to  dislodge  the  enemy?' 

"Ans. — 'That  is  a  question  I  cannot  answer.' 

"Ques. — 'I  merely  ask  your  military  opinion.' 

"Ans. — 'I  decline  to  give  a  military  opinion  on  that  point. 
I  am  in  possession  of  information  in  regard  to  intended  move 
ments, — rather,  a  portion  of  General  McClellan's  plans,  a 
small  poi'tion  only;  and  I  decline  giving  any  information 
whatever  in  regard  to  future  movements,  or  what  they  ought 
to  be.  I  do  not  think  it  my  business  to  do  so,  and  we  are 
forbidden  by  our  regulations  to  discuss  or  express  opinions 
on  these  matters.'  " — -Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Part  I, 
p.  171. 


AGE  34.]       CONGRESSIONAL    COMMITTEE.  131 

It  is  fair  to  state  that  at  the  very  first  meeting 
of  the  committee  '-it  was  agreed  that,  as  a  matter 
of  honor,  none  of  its  members  should  reveal  any 
thing  that  transpired  in  committee  until  such  time 
as  the  injunction  of  secrecy  should  be  removed;" 
but  such  a  determination,  by  the  cloud  of  mystery 
it  threw  around  their  proceedings,  could  only  give 
rise  to  conjectures  probably  more  injurious  in  their 
influence  than  the  truth  would  have  been  if  fully 
revealed.  Besides,  Congressional  committees  are 
human,  and  not  hermetically  sealed  against  the 
transmission  of  that  kind  of  knowledge  which  has 
the  charm  of  being  forbidden. 

Nor  did  the  committee  confine  themselves  to  the 
task  of  taking  and  recording  testimony,  and  the  free 
discussion  in  their  own  room  of  military  plans  and 
movements,  but,  as  they  say  in  their  Report,  "they 
were  in  constant  communication  with  the  President 
and  his  Cabinet,  and  neglected  no  opportunity  of  at 
once  laying  before  them  the  information  acquired 
by  them  in  the  course  of  their  investigations."  It 
is  fair  to  presume  that  they  gave  advice  as  well  as 
information;  and,  indeed,  the  journal  of  their  pro 
ceedings  shows  that  they  did;  and  their  advice  was 
probably  of  weight  in  the  conduct  of  the  campaign. 
The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  journal  of  the 
committee: — 

"February  26,  1862. 

"Pursuant  to  previous  arrangement,  the  committee 
waited  upon  tlio  President  at  eight  o'clock  on  Tuesday 
evening,  February  125.  They  made  known  to  the  Presi 
dent  that,  having  examined  many  of  the  highest  military 


132  CONGRESSIONAL    COMMITTEE.  [1861. 

officers  of  the  army,  their  statements  of  the  necessity  of 
dividing  the  great  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  corps  d'armtfe 
had  impressed  the  committee  with  the  belief  that  it  was  es 
sential  that  such  a  division  of  that  army  should  be  made. — 
that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  move  upon  a  formidable 
enemy  with  the  present  organization  of  the  army.  The 
application  was  enforced  by  many  arguments  drawn  from 
the  usages  in  France,  and  every  other  military  nation  in 
Europe,  and  the  fact  that,  so  far  as  the  committee  could 
learn,  all  our  military  officers  agreed  that  our  army  would 
not  be  efficient  unless  such  an  organization  was  had. 
The  President  observed  that  he  had  never  considered 
the  organization  of  the  army  into  army  corps  so  essential 
as  the  committee  seemed  to  represent  it  to  be:  still,  he 
had  long  been  in  favor  of  such  an  organization.  General 
McClellan,  however,  did  not  seem,  to  think  it  so  essential, 
though  he  had  at  times  expressed  himself  as  favorable 
to  it.  The  committee  informed  the  President  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  authorized  them  to  say  to  him  that 
he  deemed  such  an  organization  necessary. 

"  General  McClellan  was  in  favor  of  an  organization 
into  corps,  but  only  proposed  deferring  it  till  time  should 
show  what  officers  were  best  fitted  for  corps  commanders, 
— which  seems  reasonable  enough.  It  was  a  measure 
which  surely  might  have  been  postponed  till  the  army 
had  taken  the  field,  at  least." 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  motives  of  the 
committee,  or  however  earnest  may  have  been 
their  desire  to  see  the  war  brought  to  a  speedy 
and  successful  termination,  it  is  certain  that,  in 
point  of  fact,  they  were  only  aiding  the  enemy; 
for  the  interference  of  such  a  body,  direct  or  in 
direct,  with  the  conduct  of  the  campaign,  could 


AGE  35.]      CONFEDERATE  FORCES.          133 

have  no  other  effect  than  to  impair  the  unity  of 
action  and  concentration  of  purpose  which  are  so 
essential  to  the  success  of  an  army. 


CIIAPTEE  VI. 

WE  are  now  brought  to  the  close  of  the  year 
1861  and  the  opening  of  1862.  The  positions  and 
numbers  of  the  Confederate  army  in  Eastern  Vir 
ginia  were  as  follows.  At  Norfolk  and  Yorktown 
there  was  a  considerable  force, — probably  over  thirty 
thousand  men.  The  army  before  Washington  occu 
pied  an  extended  line  running  from  the  southeast 
to  the  northwest.  The  left  wing  was  at  Lcesburg 
and  its  vicinity,  in  force  about  forty-five  hundred; 
and  there  were  about  thirteen  thousand  in  the  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah.  The  main  body,  comprising 
about  eighty  thousand  men,  was  at  Manassas  and 
Centreville.  At  these  points  the  positions  were  na 
turally  very  strong,  with  impassable  streams  and 
broken  ground,  affording  ample  protection  to  their 
flanks,  and  with  lines  of  intrcnchment  sweeping  all 
the  available  approaches.  The  right  was  at  Brooks's 
Station,  Dumfries,  Lower  Occoquan  and  vicinity, 
numbering  about  eighteen  thousand.  This  wing 
of  the  army  formed  a  support  to  several  batteries 
on  the  Lower  Potomac,  extending  from  High  Point 
and  Cockpit  Point  to  the  Chopawampsic  Creek. 
These  batteries,  greatly  obstructing  the  navigation 
of  the  river,  and  to  this  extent  practically  block- 

12 


134          FORWARD     MOVEMENT    DESIRED. 

ading  Washington,  were  a  source  of  great  annoy 
ance  to  the  Administration  and  of  mortification  to 
the  people,  and  a  strong  desire  was  felt  that  a 
movement  should  be  made  to  destroy  them;  but 
General  McClellan  was  of  the  opinion  that  such  an 
attempt  would  be  attended  with  danger,  and  that 
the  destruction  of  these  batteries  by  our  army 
would  afford  but  temporary  relief  unless  we  were 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  entire  line  of  the  Poto 
mac.  The  desired  end  could  be  secured  either  by 
driving  the  enemy  from  Manassas  and  Acquia 
Creek  by  superior  force,  or  by  manoeuvring  to 
compel  him  to  vacate  the  position.  The  latter 
course  was  finally  adopted,  with  success. 

That  an  onward  movement  should  be  made  to 
Richmond,  and  the  rebellion  be  there  attacked  in 
its  heart,  was  a  point  on  which  the  public,  the 
Administration,  and  the  commander-in-chief  were 
agreed;  but  by  what  route  to  make  the  approach — 
whether  by  the  Lower  Potomac  and  the  Peninsula, 
or  by  a  direct  attack  upon  the  positions  at  ]\Ianassas 
and  Centreville — formed  a  fruitful  subject  of  debate 
in  the  newspapers  and  among  military  men;  and 
the  discussion  was  all  the  more  animated  from  the 
fact  that  whatever  plans  General  McClellan  had 
formed,  or  was  forming,  he  did  not  make  them 
known  to  others. 

Thus  far  nothing  had,  apparently,  disturbed  the 
relations  between  General  McClellan  and  the  Ad 
ministration,  or  changed  the  friendly  feeling  which 
had  inspired  the  paragraph  which  has  been  quoted 
from  the  President's  message.  On  the  14th  day  of 


AGE  35.]  SECRETARY    STANTON.  135 

January,  1862,  Mr.  Simon  Cameron  resigned  his 
position  as  Secretary  of  War,  and  Mr.  Edwin  M. 
Stanton  was  appointed  to  fill  his  place.  Mr.  Stanton 
had  not  been  in  political  life,  and  was  known  only 
as  a  lawyer  in  large  practice,  of  strong  grasp  of 
mind  and  great  capacity  for  labor.  He  had  been 
a  member  of  the  Democratic  party;  and  the  selec 
tion  of  an  able  and  honorable  political  opponent 
for  such  a  place,  at  such  a  time,  seemed  an  act  alike 
of  wisdom  and  magnanimity,  which  gave  general 
pleasure.  •  Thus  the  appointment  was  hailed  with 
universal  favor,  and  the  highest  hopes  were  enter 
tained  of  an  improved  administration  of  the  War 
.Department,  under  a  man  fresh  from  the  people, 
imscarred  and  unstained  by  political  strife.  Bat, 
in  whatever  other  respects  the  country  may  have 
been  a  gainer  by  the  introduction  into  the  Cabinet 
of  a  man  of  Mr.  Stanton's  energy,  it  is  certain  that 
the  hands  of  General  McClcllan  were  not  strength 
ened  by  the  change,  and  that  the  confidence  reposed 
in  him  by  the  Administration  was  not  thereby  in 
creased.* 


*  The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  journal  of  the  Con 
gressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  under  date 
of  January  21,  1862,  a  few  days  after  Mr.  Stanton's  appoint 
ment: — 

"Sm: — I  am  instructed  by  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  present  War  to  inquire  of  you  Avhether  there  is 
such  an  office  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States,  or  any  grade  above  that  of  major-general.  If 
so,  by  what  authority  is  it  created?  Does  it  exist  by  virtue 


130    I  N  T  E  R  V  I  E  W    W  I  T  II     T  II  E     £  E  0  R  E  T  A  K  Y.    [1 802. 

General  McClellan  had  been  taken  ill  at  Christ 
inas-time,  1861,  and  was  confined  to  his  bed  about 
three  weeks.  Upon  his  recovery,  in  the  middle  of 
January,  he  says  in  his  Report  that  he  found  that 
an  excessive  anxiety  for  an  immediate  movement  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  taken  possession  of 
the  Administration.  He  had  an  interview  with  the 
new  Secretary  of  War,  soon  after  the  appointment 
of  the  latter,  in  which  he  explained  verbally  his 
design  as  to  the  part  of  the  campaign  to  be  exe 
cuted  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  and  tkis  was,  to 
attack  Richmond  by  the  Lower  Chesapeake.  The 
Secretary  instructed  him  to  develop  his  plan  to  the 
President. — which  he  did.  Unfortunately,  it  did 
not  meet  with  the  approbation  of  the  latter;  and 


of   any  law  of   Congress,  or  any  usage  of  the  Government? 
Please  give  us  the  information  asked  for,  at  your  convenience. 
"I  remain,  &c., 

"B.  F.  WADE,  Chairman. 
"Hon.  EDWIN  M.  STAXTOX, 

"  Secretary  of  War." 

This  seems  hardly  respectful  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  after  his  announcement  in  his  Annual  Message  that  he 
had  appointed  General  McClellan  to  the  very  office  which  the 
committee  insinuate  does  not  exist;  and  had  Abraham  Lincoln 
been  Andrew  Jackson,  he  would  have  been  a  bold  man  who 
would  have  addressed  such  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
But  we  may  infer  that  such  a  communication  would  not  have 
been  sent  to  Mr.  Stanton  unless  the  committee  had  surmised 
it  would  be  welcome, — which  inference  is  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  the  committee,  on  the  preceding  day,  January  20, 
had  had  a  conference  with  the  Secretary,  at  his  request,  of 
several  hours'  duration. 


Ac  K  i'o.J  1- 11 RSLD  K  N  T     h  J  N  0  0  L  X .  J  o  7 

from  that  moment  there  began  on  the  part  of  the 
President  an  active  interference  with  the  move 
ments  of  the  army,  frequently  without  conference 
with  the  commander,  which  much  increased  the 
difficulties  of  the  latter,  and  were  most  untoward 
in  their  influence  upon  the  results  of  the  campaign. 
The  President's  course  can  be  shown  out  of  his  own 
mouth  to  have  been  unwise;  for  in  his  Annual 
Message  of  December  3,  1861,  he  says,  immedi 
ately  after  the  paragraph  which  has  been  already 
quoted,  announcing  the  appointment  of  General 
McClellan  as  commander- in-chief, — 

"  It  has  been  said  that  one  bad  general  is  better  than 
two  good  ones;  and  the  saying  is  true,  if  taken  to  mean 
no  more  than  that  an  army  is  better  directed  by  a  single 
mind,  though  inferior,  than  by  two  superior  ones  at  vari 
ance  and  cross-purposes  with  each  other. 

"And  the  same  is  true  in  all  joint  operations,  wherein 
those  engaged  can  have  none  but  a  common  end  in  view, 
and  can  differ  only  as  to  the  choice  of  means.  In  a 
storm  at  sea,  no  one  on  board  can  wish  the  ship  to  sink: 
and  yet,  not  imfrequently,  all  go  down  together,  because 
too  many  will  direct,  and  no  single  mind  can  be  allowed 
to  control." 

This  is  well  put:  it  is  good  sense,  enforced  by 
pertinent  illustration;  and  the  question  naturally 
rises,  why  did  not  the  President  "reck  his  own 
rede  "  ?  Without  impugning  his  patriotism,  it  may 
be  presumed  that  he  yielded  his  own  judgment  to 
the  force  of  that  mysterious  influence  called  <4  press 
ure  " — "  a  power  behind  the  throne,  greater  than  th 

1  2 '' 


138  PRESIDENT     LINCOLN.  [1862. 

throne," — which  has  done  so  much  harm  and  so  littlo 
good  in  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

The  President's  practical  exercise  of  his  constitu 
tional  functions  as  commander-in-chief  began  with 
the  issuing  of  the  following  order,  which,  be  it 
always  borne  in  mind,  was  done  without  consulta 
tion  with  General  McClellan : — 

("President's  General  War  Order,  No.  1.) 

"EXECUTIVK  MANSION*, 
WASHINGTON,  January  27,  1862. 

"  Ordered,  That  the  22d  day  of  February,  1802,  be  the 
day  for  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States  against  the  insurgent  forces.  That 
especially  the  army  at  and  about  Fortress  Monroe,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  Army  of  Western  Virginia,  the 
army  near  Munfordsville,  Kentucky,  the  army  and  flotilla 
at  Cairo,  and  a  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  be 
ready  to  move  on  that  day. 

"That  all  other  forces,  both  land  and  naval,  with  their 
respective  commanders,  obey  existing  orders  for  the  time, 
and  be  ready  to  obey  additional  orders  when  duly  given. 

"That  the  heads  of  departments,  and  especially  the 
Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy,  with  all  their  sub 
ordinates,  and  the  general-in-chief,  with  all  other  com 
manders  and  subordinates  of  land  and  naval  forces,  will 
severally  be  held  to  their  strict  and  full  responsibilities 
for  prompt  execution  of  this  order. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

The  President,  as  has  been  said,  disapproved  of 
General  McClelland  plan  of  attacking  Richmond 
by  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  and  substituted  one  of 
his  own,  by  a  new  order,  as  follows: — 


AOB  .*5r..]     P  II  K  S  I  D  E  N  T     L  I  N  0  O  L  N  '  S     O  K  I)  K  US.          1  .'>«» 
("President's  Special  War  Order,  No.  1.) 

"  E  X  E  0  U  T I V  !•:   M  A  X  S 1 0  X,  ] 

WASHINGTON-,  January  ','>],  1S62.    j 

"  Ordered,  That  all  the  disposable  force  of  tho  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  after  providing  safely  for  the  defence  of 
Washington,  be  formed  into  an  expedition  for  the  im 
mediate  object  of  seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon  the 
railroad  southweshvard  of  what  is  known  as  Manassas 
Junction,  all  details  to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  and  the  expedition  to  move  before  or  on 
the  22d  day  of  February  next. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

These  two  orders  should  be  considered  together 
and  carefully  pondered  by  every  candid  man  who 
desires  to  form  a  correct  judgment  as  to  the  past, 
irrespective  of  political  prepossessions.  The  out 
posts  of  an  army  mark  the  line  where  the  sphere 
of  party  politics  ends.  A  general  is  a  good 
general  or  a  bad  general,  a  cautious  general  or  a 
rash  general;  but  no  military  critic  will  speak  of  a 
tory  general  or  a  whig  general,  a  Republican  gene 
ral  or  a  Democratic  general.  The  President  of 
the  United  States  is  a  civilian,  without  military 
training  or  experience;  and  he  is,  moreover,  of 
necessity,  greatly  occupied  with  important  civil  du 
ties,  and  thus  unable  to  give  his  time  and  thoughts 
exclusively  to  military  matters.  The  second  in 
date  of  the  above  orders,  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen, 
directs  that  a  most  momentous  campaign  should  be 
conducted  upon  a  plan  which  the  commanding 
officer,  charged  with  the  duty  and  responsibility 
of  carrying  it  out,  had,  after  great  deliberation. 


140  P  R  E  S  I  D  E  N  T     L  I  X  C  0  L  X .  [1S62. 

decided  to  be  inexpedient.  It  is  easy  to  see  how 
unequal,  under  such  difference  of  opinion,  is  the 
contest  between  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  the  general  who  acts  under  peremptory  orders 
to  take  a  certain  step,  but  has  the  ';  details"  in  his 
own  "discretion."  Does  he  succeed?  it  is  because 
the  plan  was  good;  does  he  fail?  it  is  because  the 
"details"  were  not  zealously  and  ably  executed.* 

But  the  first  of  these  orders  deserves  more 
consideration  even  than  the  second.  The  Presi 
dent  appoints  a  certain  future  day  for  a  general 
movement  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
country,  as  if  it  were  the  marshalling  of  a  civic 
procession  or  the  arranging  of  a  mock  battle  on 
the  stage.  i!so  man  can  venture  to  say  that  a 
great  army  shall  move  or  a  great  fleet  shall  sail 


*  It  may  be  a  consolation  for  us  to  know  that  the  interference 
of  civilians  in  the  plans  of  military  commanders  has  been  an 
evil  in  other  countries  besides  ours.  A  respectable  English 
writer,  speaking  of  their  Peninsular  campaign,  says,  "We  may 
here  observe  how  hard  is  the  fate  of  an  English  general  sent 
out  in  command  of  an  expedition.  With  the  single  exception 
of  the  first  Earl  of  Chatham,  England  never  has  possessed  an 
able  war-minister.  Ministers,  in  general,  are  far  better  skilled 
in  parliamentary  tactics  and  political  intrigue  than  in  history, 
geography,  and  the  other  sciences  connected  with  war.  Yet 
they  will  boldly  take  upon  them  to  plan  campaigns,  and  will  even 
order  impossibilities  to  be  performed,  and  the  whole  blame  of 
failure  is  laid  upon  the  unfortunate  commander.  What,  for 
example,  can  be  conceived  more  absurd  than  a  Castlereagh,  a 
Canning,  or  a  Frere,  directing  a  Moore  or  a  Wellington? 
Such  things,  however,  were.'' — KEIGHTLEY:  History  of  England 
vol.  iii.  p.  o07. 


AOB  :>;">.]  PRESIDENT    LINCOLN.  141 

on  a  fixed  future  day,  unless  he  be  endowed  with 
the  gift  of  prophecy.  And  the  22d  day  of  Febru 
ary  was  named  for  the  combined  movement,  it  may 
be  presumed,  simply  because  it  was  the  birthday 
of  Washington.  Thus  a  sort  of  melodramatic  grace 
was  attempted  to  be  thrown  over  the  stern  aspect 
of  war,  and  the  corps  of  fine  writers  who  were  in 
attendance  upon  the  army  were  furnished  with  a 
theme  for  a  sensation  paragraph.  It  is  melancholy 
to  think  that  the  lives  and  blood  of  brave  men 
were  under  the  control  of  those  who  could  be 
moved  by  so  trumpery  a  consideration  as  this. 

General  McClellan,  on  receiving  the  order  of 
January  3,  asked  the  President  whether  it  was 
to  be  regarded  as  final,  or  whether  he  could  be  per 
mitted  to  submit  in  writing  his  objections  to  the 
plan  of  the  Executive  and  his  reasons  for  preferring 
his  own.  Permission  was  granted,  and  a  letter 
was  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  dato 
of  February  3.  But,  before  it  had  been  submitted 
to  the  President,  General  McClellan  received  from 
him  the  following  note  : — 


"EXECUTIVE  MANSION,          1 
WASHINGTON,  February  3,  1862.    J 

"Mr  DEAR  SIR: — You  and  I  have  distinct  and  different 
plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, — yours 
to  be  done  by  the  Chesapeake,  up  the  Rappahannock  to 
Urbana,  and  across  land  to  the  terminus  of  the  railroad 
on  the  York  River:  mine  to  move  directly  to  a  point  on 
the  railroad  southwest  of  Manassas. 

"  If  you  will  give  me  satisfactory  answers  to  the  follow 
ing  questions,  I  shall  gladly  yield  my  plan  to  yours: — 


142      LETTER  TO  THE  SECRETARY. 


"1st.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly  larger  ex 
penditure  of  time  and  money  than  mine?, 

"2d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your  plan 
than  mine? 

"3d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable  by  your  plan 
than  mine? 

"4th.  In  fact,  would  it  not  be  less  valuable,  in  this, 
that  it  would  break  no  great  line  of  the  enemy's  commu 
nications,  while  mine  would? 

"5th.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  retreat  be  more 
difficult  by  your  plan  than  mine? 

"Yours,  truly, 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLX. 

"Major-General  MCCLELLAN." 

These  questions  were  substantially  answered  in 
the  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  above  referred 
to,  which  appears  in  General  McClellan's  Eeport; 
but  its  length  forbids  its  being  copied  in  full,  and 
only  an  abstract  of  its  contents  can  be  given. 

He  begins  with  a  brief  statement  of  the  condition 
of  the  troops  when  he  assumed  the  command  in 
July,  1861,  and  of  the  defenceless  position  of  the 
capital  at  that  time,  and  thus  recapitulates  what 
had  been  accomplished  up  to  the  date  of  writing : — 

"The  capital  is  secure  against  attack;  the  extensive 
fortifications  erected  by  the  labor  of  our  troops  enable  a 
small  garrison  to  hold  it  against  a  numerous  army;  the 
enemy  have  been  held  in  check;  the  State  of  Maryland 
is  securely  in  our  possession:  the  detached  counties  of 
Virginia  are  again  within  the  pale  of  our  laws,  and  all 
apprehension  of  trouble  in  Delaware  is  at  an  end ;  the 
enemy  are  confined  to  the  positions  they  occupied  before 
the  disaster  of  the  21st  of  July.  More  than  all  this,  I  have* 


AGE  35.]       LETTER     TO     THE     SECRETARY.  143 

now  under  my  command  a  well-drilled  and  reliable  army, 
to  which  the  destinies  of  the  country  may  be  confidently 
committed.  This  army  is  young  and  untried  in  battle; 
but  it  is  animated  by  the  highest  spirit,  and  is  capable 
of  great  deeds. 

"That  so  much  has  been  accomplished  and  such  an 
army  created  in  so  short  a  time  from  nothing,  will  here 
after  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  glories  of  the  Ad 
ministration  and  the  nation." 

After  telling  the  Secretary  that  he  has  not  yet 
under  his  command  such  a  force  as  he  asked  for  in 
his  earliest  papers  submitted  to  the  President,  ho 
thus  proceeds : — 

"When  I  was  placed  in  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States,  I  immediately  turned  my  attention  to  the 
whole  field  of  operations,  regarding  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  as  only  one,  while  the  most  important,  of  the 
masses  under  my  command. 

"I  confess  that  I  did  not  then  appreciate  the  total  ab 
sence  of  a  general  plan  which  had  before  existed,  nor  did 
I  know  that  utter  disorganization  and  want  of  prepara 
tion  pervaded  the  Western  armies. 

"  I  took  it  for  granted  that  they  were  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
in  condition  to  move  towards  the  fulfilment  of  my  plans. 
I  acknowledge  that  I  made  a  great  mistake. 

"I  sent  at  once — with  approval  of  the  Executive — 
officers  I  considered  competent  to  command  in  Kentucky 
and  Missouri.  Their  instructions  looked  to  prompt 
movements.  I  soon  found  that  the  labor  of  creation 
and  organization  had  to  be  performed  there :  transporta 
tion,  arms,  clothing,  artillery,  discipline,  all  were  want 
ing.  These  things  required  time  to  procure  them. 

"The  generals  in  command  have  done  their  work  most 
creditably ;  but  we  are  still  delayed.  I  had  hoped  that  a 


114  LETTER    TO     THE     SECRETARY.  [1S62. 

general  advance  could  be  made  during  the  good  weather 
of  December:  I  was  mistaken. 

"  My  wish  was  to  gain  possession  of  the  Eastern  Ten 
nessee  Kailroad,  as  a  preliminary  movement,  then  to 
follow  it  up  immediately  by  an  attack  on  Nashville  and 
Richmond  as  nearly  at  the  same  time  as  possible. 

"I  have  ever  regarded  our  true  policy  as  being  that  of 
fully  preparing  ourselves,  and  then  seeking  for  the  most 
decisive  results.  I  do  not  wish  to  waste  life  in  useless 
battles,  but  prefer  to  strike  at  the  heart." 

He  next  proceeds  to  state  that  two  bases  of  ope 
ration  presented  themselves  for  the  advance  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac, — first,  that  of  Washing 
ton,  its  present  position,  involving  a  direct  attack 
upon  the  intrenched  positions  of  the  enemy  at 
Centreville,  Manassas,  &c.,  or  else  a  movement  to 
turn  one  or  both  of  those  positions,  or  a  combina 
tion  of  the  two  .plans.  The  relative  force  of  the 
two  armies  would  not  justify  an  attack  on  both 
flanks  of  the  enemy;  and  an  attack  on  his  left  flank 
alone  would  involve  a  long  line  of  wagon-commu 
nication,  and  could  not  prevent  him  from  collecting 
for  the  decisive  battle  all  the  detachments  now  on 
his  extreme  right  and  loft. 

He  next  sets  forth  in  great  detail  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  of  an  attack  upon  the  right  flank,  by 
the  line  of  the  Occoquan,  and  a  crossing  of  the 
Potomac  below  that  river,  showing  a  minute  know 
ledge  of  the  localities  of  the  region,  and  demon 
strating  to  his  correspondent  the  great  advantage 
possessed  by  the  enemy  in  the  central  position  he 
occupied,  with  roads  diverging  in  every  direction, 


AGE  ;j  J.J       L  E  T  T  E  II     T  0     THE     S  E  C  R  E  T  A  It  Y.  1 45 

and  it  strong  lino  of  defence,  enabling  him  to  await 
tin  attack  with  a  small  force  on  one  flank,  while  he 
concentrates  every  thing  on  the  other  for  a  decisive 
action.  Among  other  difficulties,  he  speaks  of  "  the 
present  unprecedented  and  impassable  condition  of 
the  roads."  But,  supposing  the  movement  in  this 
direction  to  be  successful,  the  results,  he  thinks, 
would  be  confined  to  the  possession  of  the  field  of 
battle,  the  evacuation  of  the  line  of  the  Upper  Po 
tomac  by  the  enemy,  and  the  moral  effect  of  the 
victory, — important  results,  it  is  true,  but  not  de 
cisive  of  the  war,  or  securing  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  main  army  or  the  capture  of  Richmond. 

The  second  base  of  operations  available  for  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  is  that  of  the  Lower  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  which  affords  the  shortest  possible  land- 
route  to  Richmond  and  strikes  directly  at  the  heart 
of  the  enemy's  power  in  the  East.  In  favor  of  this 
plan  he  thus  reasons : — • 

"The  roads  in  that  region  are  passable  at  all  periods  of 
the  year. 

"The  country  now  alluded  to  is  much  more  favorable 
for  offensive  operations  than  that  in  front  of  Washington 
(which  is  very  unfavorable), — much  more  level,  morecleared 
land,  the  woods  less  dense,  the  soil  more  sandy,  and  the 
spring  some  two  or  three  weeks  earlier.  A  movement  in 
force  on  that  line  obliges  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  in 
trenched  position  at  Manassas  in  order  to  hasten  to  cover 
Richmond  and  Norfolk.  lie  must  do  this;  for,  should  he 
permit  us  to  occupy  Richmond,  his  destruction  can  bo 
averted  only  by  entirely  defeating  us  in  a  battle  in  which 
he  must  be  the  assailant.  This  movement,  if  successful, 
gives  us  the  capital,  the  communications,  the  supplies, 


146  LETTER     TO     THE    SECRETARY.  [1862. 

of  the  rebels;  Norfolk  would  fall,  all  the  waters  of  the 
Chesapeake  would  be  ours,  all  Virginia  would  be  in  our 
power,  and  the  enemy  forced  to  abandon  Tennessee  and 
North  Carolina.  The  alternative  presented  to  the  enemy 
would  be  to  beat  us  in  a  position  selected  by  ourselves, 
disperse,  or  pass  beneath  the  Caudine  forks. 

"Should  we  be  beaten  in  a  battle,  we  have  a  perfectly 
secure  retreat  down  the  Peninsula  upon  Fort  Monroe, 
with  our  flanks  perfectly  covered  by  the  fleet. 

"During  the  whole  movement  our  left  flank  is  covered 
by  the  water.  Our  right  is  secure,  for  the  reason  that  the 
enemy  is  too  distant  to  reach  us  in  time:  he  can  only  op 
pose  us  in  front;  we  bring  our  fleet  into  full  play. 

"After  a  successful  battle,  our  position  would  be — 
Burnside  forming  our  left,  Norfolk  held  securely,  our 
centre  connecting  Burnside  with  Buell  both  by  Raleigh 
and  Lynchburg,  Buell  in  Eastern  Tennessee  and  North 
Alabama,  Halleck  at  Nashville  and  Memphis. 

"The  next  movement  would  be  to  connect  with  Sher 
man  on  the  left,  by  reducing  Wilmington  and  Charles 
ton  ;  to  advance  our  centre  into  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia;  to  push  Buell  either  towards  Montgomery  or  to 
unite  with  the  main  army  in  Georgia ;  to  throw  Halleck 
southward  to  meet  the  naval  expedition  from  New  Orleans. 

"We  should  then  be  in  a  condition  to  reduce  at  our 
leisure  all  the  Southern  sea-ports,  to  occupy  all  the  avenues 
of  communication,  to  use  the  great  outlet  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  to  re-establish  our  Government  and  arms  in  Ar 
kansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas,  to  force  the  slaves  to  labor 
for  our  subsistence  instead  of  that  of  the  rebels,  to  bid 
defiance  to  all  foreign  interference.  Such  is  the  object  I 
have  ever  had  in  view;  this  is  the  general  plan  which  I 
hope  to  accomplish. 

"For  many  long  months  I  have  labored  to  prepare  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  play  its  part  in  the  programme. 
From  the  day  when  I  was  placed  in  command  of  all  our 


AGE  :55.J       LETTER     TO     THE     SECRETARY.  147 

armies,  I  have  exerted  myself  to  place  all  the  other  armies 
in  such  a  condition  that  they  too  could  perform  their 
allotted  duties/' 

He  then  tells  his  correspondent  that,  if  it  should 
be  determined  to  operate  from  the  Lower  Chesa 
peake,  the  best  point  of  landing*  would  be  Urbana, 
on  the  Lower  Eappahannock,  and  states  his  reasons 
for  the  opinion ;  but,  if  circumstances  should  render 
it  advisable  not  to  land  there,  either  Mobjack  Bay 
or  Fort  Monroe  might  be  resorted  to.  A  large 
amount  of  cheap  water  transportation  would  be 
requisite  to  move  the  army  to  whatever  point 
might  be  selected  as  a  base  of  operations;  and  ho 
gives  some  details  in  relation  to  this  important 
point.  The  letter  thus  concludes: — 

"The  total  force  to  be  thrown  upon  the  new  line  would 
be,  according  to  circumstances,  from  one  hundred  and  ten 
thousand  to  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand.  I  hope  to 
use  the  latter  number  by  bringing  fresh  troops  into  Wash 
ington  and  still  leaving  it  quite  safe.  I  fully  realize  that, 
in  all  projects  offered,  time  will  probably  be  the  most  valu 
able  consideration.  It  is  my  decided  opinion  that,  in  that 
point  of  view,  the  second  plan  should  be  adopted.  It  is 
possible — nay,  highly  probable — that  the  weather  and  state 
of  the  roads  may  be  such  as  to  delay  the  direct  movement 
from  Washington,  with  its  unsatisfactory  results  and  great 
risks,  far  beyond  the  time  required  to  complete  the  second 
plan.  In  the  first  case,  we  can  fix  no  definite  time  for  an 
advance.  The  roads  have  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  No 
thing  like  their  present  condition  was  ever  known  here 
before:  they  are  impassable  at  present.  We  are  entirely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  weather.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
we  can  beat  them  at  Manassns.  On  the  other  line  I  re 
gard  success  as  certain  by  all  the  chances  of  war.  We 


14S  L  E  T  T  E  R     T  O     THE     S  E  C  K  E  T  A  11  V.  US62. 

demoralize  the  enemy  by  forcing  him  to  abandon  his  pre 
pared  position  for  one  which  we  have  -chosen,  in  which 
all  is  in  our  favor  and  where  success  must  produce  im 
mense  results. 

"My  judgment,  as  a  general,  is  clearly  in  favor  of  this 
project.  Nothing  is  certain  in  war;  but  all  the  chances 
are  in  favor  of  this  movement.  So  much  am  I  in  favor 
of  the  southern  line  of  operations,  that  I  would  prefer 
the  move  from  Fortress  Monroe  as  a  base,  as  a  certain 
though  less  brilliant  movement  than  that  from  Urbana, 
to  an  attack  upon  Manassas. 

"I  know  that  his  Excellency  the  President,  you,  and  I. 
all  agree  in  our  wishes,  and  that  these  wishes  are,  to 
bring  this  war  to  a  close  as  promptly  as  the  means  in  our 
possession  will  permit.  I  believe  that  the  mass  of  the 
people  have  entire  confidence  in  us.  I  am  sure  of  it. 
Let  us,  then,  look  only  to  the  great  result  to  be  accom 
plished,  and  disregard  every  thing  else." 

This  carefully-prepared  and  well-reasoned  letter, 
and  the  many  verbal  conferences  which  followed 
it,  seem  to  have  induced  the  President  to  give  up 
his  own  "plan;"  for  the  execution  of  his  order  was 
not  insisted  upon, — though,  as  it  was  not  revoked 
so  formally  as  it  had  been  issued,  General  McClel- 
lan  stood  before  the  public  in  the  awkward  position 
of  a  general  officer  declining  to  execute  an  order 
of  the  commander-in-chief  still  apparently  in  force. 
But  from  this  time  General  McClellan's  "plan"  of 
attacking  Richmond  by  way  of  the  Peninsula  was 
assented  to,  or  acquiesced  in,  by  the  President;  and 
no  further  conflict  of  opinion  took  place  between 
them  on  this  point. 

The  plan  of  operations  being  settled,  the  next 


Ac  E  y  o.  J  1'  L  A  X     O  F     O  P  E  E  A  T  I  O  N  S.  141) 

thing  was  to  devise  ways  and  means  to  carry  it 
into  execution.  Secrecy  arid  despatch  were  to  be  se 
cured,  as  far  as  was  practicable.  An  immense  army 
was  to  be  moved  by  water  from  a  point  or  points 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Washington,  and  the  plan 
of  the  campaign  was  to  be  kept  from  the  know 
ledge  of  the  enemy  till  the  latest  possible  moment. 
Immediate  measures  were  taken  to  provide  a  force 
of  steamers  and  sailing-vessels  necessary  for  the 
contemplated  object.* 


*  In  the  order  of  time,  the  following  letter  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  may  be  appropriately  introduced  here,  as  showing  his 
feeling  towards  General  McClellan  and  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac: — 

"WAu  DEPARTMENT,  j 

WASHINGTON,  February  17,  1862.  j 
"To  Brigadier-General  F.  W.  LANDER: — 
"The  President  directs  me  to  say  that  he  has  observed  with 
pleasure  the  activity  and  enterprise  manifested  by  yourself 
and  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  your  command.  You  have 
shown  how  much  may  be  done,  in  the  worst  weather  and 
worst  roads,  by  a  spirited  officer,  at  the  head  of  a  small  force 
of  brave  men,  unwilling  to  waste  life  in  camp  when  the  ene 
mies  of  their  country  are  in  reach.  Your  brilliant  success  is 
a  happy  presage  of  what  may  be  expected  when  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  shall  be  led  to  the  field  by  their  gallant  general. 

" EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 
"Secretary  of  War." 

A  few  days  after,  the  Secretary  wrote  another  letter,  ad 
dressed  to  the  editor  of  the  New  York  "Tribune/'  which  is  as 
follows:  — 

"WASHINGTON,  February  20,  1862. 

"Sin: — I  cannot  suffer  undue  merit  to  be  ascribed  to  my 
official  action.     The  glory  of  our  recent  victories  belongs  to 
13* 


100  LETTER     FROM     THE     SECRETARY.         [18C2. 

About  tbo  20tli  of  February,  measures  were 
taken  to  secure  the  reopening  of  the  Baltimore  & 

the  gallant  officers   that  fought  the  battles.     No  share  of   it 
belongs  to  me. 

"Much  has  been  recently  said  of  military  combination  and 
organizing  victory.  I  hear  such  phrases  with  apprehension. 
They  commenced  in  infidel  France  with  the  Italian  campaign, 
and  resulted  in  Waterloo.  Who  can  organize  victory?  Who 
can  combine  the  elements  of  success  on  the  battle-field  ?  We 
owe  our  recent  victories  to  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord,  that  moved 
our  soldiers  to  dash  into  battle,  and  filled  the  hearts  of  our 
enemies  with  terror  and  dismay.  The  inspiration  that  con 
quered  in  battle  was  in  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers,  and  from 
on  high.  Patriotic  spirit  with  resolute  courage  in  officers  and 
men  is  a  military  combination  that  never  failed. 

"We  may  well  rejoice  at  the  recent  victories  ;  for  they  teach 
us  that  battles  are  to  be  won  now  and  by  us  in  the  same  and 
only  manner  that  they  were  ever  won  by  any  people  or  in  any 
age  since  the  days  of  Joshua, — by  boldly  pursuing  and  strik 
ing  the  foe.  What,  under  the  blessing  of  Providence,  I  con 
ceive  to  be  the  true  organization  of  victory  and  military  com 
bination  to  end  this  war.  was  declared  in  a  few  words  by 
General  Grant's  message  to  General  Buckner: — 'I  propose  to 
move  immediately  on  your  works.' 

"Yours,  truly, 

" EDWIN  M.  STAXTOX." 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  this  absurd  letter,  which  no 
officer  in  the  army  could  have  read  without  indignation  and 
disgust,  could  have  been  written  by  a  Secretary  of  War.  Be 
sides  its  bad  taste  and  false  rhetoric,  it  involves  a  contemptuous 
disparagement  of  military  science,  most  unbecoming  in  a  man 
who  was  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department  of  a  great  nation 
engaged  in  a  momentous  war.  And  there  breathes  through  it 
a  spirit  of  hostility  towards  General  JNIcClellan,  of  ominous 
import  to  the  success  of  our  arms.  After  reading  it,  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  ought  at  once  to  have  removed 
either  that  officer  or  Mr.  Stanton  himself. 


Aon  :tt.]  HARPER'S   FKRRY.  1~>1 

Oliio  Kailroad.  The  whole  of  General  Banks's 
division,  and  two  brigades  of  General  Sedgwick's 
division,  were  thrown  across  the  river  at  Harper's 
Ferry  on  the  2Gth,  superintended  by  General  Mc- 
Clellan  in  person,  who  had  gone  up  from  Washing 
ton  for  that  purpose.  Materials  had  been  collected 
for  making  a  permanent  bridge  by  means  of  carial- 
boats;  but,  on  attempting  to  pass  the  boats  through 
the  left  lock,  it  was  found,  for  the  first  time,  that 
the  lock  was  too  small  to  permit  their  passage. 
This  unexpected  obstacle  deranged  the  plans;  and 
an  order  which  had  been  given  for  the  movement 
of  some  forces  from  Washington  was  counter 
manded.  Every  exertion  was  made  to  establish, 
as  promptly  as  possible,  depots  of  forage  and  sub 
sistence  on  the  Virginia  side,  to  supply  the  troops. 
On  the  28th,  Charlestown  was  occupied  by  a  strong 
Federal  force;  and  on  the  same  day  General  Mc- 
Clellan  returned  to  Washington.  In  spite  of  the 
untoward  mischance  of  the  canal-boats, — for  which 
the  commander-in-chief  could  not  be  responsible, — 
the  design  aimed  at  had  been  accomplished,  and 
before  the  1st  of  April  the  railroad  was  in  running 
order. 

AVith  General  McClcllan's  return  to  Washington 
on  the  28th  of  February,  preparations  were  begun 
for  carrying  out  the  washes  of  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War  in  regard  to  destroying  the  bat 
teries  on  the  Lower  Potomac, — though  in  giving 
his  hand  to  this  movement  General  McClellan 
yielded  his  own  judgment  to  theirs.  He  was  con 
vinced  that  this  operation  would  require  the  move- 


152  0  O  U  N  C  I  L     0  F     OFFICERS.  [1 862. 

ment  of  the  entire  army,  that  the  extremely  un 
favorable  condition  of  the  roads  was  a  serious  ob 
stacle  to  be  overcome,  and  that  it  was  unnecessary, 
because  the  proposed  movement  to  the  Lower  Chesa 
peake  would — as  it  subsequently  did — force  the 
enemy  to  abandon  all  his  positions  in  front  of 
Washington.  But  the  preparations  for  a  move 
ment  towards  the  Oecoquan  in  order  to  carry  the 
batteries  were  advanced  as  rapidly  as  the  season 
permitted. 

This  brings  us  down  to  the  8th  of  March,  18G2, 
—an  important  day  in  the  history  of  the  war.  Gene 
ral  McClellan  had  invited  the  commanders  of 
divisions  to  meet  at  head-quarters  on  that  day,  in 
order  to  give  them  instructions  and  receive  their 
advice  and  opinion  in  regard  to  their  commands; 
but  at  a  very  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  that 
day  he  was  sent  for  by  the  President,  who  ex 
pressed  his  dissatisfaction  writh  the  affair  of  Har 
per's  Ferry  and  with  the  plans  for  the  new  move 
ment  down  the  Chesapeake.  Explanations  were 
made  w^hich,  apparently,  satisfied  the  President's 
mind.  At  a  later  hour  in  the  day,  the  meeting  of 
general  officers  wrhich  had  been  called  was  held  at 
head-quarters.  The  officers  present  (besides  Gene 
ral  McClellan)  were  Generals  McDowell,  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  Keyes,  Franklin,  Fitz-Jolm  Porter, 
Andrew  Porter,  Smith,  McCall,  Blenker,  Negley, 
and  Barnard.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
was  also  there.  The  plans  of  General  McClellan 
w^ere  fully  explained  to  the  council,  and  the  general 
question  submitted  to  them  was  whether  the  enemy 


AGE  3o.j  PRESIDENT'S  ORDERS.  ]">n 

should  bo  attacked  in  front  at  Manassas  and  Ccn- 
treville,  or  whether  a  movement  should  be  made 
down  to  the  Lower  Chesapeake.  After  a  full  dis 
cussion,  four  of  the  officers — McDowell,  Simmer, 
Heintzelman,  and  Barnard — approved  of  the  former 
plan,  and  the  remainder  of  the  latter.  The  details 
were  not  considered  as  fixed ;  though  it  was  gene 
rally  understood  that  the  point  of  destination  and 
landing  was  Urbana,  on  the  Rappahannock. 

At  the  close  of  this  council  of  officers,  nothing 
had  transpired  to  lead  General  McClellan  to  sup 
pose  that  there  was  any  lingering  distrust  of  him  in 
the  President's  mind;  and  he  was  therefore  much 
and  painfully  surprised  to  learn  that  on  that  very 
8th  day  of  March  the  President,  without  consult 
ing  him,  had  issued  two  important  military  orders. 
The  first  of  these  was  as  follows : — 


("President's  General  War  Order,  No.  2.) 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION,      ) 
WASHINGTON,  March  8,  18G2.  } 

"  Ordered,  1st.  That  the  major-general  commanding  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  proceed  forthwith  to  organize  that 
part  of  the  said  army  destined  to  enter  upon  active  ope 
rations  (including  the  reserve,  but  excluding  the  troops 
to  be  left  in  the  fortifications  about  Washington)  into 
four  army  corps,  to  be  commanded,  according  to  seniority 
of  rank,  as  follows: — 

''First  Corps  to  consist  of  four  divisions,  and  to  be  com 
manded  by  Major-General  I.  McDowell.  Second  Corps 
to  consist  of  three  divisions,  and  to  be  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  E.  V.  Sumner.  Third  Corps  to  consist 
of  three  divisions,  and  to  be  commanded  by  Brigadier- 


154  PRESIDENT'S   ORDERS.  [isca. 

General  S.  P.  Heintzelman.  Fourth  Corps  to  consist  of 
three  divisions,  and  to  be  commanded  by  Brigadier-Gene 
ral  E.  D.  Iveyes. 

"2d.  That  the  divisions  now  commanded  by  the  officers 
above  assigned  to  the  commands  of  army  corps  shall  be 
embraced  in  and  form  part  of  their  respective  corps. 

"3d.  The  forces  left  for  the  defence  of  Washington  will 
be  placed  in  command  of  Brigadier-General  James  Wads- 
worth,  who  shall  also  be  Military  Governor  of  the  District 
of  Columbia. 

"4th.  That  this  order  be  executed  with  such  prompt 
ness  and  despatch  as  not  to  delay  the  commencement 
of  the  operations  already  directed  to  be  undertaken  by  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"5th.  A  Fifth  Army  Corps,  to  be  commanded  by 
Major-General  N.  P.  Banks,  will  be  formed  from  his  own 
and  General  Shields's  (late  General  Lander's)  division. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

This  order  was  probably  of  no  great  practical 
importance,  as  it  simply  anticipated  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  purpose.  He  had  always  been  in  favor  of 
an  organization  into  army  corps,  but  preferred  de 
ferring  its  practical  execution  until  some  little  ex 
perience  in  the  coming  campaign  and  on  the  field 
of  battle  should  show  what  general  officers  were 
most  competent  to  exercise  these  high  commands, 
as  an  incompetent  commander  of  an  army  corps 
might  cause  very  serious  damage,  while  an  incom 
petent  division  commander  could  do  no  great  harm. 
These  views  commend  themselves  to  common  sense; 
but  they  failed  to  convince  the  President's  mind, 
who  assumed  a  responsibility  from  which  General 
McClellan  at  that  time  shrank.  The  latter  at  once 


AGE  35.]  PRESIDENT'S     ORDERS.  155 

issued  the  order  necessary  to  carry  out  the  com 
mand  of  the  President. 

The  second  of  the  orders  issued  by  the  President 
on  the  8th  of  March  was  as  follows : — 

("President's  General  War  Order,  No.  3.) 

"  EXECUTIVE  MANSION,      ) 
WASHINGTON,  March  8,  1862.  } 

'•  Ordered,  That  no  change  of  the  base  of  operations  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  shall  be  made  without  leaving 
in  and  about  Washington  such  a  force  as,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  general-in-chief  and  the  commanders  of  army 
corps,  shall  leave  said  city  entirely  secure. 

"  That  no  more  than  two  army  corps  (about  fifty  thou 
sand  troops)  of  said  Army  of  the  Potomac  shall  be  moved 
en  route  for  a  new  base  of  operations  until  the  navigation 
of  the  Potomac  from  Washington  to  the  Chesapeake 
Bay  shall  be  freed  from  enemy's  batteries  and  other 
obstructions,  or  until  the  President  shall  hereafter  give 
express  permission. 

"That  any  movement,  as  aforesaid,  en  route  for  a  new 
base  of  operations  which  may  be  ordered  by  the  general- 
in-chief,  and  whioh  may  be  intended  to  move  upon  the 
Chesapeake  Bay,  shall  begin  to  move  upon  the  bay  as 
early  as  the  18th  of  March  instant ;  and  the  general-in-chief 
shall  be  responsible  that  it  so  moves  as  early  as  that  day. 

"  Ordered,  That  the  army  and  navy  co-operate  in  an  im 
mediate  effort  to  capture  the  enemy's  batteries  upon  the 
Potomac  between  Washington  and  the  Chesapeake  Bay. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"L.  THOMAS,  Adjutant-General" 

Here  it  will  be  seen  that  the  President  again  as 
sumes  to  fix  a  certain  day  in  the  future  for  the 
beginning  of  an  important  military  movement 


156  M  ERR  I  MAC    AND     MONITOR.  [1862. 

Whether  the  army  would  be  prepared  to  move 
upon  the  Bay  on  the  18th  of  March  depended  upon 
the  state  of  readiness  of  the  transports,  the  entire 
control  of  which  had  been  placed  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  in  the  hands  of  one  of  the  assistant  secre 
taries.  Unless  his  arrangements  had  been  com 
pleted  on  or  before  that  day,  the  army  could  not 
have  moved. 

But  the  record  of  the  important  events  of  the  8th 
of  March  is  not  completed;  for  on  that  day  the 
Merrimac  appeared  in  Hampton  Eoads  and  de 
stroyed  the  Cumberland  and  Congress,  and  the 
news,  flashed  far  and  wide  by  the  telegraph-wires, 
filled  the  whole  land  with  consternation  and  dis 
may.  But  our  spirits  rose  the  next  day  at  the  op 
portune  arrival  and  gallant  and  successful  achieve 
ment  of  the  Monitor.  It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon 
the  memorable  contest  between  these  two  vessels, 
so  important  in  its  effects  upon  the  whole  science 
of  naval  warfare;  but  it  was  an  event  of  no  incon 
siderable  moment  in  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign.  The  power  of  the  Monitor 
had  been  so  satisfactorily  demonstrated,  and  the 
other  naval  preparations  were  so  extensive  and 
formidable,  that  the  security  of  Fortress  Monroe 
as  a  base  of  operations  was  placed  beyond  a  doubt; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  presence  of  the  Merri 
mac  in  the  James  .River  closed  that  river  to  us,  and 
threw  us  upon  the  York  .River,  with  its  tributaries, 
as  our  only  line  of  water-communication  with  the 
fortress.  The  general  plan,  therefore,  remained  un- 


AGE  35.]       MOVEMENTS    OF    THE    ENEMY.  157 

disturbed,  though  less  promising  in  its  details  than 
when  James  .River  was  in  our  control. 

On  Sunday,  the  9th  of  March,  trustworthy  in 
formation  came  to  Washington  that  the  enemy  was 
beginning  to  evacuate  his  positions  at  Centreville 
and  Manassas,  as  well  as  on  the  Upper  and  Lower 
Potomac.  It  is  not  improbable  that,  in  some  mys 
terious  way,  they  had  heard  of  the  council  of  gene 
ral  officers  held  on  the  preceding  day,  and  of  the 
conclusions  arrived  at.* 


*  "  We  have  the  right,  we  think,  to  say  that  McClellan  never 
intended  to  advance  upon  Centreville.  His  long-determined 
purpose  was  to  make  Washington  safe  by  means  of  a  strong 
garrison,  and  then  to  use  the  great  navigable  waters  and  im 
mense  naval  resources  of  the  North  to  transport  the  army 
by  sea  to  a  point  near  Richmond.  For  weeks — perhaps  for 
months — this  plan  had  been  secretly  maturing  Secrecy  as 
well  as  promptness,  it  will  be  understood,  was  indispensable 
here  to  success.  To  keep  the  secret,  it  had  been  necessary  to 
confide  it  to  few  persons;  and  hence  had  arisen  one  great 
cause  for  jealousy  of  the  general. 

"Be  this  as  it  may,  as  the  day  of  action  drew  near,  those 
who  suspected  the  general's  project  and  were  angry  at  not 
being  informed  of  it, — those  whom  his  promotion  had  excited  to 
envy, — his  political  enemies  (who  is  without  them  in  America?) 
— in  short,  all  those  beneath  or  beside  him  who  wished  him 
ill, — broke  out  into  a  chorus  of  accusations  of  slowness,  in 
action,  incapacity.  McClellan,  with  a  patriotic  courage  which 
1  have  always  admired,  disdained  these  accusations,  and  made 
no  reply.  He  satisfied  himself  with  pursuing  his  preparations 
in  laborious  silence.  But  the  moment  came  in  which,  notwith 
standing  the  loyal  support  given  him  by  the  President,  that 
functionary  could  no  longer  resist  the  tempest.  A  council  of 
war  of  all  the  divisional  generals  was  held:  a  plan  of  campaign, 

H 


158  MANASSAS.  [1862. 

As  soon  as  the  news  came,  General  McClellan 
determined  to  cross  the  river  immediately  and  as 
certain  by  observation  whether  the  intelligence  was 
true,  and  then  determine  what  course  to  pursue. 
Orders  were  accordingly  issued,  during  the  9th  of 
March,  for  a  general  movement  of  the  army  the  next 
morning  towards  Centreville  and  Manassas,  send 
ing  in  advance  two  regiments  of  cavalry  as  a  corps 
of  observation.  At  noon  on  the  10th  of  March  the 
cavalry  advance  reached  the  enemy's  lines  at  Cen 
treville,  finding  there  still  burning  heaps  of  military 

not  that  of  McClellan,  was  proposed  and  discussed.  McClellan 
was  then  forced  to  explain  his  projects,  and  the  next  day 
they  were  known  to  the  enemy  Informed,  no  doubt,  by  one 
of  those  thousand  female  spies  who  keep  up  his  communications 
into  the  domestic  circles  of  the  Federal  enemy,  Johnston 
evacuated  Manassas  at  once  This  was  a  skilful  manoeuvre. 
Incapable  of  assuming  the  offensive,  threatened  with  attack 
either  at  Centreville,  where  defence  would  be  useless  if  suc 
cessful,  or  at  Richmond,  the  loss  of  which  would  be  a  grave 
check,  and  unable  to  cover  both  positions  at  once,  Johnston 
threw  his  whole  force  before  the  latter  of  the  two." 

The  above  is  taken  from  a  pamphlet  published  in  New  York, 
in  1863,  with  the  following  title: — "The  Army  of  the  Potomac: 
its  Organization,  its  Commander,  and  its  Campaign.  By  the 
Prince  de  Joinville  Translated  from  the  French,  with  Notes, 
by  William  Henry  Hurlbert."  The  original  appeared  in  the 
number  of  the  "Revue  des  Deux  Mondes"  for  October  15, 
18G2.  It  is  there  entitled  "Campagne  de  1'Armee  du  Potomac, 
Mars-Juillet,  1862,"  and  bears  the  signature  of  "A.  Trognon." 
The  article  has  been  generally  ascribed  to  the  Prince  de  Join 
ville;  and,  as  the  translation  bears  his  name  on  the  title-page 
and  has  been  constantly  referred  to  as  his,  the  future  extracts 
from  the  pamphlet  will  be  cited  under  his  name. 


AGE  35.]  PRESIDENT'S    ORDER.  159 

stores  and  much  valuable  property.  The  mass  of 
the  army  advanced  to  the  vicinity  of  Fairfax  Court- 
Housc,  and  General  McClellan  himself  went  to  Ma- 
nassas.  The  roads  were  in  so  impassable  a  condi 
tion  that  a  rapid  pursuit  of  an  enemy  who  burned 
or  broke  up  all  the  bridges  behind  him  in  his  re 
treat  was  impossible.  The  main  body  of  the  army 
was  on  the  15th  of  March  moved  back  to  the 
vicinity  of  Alexandria,  to  be  embarked.  It  was 
while  General  McClellan  wras  absent  on  this  brief 
reconnoissance  in  force  that  the  President  saw  fit 
to  remove  him  from  the  position  of  gencral-in-chief, 
by  the  following  order,  which  appeared  in  the  "  Na 
tional  Intelligencer"  of  March  12,  and  which  Gene 
ral  McClellan  heard  of  for  the  first  time  at  Fairfax 
Court-House. 


TIVE  MANSION,         ) 
)N,  March  11,  18G2.  ) 


("President's  War  Order,  No.  3.) 

"EXECUTIVE 
WASHINGTON, 

"Major-General  McClellan  having  personally  taken  the 
field  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  until  other 
wise  ordered,  he  is  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  other 
military  departments,  he  retaining  command  of  the  De 
partment  of  the  Potomac. 

"  Ordered,  further,  That  the  departments  now  under  the 
respective  commands  of  Generals  Ilallock  and  Hunter, 
together  with  so  much  of  that  under  General  Buoll  as 
lies  west  of  a  north-and-south  line  indefinitely  drawn 
through  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  be  consolidated,  and  desig 
nated  the  Department  of  the  Mississippi ;  and  that,  until 
otherwise  ordered,  Major-General  Halleck  have  command 
of  said  department. 

"  Ordered,  also,  That  the  country  west  of   the  Depart- 


IM  COUNCIL     OF     WAR.  [1862. 

ment  of  the  Potomac  and  east  of  the  Department  of  the 
Mississippi  be  a  military  department,  to  be  called  the 
Mountain  Department,  and  that  the  same  be  commanded 
by  Major-General  Fremont. 

"That  all  the  commanders  of  departments,  after  the 
receipt  of  this  order  by  them,  respectively  report  severally 
and  directly  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  prompt, 
full,  and  frequent  reports  will  be  expected  of  all  and  each 
of  them. 

''ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

Whatever  emotions  General  McClellan  may  have 
felt  on  reading  this  order,  his  sense  of  duty  as  a 
patriotic  citizen,  and  his  instincts  of  obedience  as 
a  soldier,  taught  him  to  suppress  all  expression  of 
them;  and,  in  a  note  addressed  by  him  to  the  Presi 
dent  on  the  12th  of  March,  the  next  day,  he  said,  in 
language  alike  distinguished  for  good  feeling  and 
good  taste, — 

"  I  believe  I  said  to  you,  some  weeks  since,  in  connection 
with  some  Western  matters,  that  no  feeling  of  self-inte 
rest  or  ambition  should  ever  prevent  me  from  devoting 
myself  to  the  service.  I  am  glad  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  prove  it ;  and  you  will  find  that,  under  present  circum 
stances,  I  shall  work  just  as  cheerfully  as  before,  and  that 
no  consideration  of  self  will  in  any  manner  interfere  with 
the  discharge  of  my  public  duties." 

On  the  13th  of  March  a  council  of  war  was  as 
sembled  at  Fairfax  Court-House,  to  discuss  the 
military  position.  The  President's  order  Xo.  3,  of 
March  8,  was  considered.  As  future  events  made 
the  action  of  this  council  of  considerable  import- 


AGK  ;}5.J  0  O  U  N  C  I  L     O  F     W  A  11.  101 

ancc,  the  memorandum  of  its  proceedings  is  here 
given  in  full : — 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC,        ) 

FAIRFAX  CouiiT-HousK,  March  13,  1862.  j 

"A  council  of  the  generals  commanding  army  corps,  at 
the  head-quarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  were  of 
the  opinion — 

"I.  That  the  enemy  having  retreated  from  Manassas 
to  Gordonsville,  behind  the  Eappahannock  and  Rapidan, 
it  is  the  opinion  of  generals  commanding  army  corps 
that  the  operations  to  be  carried  on  will  be  best  under 
taken  from  Old  Point  Comfort,  between  the  York  and 
James  Rivers:  Provided — 

"1st.  That  the  enemy's  vessel,  Merrimac,  can  be  neu 
tralized. 

"2d.  That  the  means  of  transportation  sufficient  for 
an  immediate  transfer  of  the  force  to  its  new  base  can 
be  ready  at  Washington  and  Alexandria  to  move  down 
the  Potomac;  and, 

"3d.  That  a  naval  auxiliary  force  can  be  had  to  silence, 
or  aid  in  silencing,  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  York 
River. 

"4th.  That  the  force  to  be  left  to  cover  Washington 
shall  be  such  as  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security  for 
its  safety  from  menace.  (Unanimous.) 

"II.  If  the  foregoing  cannot  be,  the  army  should  then 
be  moved  against  the  enemy,  behind  the  Rappahannock, 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  and  the  means  for  recon 
structing  bridges,  repairing  railroads,  and  stocking  them 
with  materials  sufficient  for  supplying  the  army  should 
at  once  be  collected  for  both  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
and  Acquia  &  Richmond  Railroads.  (Unanimous.) 

"X.B. — That,  with  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Potomac  fully  garrisoned,  and  those  on  the  left  bank  oc- 

14* 


162  ADDRESS     TO     THE     SOLDIERS. 


cupied,  a  covering  force  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line  of 
twenty-five  thousand  men  would  suffice.  (Keyes,  Heint- 
zelman,  and  McDowell.)  A  total  of  forty  thousand  men 
for  the  defence  of  the  city  would  suffice.  (Sumrier.)" 

This  was  assented  to  by  General  McClellan,  and 
immediately  communicated  to  the  War  Depart 
ment;  and  on  the  same  day  the  following  reply 
was  received : — 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  March  13,  1802. 

"  The  President,  having  considered  the  plan  of  operations 
agreed  upon  by  yourself  and  the  commanders  of  army 
corps,  makes  no  objection  to  the  same,  but  gives  the  fol 
lowing  directions  as  to  its  execution : — 

"1.  Leave  such  force  at  Manassas  Junction  as  shall 
make  it  entirely  certain  that  the  enemy  shall  not  repossess 
himself  of  that  position  and  line  of  communication. 

"2.  Leave  Washington  entirely  secure. 

"3.  Move  the  remainder  of  the  force  down  the  Potomac, 
choosing  a  new  base  at  Fortress  Monroe,  or  anywhere 
between  here  and  there;  or,  at  all  events,  move  such  re 
mainder  of  the  army  at  once  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  by 
some  route. 

"  EDWIN  M.  STANTOX, 
"  Secretary  of  War. 

"Major-General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

On  the  14th  day  of  March,  General  McClellao 
issued  the  following  address  to  his  soldiers  : — 


"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  ) 

FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  VA.,  March  14,  1862.  [ 

"SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC: — 

"  For  a  long  time  I  have  kept  you  inactive,  but  not 
without  a  purpose.     You  were  to  be  disciplined,  armed, 


Ao  K  Si).  ]        ADDRESS     TO     T  II  E     S  O  I,  D  I  E  R  S  1  Gii 

and  instructed ;  the  formidable  artillery  you  now  have 
had  to  be  created;  other  armies  were  to  move  and 
accomplish  certain  results.  I  have  held  you  back  that 
you  might  give  the  death-blow  to  the  rebellion  that  has 
distracted  our  once  happy  country.  The  patience  you 
have  shown,  and  your  confidence  in  your  general,  are 
worth  a  do/en  victories.  These  preliminary  results  are 
now  accomplished.  I  feel  that  the  patient  labors  of  many 
months  have  produced  their  fruit:  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  is  now  a  real  army,  magnificent  in  material,  admi 
rable  in  discipline  and  instruction,  excellently  equipped 
and  armed;  your  commanders  are  all  that  I  could  wish. 
The  moment  for  action  has  arrived,  and  I  know  that  I 
can  trust  in  you  to  save  our  country.  As  I  ride  through 
your  ranks,  I  see  in  your  faces  the  sure  presage  of  victory ; 
I  feel  that  you  will  do  whatever  I  ask  of  you.  The  period 
of  inaction  has  passed.  1  will  bring  you  now  face  to  face 
with  the  rebels,  and  only  pray  that  God  may  defend  the 
right.  In  whatever  direction  you  may  move,  however 
strange  my  actions  may  appear  to  you,  ever  bear  in  mind 
that  my  fate  is  linked  with  yours,  and  that  all  I  do  is  to 
bring  you,  where  I  know  you  wish  to  be,  on  the  decisive 
battle-field.  It  is  my  business  to  place  you  there.  I  am 
to  watch  over  you  as  a  parent  over  his  children ;  and  you 
know  that  your  general  loves  you  from  the  depths  of  his 
heart.  It  shall  be  my  care,  as  it  has  ever  been,  to  gain 
success  with  the  least  possible  loss ;  but  I  know  that,  if  it  is 
necessary,  you  will  willingly  follow  me  to  our  graves  for 
our  righteous  cause.  God  smiles  upon  us,  victory  attends 
us.  Yet  I  would  not  have  you  think  that  our  aim  is  to  be 
attained  without  a  manly  struggle.  I  will  not  disguise  it 
from  you:  you  have  brave  foes  to  encounter,  foemen  well 
worthy  of  the  steel  that  you  will  use  so  well.  I  shall  de 
mand  of  you  great,  heroic  exertions,  rapid  and  long 
marches,  desperate  combats,  privations  perhaps.  We 
will  share  all  these  together:  and,  when  this  sad  war  ia 


ll>4         NOTK     TO     THE     WAR     DEPARTMENT.     [1862. 

over,  >ve  will  return  to  our  homes  and  feel  that  we  can 
ask  ho  higher  honor  than  the  proud  consciousness  that 
we  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

''CEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"  MajoT-Gencral  commanding'1 

Preparations  were  immediately  begun,  in  com 
pliance  with  the  directions  contained  in  the  letter 
from  the  Secretary  of  War  of  March  13,  above 
given.  On  the  16th  of  March,  General  McClellan 
addressed  a  letter  of  instructions  to  General  Banks 
to  post  his  command  in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas 
and  intrench  himself  strongly  there,  for  the  gene 
ral  object  of  covering -the  line  of  the  Potomac  and 
Washington;  and  on  the  same  day  a  similar  letter 
of  instructions  was  addressed  by  him  to  General 
Wadsworth,  who  was  in  command  at  Washington, 
giving  him  minute  and  detailed  directions  as  to  the 
military  precautions  to  be  taken  to  keep  the  capital 
secure. 

The  Secretary  of  War  having  expressed  a  desire 
that  General  McClellan  should  communicate  to  the 
Departments,  in  an  official  form,  his  designs  with 
regard  to  the  employment  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  the  latter  addressed  to  the  Department  a 
note  under  date  of  March  19,  in  which  he  unfolds 
briefly  his  plan,  sets  forth  its  advantages,  and 
states  what  will  be  requisite  to  insure  its  success 
ful  accomplishment.  lie  especially  urges  the  abso 
lute  necessity  of  a  full  co-operation  of  the  navy  in 
a  combined  naval  and  land  attack  upon  Yorktown, 
as  a  part  of  his  programme.  He  enforces  this  view 


ACK  3.}.1    INTKUV1KW    WITH    T  II  K    I'RKSIDKNT.    LOd 

by   many   considerations,   and    thus   concludes   his 
communication : — 

"It  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words,  that  for  the 
prompt  success  of  this  campaign  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  navy  should  at  once  throw  its  whole  available 
force,  its  most  powerful  vessels,  against  Yorktown.  There 
is  the  most  important  point, — there  the  knot  to  be  cut. 
An  immediate  decision  upon  the  subject-matter  of  this 
communication  is  highly  desirable,  and  seems  called  for 
by  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion/' 

In  the  mean  time,  the  troops  destined  to  form  the 
active  army  were  collected  in  camps  convenient  to 
the  points  of  embarkation,  and  every  preparation 
was  made  to  despatch  them  as  rapidly  as  possible 
when  the  transports  should  be  ready.  While  the 
army  was  still  encamped  at  Alexandria,  a  few 
days  before  sailing  for  Fortress  Monroe,  General 
McClellan  met  the  President,  by  appointment,  on 
board  a  steamer,  and  wras  told  by  the  President 
that  he  had  been  strongly  pressed  to  take  General 
Blenker's  division  from  his  (General  McClellan's) 
command  and  give  it  to  General  Fremont;  but  he, 
however,  suggested  many  considerations  in  op 
position  to  this  step,  and  frankly  and  voluntarily 
avowed  his  purpose  of  allowing  the  division  to  re 
main  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  astonish 
ment,  therefore,  of  General  McClellan  may  w^ell  be 
imagined  when  by  the  receipt  of  the  following  note 
be  learned  that  the  President  had  changed  his  mind, 
and  determined  upon  a  measure  the  inexpediency 
of  which  was  so  obvious  to  him  but  a  few  days 
before  : — 


10(5    BLEJSKKR'S    DIVISION    WITHDRAWN,  [ 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  March  31,  1862. 

"Mr  DEAR  SIR: — This  morning  I  felt  constrained  to 
order  Blenker's  division  to  Fremont;  and  I  write  this  to 
assure  you  that  I  did  so  with  great  pain,  understanding 
that  you  would  wish  it  otherwise.  If  you  could  know  the 
full  pressure  of  the  case,  I  am  confident  that  you  would 
justify  it,  even  beyond  a  mere  acknowledgment  that  the 
commander-in-chief  may  order  what  he  pleases. 

"Yours,  very  truly, 

"A,  LINCOLN. 

"  Major-General  MCCLELLAX." 

The  weak  and  deprecatory  tone  of  this  note  dis 
arms,  or  at  least  alloys  with  contempt,  the  indigna 
tion  justly  awakened  by  the  deliberate  breach  of 
faith  which  it  confesses;  but  it  is  a  melancholy  fact 
that  at  so  critical  a  period  the  reins  of  executive 
power  were  in  hands  that  held  them  with  so  slack  a 
grasp,  and  that  the  President,  by  yielding  to  un 
known  and  irresponsible  advisers  in  the  conduct 
of  a  campaign,  seemingly  acted  as  if  he  thought 
that  many  bad  generals  were  better  than  one  good 
one. 

General  McClellan  could  only  acquiesce  in  the 
latest  decision  of  the  President,  not  suppressing 
some  natural  expressions  of  surprise;  but  he  was 
relieved  by  the  President's  positive  and  emphatic 
assurance  that  he  might  be  confident  that  in  no 
event  should  any  more  troops  be  detached  from  his 
command.  General  Blenker's  division  consisted  of 
about  ten  thousand  men. 

On  the  1st  of  April,  General  McClellan  addressed 


AGK  35.]        DEFENCES     OF     W  A  S  II I  N  G  T  O  N.  1  (>7 

another  letter  of  instruction  to  General  Banks, 
founded  upon  the  retreat  of  General  Jackson  up  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  the  change  for  the 
better  in  the  military  position  of  the  Federal  cause 
in  that  region. 

In  view  of  events  which  subsequently  occurred, 
and  of  questions  which  were  subsequently  raised,  it 
becomes  of  importance  here  that  the  reader  should 
understand  how  far  the  defence  of  Washington 
was  provided  for  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  withdrawn. 

In  the  first  place,  the  city  itself  was  defended  by 
a  strong  system  of  fortifications,  built  under  tho 
directions  of  General  Barnard,  and  sweeping  round 
a  line  of  thirty-three  miles  in  extent.  The  troops 
which  were  assigned  to  garrison  these  fortifications 
were  eighteen  thousand  in  number,  with  thirty-two 
field-guns.  At  Manassas  there  were  ten  thousand 
men;  on  the  Lower  Potomac,  thirteen  hundred;  in 
the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  thirty-five  thousand. 
Thus,  without  including  General  Blenker's  division, 
which  was  at  Warrenton,  there  were  about  sixty- 
three  thousand  men  disposed  at  various  points  for 
the  protection  of  Washington,  together  with  eighty- 
five  pieces  of  light  artillery,  including  the  thirty- 
two  above  mentioned.  There  was  also  a  body  of 
troops  in  Xcw  York,  over  four  thousand  in  number, 
which  General  McClellan  recommended  to  have  sent 
to  Washington  to  reinforce  the  garrison  there. 

These  forces  were  deemed  by  him  amply  ade 
quate  to  insure  the  safety  of  Washington  and  to 
give  everybody  there  an  entire  sense  of  security. — 


168  DEFENCES     OF     WASHINGTON. 


[1862, 


a  conclusion  not  to  be  doubted,  as  the  following 
facts  show. 

There  was  no  reason  to  apprehend  an  attack  by 
way  of  Manassas  and  Centreville;  for  the  enemy 
in  their  retreat  across  the  Rappahannock  had  de 
stroyed  all  the  railroad-bridges  behind  them.  Had 
they  attempted  such  a  movement,  their  progress 
must  have  been  very  slow;  for  they  must  have  re 
built  their  bridges,  and  this  would  have  announced 
their  purpose  beforehand  and  afforded  ample  time 
to  concentrate  a  large  body  of  forces  at  Washing 
ton. 

Nor  was  there  any  real  ground  of  apprehension 
from  the  Yalley  of  the  Shenandoah;  because  the 
movement  of  the  army  on  Richmond  would  make 
it  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  leave  in  that  region 
men  enough  to  overpower  the  large  body  of  troops 
we  had  there.  But,  in  General  McClellan's  opinion, 
the  way  to  defend  Washington  was  to  attack  Rich 
mond;  and  the  greater  the  force  thrown  against 
the  rebel  capital,  the  greater  the  security  of  our 
own.  Strongly  fortified  as  Washington  was,  capa 
ble  of  being  readily  reinforced  from  the  North,  it 
was  manifest  that  the  enemy  could  not  afford  to 
detach  from  his  main  army  a  force  sufficient  to 
capture  it. 

Here  were  solid  grounds  enough,  it  would  appear, 
for  General  McClellan's  conclusion  that  he  had  left 
Washington  perfectly  safe;  but,  unhappily,  fears, 
panics,  and  apprehensions  take  their  rise  in  that 
part  of  the  mind  which  is  not  reached  by  the  voice 
of  reason.  Whether  Washington  were  safe  or  not 


AGE  35.]  EMBARKATION     BEGUN.  169 

was  a  matter  of  sound  military  judgment;  but  as 
u  matter  of  fact  it  is  certain  that  from  the  mo 
ment  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  landed  upon  the 
Peninsula  an  uneasy  sense  of  insecurity  took  pos 
session  of  the  minds  of  the  President,  the  Cabinet, 
and  the  members  of  Congress.  The  public  in  gene 
ral  shared  this  feeling;  and  the  Northern  press 
encouraged  and  increased  it.  All  over  the  loyal 
States  the  question  of  the  safety  of  Washington 
was  discussed,  with  abundant  zeal  and  very  little 
knowledge.  Some  of  this  alarm  may  have  been 
counterfeited  for  political  effect;  but  without  doubt 
much  of  it  was  real;  and  this  should  be  borne 
in  mind,  when  discussing  measures  subsequently 
adopted,  disastrous  in  their  consequences,  but,  un 
questionably,  inspired  by  an  honest  but  miserable 
fright.  It  was  destined,  in  the  providence  of  God, 
that  our  cause  should  suffer  alike  from  unreason 
able  hopes  and  extravagant  fears. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ALEXANDRIA  was  selected  as  the  point  of  depart 
ure,  and  the  embarkation  began  on  the  17th  of 
March.  The  removal  of  a  large  body  of  troops, 
including  cavalry  and  artillery,  wTith  armaments 
and  supplies,  was  of  necessity  a  slow  work;  and 
more  than  a  fortnight  elapsed  before  the  whole 
force  was  transported.  General  McClellan  reached 
Fortress  Monroe  on  the  2d  of  April.  He  had  in 


170  FORTRESS     MONROE.  [I8fi2, 

all  between  fifty  and  sixty  thousand  men  with  him; 
and  others  were  to  follow  as  fast  as  means  of  trans 
portation  could  be  supplied. 

It  should  here  be  borne  in  mind,  as  a  matter  of 
mere  justice  to  General  McClellan,  that  for  the  suc 
cessful  execution  of  his  projected  expedition  he  had 
required  that  the  whole  of  the  four  corps  under  his 
command  should  be  employed,  with  the  addition 
of  ten  thousand  men  drawn  from  the  forces  in  the 
vicinity  of  Fortress  Monroe, — that  position  and  its 
dependencies  being  regarded  as  amply  protected 
by  the  naval  force  in  its  neighborhood.  Before  ho 
left  Washington,  an  order  had  been  issued  by  the 
War  Department,  placing  Fortress  Monroe  and  its 
dependencies  under  his  control,  and  authorizing 
him  to  draw  from  the  troops  under  General  Wool 
a  division  of  about  ten  thousand  men.  And.  in  ad 
dition  to  the  land-forces,  the  co-operation  of  the 
navy  was  deemed  essential  in  order  to  reduce  or 
silence  the  strong  batteries  which  the  Confederates 
had  erected  at  Yorktown  and  Gloucester. 

But  he  had  hardly  landed  upon  the  Peninsula 
when  he  was  doomed  to  taste  the  bitterness  of  dis 
appointed  hope,  and  by  another  experience  to  have 
the  conviction  forced  upon  him  that  the  Administra 
tion  was  unfaithful  to  him.  During  the  night  of 
the  3d  of  April,  he  received  a  telegram  from  the 
Adjutant-General  of  the  army,  stating  that,  by  the 
President's  order,  he  was  deprived  of  all  control 
over  General  Wool  and  the  troops  under  his  com 
mand,  and  forbidden,  without  that  officer's  sanc 
tion,  to  detach  any  portion  of  his  force.  Xo  causes 


AGE  35.]  MERRIMAC.  171 

were  assigned,  or  have  ever  been  assigned,  for  this 
order,  which  was  in  violation  of  a  deliberate  and 
official  engagement,  and  left  the  general  in  com 
mand  of  a  most  important  military  movement  with 
out  any  base  of  operations  under  his  own  control, 
— a  situation  without  parallel,  it  is  believed,  in 
military  history. 

Kor  was  this  all.  The  terrible  Merrimac  lay, 
"hushed  in  grim  repose,"  in  the  James  Biver;  and 
no  one  knew  when  she  might  reappear  or  in  how 
formidable  a  guise.  Admiral  Goldsborough,  then  in 
command  of  the  United  States  squadron  in  Hampton 
Roads,  felt,  and  with  justice,  that  it  was  his  para 
mount  duty  to  watch  the  Merrimac;  and  he,  con 
sequently,  did  not  venture  to  detach  for  the  assist 
ance  of  the  army  a  suitable  force  to  attack  the 
water-batteries  at  Yorktown  and  Gloucester.  This 
was  contrary  to  what  General  McClellan  had  been 
led  to  expect,  and  a  serious  derangement  of  his 
plans. 

In  fact,  it  should  be  remembered  that  during  the 
operations  against  Yorktown  the  navy  was  not  able 
to  lend  the  army  any  material  assistance  till  after 
the  siege-guns  had  partially  silenced  the  enemy's 
water-batteries. 

But  the  heaviest  blow  wras  yet  to  come.  On  the 
4th  of  April  the  following  telegram  was  received : — 

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  April  4,  1862. 
"By  direction  of  the  President,  General   McDowell's 
army  corps  has  been  detached  from  the  force  under  your 


172  MCDOWELL'S   CORPS.  [isc2. 

immediate  command,  and  the  general  is  ordered  to  re 
port  to  the  Secretary  of  War.     Letter  by  mail. 

"L.  THOMAS, 

"  Adjutant-General. 
"General  MCCLELLAN." 

This  fell  with  crushing  weight  upon  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  hopes.  Its  effect  upon  him  cannot  be 
better  described  than  in  his  own  simple  language, — 
the  force  of  wrhich  could  not  be  increased  by  any 
attempt  at  rhetorical  embellishment: — 

"The  President  having  promised,  in  our  interview  fol 
lowing  his  order  of  March  31,  withdrawing  Blenker's  divi 
sion  of  ten  thousand  men  from  my  command,  that 
nothing  of  the  sort  should  be  repeated, — that  I  might 
rest  assured  that  the  campaign  should  proceed,  with  no 
further  deductions  from  the  force  upon  which  its  opera 
tions  had  been  planned, — I  may  confess  to  having  been 
shocked  at  this  order,  which,  with  that  of  the  31st  ultimo 
and  that  of  the  3d,  removed  nearly  sixty  thousand  men 
from  my  command,  and  reduced  my  force  by  more  than 
one-third,  after  its  task  had  been  assigned,  its  operations 
planned,  its  fighting  begun.  To  me  the  blow  was  most 
discouraging.  It  frustrated  all  my  plans  for  impending 
operations.  It  fell  when  I  was  too  deeply  committed  to 
withdraw.  It  left  me  incapable  of  continuing  operations 
which  had  been  begun.  It  compelled  the  adoption  of 
another,  a  different  and  a  less  effective,  plan  of  campaign. 
It  made  rapid  and  brilliant  operations  impossible.  It  was 
a  fatal  error." 

General  McClellan's  plan  had  been,  if  the  works  at 
Yorktown  and  Williamsburg  offered  a  serious  resist 
ance,  that  General  McDowell's  corps  should  land 


AGE  35.]          NATURE     OF     THE     COUNTRY.  173 

on  the  left  bank  of  the  York,  or  on  the  Severn,  BO  as 
to  move  upon  Gloucester  and  West  Point,  in  order 
to  take  in  reverse  whatever  force  the  enemy  might 
have  on  the  Peninsula  and  compel  him  to  abandon 
his  positions.  But,  since  McDowell's  corps  was 
withheld,  this  plan,  of  course,  became  impossible, 
and  there  was  no  choice  left  but  to  attack  the 
enemy's  positions  directly  in  front.  And  a  grave 
question  now  rose, — whether  these  positions  should 
be  assaulted  or  invested.  The  problem  presented 
was  not  easy  of  solution. 

From  the  moment  of  landing  upon  the  Peninsula, 
it  became  obvious  that  the  difficulties  in  the  ad 
vance  to  Richmond  were  sufficient  to  task  all  the 
resources  of  the  general  in  command,  even  if  he 
had  been  furnished  with  the  entire  force  promised 
him, — which  he  had  not  been.  The  nature  of  the 
country  is  very  unfavorable  to  an  invading  army, 
and  to  the  same  extent  favorable  to  a  force  which 
stands  upon  the  defensive.  It  is  a  low,  flat  region, 
little  elevated  above  the  level  of  the  sea,  thinly  in 
habited,  and  scourged  with  malaria  for  many  weeks 
of  the  year.  It  is  covered  with  marshy  forests; 
and  the  roads  which  traverse  it  hardly  deserve  the 
name.  It  is  everywhere  veined  with  streams  and 
water-courses,  which  flow  lazily  along  their  level 
beds,  and,  by  the  copious  rains  which  fall  there, 
are  easily  swollen  into  broad  and  shallow  lakes. 
The  earth  was  constantly  saturated  with  moisture, 
and  the  mud  was  deep,  pitiless,  and  universal. 
After  a  rain,  the  so-called  roads  became  utterly  im 
practicable  for  any  kind  of  wheeled  vehicle.  The 

1  f,* 


174  CONFEDERATE     DEFENCES.  [1862. 

wagons  stuck  hopelessly  fast  in  the  tenacious  mire; 
and  to  transport  them  it  became  necessary  to  con 
struct  corduroy  roads, — a  slow  and  toilsome  process. 

And,  strange  to  say,  though  this  was  the  earliest- 
settled  portion  of  the  whole  country  and  full  of 
historical  interest,  serious  difficulties  were  encoun 
tered  from  the  want  of  accurate  topographical  know 
ledge  of  the  region  before  them.  The  common 
maps  were  found  to  be  so  incorrect  as  to  be  of  little 
or  no  value.  Eeconnoissances,  frequently  made  at 
great  risk,  proved  the  only  trustworthy  sources  of 
information. 

The  progress  of  our  army  would  have  been  slow 
had  natural  difficulties  alone  been  in  their  path;  but 
they  found  themselves  met  by  a  foe  whose  courage 
and  energy  they  were  too  brave  themselves  not  to 
respect.  Among  the  Confederates  there  were  unity 
of  purpose  and  concerted  action  towards  a  common 
end.  They  knew  that  time  was  on  their  side,  and 
their  great  object  was  to  gain  time  and  delay  our 
progress  as  much  as  possible.  Since  leaving  Ma- 
nassas,  they  had  been  diligently  at  work,  without 
the  loss  of  an  hour,  in  strengthening  all  available 
points  by  skilfully  constructed  works.  It  was 
found  that  Warwick  River  was  controlled  by  the 
Confederate  gunboats  for  some  distance  from  its 
mouth, — that  the  fords  had  been  destroyed  by  dams, 
the  approaches  to  which  were  generally  through 
dense  forests  and  deep  swamps  and  defended  by 
extensive  and  formidable  works, — and  that  York- 
town  was  strongly  fortified,  armed  and  garrisoned, 
and  connected  with  the  defences  of  the  Warwick 


AGE35.]  YORKTOWN     INVESTED.  175 

by  forts  and  intrcnchmcnts,  the  ground  in  front  of 
which  was  swept  by  the  guns  of  Yorktown. 

After  close  personal  recoimoissance,  and  after 
careful  reflection  and  consultation,  General  Mc- 
Clellan  determined  not  to  attempt  to  carry  the 
lines  of  Yorktown  by  immediate  assault,  but  to 
assail  it  by  the  regular  operations  of  a  siege.  As 
this  decision  has  been  severely  criticized  by  writers 
who  conduct  campaigns  in  their  studies  and  judge 
of  military  movements  and  military  men  by  the 
light  of  subsequent  events,  it  may  be  well  to  pause 
for  a  moment  and  consider  briefly  the  grounds  of 
his  determination. 

He  had  with  him  at  that  time — General  Frank 
lin's  division  not  having  then  arrived — but  a  little 
over  fifty  thousand  men.  The  number  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  was  not  known;  but  General  John 
ston  had  reached  Yorktown  on  the  6th  of  April 
with  heavy  reinforcements,  and  it  was  believed 
that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  was,  or  soon 
would  be,  not  less  than  a  hundred  thousand  men. 
Our  troops  were  admirable  troops,  as  their  subse 
quent  conduct  abundantly  showed;  but  they  were 
comparatively  new;  and  nothing  tries  the  temper 
and  nerve  of  the  soldier  so  much  as  the  assault  of 
a  strongly-defended  place. 

General  Barnard,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  army, 
whose  position  entitled  his  opinion  to  the  highest 
consideration,  expressed  his  judgment  that  the 
works  could  not  with  any  reasonable  degree  of 
certainty  be  carried  by  assault.  There  are  co 
pious  extracts  from  his  Report  embodied  in  that  of 


176  GENERAL    BARNARD.  [1862. 

General  McClellan.  The  details  are  too  technical 
to  be  fully  understood  by  the  general  reader;  but  a 
single  sentence  will  serve  to  show  what  our  assault 
ing  force  must  have  been  prepared  to  meet : — 

"It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  our  approaches  were 
swept  by  the  fire  of  at  least  forty-nine  guns,  nearly  all  of 
which  were  heavy,  and  many  of  them  the  most  formida 
ble  guns  known.  Besides  that,  two-thirds  of  the  guns  of 
the  water-batteries,  and  all  the  guns  of  Gloucester,  bore  on 
our  right  batteries,  though  under  disadvantageous  cir 
cumstances." 

It  is  true  that  General  Barnard  has  since  changed 
his  mind,  and  given  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  lines 
of  Yorktown  should  have  been  assaulted;  but  it  is 
clear  that  General  McClellan  had  an  opposite  judg 
ment  given  at  the  time  and  on  the  spot  and  under 
the  gravest  official  responsibility.* 


*  This  second,  or  retrospective,  Report  of  General  Barnard 
was  made  in  January,  1863,  at  a  time  when  General  McClellan 
was  living  in  retirement  and  out  of  favor  with  the  Administra 
tion.  The  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  copy  several  of  its  paragraphs  into  their  Report  on  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac;  and  the  whole  of  it  may  be  found  at 
page  394  of  their  Proceedings,  Part  First,  appended  to  Gene 
ral  Barnard's  testimony.  The  Report  of  the  Committee  has 
been  translated  into  French,  and  published,  with  notes,  by 
Colonel  Lecomte,  an  accomplished  Swiss  officer  who  served 
on  General  McClellan's  staff  during  the  Peninsular  campaign. 
One  of  General  Barnard's  paragraphs  which  the  Committee 
copy  is  as  follows: — "However  I  may  be  committed  to  any  ex 
pression  of  professional  opinion  to  the  contrary  (I  certainly 
did  suggest  it),  my  opinion  now  is  that  the  lines  of  Yorktown 


Ac K  .°,5.]  GENERAL     BARNARD.  177 

General  McClellan,  on  the  7th  of  April,  sent  a 
long  telegram  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which 
he  explained  the  reasons  why  an  instant  assault  was 


should  have  been  assaulted.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
they  were  not  held  in  strong  force  when  our  army  appeared 
before  them;  and  we  know  that  they  were  far  from  complete. 
The  prestige  of  power,  the  morale,  were  on  our  side.  It  was 
due  to  ourselves  to  confirm  and  sustain  it.  We  should  proba 
bly  have  succeeded.  But,  if  we  had  failed,  it  may  be  well 
doubted  whether  the  shock  of  an  unsuccessful  assault  would 
be  more  demoralizing  than  the  labors  of  a  siege." 

Upon  the  above,  Colonel  Lecomte  remarks,  "We  are  the 
more  astonished  at  this  retrospective  confidence  of  General 
Barnard,  because,  on  the  spot,  the  engineer  officers  who  were 
associated  with  htm,  and  he  himself,  we  believe,  repeatedly 
expressed  very  different  opinions." 

General  Barnard  further  says,  "  The  siege  having  been  de 
termined  upon,  we  should  have  opened  our  batteries  upon  the 
place  as  fast  as  they  were  completed.  The  effect  on  our  troops 
would  have  been  inspiring.  It  would  have  lightened  the  siege 
and  shortened  our  labors;  and,  besides,  we  should  have  had 
the  credit  of  driving  the  enemy  from  Yorktown  by  force  of 
arms, — whereas,  as  it  was,  we  only  induced  him  to  evacuate 
for  prudential  reasons." 

Upon  which  Colonel  Lecomte  remarks,  "This  is  not  certain. 
On  the  contrary,  nothing  discourages  an  army  and  inspirits  the 
enemy  more  than  a  fire  of  artillery  that  begins  feebly,  without 
taking  into  account  that  in  this  way  the  calibre  of  the  pieces 
is  revealed.  And  as  to  the  'credit'  of  taking  Yorktown  by 
force  of  arms,  this  slight  advantage  might  also  have  been 
doubtful;  because,  unless  we  had  inflicted  heavy  loss  upon 
the  enemy  and  taken  many  prisoners  at  the  very  moment  of 
evacuation  (which  was  hardly  to  be  expected),  they  might 
have  pretended  that  they  repulsed  us,  and  only  evacuated  the 
place,  later,  for  prudential  reasons." 


178        PRESIDENT   LINCOLN'S   LETTER,      [isc.2. 

not  to  be  made,  prominent  among  which  was  the 
limited  amount  of  force  as  yet  under  his  control. 
This  was  replied  to  by  the  President,  in  a  letter 
dated  April  9,  in  which  he  restates  the  grounds 
on  which  Blenker's  division  had  been  kept  back, 
and  showrs  that  his  mind  was  still  not  free  from  ap 
prehensions  as  to  the  safety  of  Washington !  The 
concluding  paragraphs  are  as  follow : — 

"I  suppose  the  whole  force  which  has  gone  forward  for 
you  is  with  you  by  this  time.  And,  if  so,  I  think  it  is 
the  precise  time  for  you  to  strike  a  blow.  By  delay  the 
enemy  will  relatively  gain  upon  you ;  that  is,  he  will  gain 
faster  by  fortifications  and  reinforcements  than  you  can 
by  reinforcements  alone.  And  once  more  let  me  tell  you, 
it  is  indispensable  to  you  that  you  strike  a  blow.  I  am 
powerless  to  help  this.  You  will  do  me  the  justice  to 
remember  I  always  insisted  that  going  down  the  bay  in 
search  of  a  field,  instead  of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas, 
was  only  shifting,  and  not  surmounting,  a  difficulty, — 
that  we  wrould  find  the  same  enemy  and  the  same  or 
equal  intrenchments  at  either  place.  The  country  will 
not  fail  to  note — is  now  noting — that  the  present  hesi 
tation  to  move  upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is  but  the 
story  of  Manassas  repeated. 

"I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never  written  you  or 
spoken  to  you  in  greater  kindness  of  feeling  than  now, 
nor  with  a  fuller  purpose  to  sustain  you,  so  far  as,  in 
my  most  anxious  judgment,  I  consistently  can.  But  you 
must  act. 

"Yours,  very  truly, 

"A.  LINCOLN. 

"Major-General  MCCLELLAX." 

To  these  considerations   General  McClellan  re~ 


AGE  35.]      INVESTMENT     OF    YORK  TOWN.  179 

plies,  iii  his  Report,  in  a  few  words,  which  are  here 
({noted,  as  they  can  hardly  be  improved  :— 

"His  Excellency  could  not  judge  of  the  formidable 
character  of  the  works  before  us  as  well  as  if  he  had  been 
on  the  ground;  and,  whatever  might  have  been  his  desire 
for  prompt  action  (certainly  no  greater  than  mine),  I  feel 
confident,  if  he  could  have  made  a  personal  inspection  of 
the  enemy's  defences,  he  would  have  forbidden  me  risk 
ing  the  safety  of  the  army  and  the  possible  successes  of 
the  campaign  on  a  sanguinary  assault  of  an  advantageous 
and  formidable  position,  which,  even  if  successful,  could 
not  have  been  followed  up  to  any  other  or  better  result 
than  would  have  been  reached  by  the  regular  operations 
of  a  siege.  Still  less  could  I  forego  the  conclusions  of  my 
most  instructed  judgment  for  the  mere  sake  of  avoiding 
the  personal  consequences  intimated  in  the  President's 
despatch." 

The  investment  of  Yorktown,  as  it  proved,  cost 
a  month  of  valuable  time, — which  certainly  was  no 
inconsiderable  gain  to  the  enemy;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  cost  us  no  loss  of  life.  We  got  it  at  last 
without  bloodshed.  But  suppose  General  McClellan 
had  assaulted  it  early  in  April,  as  now  he  is  blamed 
by  many  for  not  having  done,  and,  after  the  fright 
ful  carnage  which  must  have  been  the  result  of 
such  an  attempt, — after  thousands  of  the  flower  of 
our  population  had  been  mowed  down  by  a  tempest 
of  iron  hail,  as  grass  falls  before  the  mower's  scythe, 
—the  attack  had  been  at  last  unsuccessful,  as  was 
the  Duke  of  Wellington's  upon  Burgos  :  what  would, 
have  been  the  public  feeling, — bearing  in  mind  al 
ways  that  the  judgment  of  the  Chief  Engineer, 


180  EVACUATION     OF     YOU  KT  OWN.  [1862. 

General  Barnard,  was  against  an  assault?  "Would- 
not  such  a  storm  of  indignation  have  been  raised 
against  General  McClellan  as  would  Lave  com 
pelled  his  sacrifice  at  the  hands  of  an  Administra 
tion  not  inclined — perhaps  not  able — to  resist  that 
sweeping  power  of  public  opinion  which  moves  and 
rages  with  more  than  "  the  force  of  winds  and  waters 
pent"  ?* 

On  the  22d  of  April,  while  the  siege  of  York- 
town  was  going  on,  General  Franklin's  division, 
forming  part  of  General  McDowell's  corps,  arrived, 
and  reported  to  General  McClellan.  These  troops 
were  kept  on  board  the  transports,  and  not  em 
ployed  for  some  days.  It  was  General  McClellan's 
purpose  to  act  on  Gloucester  by  disembarking  this 
division  on  the  north  bank  of  the  York  Eiver, 
under  the  protection  of  the  gunboats,  but  subse 
quent  events  rendered  the  movement  unnecessary. 

Our  batteries  would  have  been  ready  to  open 
upon  Yorktown  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May 
at  latest ;  but  in  the  nights  of  the  3d  and  4th  of 
May,  that  position  and  the  Confederate  lines  of  the 

*  "Many  of  Lord  Wellington's  proceedings  might  be  called 
rash,  and  others  timid  and  slow,  if  taken  separately  :  yet,  when 
viewed  as  parts  of  a  great  plan  for  delivering  the  whole  Tenin- 
sula,  they  will  be  found  discreet  or  daring,  as  the  circumstances 
warranted.  Nor  is  there  any  portion  of  his  campaigns  that 
requires  this  wide-based  consideration  more  than  his  early 
sieges,  which,  being  instituted  contrary  to  the  rules  of  art, 
and  unsuccessful, — or,  when  successful,  attended  with  a  mourn 
ful  slaughter, — have  given  occasion  for  questioning  his  great 
military  qualities,  which  were,  however,  then  most  signally 
displayed. " — NAPIER. 


AGE  35.]        BATTLE     OF     WI  LLI  A  M  SB  URG.  181 

Warwick  River  were  evacuated.  This  work  was 
doubtless  commenced  some  days  before,  and  was 
conducted  with  skill  and  energy.  On  the  3d, 
with  a  view  of  masking  their  retreat,  the  fire  of 
their  batteries  was  unusually  severe. 

The  Confederates  left  behind  them  all  their  heavy 
guns,  eighty  in  number,  each  piece  supplied  with 
seventy-six  rounds  of  ammunition.  A  large  amount 
of  warlike  stores  of  every  description  was  also 
abandoned  or  destroyed.  The  evacuation  is  said 
to  have  been  the  result  of  a  council  of  war  at 
which  President  Davis  and  Generals  Lee  and 
Johnston  were  present,  and  to  have  been  very  dis 
tasteful  to  General  Magruder,  the  officer  in  com 
mand,  who  did  not  like  to  retire  from  his  works 
without  a  fight. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    WILLIAMSBURG. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  the  next  im 
portant  point  before  the  Federal  army  was  the  city 
of  William sburg,  the  Colonial  capital  of  Virginia. 
It  is  about  ten  miles  from  Yorktown,  and  is  on  the 
narrowest  part  of  the  peninsula  between  the  James 
and  York  Rivers,  being  about  three  miles  from  tho 
former,  and  five  and  a  quarter  from  the  latter. 

On  the  4th  of  May,  immediately  after  tho  evacua 
tion  of  Yorktown,  a  portion  of  the  army  was  put 
in  motion  to  pursue  the  flying  foe,  and  General 
Franklin's  division  was  ordered  to  move  by  water 
to  the  vicinity  of  West  Point,  to  cut  off  the  enemy's 
retreat  in  that  direction.  General  Stoneman  led 

16 


182  BATTLE     OP     WILLIAMSBURG.  [1862. 

the  advance  upon  Williamsburg  with  the  entire 
cavalry  force  and  four  batteries  of  horse-artillery, 
as  fast  as  the  muddy  condition  of  the  roads  would 
permit,  and,  on  reaching  a  space  where  the  roads 
from  Yorktown  and  Warwick  Court-House  debouch 
upon  the  isthmus,  he  found  a  large  Confederate 
force  in  a  strongly-defended  position.  After  sus 
taining  and  repelling  a  cavalry  charge  of  the 
enemy,  and  gallantly  returning  with  his  batteries 
the  fire  of  their  artillery,  as  he  had  no  infantry  to 
carry  the  works,  he  withdrew  his  command  and  fell 
back  to  a  clearing  about  half  a  mile  distant. 

By  this  time  night  was  falling.  The  Federal  in 
fantry  had  come  up  slowly,  retarded  by  the  bad 
state  of  the  roads,  and  it  was  completely  dark  be 
fore  they  arrived  in  full  force;  and,  though  General 
Sumner,  who  had  come  up  and  assumed  the  com 
mand,  desired  to  make  an  attempt  to  carry  the 
works  that  night,  it  was  impossible  to  do  so,  owing 
to  the  late  hour  and  the  darkness.  The  troops 
bivouacked  in  the  woods,  and,  unfortunately,  a  heavy 
rain  set  in,  and  continued  for  thirty  hours,  convert 
ing  the  country  into  a  vast  lake  and  the  roads  into 
channels  of  liquid  mud.  The  battle  of  the  next 
day  cannot  be  better  described  than  in  the  clear 
and  graphic  language  of  the  Prince  de  Joinville, 
besides  which  his  account  contains  the  criticism  of 
a  candid  and  intelligent  observer  upon  a  defect  in 
the  organization  of  our  armies,  which  is  the  more 
worthy  of  our  consideration  because  offered  in  so 
kindly  a  spirit. 


AGE  35.]       BATTLE     OF     W  I  LLI  A  M  SB  URG.  183 

"Next  day  the  battle  began  again,  but,  of  course,  in  cir 
cumstances  unfavorable  to  the  Federals.  The  two  roads 
leading  to  Williamsburg  were  crowded  with  troops.  Upon 
that  to  the  left  from  Lee's  Mill  were  the  divisions  of 
Hooker  and  Kearney,  belonging  to  Heintzelman's  corps; 
but  they  were  separated  from  each  other  by  an  enormous 
multitude  of  wagons  loaded  down  with  baggage  and  for 
the  most  part  fast  in  the  mud.  Upon  that  to  the  right, 
two  other  divisions  were  moving  forward  with  still  greater 
difficulty.  Such  was  the  condition  of  the  ground  that 
the  cannon  sank  over  the  axle  into  the  mud.  This 
medley  of  men  and  baggage  thrown  pellmell  into  narrow 
and  flooded  roads  had  fallen  into  considerable  disorder. 
In  the  United  States  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  corps  of 
the  general  staff.  The  American  system  of  'every  man 
for  himself/  individually  applied  by  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  each  corps  to  one  another,  is  also  applied  by 
the  corps  themselves  to  their  reciprocal  relations.  There 
is  no  special  branch  of  the  service  whose  duty  it  is  to  regu 
late,  centralize,  and  direct  the  movements  of  the  army.  In 
such  a  case  as  this  of  which  we  are  speaking,  we  should 
have  seen  the  general  staff  officers  of  a  French  army 
taking  care  that  nothing  should  impede  the  advance  of 
the  troops,  stopping  a  file  of  wagons  here  and  ordering  it 
out  of  the  road  to  clear  the  way,  sending  on  a  detail  of 
men  there  to  repair  the  roadway  or  to  draw  a  cannon  out 
of  the  mire,  in  order  to  communicate  to  every  corps-com 
mander  the  orders  of  the  general-in -chief. 

"Here,  nothing  of  the  sort  is  done.  The  functions  of 
the  adjutant-general  are  limited  to  the  transmission  of 
the  orders  of  the  general.  lie  has  nothing  to  do  with 
seeing  that  they  are  executed.  The  general  has  no  one 
to  bear  his  orders  but  aides-de-camp,  who  have  the  best 
intentions  in  the  world,  and  are  excellent  at  repeating 
mechanically  a  verbal  order,  but  to  whom  nobody  pays 
much  attention  if  they  undertake  to  exercise  any  initia- 


184  BATTLE     OF     W1LLIAMSBURG.  [1862. 

five  whatever.  Down  to  the  present  moment,  although 
this  want  of  a  general  staff  had  been  often  felt,  its  con 
sequences  had  not  been  serious.  We  had  the  telegraph, 
which  followed  the  army  everywhere  and  kept  up  com 
munications  between  the  different  corps:  the  generals 
could  converse  together  and  inform  each  other  of  any 
thing  that  it  was  important  to  know.  But,  once  on  tho 
march,  this  resource  was  lost  to  us,  and  so  farewell  to  our 
communications ! 

"The  want  of  a  general  staff  was  not  less  severely  felt 
in  obtaining  and  transmitting  the  information  necessary 
at  the  moment  of  an  impending  action.  No  one  knew 
the  country ;  the  maps  were  so  defective  that  they  were 
useless.  Little  was  known  about  the  fortified  battle-field 
on  which  the  army  was  about  to  be  engaged.  Yet  this 
battle-field  had  been  seen  and  reconnoitred  the  day  before 
by  the  troops  which  had  taken  part  in  Stoneman's 
skirmish.  Enough  was  surely  known  of  it  for  us  to  com 
bine  a  plan  of  attack  and  assign  to  every  commander  his 
own  part  in  the  work.  No !  this  was  not  so.  Every  one 
kept  his  observations  to  himself, — not  from  ill  will,  but 
because  it  was  nobody's  special  duty  to  do  this  general 
work.  It  was  a  defect  in  the  organization ;  and,  with  the 
best  elements  in  the  world,  an  army  which  is  not  organized 
cannot  expect  great  success.  It  is  fortunate  if  it  escape 
great  disaster. 

"Thanks  to  this  constitutional  defect  of  the  Federal 
armies,  Hooker's  division,  which  led  the  column  on  the 
left-hand  road,  and  had  received,  the  day  before,  a  gene 
ral  order  to  march  upon  "Williamsburg,  came  out  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th  upon  the  scene  of  Stoneman's  cavalry- 
fight,  without  the  least  knowledge  of  what  it  was  to  meet 
there.  Ileceived,  as  soon  as  it  appeared,  with  a  steady  fire 
from  the  hostile  works,  it  deployed  resolutely  in  the 
abatis  and  went  into  action.  But  it  came  up  little  by 
little  and  alone, — whilst  the  defence  was  carried  on  by 


Ar.u  3J.]        BATTLE     OF     W  I  LLI  A  M  S  E  URG.  185 

from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand  men  strongly  intrenched. 
The  odds  were  too  great. 

"Hooker,  who  is  an  admirable  soldier,  held  his  own 
for  some  time;  but  he  had  to  give  way  and  fall  back, 
leaving  in  the  woods  and  in  these  terrible  abatis  some 
two  thousand  of  his  men  killed  and  wounded,  with 
several  of  his  guns  which  he  could  not  bring  off.  The 
enemy  followed  him  as  he  fell  back.  The  division  of 
General  Kearney,  having  passed  the  crowded  road,  and 
marching  upon  the  guns  at  the  pas  dc  course,  re-established 
the  battle.  The  fight  had  now  rolled  from  the  edges  of 
the  plain  into  the  forest;  and  it  was  sharp,  for  the  enemy 
was  strongly  reinforced.  The  Federals  fought  not  less 
firmly,  encouraged  by  their  chiefs,  Hooker,  Ileintzelman, 
and  Kearney.  Kearney  in  especial,  who  lost  an  arm  in 
Mexico,  and  fought  with  the  French  at  the  Muzaia  and 
at  Solferino,  had  displayed  the  finest  courage.*  All  his 

*  "  The  general  acceded  to  his  urgent  request,  and  immediately 
ordered  up  Kearney's  division  to  his  aid.  He  could  not  have 
sent  a  better  man.  Kearney  was  of  that  chivalrous  character 
so  often  to  be  met  with  in  the  French  army.  He  had  lost  an 
arm  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  he  afterwards  joined  the  French 
army  as  a  volunteer  aide-de-camp  in  the  Italian  campaign, 
greatly  distinguishing  himself  at  both  Solferino  and  Magenta. 
Kearney  brought  up  his  men  at  the  double  quick  to  support 
Hooker,  although  the  execrable  state  of  the  roads  somewhat 
retarded  him;  but  he  eventually  reached  the  hard-pressed  divi 
sion.  It  was  a  fine  sight  to  see  Kearney  lead  on  his  men,  eager 
for  the  fight  as  they  were.  He  seemed  to  be  ubiquitous, — now 
leading  on  his  centre,  now  ordering  up  a  battery,  in  another 
moment  charging  at  the  head  of  his  troops.  His  striking,  manly 
form  was  prominent  wherever  the  fight  was  thickest,  setting  a 
noble  example  to  his  soldiers.  The  opposing  troops  were  soon 
intermingled  in  a  regular  melee,  and  both  sides  fought  despe 
rately.  Owing  to  the  state  of  the  ground,  our  cavalry  was  not  ser 
viceable,  much  to  the  regret  of  its  officers :  it  was  also  very  difli- 


186  BATTLE     OP     WILLIAMSBURG.  [1862. 

aides  had  fallen  around  him,  and,  left  alone,  he  had  electri 
fied  his  men  by  his  intrepidity.  During  all  this  time  the 
part  of  the  army  massed  on  the  road  to  the  right  re 
mained  passive.  A  single  division  only  had  come  up, 
and  the  generals  in  command  could  not  resolve  to  throw 
it  into  the  engagement  without  seeing  its  supports.  These 
supports  were  delayed  by  the  swollen  streams,  the  encum 
bered  roads,  the  shattered  wagons  sticking  in  the  mud. 

"But  all  the  while  the  sound  of  Hooker's  musketry 
was  in  our  ears.  His  division  was  cut  up  and  falling  back. 
His  guns  had  been  heard  at  first  in  front,  then  on  one 
side,  and  they  were  receding  still.  The  balls  and  the 
shells  began  to  whistle  and  shatter  the  trees  over  the  fresh 
division,  as  it  stood  immovable  and  expectant. 

"It  was  now  three  o'clock,  and  the  generals  resolved  to 
act.  Cue  division  passed  through  the  woods  to  flank  the 
regiments  which  were  driving  Hooker,  while  to  the  ex 
treme  right  a  brigade  passed  the  creek  on  an  old  mill- 
bridge,  which  the  enemy  had  failed  to  secure,  and  de 
bouched  upon  the  flank  of  the  Williamsburg  works. 
The  Confederates  did  not  expect  this  attack,  which,  if 
successful,  must  sweep  every  thing  before  it.  They  de 
spatched  two  brigades,  which  advanced  resolutely  through 
the  corn-fields  to  drive  back  the  Federals.  The  latter 
coolly  allowed  their  foes  to  come  up,  and  received  them 
with  a  tremendous  fire  of  artillery.  The  Confederates, 

cult  for  the  artillery  to  manoeuvre.  The  struggle,  which  had 
commenced  at  the  verge  of  a  wood,  Avas  gradually  drawn  into 
the  forest  itself,  and  here,  under  the  cracking  branches  of 
venerable  trees,  amidst  the  roar  of  the  artillery,  many  des 
perate  hand-to-hand  encounters  took  place,  such  as  have  seldom 
been  witnessed  in  other  wars." — Estvan's  War-Pictures  from  the 
South,  p.  277. 

The  author  of  the  above  work  was  a  Prussian  officer,  serving 
in  the  Confederate  army. 


ACK  35.]        BATTLE     OP     W  I  LLI  AM  SB  URd.  187 

unshaken,  pushed  on  within  thirty  yards  of  the  cannon's 
mouth,  shouting,  'Bull  Run!  Bull  Hun!'  as  the  Swiss 
used  to  shout,  'Granson!  Granson !'  There,  however, 
they  wavered,  and  the  Federal  General  Hancock,  seizing 
the  moment,  cried  to  his  soldiers,  as  he  waved  his  cap, 
'Now,  gentlemen!  the  bayonet!'  and  charged  with  his 
brigade.  The  enemy  could  not  withstand  the  shock, 
broke  and  fled,  strewing  the  field  with  his  dead.  At  this 
very  moment  General  McClellan,  who  had  been  detained 
at  Yorktown,  appeared  on  the  field.  It  was  dusk:  the 
night  was  coming  on,  the  rain  still  falling  in  torrents. 
On  three  sides  of  the  plateau  on  which  the  general  -was, 
the  cannon  and  the  musketry  were  rattling  uninterrupt 
edly.  The  success  of  Hancock  had  been  decisive,  and 
the  reserves  brought  up  by  the  general-in-chief,  charg 
ing  upon  the  field,  settled  the  affair.  Then  it  was  that 
I  saw  General  McClellan,  passing  in  front  of  the  Sixth 
Cavalry,  give  his  hand  to  Major  Williams,  with  a  few 
words  on  his  brilliant  charge  of  the  day  before.  The 
regiment  did  not  hear  what  he  said;  but  it  knew  what  he 
meant,  and  from  every  heart  went  up  one  of  those  mas 
culine,  terrible  shouts  which  are  only  to  be  heard  on  the 
field  of  battle.*  These  shouts,  taken  up  along  the  whole 


*  "Suddenly  a  shout  of  a  thousand  voices  broke  upon  the  air, 
like  the  rushing  of  a  mighty  wind  from  the  wood.  What  did 
this  portend?  There  was  little  time  left  for  \is  to  speculate. 
Charge  after  charge  was  made  upon  our  men,  and  the  news 
then  spread  that  General  McClellan,  with  the  main  body  of 
his  army,  had  arrived  on  the  field  of  battle.  This  explained 
the  loud  cheers  from  the  wood.  Our  men  could  no  longer 
stand  their  ground.  McClellan,  in  person,  led  on  his  troops 
into  the  midst  of  the  fire.  Magruder  now,  finding  that  the 
battle  was  lost,  ordered  a  retreat  to  be  sounded,  and  directed 
Hill's  division,  which  had  just  come  up,  to  cover  the  movement. 
All  the  wounded  and  a  great,  portion  of  the  baggage  were 


188  BATTLE     OF     WILLIAMSBURG. 


line,  struck  terror  to  the  enemy.  We  saw  them  come 
upon  the  parapets  and  look  out  in  silence  and  motionless 
upon  the  scene.  Then  the  firing  died  a/way,  and  night 
fell  on  the  combat  which  in  America  is  called  '  the  battle 
of  Williamsburg/" 

Our  loss  in  the  battle  of  Williamsburg — the  greater 
part  of  which  was  sustained  by  General  Hooker's 
division — was  as  follows :  Killed,  four  hundred 
and  fifty-six;  wounded,  fourteen  hundred;  missing, 
three  hundred  and  seventy-two:  total,  two  thou 
sand  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight.  The  engage 
ment  had  been  fought  under  the  disadvantage  on 
our  part  of  not  knowing  the  numbers  of  the  enemy 
or  the  strength  of  his  positions;  and  we  became 
involved  in  a  serious  battle,  with  a  large  force 
powerfully  intrenched,  when  we  had  expected  to 
do  no  more  than  attack  the  rear-guard  of  a  retreat 
ing  army.  This  explains  the  want  of  concert  among 
the  officers  on  the  field,  and  the  failure  to  send 
support,  in  all  cases,  to  the  place  and  at  the  time 
when  most  needed.  General  McClellan,  during  the 
forenoon  of  the  day,  was  at  Yorktown,  engaged  in 
making  arrangements  for  the  forwarding  of  Gene 
ral  Franklin's  division  to  West  Point,  and  in  con 
sultation  with  the  naval  commanders,  as  well  as 
with  the  other  duties  incident  to  his  position.  It 


left  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The  shades  of  night  put  an  end 
to  the  fight ;  a  heavy  rain,  too,  began  to  fall ;  and  these  circum 
stances,  fortunately,  prevented  the  enemy  from  completely  over 
whelming  us.  Tired  and  worn  out,  our  troops  returned  to 
Williamsburg,  where  the  excitement  had  become  intense.'' — 
Estvans  War-Pictures  from  the  South,  p.  279. 


AGE  35.]  TESTIMONY     OF     GENERAL     KEYES.       189 

was  not  until  about  one  o'clock  that  he  heard  from 
his  aides  that  every  thing  was  not  going  on  favor 
ably  in  front, — upon  which  he  hurried  up^as  rapidly 
as  possible,  arriving  there  between  four  and  five  in 
the  afternoon. 

General  Keyes,  in  his  examination  before  the 
Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  says,  "  The  battle  of  Williamsburg  was  gained 
by  our  side,  but  at  a  very  great  loss  in  Hooker's 
division  and  considerable  loss  in  Hancock's  and 
Peck's  brigades.  The  victory,  for  the  reasons  I 
have  stated,  was  nothing  like  as  decisive  as  it 
should  have  been,  nor  gained  so  early  in  the  day. 
In  fact,  the  victory  was  not  what,  in  military  lan 
guage,  is  generally  called  a  perfect  victory,  because 
we  were  not  able  to  sleep  in  the  enemy's  camp  ex 
cept  in  part."* 

*  Upon  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  General  Barnard  says, 
"We  fought,  we  lost  several  thousand  men,  and  we  gained 
nothing.  If  we  had  not  fought,  the  next  day  a  battle  would, 
in  all  probability,  have  been  unnecessary.  But,  if  it  had  been 
necessary,  we  should  have  had  time  to  have  brought  up  our 
resources,  reconnoitred  the  position,  and  delivered  our  attack 
in  such  a  way  that  some  result  would  have  flowed  from  it." 

Upon  this  Colonel  Lecomte  remarks,  "We  gained  there  at 
least  the  credit  of  having  carried  a  position  by  force  of 
arms,  which  General  Barnard  regrets  so  much  we  did  not  do  at 
Yorktown.  But  this  is  not  the  only  contradiction  into  which 
the  honorable  general  falls.  He  would  not  have  feared,  for  in 
stance,  assaults,  however  fruitless,  upon  the  strongly-fortified 
line  of  Yorktown  and  Warwick,  and  he  is  inconsolable  at  the 
losses  caused  by  success." 


190  W  ILL  I  AMSBU11G    OCCUPIED.  [1862. 

However  imperfect  the  victory  may  have  been, 
the  battle  had  been  entirely  satisfactory  so  far  as 
the  courage  and  conduct  of  the  men  were  concerned. 
They  had  behaved  admirably,  regulars  and  volun 
teers  alike,  and  given  to  their  commanding  officer 
abundant  proof  that  he  might  depend  alike  upon 
their  bravery  and  their  steadiness. — their  power  to 
attack  and  their  power  to  resist  attack.  That  the 
operations  of  the  army  and  the  course  of  its  com 
mander  had  thus  far  been  approved  by  the  public 
sentiment  of  the  country  may  be  inferred  from  the 
following  resolutions,  offered  by  Mr.  Lovejoy,  and 
unanimously  adopted  by  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  on  the  5th  of  May: — 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  with  feelings  of  profound  grati 
tude  to  Almighty  God  that  the  House  of  Representatives, 
from  time  to  time,  hear  of  the  triumphs  of  the  Union 
armies  in  the  great  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
Constitution  and  the  integrity  of  the  Union. 

"Resolved,  That  we  receive  with  profound  satisfaction 
intelligence  of  the  recent  victories  achieved  by  the 
armies  of  the  Potomac,  associated  from  their  localities 
with  those  of  the  Revolution,  and  that  the  sincere  thanks 
of  the  House  are  hereby  tendered  to  Major-General 
George  B.  McClellan  for  the  display  of  those  high  mili 
tary  qualities  which  secure  important  results  with  but 
little  sacrifice  to  human  life." 

On  the  morning  after  the  battle,  finding  the 
enemy's  position  abandoned,  we  occupied  Port 
Magruder  and  the  town  of  Williamsburg,  which 
was  filled  with  the  enemy's  wounded,  to  whose 


AGE  35.]  WHITE    HOUSE.  191 

assistance  eighteen  of  their  surgeons  were  sent 
by  General  Johnston.  Our  troops  were  greatly  ex 
hausted  by  their  toilsome  march  through  the  mud 
from  their  positions  in  front  of  York  town,  and  by 
the  protracted  battle  they  had  fought;  and  the  roads 
were  in  such  a  state,  after  thirty-six  hours  of  con 
tinuous  rain,  that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  pass 
even  empty  wagons  over  them.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances,  an  immediate  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
was  out  of  the  question. 

The  divisions  of  Franklin,  Sedgwick,  Porter,  and 
Richardson  were  sent  from  Yorktown,  by  water, 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Parnunkey,  in  the  vicinity 
of  "West  Point.  Early  on  the  morning  of  May  7, 
General  Franklin  had  completed  the  disembark 
ation  of  his  division.  Between  ten  and  eleven 
o'clock  he  was  assailed  by  a  largo  force  of  the 
enemy,  but,  after  a  spirited  engagement  of  three 
or  four  hours,  the  Confederates  retired,  all  their 
attacks  having  been  repulsed.  The  gunboats  were 
very  efficient,  and  contributed  materially  to  the 
success  of  the  day. 

As  soon  as  supplies  had  been  received,  and  the 
condition  of  the  roads  had  somewhat  improved,  the 
army  turned  its  face  towards  Richmond,  moving 
slowly  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  one 
of  the  two  affluents  forming  the  York  River,  and 
navigable  from  its  junction  with  the  latter  river  as 
far  as  White  House.  The  head-quarters  of  the 
army  reached  this  place  on  the  10th  of  May.  So 
bad  were  the  roads  that  the  train  of  one  division 


192  MARCH     DESCRIBED.  [1862. 

took  thirty-six  hours  to  get  to  White  House  from 
Cumberland,  a  distance  of  only  five  miles.* 

*  "Nothing  could  be  more  picturesque  than  this  military 
march  along  the  banks  of  a  fine  stream  through  a  magnificent 
country  arrayed  in  all  the  wealth  of  spring  vegetation.  The 
winding  course  of  the  Pamunkey,  through  a  valley  in  which 
meadows  of  the  brightest  green  alternated  with  wooded  hills, 
offered  a  perpetual  scene  of  enchantment  to  our  eyes.  Flowers 
bloomed  everywhere,  especially  on  the  river-banks,  which 
abounded  in  magnolias,  Virginia  jessamines,  azaleas,  and  blue 
lupines.  Humming-birds,  snakes,  and  strange  birds  of  every 
hue  sported  in  the  branches  and  about  the  trunks  of  the  trees. 
Occasionally  we  passed  a  stately  habitation  which  recalled  the 
old  mansions  of  rural  France,  with  its  large  windows  in  the 
roof, — around  it  a  handsome  garden,  and  behind  it  the  slave- 
cabins. 

"As  the  army  was  descried  in  the  distance,  the  inhabitants 
would  hang  out  a  white  flag.  One  of  the  prcfvost -marshal's 
horsemen  would  dismount  at  the  door,  and,  reassured  by  his 
presence,  the  ladies,  in  their  long  muslin  dresses,  surrounded 
by  a  troop  of  little  negresses  with  frizzled  hair  and  bare  legs, 
would  come  out  upon  the  veranda  and  watch  the  passage  of  the 
troops.  They  were  often  accompanied  by  old  men  with  strongly- 
marked  faces,  long  white  locks,  and  broad-brimmed  hats, — 
never  by  young  men.  All  the  men  capable  of  bearing  arms 
had  been  carried  off,  willy-nilly,  by  the  Government,  to  join  in 
the  general  defence. 

"So  from  point  to  point  we  moved  along  the  river.  The 
gunboats  went  first  and  explored  the  country  before  us ;  then 
came  the  topographical  officers,  moving  through  the  woods  with 
an  escort  of  cavalry,  reconnoitring  the  country,  and  sketching 
by  the  eye  and  the  compass  provisional  maps,  which  were 
photographed  at  head-quarters  for  the  use  of  the  generals. 
The  next  day,  with  the  help  of  these  maps,  the  army  would 
get  into  motion,  mingled  in  masses  with  its  immense  team  of 
wagons.  About  one-fourth  of  each  regiment  was  occupied  in 


AGE  35.]  RESPECT    FOR    PRIVATE    PROPERTY,     193 

At  White  House  the  Pamunkey  ceases  to  be 
navigable.  The  York  River  Railroad,  which  runs 
from  Richmond  to  West  Point,  crosses  the  river 
here  by  a  bridge  which  the  enemy  had  destroyed. 
Some  of  the  rails  also  had  been  removed  from  the 
track,  and  the  rolling  stock  had  been  carried  off;  but 
the  rails  were  soon  relaid.  and  new  cars  and  locomo 
tives  took  the  place  of  those  that  had  been  taken 
away.  A  great  depot  was  established  at  White 
House,  under  the  protection  of  the  gunboats.  The 
army  began  its  march  to  Richmond,  following  the 


escorting  the  materiel  of  the  corps,  piled  up — provisions,  am 
munition,  tents,  and  furniture — on  wagons,  at  the  rate  of  ten 
to  a  battalion.  But  for  the  absence  of  women,  we  might  have 
been  taken  for  an  armed  emigration  rather  than  for  soldiers 
on  the  march. 

"On  May  10,  we  reached  White  House,  a  fine  building,  once 
the  property  of  Washington,  and  now  of  his  descendants,  the 
Lee  family.  The  head  of  this  family,  General  Lee,  was  one  of 
the  chief  officers  of  the  Confederate  Army;  one  of  his  nephews 
was  in  the  Federal  ranks.  General  McClellan,  always  careful 
to  insist  upon  respect  for  private  property,  stationed  sentinels 
around  the  residence  of  the  hostile  general,  forbade  any  one  to 
enter  it,  and  would  not  enter  it  himself.  He  planted  his  tent 
in  a  neighboring  meadow.  This  respect  for  Southern  property 
lias  been  made  a  reproach  to  the  general  in  Congress:  the 
opinion  of  the  army  did  not  take  this  direction;  it  endorsed 
the  delicate  feeling  of  its  leader.  This  feeling  was  pushed  so 
far  that  when  a  general's  servants  found  one  day,  in  an  aban 
doned  house,  a  basket  of  champagne,  the  general  sent  it  back 
again  conspicuously  the  next  by  an  aide-de-camp.  We  may 
smile  at  this  puritanical  austerity,  to  which  we  arc  not  accus 
tomed  in  Europe.  For  my  own  part,  I  admit  that  I  always  ad> 
inired  it." — PRINCE  DE  JOIXVILT.E." 

17 


194  ME  R  III  MAC     DESTROYED.  [1862. 

line  of  the  railroad,  upon  which  it  was  dependent 
for  its  daily  supplies.  On  the  20th  of  May,  our 
advanced  light  troops  reached  the  banks  of  Chick- 
ahominy  Eivcr,  about  eight  miles  from  Richmond. 

Meanwhile,  important  events  had  been  going  on 
in  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The  abandonment 
of  Yorktown  without  waiting  for  an  assault  was 
the  result  of  a  determination  on  the  part  of  the 
Southern  leaders  to  transfer  the  scene  of  struggle 
and  resistance  from  the  Peninsula  to  the  neighbor- 

O 

hood  of  Richmond.  The  same  policy  which  coun 
selled  a  withdrawal  from  Yorktown  required  the 
giving  up  of  Norfolk;  for  General  linger  and  his 
garrison  of  eighteen  thousand  men  were  wanted 
elsewhere.  Orders  were,  accordingly,  given  him 
to  evacuate  the  place,  which  he  did  early  in  May, 
after  destroying  a  large  amount  of  public  property; 
and  on  the  10th  of  May  Norfolk  was  taken  pos 
session  of  by  our  troops  under  General  Wool. 

But  a  more  painful  sacrifice  yet  was  exacted  at 
the  hands  of  the  Confederates, — the  sacrifice  of  the 
Merrimac,  which  had  done  them  such  substantial 
service,  and  of  whose  achievements  they  were  so 
justly  proud.  About  four  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  lltli  of  May,  a  brilliant  light  was  seen  from 
Fortress  Monroe,  in  the  direction  of  Craney  Island; 
and  at  half-past  four  an  explosion  was  heard  which 
shook  the  earth  far  and  wide.  This  was  caused  by 
the  blowing  up  of  the  Merrimac,  which  had  been 
abandoned  by  her  officers  and  crew  and  set  on  fire. 
The  reasons  for  destroying  her  were  simply  these: 
she  was  wholly  unfitted  for  ocean  navigation,  and 


AGE  35.]  C  0  X  F  E  D  E  II  A  T  K     P  O  L  I  C  Y.  195 

must  have  gone  down  in  the-  first  storm  she  met; 
and  her  draught  of  water  was  such  that  she  could 
not  tret  far  enough  up  the  James  lliver  to  be  out 

O  i-3  A 

of  the  reach  of  the  Federal  navy,  to  which  the 
river  was  now  opened,  and  which  at  any  cost  would 
have  avenged  upon  the  Merrimac  the  loss  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Congress.  She  must  either  be 
destroyed  or  fall  into  our  hands.  This  now  seems 
obvious  enough;  but  the  sacrifice  of  the  Merrimac — 
the  Virginia,  as  they  called  her — was  a  bitter 
draught  for  the  Southern  people  to  swallow.  Jt 
wounded  them  in  their  sectional  pride,  where  the 
Southern  mind  has  always  been  so  sensitive.  The 
newspapers  were  loud  and  general  in  lamenting  and 
denouncing  it;  and  even  the  court  of  inquiry  which 
was  summoned  to  investigate  the  subject  reported 
that  her  destruction  was  unnecessary  at  the  time 
and  place  at  which  it  was  effected.  But,  for  all 
this,  the  sacrifice  of  the  Merrimac  was  a  necessary 
result  of  the  policy  of  defence  which,  after  great 
deliberation,  was  adopted;  and  that  the  policy  was 
sound,  subsequent  events  have  proved  beyond  a 
doubt.  It  may  be  not  without  profit  to  pause  hero 
a  moment,  and  consider  in  what  spirit  and  with 
what  measures  the  Confederate  States  prepared 
themselves  for  the  conflict  before  them 

The  whole  military  resources  of  the  Confederates 
at  that  time  were  under  the  control  of  three  men, 
President  Davis,  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  and  Gene 
ral  Joseph  E.  Johnston, — all  of  them  trained  soldiers, 
and  one  of  them  also  a  trained  statesman.  There 
was  entire  confidence  and  perfect  harmony  of  ac- 


198  SOUTHERN     INSTITUTIONS.  [1862. 

lion  between  them.  That  fatal  apple  of  discord, 
the  Presidency,  never  made  any  one  of  them  the 
rival  of  any  other.  They  acted  together  for  one 
object;  and  that  was  success  in  the  military  con 
test.  They  resolved  to  transfer  the  scene  of  deci 
sive  conflict  from  the  Peninsula  to  the  neighbor 
hood  of  Eichmond;  and  that  this  was  a  wise  deter 
mination  is  shown  by  a  glance  at  the  map.  The 
Peninsula  has  York  Eiver  on  one  side  and  James 
River  on  the  other;  these  rivers  must  sooner  or  later 
have  been  commanded  by  our  gunboats,  and  then 
their  forces  would  have  been  turned  and  defeated. 
The  surrender  of  Norfolk  was  a  source  of  mortifi 
cation;  but  it  was  a  judicious  step.  The  garrison 
was  wanted  at  Eichmond  much  more  than  at 
Norfolk;  and  as  the  Confederates  had  no  navy,  and 
their  entire  coast  was  or  soon  would  be  blockaded, 
the  possession  of  Norfolk,  though  it  gratified  their 
pride,  was  of  no  substantial  advantage  to  them. 

The  loss  of  the  Merrimac  was  a  more  painful 
sacrifice  still:  it  was  indeed  a  blow  upon  the  naked 
heart;  but  it  was  a  judicious,  nay,  an  inevitable, 
step,  and,  as  such,  it  was  at  last  acquiesced  in. 

In  the  political  contests  which  have  ended  in  the 
present  civil  war,  it  was  often  said  by  Northern 
writers  and  speakers  that  the  South  was  an  olig 
archy,  and  that  though  their  political  forms  were 
democratic  their  institutions  were  aristocratic.  The 
remark  is,  to  some  extent,  true.  In  the  Southern 
States  the  mass  of  the  people  have  always  been  con 
tent  to  follow  the  lead  of  a  comparatively  few  .per 
sons  who  have  practised  politics  as  a  profession. 


A<;  E  35.]  F  0  R  T     D  A  R  L  I  N  G.  1!)  i 

This  relation  between  the  many  and  the  few,  what 
ever  objections  may  be  urged  to  it  in  time  of  peace 
is  no  disadvantange  in  the  conduct  of  a  war. 

The  Confederate  Congress  had  passed  in  April  a 
very  strong  and  sweeping  conscription-law,  which 
included  every  able-bodied  man  between  eighteen 
and  thirty-five,  and  it  was  everywhere  enforced 
by  a  powerful  public  sentiment:  so  that  early  in 
June  their  army  began  to  be  steadily  recruited  from 
this  source.  The  work  upon  the  defences  around 
Richmond,  which  had  been  planned  some  time  be 
fore,  was  prosecuted  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

The  destruction  of  the  Merrirnac  opened  the 
James  River  to  our  gunboats,  but  not  until  the 
Confederates  had  had  time  to  protect  Richmond 
against  a  naval  attack.  On  the  15th  of  May,  a 
fleet  of  five  of  our  gunboats,  under  Captain  John 
Rodgcrs,  steamed  up  the  James,  running  aground 
several  times,  but  meeting  no  artificial  impediments 
till  they  came  to  Ward's  Bluff,  about  eight  miles 
from  Richmond,  where  they  encountered  a  heavy 
battery,  called  Fort  Darling,  and  two  separate  bar 
riers,  formed  of  piles,  steamers,  and  sail-vessels. 
The  stream  was  here  very  narrow,  being  only  twice 
as  wide  as  the  Galena,  the  leading  gunboat,  was 
long.  The  banks  of  the  river  were  lined  wTith 
rifle-pits,  from  which  sharpshooters  annoyed  the 
men  at  the  guns  and  rendered  a  removal  of  the 
obstructions  impossible.  The  battery  was  on  a 
bluff  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  high,  bristling  with 
guns  of  long  range  and  heavy  calibre,  the  shot 
from  which  fell  with  crushing  weight  upon  our 


198  THE     M  ERR  I  MAC.  [1SG2. 

gallant  little  fleet.  A  rifled  hundred-pound  Parrott 
gun  on  board  one  of  the  gunboats,  the  Xuugatuck, 
burst  during  the  fight,  and  disabled  the  vessel. 
The  great  height  of  the  bluff  put  it  out  of  the 
range  of  many  of  our  guns;  and  after  a  fight  of 
between  three  and  four  hours,  in  which  officers  and 
men  fully  sustained  the  high  character  of  the  Ame 
rican  navy,  Commodore  Bodgers  gave  the  signal 
to  discontinue  the  action. 

One  word  more,  in  conclusion,  upon  the  Merri- 
mac,  or  Virginia,  and  the  lessons  her  career  teaches. 
Her  first  appearance  upon  the  stage  of  the  world 
was  on  the  8th  day  of  March,  and  the  drama 
closed  with  the  flames  of  her  funeral  pyre  on  the 
morning  of  the  llth  of  May;  and  certainly  never 
was  there  an}-  mortal  craft  that  within  the  short 
space  of  two  months  played  a  more  important  part 
or  led  a  more  eventful  life.  She  was  originally 
a  United  States  steam  screw  frigate  of  fifty  guns, 
and,  being  at  Gosport  when  the  rebellion  broke  out, 
was,  like  many  of  her  consorts,  partly  burned  and 
sunk  when  it  became  certain  that  Xorfolk  must  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  seceding  State  of  Virginia. 
After  a  while  the  Confederates  fished  her  up,  and 
it  was  found  that  the  bottom  of  the  hull,  the  boilers, 
and  the  essential  parts  of  the  engine  were  little 
injured.  It  was  proposed  to  make  this  wreck  the 
nucleus  of  a  cascmated  vessel  with  inclined  iron- 
plated  sides  and  submerged  ends.  This  ingenious 
suggestion  was  carried  out  Avith  skill  and  energy. 
The  peculiar  feature  of  the  Merrimac  was  that  her 
ends  and  the  eaves  of  her  casemate  were  sub- 


Ar.r.  ;:r..]  T  11  K    M  K  u  u  i  M  A  o. 

merged.  The  inclined  roof,  covered  with  railroad- 
iron,  was  pierced  with  port-holes  for  ten  guns  of 
very  heavy  calibre.  The  inclination  of  her  plates, 
and  their  thickness  and  form,  were  determined  by 
actual  experiment.  Her  bow  was  armed  with  a 
strong  projecting  prow  or  beak  of  steel.  When 
completed,  she  looked  something  like  the  roof  of 
a  house  floating  upon  the  water. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  March,  this  strange, 
uncouth  fabric  is  seen  paddling  along  the  calm 
waters  of  Hampton  Roads,  like  some  huge  animal 
of  the  turtle-kind,  making  not  more  than  five  knots 
an  hour.  There  the  Cumberland  and  the  Congress, 

O  " 

two  old-fashioned  wooden  frigates,  were  lying  at 

O  J  O 

anchor;  and  not  far  from  them  were  the  Minne 
sota  and  Roanoke,  screw  frigates,  and  the  St.  Law 
rence,  an  old  sailing-frigate.  The  Merrimac  crawls 
l>y  the  Congress,  delivering  a  broadside  as  she 
passes,  and  makes  straight  for  the  Cumberland. 
The  sailors  on  board  the  latter  vessel  greet  her 
with  jokes  and  laughter;  but  the  officers  note  with 
surprise  and  uneasiness  that  the  shot  of  their  heaviest 
broadsides  rattle  off  the  roof  of  the  ominous  craft 
like  so  many  India-rubber  balls,  without  making 
the  slightest  impression  upon  her  iron  ribs.  In  a 
few  moments  she  crashes  into  the  Cumberland, 
head  on,  drives  her  projecting  prow  into  the  star 
board  bow  below  the  water-line,  and  knocks  a 
hole  in  her  side  as  big  as  a  hogshead.  The  gallant 
frigate  reels  and  shivers  in  every  limb  under  the 
death-stroke,  settles  by  the  head,  and  begins  at 
once  to  sink,  carrying  with  her  two  hundred  of  her 


200  THE     M  ERR  I  MAC.  [18(12. 

dauntless  crew,  before  they  had  fairly  recovered 
from  tlic  surprise  of  the  portentous  shock. 

The  Merrimac  next  approaches  the  Congress ; 
but  she  has  probably  broken  or  displaced  her  prow 
in  running  into  the  Cumberland,  and  she  attacks  the 
Congress,  therefore,  by  shot  and  shells.  But  before 
her  tremendous  armament  the  Congress  proves  as 
powerless  as  was  the  Cumberland  before  her  beak. 
Her  colors  are  hauled  down;  she  is  run  ashore,  and 
set  on  fire  by  the  Merrimac's  battery. 

Of  the  other  three  vessels  which  have  been  men 
tioned,  the  Minnesota  was  the  only  one  which 
could  have  been  of  any  service;  and  she.  unfortu 
nately,  ran  aground.  The  Merrimac,  after  firing 
a  few  shots  at  her,  deeming  her  a  sure  prey  for  the 
next  day,  turns  aside  to  shell  the  camp  and  batte 
ries  at  Xewport  I^ews, — but  with  very  little  effect. 
In  the  night  the  gallant  little  Monitor  arrives. — as 
opportunely  as  one  of  Homer's  gods  coming  down 
from  Olympus  to  share  in  a  mortal  fray. — attacks 
the  Merrimac  the  next  morning,  and,  after  a  con 
test  resembling  a  fight  between  a  swordfish  and 
a  whale,  drives  away  her  gigantic  adversary,  baffled 
and  disabled,  thus  rendering  us  a  service  cheaply 
estimated  at  her  weight  in  gold. 

On  the  llth  of  April,  the  Merrimac  again  appears 
in  Hampton  Roads,  attended  by  five  small  vessels. 
As  soon  as  she  is  discerned,  a  large  fleet  of  trans 
ports  and  sailing-vessels  in  the  upper  roads  scuds 
away  to  a  place  of  safety,  like  a  flock  of  <;tamc 
villatic  fowl"  that  seeks  a  sheltering  covert  when 
the  hawk  is  seen  in  the  air.  Aided  by  her  at- 


AGR  35.]  THE     ME  Kill. MAC.  "201 

tcudant  spirits,  she  captures  three  sailing-vessels 
under  the  eye  of  our  own  ileet,  among  which  was 
the  Monitor  herself.  After  this,  the  Merrimac 
slowly  moves  to  arid  fro  across  the  mouth  of 
Elizabeth  River,  seemingly  inviting  a  champion  to 
come  out  and  try  conclusions  with  her;  but  her 
defiance  is  not  accepted,  and  she  retires  with  her 
prizes,  unmolested.  To  make  the  sting  of  our  mor 
tification  a  little  sharper,  all  this  was  done  under 
the  bows  of  two  foreign  frigates, — one  French  and 
one  English. 

Thus,  the  destruction  of  two  frigates  and  the  cap 
ture  of  three  small  vessels  make  up  the  list  of  the 
Merrimac's  material  triumphs  and  trophies;  but 
these  were  by  no  means  all  the  services  she  ren 
dered  the  Confederates,  nor  all  the  harm  she  did  to 
us.  In  the  first  place,  she  controlled  the  James 
Itiver  so  long  as  she  lived.  This  rendered  it  im 
possible  for  us  to  make  use  of  that  river  as  the  base 
of  our  operations;  and  this  was  the  best  base  for  a 
movement  upon  Richmond,  and  that  one  which,  un 
questionably,  we  should  have  adopted  but  for  her 
presence.  And,  in  the  second  place,  the  necessity 
of  watching  the  Merrimac  rendered  it  impossible  to 
detach  from  the  squadron  at  Hampton  Roads  a  suit 
able  force  to  attack  the  enemy's  water-batteries  at 
Yorktown  and  Gloucester;  and  this  delayed  the 
army  before  the  lines  of  Yorktown,  and  gave  the 
Confederates — what  they  so  much  wanted — time. 
Thus  the  whole  current  of  the  Peninsular  campaign 
was  turned  aside,  and  the  course  of  the  war  itself 
materially  influenced,  by  this  single  vessel.  Never 


THE     M  ERR  I  MAC. 


was  there  a  greater  apparent  disproportion  between 
cause  and  effect. 

And  the  lesson  which  the  lEerrimac  teaches  is, 
that  in  war  no  chance  should  be  thrown  away,  no 
advantage  should  be  foregone;  that  counsel  never 
should  be  taken  of  distrust  and  despondency;  that 
the  game  of  war  is  never  wholly  lost  and  never 
wholly  won,  and  that  in  desperate  straits  there  is 
nothing  that  ingenuity  can  suggest  which  is  not 
worth  trying.  A  sudden  and  unexpected  charge 
by  Kellermann,  at  the  head  of  eight  hundred  cav 
alry,  turned  the  adverse  tide  of  battle  at  Marengo 
into  a  victory.  The  little  fort  of  Bard,  in  the 
valley  of  Aosta,  a  few  weeks  earlier,  checked, 
and,  had  not  the  garrison  been  over-confident  and 
under-vigilant,  would  have  turned  back,  the  whole 
French  army.*  And  the  Merrimac  may  have 
saved  the  city  of  Richmond  from  capture. 

Jt  is  curious  to  reflect,  after  all  the  inventions  by 
which  the  force  and  destructiveness  of  projectiles 
have  been  increased,  that  in  the  ^lerrimac  we  came 
back  to  the  point  from  which  naval  architecture, 
as  applied  to  war.  started.  The  Merrimac's  beak 
was  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  rostrum  of  a 
.Roman  galley,  enlarged  and  strengthened. 

During  the  march  from  Yorktown  to  the  banks 
of  the  Chiekahominy,  besides  the  weighty  cares  and 
heavy  responsibilities  of  a  commanding  general  at 
the  head  of  a  great  expedition,  the  mind  of  General 

*  See  the  account  in  Alison's  "History  of  the  French  Revo 
lution,''  chap.  xxx. 


AGE  35.]  MORE     MEN     NEEDED.  203 

McClellan  was  constantly  burdened  with  a  convic 
tion  that  his  troops  were  not  numerous  enough  for 
the  work  in  hand,  and  that  reinforcements  wero 
essential  to  success.  He  had  carried  with  him  to 
the  Peninsula  about  eighty-live  thousand  men,  and 
Franklin's  division,  which  had  subsequently  joined 
him,  amounted  to  ten  thousand  more;  but  some  of 
his  troops  had  been  killed  or  disabled  in  battle, 
some  had  died  from  disease,  and  garrisons  had  been 
left  at  Yorktown,  Williamsburg,  and  Gloucester,  so 
that  now  he  could  not  confidently  rely  upon  more 
than  eighty  thousand  men.  But  time,  which  was 
thinning  his  ranks,  was  swelling  those  of  the  enemy; 
and  the  task  before  him  was  that  of  taking  a  city 
strongly  defended,  before  which  was  an  army  larger 
than  his  own.  On  the  10th  of  May,  from  a  camp 
three  miles  from  Williamsburg,  he  sent  a  brief  tele 
gram  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  setting  forth  his 
position,  and  urging  the  necessity  of  reinforcing 
him  without  delay  with  all  the  disposable  troops  in 
Eastern  Virginia.  He  assures  the  Secretary  that 
the  rebels  will  not  abandon  Bichmond  without  a 
struggle,  and  adds  that  unless  he  is  reinforced  it  is 
probable  he  shall  be  obliged  to  fight  nearly  double 
his  numbers,  strongly  intrenched. 

On  the  14th  of  May,  he  sent  a  telegram  to  the 
President  in  the  same  strain,  stating  that  the  time 
had  come  for  striking  a  fatal  blow  at  the  enemies 
of  the  Constitution,  and  entreating  him  that  ho 
would  cause  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  to  be  rein 
forced  without  delay  by  all  the  disposable  troops  of 
the  Government.  To  this,  on  the  18th.  an  answer 


204        LETTER    FROM    THE    SECRETARY    OF    AVAR.     [1862. 

was  received  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  mate 
rial  portions  of  which  are  as  follows  : — 

"The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover  the  capital 
entirely ;  and  it  is  believed  that,  even  if  this  were  prudent, 
it  would  require  more  time  to  effect  a  junction  between 
your  army  and  that  of  the  Ilappahannock,  by  the  way  of 
the  Potomac  and  York  Rivers,  than  by  a  land  march.  In 
order,  therefore,  to  increase  the  strength  of  the  attack 
upon  Richmond  at  the  earliest  moment,  General  McDowell 
has  been  ordered  to  march  upon  that  city  by  the  shortest 
route.  He  is  ordered,  keeping  himself  always  in  position 
to  save  the  capital  from  all  possible  attack,  so  to  operate 
as  to  put  his  left  wing  in  communication  with  your  right 
wing  ;  and  you  are  instructed  to  co-operate  so  as  to  esta 
blish  this  communication  as  soon  as  possible,  by  extending 
your  right  wing  to  the  north  of  Richmond. 

#  -X-  -X-  -X-  -X- 

"When  General  McDowell  is  in  position  on  your  right, 
his  supplies  must  be  drawn  from  West  Point;  and  you 
will  instruct  your  staff  officers  to  be  prepared  to  supply 
him  by  that  route. 

"The  President  desires  that  General  McDowell  retain 
the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock, 
and  of  the  forces  with  which  he  moves  forward." 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that  General  McClellan 
wished  and  had  advised  that  reinforcements  should 
be  sent  to  him  by  water,  as  their  arrival  would  have 
been  more  certain.  Xow  that  the  James  River  was 
open,  they  might  have  been  sent  by  that  route,  in 
which  event  our  left  flank  would  have  rested  upon 
that  river  and  been  protected  by  it.  Richmond 
fould  have  been  approached  by  the  James,  and  we 
should  have  escaped  the  losses  and  delays  incurred 


AGE  35.]    INSTRUCTIONS    TO    GENERAL    3KDOWELL.       205 

by  bridging  the  Chickahominy,  and  should  have 
had  the  army  massed  in  one  body  instead  of  being 
necessarily  divided  by  that  stream.  This  judicious 
military  plan,  which  in  all  probability  would  have 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  Richmond,  could  not  bo 
carried  out,  because  to  the  President's  distempered 
fancy  Washington  was  not  safe  unless  it  was 
covered  by  McDowell's  division  in  a  direct  line 
between  that  city  and  Richmond.  Under  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  case,  an  attack  upon  Washington 
by  a  Confederate  force  strong  enough  to  carry  its 
defences  was  about  as  probable  an  event  as  an  inun 
dation  of  the  city  by  an  overflow  of  the  Potomac. 

By  these  orders  it  will  be  also  noticed  that  General 
McClellan  was  commanded  to  extend  his  right  wing 
to  the  north  of  Richmond,  in  order  to  establish 
the  communication  between  himself  and  General 
McDowell.  This  was  running  a  great  risk  in  case 
General  McDowell  should  not  come,  because  it  ex 
posed  our  right  in  a  way  that  no  prudent  officer 
would  have  done;  and,  as  General  McDowell  did 
not  come,  the  enemy  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  the  opportunity  thus  afforded  them. 

The  Secretary's  communication  of  the  18th  was 
accompanied  by  a  copy  of  the  instructions  which 
had  been  sent  to  General  McDowell  on  the  previous 
day,  of  which  the  following  is  the  substance  : — 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,        "| 
WASHINGTON,  May  17,  18G2.  J 

"GENERAL: — Upon  being  joined  by  General  Shields's 
division,  you  will  move  upon  Richmond  by  the  general 
route  of  the  Richmond  &  Freclericksburg  Railroad,  co-ope- 

18 


206         INSTRUCTIONS    TO    GENERAL    MCDOWELL. 


[1862. 


rating  with  the  forces  under  General  McGlellan,  now 
threatening  Richmond  from  the  line  of  the  Pamunkey 
and  York  Rivers. 

"While  seeking  to  establish  as  soon  as  possible  a  com 
munication  between  your  left  wing  and  the  right  wing  of 
General  McGlellan,  you  will  hold  yourself  always  in  such 
position  as  to  cover  the  capital  of  the  nation  against  a 
sudden  dash  of  any  large  body  of  the  rebel  forces." 

General  McDowell  had  with  him  forty  thousand 
men  arid  ninety  pieces  of  artillery. 

On  the  21st  of  May,  General  McClellan  sent 
another  despatch,  of  some  length,  to  the  President. 
He  explains  to  him  the  position  of  the  army,  and 
earnestly  and  respectfully  expresses  his  regret  at 
the  delay  of  McDowell's  advance.  He  tells  the 
President  frankly  that  the  march  pf  McDowell's 
column  upon  .Richmond  by  the  shortest  land  route 
will  uncover  Washington  as  completely  as  its  move 
ment  by  water;  that  the  enemy  cannot  advance  by 
Fredericksburg,  and  that  if  they  attempt  a  move 
ment,  which  to  him  seems  utterly  improbable,  their 
route  would  be  by  Gordonsville  arid  Manassas.  In 
conclusion,  he  desires  that  the  extent  of  his  author 
ity  over  General  McDowell  may  be  clearly  defined, 
and  suggests  that  the  dangers  of  a  divided  command 
can  only  be  surely  guarded  against  by  explicitly 
placing  General  McDowell  under  his  orders  in  the 
usual  way. 

On  the  24th  he  received  from  the  President  a 
reply  to  the  above,  in  which  he  suggests  a  plan  of 
military  movement  against  General  Anderson  in 
concert  with  General  McDowell,  assures  him  that 


AGE  35.]  GENERAL    M  c  D  O  W  E  L  L   W  I T  II 1)  It  A  W  N.    207 

McDowell's  division,  strengthened  by  Sliields's  com 
mand,  would  begin  to  move  on  Monday,  the  26th, 
and  tells  him  that  McDowell,  after  joining  him, 
would  be  under  his  command. 

This,  of  course,  was  highly  satisfactory,  as  it  gave 
General  McClellan  assurance  that  he  would  soon  be 
reinforced  by  at  least  fifty  thousand  men,  and  thus 
be  made  sufficiently  strong  to  overpower  the  large 
army  confronting  him.  But  his  astonishment,  his 
agony  of  disappointment,  may  well  be  imagined 
when  all  these  confident  expectations  were  broken 
to  pieces  by  the  crushing  despatch  received  at  a 
later  hour  of  the  same  day,  which  ran  thus : — 

"May  24,  1862,          | 
From  WASHINGTON,  4  P.M.  ) 

"In  consequence  of  General  Banks's  critical  position,  I 
have  been  compelled  to  suspend  General  McDowell's 
movements  to  join  you.  The  enemy  are  making  a  des 
perate  push  upon  Harper's  Ferry ;  and  we  are  trying  to 
throw  General  Fremont's  force,  and  part  of  General 
McDowell's,  in  their  rear. 

"A.  LIXCOLN,  President. 
"Major-General  GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

It  is  necessary  to  go  back  a  little  and  state  the 
events  which  occasioned  this  last  despatch. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  State  of  Virginia, 
contrary  to  sound  military  maxims,  and  certainly 
for  reasons  other  than  military,  had  been  parcelled 
out  into  five  separate  commands.  General  Fremont 
was  west  of  the  mountains,  General  Banks  was  in 
the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  General  McDowell 


-08  JACK  SON '8    ,M  U  V  il  M  EXTS.  [1862. 

was  on  the  Eappahannock,  and  General  Wool  was 
at  Fortress  Monroe.  During  the  preceding  autumn 
and  winter  the  Confederate  General  Jackson  had 
been  at  or  near  Winchester  with  a  body  of  raw 
troops,  which  he  had  been  engaged  in  drilling  and 
disciplining.  The  campaign  opened  in  the  valley 
early  in  March.  On  the  23d  of  that  month  a  battle 
was  fought  near  Winchester  between  General  Shields 
and  General  Jackson,  in  which  the  latter  was  de 
feated.  This  battle,  by  revealing  the  presence  of  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy  in  that  region,  was 
probably  the  reason  why  McDowell's  corps  was  not 
sent  to  the  Peninsula  with  McClellan.  After  the 
battle  of  Winchester,  Jackson  had  retreated  up  the 
valley  to  Harrisonburg,  and  then  struck  off  to  the 
west.  On  the  8th  of  May,  he  fought  a  battle  of  not 
very  decisive  results  with  the  Federal  forces  under 
Milroy  and  Schenck,  at  a  place  called  McDowell, 
near  Bull  Pasture  Mountain.  From  this  point  ho 
marched  to  Harrisonbur";,  thence  to  Xew  Market, 

O  / 

where  a  junction  was  effected  with  Swell's  division, 
which  had  come  from  Elk  Eun  Valley.  Their 
united  forces  amounted  to  at  least  fifteen  thousand 
men. 

About  the  middle  of  May,  an  order  was  issued 
from  the  War  Department  at  Washington  for 
General  Shields  to  move  with  his  command  from 
the  Yalley  of  the  Shcnandoah  and  join  General 
McDowell  at  Fredericksburg.  This  left  General 
Banks  with  only  five  or  six  thousand  men  at  Stras- 
burg.  The  Government  was  warned  of  the  danger 
of  leaving  him  with  so  small  a  force  when  so  active 


AUK  ?..").]  ^  K  N  K  I!  A  L     li  A  N  K.  S.  '2(W 

and  vigilant  an  officer  as  Jackson  was  in  the  valley; 
but  it  was  all  to  no  purpose.  It  is  a  mistake  to  sup 
pose  that  General  Jackson  had  been  planning  and 
executing  movements  of  his  own,  and  upon  his  own 
responsibility,  all  this  time:  he  had  been  under  the 
control  of  the  commander-in-cluef  at  Richmond, 
and  all  his  marches  and  battles  had  reference  to 
one  sole  object, — the  defence  of  that  city.  The  Con 
federate  authorities  knew  how  important  it  was  for 
General  McClellan  that  he  should  be  reinforced  by 
General  McDowell,  and  they  also  knew  that  it  was 
an  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  Washington  that 
had  thus  far  prevented  the  junction;  and  they,  of 
course,  reasoned  that  by  keeping  up  and  increasing 
this  alarm  they  might  postpone  indefinitely  a  com 
bination  of  forces  which  would  be  fatal  to  them. 
The  time  had  come,  now  that  General  Banks  was 
left  so  exposed,  when  a  decisive  blow  might  be  struck 
towards  the  end;  and  the  opportunity  was  not 
neglected. 

After  the  battle  at  McDowell,  General  Jackson 
had  contrived  to  conceal  his  movements  from  the 
observation  of  our  forces.  General  Banks,  as  has 
been  said,  was  at  Strasburg.  At  Front  Royal, 
twelve  miles  in  advance,  Colonel  Kenley  was  sta 
tioned,  with  a  Maryland  regiment  and  a  few  com 
panies, — about  twelve  hundred  in  all,  rank  and  file. 
On  Friday,  the  23d,  at  noon,  this  little  handful  of 
men  was  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  assailed  by 
General  Jackson  at  the  head  of  a  force  at  least 
ten  times  as  large  as  its  own.  Though  taken  by 
surprise,  and  with  such  immense  odds  against  him, 


RETREAT  OF  GENERAL  BANKS, 


Colonel  Kenley  and  his  men  fought  gallantly  arid 
obstinately  for  three  or  fouv  hours,  and  thus  re 
tarded  the  Confederate  advance;  but  they  were  at 
last  overpowered  by  superior  numbers,  and  nearly 
all  cut  to  pieces  or  taken  prisoners. 

The  startling  news  reached  General  Banks  at 
nightfall,  and,  after  a  little  reflection,  he  determined 
to  move  upon  Winchester  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
Accordingly,  at  a  very  early  hour  the  next  morning 
he  began  his  march.  His  column  was  attacked  in 
flank  while  on  the  way,  and  a  portion  of  the  rear 
guard  turned  back  to  Strasburg.  At  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  the  advance-guard  arrived  at  Win 
chester.  The  whole  force  General  Banks  had  with 
him  was  less  than  five  thousand  men,  while  that 
of  the  enemy  was  fifteen  thousand  at  least.  At 
Winchester  General  Banks  determined  to  try  the 
strength  of  the  Confederates  by  actual  collision; 
and  preparations  were  made  accordingly  during 
the  night.  The  engagement  began  early  the  next 
morning,  and  held  the  enemy  in  check  for  five 
hours.  Our  soldiers  fought  well,  and  were  well 
handled;  but  it  was  in  vain  to  contend  against  such 
odds,  and  orders  were  given  to  withdraw.  The 
pursuit  by  the  enemy  was  prompt  and  vigorous, 
and  the  retreat  rapid  and  without  serious  loss.  A 
halt  of  two  hours  and  a  half  was  made  at  Martins- 
burg;  and  the  rear-guard  finally  reached  the  Po 
tomac  at  sunset  on  the  25th.  This  was  forty-eight 
hours  after  the  first  news  of  the  attack  on  Front 
Royal.  It  was  a  march  of  fifty-three  miles,  thirty- 
five  of  which  were  performed  in  one  day.  The 


AUK  3,y. j       R  K  T  K  K  A  'I'     O  K     ( i  I'.  N  K  K  A  L     li  A  N  Iv  S.          2 1 1 

river  was  crossed  the  next  day;  "and/1  sa}-s  Gene 
ral  Banks,  in  his  official  report,  "there  never  were 
more  grateful  hearts  in  the  same  number  of  men 
than  when,  at  mid-day  on  the  26th,  we  stood  011 
the  opposite  shore/' 

General  Banks  throughout  these  two  disastrous 
days  behaved  with  energy  and  self-possession;  and 
there  is  nothing  disparaging  to  his  military  repu 
tation  in  the  fact  that  he  retreated,  because  he 
did  it  in  good  order  against  a  force  three  or  four 
times  as  great  as  his  own,  saving  all  his  guns, 
and  losing  only  fifty-five  wagons  out  of  five  hun 
dred. 

On  the  part  of  the  enemy  it  must  be  admitted 
that  this  expedition,  as  a  move  upon  the  great 
chess-board  of  war,  demands  the  highest  praise. 
It  was  admirably  planned  and  skilfully  and  suc 
cessfully  executed.  The  loss  of  men  on  our  side 
was  not  great;  that  of  army  and  medical  stores 
was  more  considerable;  but  the  indirect,  the  moral, 
advantages  it  secured  to  the  enemy  were  of  infi 
nitely  greater  moment.  To  drive  General  Banks 
from  Strasburg  across  the  Potomac  was  in  itself  a 
play  not  worth  the  candle;  but  the  real  object  of 
the  expedition  was  to  prevent  General  McDowell's 
division  from  being  sent  to  reinforce  General  Mc- 
Clellan;  and  it  unfortunately  succeeded. 

AVhen  news  of  the  attack  on  Colonel  Kenle}r's 
command  at  Front  Royal,  on  the  23d,  reached 
General  Geary,  who  was  at  Reetortown  with  a 
force  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  IVIanassas 
Gap  Railroad,  he  immediately  began  to  move  to 


-1-  ALARM     AT     WASHINGTON. 


[1862. 


Manassas  Junction.  His  troops,  alarnred  by  exag 
gerated  reports  of  the  fate  of  the  regiment  at 
Front  Pioyal,  burnt  their  tents  and  destroyed  a 
quantity  of  arms.  The  contagion  of  panic  spread 
to  Catltttt's  Station,  where  was  General  Duryca 
with  four  regiments.  lie  hastened  to  Centreville, 
and  telegraphed  to  Washington  for  help.  The 
rumors  were  swelled  and  magnified  on  their  way 
to  the  capital:  the  authorities  there  were  thrown 
into  a  most  unnecessary  fright,  and  telegraphic  de 
spatches,  pale  with  the  hue  of  fear,  were  sent  on 
the  wings  of  lightning  all  over  the  land.  Of  these 
the  following  is  a  specimen  : — 

"WASHINGTON,  May  25,  1862. 
"To  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts . 

"  Intelligence  from  various  quarters  leaves  no  doubt  that 
the  enemy,  in  great  force,  are  marching  on  Washington. 
You  will  please  organize  and  forward  immediately  all  the 
militia  and  volunteer  force  in  your  State. 

"Emvjx  M.  STAXTOX, 
"/Secretary  of  War." 

It  was  under  the  influence  of  the  apprehensions 
occasioned  by  the  report  of  General  Jackson's 
movements  that  the  President  had  telegraphed  to 
General  McClellan,  on  the  24th  of  May,  as  we  have 
before  stated,  that  General  McDowell's  division 
would  not  join  him.  On  the  same  day,  an  order 
was  sent  by  the  President  to  General  McDowell, 
directing  him  to  lay  aside  at  present  the  move 
ment  on  Richmond,  and  put  twenty  thousand  men 
in  motion  at  once  for  the  Shenandoah,  in  order  to 


G  E  N  E  R  A  L     M  (  DOWEL  L. 


capture  the  force  of  Jackson  and  Ewell,  either 
in  co-operation  with  General  Fremont,  or  alone. 
General  McDowell's  clear  military  judgment  saw 
at  once  the  injudiciousness  of  this  order,  which 
turned  him  from  a  point  where  he  was  greatly 
needed  to  a  quarter  where  he  could  be  of  no  use; 
and  he  instantly  telegraphed  back  to  the  Presi 
dent's  order  the  following  reply,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  : — 

"  The  President's  order  has  been  received,  and  is  in 
process  of  execution.  This  is  a  crushing  blow  to  us." 

To  this  the  President  responded  as  follows,  still 
on  the  same  24th  of  May : — 

"  I  am  highly  gratified  by  your  alacrity  in  obeying  my 
orders.  The  change  was  as  painful  to  me  as  it  can  pos 
sibly  be  to  you  or  to  any  one.  Every  thing  now  depends 
upon  the  celerity  and  vigor  of  your  movements." 

To  this  General  McDowell  made  a  reply  in  writ 
ing,  of  which  the  principal  and  material  portion  is 
as  follows  :— 

'•  HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  RAPPAHAXXOCK,  1 
"  OPPOSITK  FRKPERICKSBURG,  May  24,  1862.      I 

"  His  Excellency  the  President: — 

"I  obeyed  your  order  immediately,  for  it  was  positive 
and  urgent;  and  perhaps,  as  a  subordinate,  there  I  ought 
to  stop  ;  but  I  trust  I  may  be  allowed  to  say  something  in 
relation  to  the  subject,  especially  in  view  of  your  remark 
that-  every  thing  depends  upon  the  celerity  and  vigor  of 
my  movements.  I  beg  to  say  that  co-operation  between 
General  Fremont  and  myself,  to  cut  off  Jackson  and 
Ewell.  is  not  to  be  counted  upon,  even  if  it  is  not  a  pruc- 


214  GENERAL     MCD  DWELL.  [18G2, 

tical  impossibility ;  next,  that  I  am  entirely  beyond 
helping-distance  of  General  Banks,  and  no  celerity  or 
vigor  will  be  available  as  far  as  lie  is  concerned ;  next, 
that  by  a  glance  at  the  map  it  will  be  seen  that  the  line 
of  retreat  of  the  enemy's  forces  up  the  valley  is  shorter 
than  mine  to  go  against  him.  It  will  take  a  week  or  ten 
days  for  the  force  to  get  to  the  valley  by  the  route  which 
will  give  it  food  and  forage,  and  by  that  time  the  enemy 
will  have  retreated.  I  shall  gain  nothing  for  you  there, 
and  lose  much  for  you  here.  It  is,  therefore,  not  only 
on  personal  grounds  that  I  have  a  heavy  heart  in  the 
matter,  but  I  feel  that  it  throws  us  all  back,  and  from 
Richmond  north  we  shall  have  all  our  large  mass  para 
lyzed,  and  shall  have  to  repeat  what  we  have  just  accom 
plished/7 

It  will  be  observed  that  on  the  24th  of  May  the 
President  directed  General  McDowell  to  march  to 
the  Shenandoah,  to  cut  off  the  retreating  division 
of  Jackson,  and  that  on  the  next  day  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  telegraphed  the  Governor  of  Massa 
chusetts  that  the  "  enemy,  in  great  force,"  meaning 
of  course  Jackson's  command,  were  marching  on 
Washington.  This  difference  of  opinion  between 
two  high  functionaries  as  to  an  enemy's  move 
ments  is  rather  a  curious  fact,  and  only  to  be  ex 
plained  on  the  ground  that  they  were  acting  inde 
pendently  and  without  consultation  or  conference. 

What  generous  mind  will  refuse  to  sympathize 
Avith  General  McDowell's  suffering  and  sadness 
of  spirit  in  obeying  an  order  which  he  perceives 
to  be  most  unwise  at  the  very  moment  he  prepares 
to  execute  it ! 

The  silent  and  incommunicative  Jackson — a  man 


AGE  35.]  JACKSON 's    MOVEMENTS.  215 

who  never  let  his  left  Land  know  what  his  right 
hand  was  doing,  who  rarely  spoke  and  rarely 
smiled — would  have  been  amused  if  he  had  known 
into  what  a  fright  he  had  thrown  the  authorities  at 
Washington  and  no  small  portion  of  the  Northern 
people.  lie  had  no  more  idea  of  going  to  Wash 
ington  than  of  going  to  Boston  :  such  a  diversion 
of  his  force  would  have  been  an  act  of  madness. 
Having  done  all  that  he  desired  and  proposed  to 
do,  his  next  thought  was  to  get  back  again  ;  and  he 
accordingly  began  his  retreat  up  the  Valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  which  he  conducted  bravely  and  skil 
fully,  lie  had  a  great  advantage  in  his  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  country  he  was  traversing.  He 
contrived  to  slip  through  the  Federal  forces  which 
were  pressing  upon  him  from  the  west  and  the 
east.  On  the  8th  of  June,  he  fought  a  battle  with 
General  Fremont,  at  Cross  Keys,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Shcnandoah,  by  which  he  secured  the  pass 
age  of  his  army  over  the  bridge  at  Port  Republic, 
a  few  miles  distant,  and  the  next  day  engaged  a 
portion  of  General  Shields's  command  near  the 
latter  place.  After  a  hard  fight,  our  forces  fell 
back,  and  General  Jackson  continued  his  retreat, 
to  secure  which  had  been  his  object  in  both  en 
gagements. 

Thus  ended  General  Jackson's  memorable  cam 
paign  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  which  had 
begun  on  the  llth  of  March,  in  which  that  officer 
gave  evidence  of  the  highest  military  qualities- 
vigor,  celerity,  skill  in  masking  his  designs  from 
the  enemy,  and  ability  in  handling  his  men — and 


210  GENERAL    MCCLELLAN    AT    RICHMOND.  [1862. 

fully  vindicated  his  title  to  the  enthusiastic  admi 
ration  with  which  he  was  regarded  by  his  people 
during  the  remainder  of  his  brief  career. 

It  may  be  added  that,  had  all  the  military  threads 
that  united  at  Richmond  been  held  in  the  hand  of 
General  McClellan,  as  they  should  have  been,  ho 
would  never  have  left  General  Banks  exposed  with 
so  small  a  command  at  an  indefensible  point.  That 
this  statement  is  not  matter  of  opinion  merely  may 
be  seen  by  a  careful  reading  of  General  McClellan's 
instructions  to  General  Banks  of  March  16,  to  Gene 
ral  Wadsworth  of  the  same  date,  and  his  letter  of 
April  1  to  the  Adjutant-General, — all  which  appear 
in  full  in  his  Report. 

We  now  return  to  Richmond,  where  we  left  Gene 
ral  McClellan  with  the  President's  second  despatch 
fallen  like  a  stone  upon  his  heart.  It  was  already 
certain  that  General  McDowell's  movements  to  join 
him  were  suspended,  and  for  an  indefinite  period; 
and  there  was  nothing  for  him  to  do  but  to  address 
himself  to  the  work  before  him  with  such  means  as 
he  could  command,  and  doubtless  with  a  sadness 
of  spirit  like  that  of  the  Roman  gladiators  when 
they  saluted  the  emperor,  "Morituri  te  salutamus" 

The  disposition  of  our  forces  around  Richmond 
was  controlled  by  two  elements,  one  artificial  and 
one  natural, — the  former  being  the  Richmond  & 
York  River  Railroad,  and  the  latter  the  Chickaho- 
miny  River.  The  railroad  ran  in  a  direction  nearly 
easterly  from  Richmond  to  White  House,  at  which 
latter  place  was  our  depot  of  supplies.  It  is  diffi 
cult  for  a  civilian  to  form  an  adequate  notion  of 


AGE  35.]  CHICK  A  HOMINY    R  I  V  E  E.  217 

the  immense  amount  of  these  supplies  which  must 
be  furnished  every  day  for  the  support  of  an  army 
of  seventy  thousand  men,  including  forage  for 
horses,  cavalry  and  artillery.  The  communication 
between  such  an  army  and  its  base  of  supplies  cannot 
be  for  a  moment  interrupted  or  even  endangered. 
It  was  therefore  a  point  of  paramount  importance 
to  guard  this  railroad  from  ilank  movements  on 
both  sides.  The  Chickahominy  River  flows  in  a 
southeasterly  direction,  and  is  crossed  both  by  the 
Richmond  &  York  River  Railroad  and  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railroad,  which  runs  northerly, — the 
river  and  the  portions  of  the  two  railroads  south 
of  it  forming  an  isosceles  triangle,  with  the  apex 
towards  the  cast.  Place  the  right  hand  on  a  table 
with  the  palm  down,  the  fingers  close  together, 
and  the  thumb  stretched  back  as  far  as  possible ; 
let  the  thumb  represent  the  course  of  the  Virginia 
Central  Road,  and  the  forefinger  that  of  the  Rich 
mond  &  York.  Richmond  will  then  be  in  the  hollow 
at  the  bottom  of  the  thumb,  and  a  line  drawn  from 
the  ball  of  the  thumb  to  the  first  joint  of  the  fore 
finger  will  indicate  the  course  of  the  Chickahominy 
In  order  to  keep  the  railroad  entirely  secure, 
the  course  of  the  river  made  it  necessary  to  divide 
our  forces  and  place  part  of  them  on  one  side  of 
the  stream  and  part  on  the  other.  This  is  not 
usually  deemed  a  prudent  disposition  of  an  army; 
but  there  was  an  imperative  necessity  for  it  in 
this  case.  Besides,  General  McClellan  had  been 
directed  to  extend  his  right  wing  so  as  to  form  a 
junction  with  General  McDowell;  and  the  order  for 

19 


218    DESPATCHES    FROM    THE    PRESIDENT.  [1862. 

his  co-operation  being  simply  suspended,  not  re 
voked,  General  McClellan  was  not  at  liberty  to 
abandon  the  northern  approach. 

On  the  25th  of  May  he  received  a  telegraphic  de 
spatch  from  the  President,  at  considerable  length, 
detailing  the  enemy's  movements  as  far  as  they  were 
known  up  to  its  date,  stating  that  twenty  thousand 
of  McDowell's  forces  were  moving  back  to  Front 
Royal,  that  one  more  of  his  brigades  was  ordered 
to  Harper's  Ferry  through  Washington,  and  that 
the  rest  of  his  forces  were  to  remain  for  the  pre 
sent  at  Fredericksburg,  adding  that  if  McDowell's 
force  was  beyond  their  reach  they  (in  Washington) 
should  be  entirely  helpless.  At  a  later  hour  on  the 
same  day,  the  President  sent  him  another  despatch, 
indicating  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  Washing 
ton,  saying,  "I  think  the  time  is  near  when  you 
must  either  attack  Richmond  or  give  up  the  job 
and  come  to  the  defence  of  Washington/'* 

*  Upon  the  President's  first  despatch  of  May  25,  in  which 
he  says  that  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  Washington,  and 
nothing  else,  prevented  McDowell's  being  sent  to  the  Penin 
sula,  Colonel  Lecomte  remarks,  "We  have  full  faith  in  the 
sincerity  of  the  frank  and  honest  language  of  the  President; 
but  the  Report"  (that  of  the  Congressional  Committee,  which 
quotes  a  part  of  the  President's  despatch)  "perverts  entirely 
the  facts  relative  to  Jackson's  campaign,  and  the  insane  terror 
it  inspired  in  Washington,  which  was  the  true  cause  of  the 
failure  on  the  Peninsula.  On  quitting  Washington,  before 
having  been  deprived  of  a  part  of  his  command,  General  Mc 
Clellan  had  given  the  most  exact  and  judicious  instructions  for 
the  defence  of  the  capital.  He  had  pointed  out  Manassas  and 
Front  Royal  as  points  forming  a  good  advanced  line,  and  had 


AGK  35.]     MOVEMENTS     NEAR    RICHMOND.  219 

On  the  26th  of  May,  news  came  that  a  consider 
able  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  the  neighborhood 


ordered  Banks  to  intrench  himself  there.  He  had  distinctly 
forbidden  him  to  advance  farther  into  Virginia.  But  as  soon 
as  General  McClellan's  back  was  turned,  they  wished  to  make 
Banks  a  rival  of  him,  and,  supposing  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  would  attract  all  the  force  of  the  enemy,  it  was 
thought  that  Banks  might  gather  some  cheap  laurels  if  he 
were  sent  into  the  upper  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  The  Aulic 
Council  at  Washington  thought  they  might  in  this  way  strike  a 
master-stroke,  and  cause  Richmond  to  fall  before  McClellau 
had  time  to  appear  before  it.  If  the  Confederates  had  not  been 
in  so  much  hurry,  if  they  had  let  Banks  advance  farther, 
this  brave  general  would  have  run  great  risk  of  being  captured 
with  all  his  force.  Banks  having  miraculously  escaped,  it  was 
enough  to  hold  Harper's  Ferry  strongly  on  one  side,  and  Centre- 
ville  on  the  other,  to  cover  Washington.  Jackson  might  have 
moved  between  Warrenton  Junction  and  Winchester;  he  might 
have  pushed  cavalry  detachments  into  Western  Maryland;  but 
he  could  have  attempted  no  serious  enterprise. 

"Instead  of  this,  it  was  thought  that  a  good  trick  might  be 
played  upon  Jackson,  and  that  he  might  be  'bagged,'  to  use 
an  American  expression.  To  form  a  notion  of  this  plan  of 
the  campaign,  manufactured  at  Washington,  and  the  confu 
sion  which  attended  its  execution,  one  should  read  the  series  of 
telegrams  by  which  the  President  informs  General  McClellan  of 
the  progress  of  this  wise  manoeuvre.  Generals  McDowell,  Banks, 
Sigel,  and  Fremont,  each  coming  from  his  own  position,  and 
all  preserving  their  independent  commands,  arrived  one  after 
another,  to  be  beaten  in  detail,  or  to  let  Jackson  escape  before 
their  eyes  without  a  fight.  But  the  most  unfortunate  result 
was  that  the  corps  of  McDowell,  divided,  weakened  by  forced 
marches,  and  transported  to  another  theatre  of  war,  could  not 
take  the  part  which  had  been  assigned  to  it.  For  the  second 
time,  and  definitively,  it  was  detained  far  from  the  army  of 


220  HANOVER    COURT-HOUSE.  [1862. 

of  Hanover  Court-House,  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
our  army,  and  thus  threatening  our'  communica 
tions;  and  General  Fitz-John  Porter's  division  was 
ordered  to  march  the  next  morning  at  daybreak 
to  dislodge  them.  They  set  off  in  a  heavy  storm, 
came  up  with  the  enemy  in  the  course  of  the  day, 
attacked  and  defeated  him,  and  took  and  destroyed 
his  camp  at  Hanover  Court-House.  The  bridges 
of  the  Virginia  Central  Eailroad  and  the  Frede- 

General  McClellan,  to  -which  for  the  second  time  it  thus  caused 
great  mischief,  as  a  few  brief  explanations  will  show. 

"After  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  and  the  taking  of 
Norfolk  by  the  Federals,  which  opened  the  James  River,  Com 
modore  Goldsborough  had  proposed  to  General  McClellan  to  take 
the  James  River  as  a  base  of  operations  and  have  it  flank  his  left 
wing.  This  change  of  base,  had  it  then  been  carried  out,  would 
have  made  the  attack  upon  Richmond  easier,  through  the  aid  of 
the  gunboats.  General  McClellan  abandoned  this  obvious  ad 
vantage,  because  he  had  been  ordered  to  extend  his  right  wing 
towards  McDowell,  who  was  coming  from  Fredericksburg  to 
reinforce  the  army  of  the  Peninsula  as  soon  as  it  had  reached 
Richmond.  General  McClellan  expected  General  McDowell 
by  the  railroad  from  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond,  and  had 
already  sent  troops  in  that  direction  to  effect  a  junction, — 
when,  instead  of  this  reinforcement,  he  received  a  telegraphic 
order  to  burn  the  railroad-bridges  over  the  branches  of  the 
Pamuukey,  and  thus  to  render  all  communication  with  Mc 
Dowell  impossible,  the  latter's  outposts  having  been  at  that 
time  but  twenty-one  miles  distant  from  those  of  McClellan. 
But  this  was  the  period  of  Banks's  defeat ;  and  such  was  the 
terror  at  Washington  that  they  thought  the  whole  Confederate 
army  was  marching  to  the  North  and  that  the  capital  was  to 
be  saved  by  destroying  the  bridges.  The  alarm  was  so  great 
that  it  was  even  proposed  to  General  McClellan  to  re-enibark 
his  army  and  bring  it  within  the  lines  of  Alexandria." 


AGE  35.]    GENERAL    F.  PORTER'S    MOVEMENT.    221 

ricksburg  &  Richmond  Railroad,  both  over  the 
South  Ann,  were  destroyed,  as  well  as  a  consider 
able  amount  of  Confederate  property  at  Hanover 
Court-House  and  Ashland.  General  McClellan  was 
much  gratified  at  the  way  in  which  this  brilliant 
movement  wTas  executed  by  General  Porter,  and  he 
deemed  its  results  valuable,  because  it  was  thus  ren 
dered  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  communicate  by 
rail  with  Fredericksburg,  or  with  Jackson  except  by 
the  very  circuitous  route  of  Lynchburg.  More  im 
portant  still,  by  the  clearing  of  our  right  flank  and 
rear,  the  road  was  left  entirely  open  for  the  advance 
of  McDowell,  had  he  been  permitted  to  join  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  His  advanced  guard  was 
at  this  time  at  Bowling  Green,  only  about  fifteen  or 
twenty  miles  distant  from  that  of  Porter:  so  near 
did  we  come  to  seizing  the  golden  opportunity 
which  Fortune  never  offers  a  second  time !  Mc 
Dowell's  withdrawal  towards  Front  Royal  was;  as 
General  McClellan  observes  in  his  Report,  "a  se 
rious  and  fatal  error/'  He  was  sent  to  a  point 
wThere  he  could  do  no  good,  and  diverted  from  a 
point  where  his  presence  was  greatly  needed  and 
could  not  have  failed  to  secure  important  results. 

As  our  army  w^as  massed  on  both  sides  of  the 
Chickahomiriy,  it  was  necessary  to  maintain  easy 
communication  between  them;  and  this  compelled 
the  building  of  several  bridges,  some  of  which 
were  newr,  and  others  w^ere  reconstructions  of  those 
which  the  enemy  had  destroyed.  Our  troops  were 
very  efficient  in  work  of  this  kind,  but  they  had 
great  difficulties  to  struggle  against.  The  Chicka- 

19* 


222  KAINY    WEATHER.  [1862. 

hominy  in  this  region  is  a  narrow  and  shallow 
stream,  fringed  with  a  dense  growth  of  heavy 
forest-trees,  and  bordered  hy  low  marshy  bottom 
lands,  varying  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile  in  width. 
A  heavy  rain  would  swell  the  narrow  rivulet  into 
a  broad  and  shallow  flood,  and  the  work  of  days 
would  be  swept  away  in  a  single  night.  When 
the  waters  were  low,  a  child  might  ford  it;  when 
they  were  high,  a  horse  and  his  rider  might  be 
drowned  in  it.  The  labors  of  our  engineers  were 

"Quench'd  in  a  boggy  syrtis,  neither  sea 
Nor  good  dry  land." 

The  elements,  too,  seemed  to  have  conspired 
against  us.  So  rainy  a  season  had  never  been 
known  within  the  memory  of  man:  the  pitiless 
floods  fell  upon  us  without  intermission.  The  petu 
lant  and  rebel  stream  seemed  to  take  a  perverse 
pleasure  in  breaking  the  fetters  with  which  patriot 
hands  essayed  to  bind  it.  And  then  these  rains 
turned  the  wretched  narrow  roads  of  the  Peninsula 
into  tracks  of  impassable  and  heart-breaking  mire, 
in  which  horses  sank  to  their  knees  and  wagons 
stuck  hopelessly  fast.* 

*  "Unfortunately,  every  thing  dragged  with  us.  The  roads 
were  long  in  drying,  the  bridges  were  long  in  building.  'Never 
have  we  seen  so  rainy  a  season,'  said  the  oldest  inhabitant. 
'Never  did  we  see  bridges  so  difficult  to  build,'  said  the  en 
gineers.  The  abominable  river  laughed  at  all  their  efforts. 
Too  narrow  for  a  bridge  of  boats,  too  deep  and  too  muddy  for 
piers,  here  a  simple  brook  some  ten  yards  wide,  flowing  be 
tween  two  plains  of  quicksand,  in  which  the  horses  sank  up  to 
the  girths,  and  which  offered  no  bearings, — there  divided  into  a 


AGE  35.]  BATTLE     OF     FAIR     OAKS.  223 

During  all  this  time  our  troops  were  busily  em 
ployed,  besides  building  bridges,  in  intrenching 
themselves,  throwing  up  redoubts,  digging  rifle- 
pits,  and  felling  timber  in  the  line  of  the  batteries. 


THE    BATTLE    OF    FAIR    OAKS. 

On  the  30th  of  May,  two  corps  were  on  the  south 
Bide  of  the  Chickahominy, — that  of  Kcyes,  com 
prising  the  divisions  of  Couch  and  Casey,  and  Ileint- 
zelman's,  comprising  those  of  Hooker  and  Kearney. 
Casey's  division,  numbering  about  five  thousand, 
was  at  Fair  Oaks,  a  station  on  the  York  River 
Railroad.  A  redoubt  and  rifle-pit  had  been  con 
structed,  and  there  was  also  an  abatis  in  front 
of  them.  Couch's  division,  about  eight  thousand 
strong,  was  at  Seven  Pines,  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  in  the  rear;  while  the  two  divisions  of  Ilcint- 
zelman's  corps,  in  all  about  sixteen  thousand,  were 
still  farther  back.  The  right  flank  of  Kearney  was 
on  the  railroad,  and  the  left  of  Hooker  on  White 
Oak  Swamp. 

During  the  day  and  night  of  May  30,  there  had 
been  a  violent  storm,  with  heavy  torrents  of  rain. 

thousand  tiny  rivulets  spread  over  a  surface  of  three  hundred 
yards,  and  traversing  one  of  those  wooded  morasses  which  are 
peculiar  to  tropical  countries, — changing  its  level  and  its  bed 
from  day  to  day,  the  river,  in  its  capricious  and  uncertain 
sway,  annulled  and  undid  to-day  the  labors  of  yesterday, 
carried  on  under  a  burning  sun  and  often  under  the  fire  of  the 
enemy.  And  so  went  by  days  upon  days, — precious,  irrecover 
able  days." — PRINCE  DE  JOINVILLE. 


224  BATTLE    OF    FAIR    OAKS.  [1862. 

The  Confederates,  presuming  that  a  rapid  rise  in 
the  river  would  follow,  resolved  to  seize  the  oppor 
tunity,  throw  their  whole  force  upon  our  left  wing, 
south  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  cut  it  to  pieces 
before  aid  could  come  from  the  other  side.  They 
supposed  that  they  should  have  to  deal  with  no  other 
troops  than  those  of  Keyes,  not  being  aware  of  the 
presence  of  Heintzelman's  corps.  Their  disposi 
tions  were  skilfully  made.  Longstreet  and  Hill, 
with  thirty-two  thousand  men,  were  to  advance 
along  the  \Yilliamsburg  road;  Huger,  with  sixteen 
thousand,  was  to  move  down  the  Charles  City  road, 
which  runs  southeast  from  Richmond,  to  attack 
our  left  flank;  and  Smith,  with  the  same  number, 
was  to  inarch  north,  along  the  ^ine-Mile  road,  so 
as  to  turn  our  right  flank  and  cover  the  Confede 
rate  left.  Had  these  plans  all  been  successfully 
executed,  we  could  hardly  have  escaped  an  over 
whelming  defeat. 

The  columns  started  at  daybreak  on  the  31st, 
and  Hill,  Longstreet,  and  Smith  were  in  position  to 
begin  the  attack  at  eight  o'clock;  but  Huger  did 
not  appear  at  the  appointed  time  and  place.  Hour 
after  hour  rolled  away,  and  brought  no  tidings  of 
him :  his  artillery  had  been  immovably  fixed  in  the 
mud,  and  the  passage  of  his  troops  arrested.  At 
noon,  Hill  and  Longstreet  resolved  to  make  the 
attack  without  waiting  for  him.  Accordingly,  at 
about  one  o'clock  they  fell  in  overwhelming  mass 
upon  Casey's  division.  Some  of  his  troops,  thus  sud 
denly  assailed  by  greatly  superior  numbers,  broke 
and  fled  in  disorder;  but  the  larger  part  stood  their 


AGZ  35.]  BATTLE     OP    PAIR     OAKS.  225 

ground  manfully,  and  were  nobly  sustained  by  their 
officers.  But  it  was  impossible  to  resist  the  force 
that  was  hurled  against  them.  Slowly,  inch  by 
inch,  they  gave  way;  and  it  was  not  until  after 
three  o'clock  that  they  fell  back  through  Couch's 
line  of  battle  to  the  rear,  too  much  exhausted,  and 
their  ranks  too  much  thinned,  to  take  further  part 
in  the  contest  as  a  body. 

At  four  o'clock  we  had  lost  nearly  a  mile  of 
ground,  fifteen  of  our  guns  had  been  captured,  and 
the  enemy  were  in  possession  of  Casey's  camp. 
Couch's  division  was  now  assailed.  His  troops 
stood  firm,  and  the  repeated  assaults  of  the  enemy 
were  steadily  met, — our  left  being  protected  by  tho 
impenetrable  morasses  of  the  White  Oak  Swamp. 
Two  of  Heintzelman's  brigades  appeared  on  the  field, 
with  the  gallant  Kearney  at  their  head.  The  move 
ments  of  the  troops  were  now  directed  by  General 
McClellan  in  person.  But  a  new  element  of  danger 
intervened.  General  Couch  discovered  large  masses 
of  the  enemy  pushing  towards  our  right  and  cross 
ing  the  railroad,  as  well  as  a  heavy  column  which 
had  been  held  in  reserve  and  was  now  making  its 
way  towards  Fair  Oaks  Station.  This  was  part  of 
Smith's  division,  which  had  come  by  the  Nine-Mile 
road  to  attack  our  right  flank.  General  Couch  at 
once  engaged  this  column  with  four  regiments;  but 
he  was  overpowered,  and  the  enemy  pushed  be 
tween  him  and  the  main  body  of  his  division.  Our 
position  was  now  critical;  for,  if  the  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  getting  in  our  rear,  we  must  have  been. 


226  BATTLE    OF    FAIROAKS. 


[1862. 


defeated  with  great  loss.     "But,"  says  the  Prince 
de  Joinville, — 

"But  exactly  at  this  moment  (six  o'clock  P.M.),  new 
actors  come  upon  the  stage.  Sumner,  who  has  at  last 
passed  the  river  with  Sedgwick's  division  on  the  bridge 
built  by  his  troops,  and  who,  with  a  soldier's  instinct,  has 
marched  straight  to  the  cannon  through  the  woods,  sud 
denly  appears  upon  the  flank  of  the  hostile  column 
which  is  trying  to  cut  off  Heintzelman  and  Keyes.  He 
plants  in  a  clearing  a  battery  which  he  has  succeeded  in 
bringing  up.  His  guns  are  not  rifled  guns,  the  rage  of 
the  hour,  and  fit  only  to  be  fired  in  cool  blood,  and  at 
long  range  in  an  open  country :  they  are  real  fighting 
guns,  old  twelve-pound  howitzers  carrying  either  a  round 
projectile,  which  ricochets  and  rolls,  or  a  good  dose  of 
grape.  The  simple  and  rapid  fire  of  these  pieces  makes 
terrible  havoc  in  the  hostile  ranks.  In  vain  Johnston 
sends  up  his  best  troops  against  this  battery,  the  flower 
of  South  Carolina,  including  the  Hampton  Legion ;  in 
vain  does  he  come  upon  the  field  in  person:  nothing 
can  shake  the  Federal  ranks.  When  night  falls,  it  was 
the  Federals  who,  bayonet  in  hand,  and  gallantly  led  by 
Sumner  himself,  charged  furiously  upon  the  foe,  and 
drove  him  before  them,  with  fearful  slaughter,  as  far  as 
Fair  Oaks  Station." 

Orders  had  been  sent  from  head-quarters  to  Gene 
ral  Sumner,  at  two  o'clock,  to  move  his  division 
across  the  river.  Two  bridges  had  been  built  by 
his  men,  one  opposite  General  Sedgwick's  division, 
and  one  opposite  General  Richardson's, — both  cor 
duroy  bridges.  But  the  latter  was  already  destroyed 
by  the  flood,  and  the  former  much  injured.  The 
roads,  too,  were  deep  and  muddy;  and  it  was  not 


AGE  35.]  BATTLE     OF    FAIR    OAKS.  227 

until  six  o'clock,  and  after  great  exertions,  that 
General  Sedgwick's  division,  with  a  single  battery 
(Kirby's),  was  able  to  reach  the  field  and  exert  a 
favorable  influence  upon  "the  fortunes  of  the  day. 

The  opportune  arrival  of  General  Sumner  was 
not  our  only  piece  of  good  fortune;  for  about  sun 
set  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief,  General  J. 
E.  Johnston,  who  had  accompanied  Smith's  corps 
and  directed  the  enemy's  movements  since  four  or 
five  o'clock,  was  struck  from  his  horse,  severely 
wounded,  by  the  fragment  of  a  shell.  In  conse 
quence  of  this,  utter  confusion  prevailed  for  a  time 
upon  the  Confederate  left. 

The  next  morning,  at  an  early  hour,  the  battle 
was  renewed,  the  enemy  making  an  attack  upon 
General  Eichardson's  division,  which  had  not  taken 
part  in  the  engagement  of  the  previous  day,  and 
which  was  now  posted  in  front.  They  met  it  firmly, 
and  returned  with  effect  the  enemy's  fire,  until 
General  Howard's  brigade  was  ordered  to  the  front, 
when  the  enemy's  line  fell  back.  Other  attacks,  in 
other  parts  of  the  field,  were  repulsed;  and  finally 
our  line  advanced  with  the  bayonet,  and  the  enemy 
retreated,  having  gained  about  half  a  mile  of 
ground  in  two  days'  fighting. 

In  these  severely  contested  battles  our  loss  was 
five  thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-seven,  and 
that  of  the  enemy  six  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
eighty-three :  we  also  lost  ten  pieces  of  artillery.* 

*  At  the  time  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  began,  General  Mc- 
Clellan  was  confined  to  his  bed  by  illness.  This  fact  does  not 


228  BATTLE     OF     FAIR    OAKS.  [1862. 

The  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  or  Seven  Pines,  as  the 
Confederates  call  it,  has  some  points  of  resemblance 
to  that  of  Waterloo,  and,  like  that,  shows  how  much 
military  movements  are  controlled  by  fortune  or 
accident.  At  Waterloo,  Bonaparte's  attack  upon 
the  British  lines  was  delayed  some  hours  by  the 
rain,  and  consequent  state  of  the  roads.  At  Fair 
Oaks,  the  muddy  roads  held  fast  Huger's  division, 
and  caused  the  assault  to  be  postponed  four  or  five 


appear  in  his  Report,  but  is  stated  by  him  in  his  evidence  be 
fore  the  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 
But  that  committee  say  in  their  Report  (p.  22),  speaking  of  the 
second  day's  fight,  "General  McClellan  was  with  the  main 
part  of  the  army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  After 
the  fighting  was  over,  he  came  across  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
river."  This  statement  is  as  untrue  as  it  is  unjust.  General 
McClellan,  enfeebled  as  he  was  by  illness,  immediately  got  on 
horseback  when  he  heard  the  cannon  which  opened  the  battle 
of  the  31st,  was  employed  during  the  remainder  of  the  day  in 
receiving  reports  and  giving  orders,  spent  a  portion  of  the 
night  in  conferring  with  his  officers,  and  early  the  next  morning 
went  over  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  while  the  fight  of  June 
1st  was  raging.  Colonel  Lecomte  remarks  upon  the  statement 
of  the  committee,  that  it  is  "  contradicted  by  many  ocular  wit 
nesses,  and,  among  others,  by  one  of  his  aides  who  was  with 
him  the  whole  day.  General  McClellan,  says  this  officer, 
though  severely  ill  with  dysenterj^,  had  passed  the  greater 
part  of  the  night  in  seeking  his  generals  and  conferring  with 
them.  About  half-past  seven  in  the  morning  he  left  the  head 
quarters  of  General  Sumner,  and  between  eight  and  nine  ar 
rived  at  the  place  where  the  latter  was  engaged.  The  fight 
was  then  at  its  height:  we  were  in  a  clearing,  and  were 
fighting  along  the  edge  of  a  wood,  two  hundred  metres"  (about 
six  hundred  and  fifty  feet)  "from  the  spot  where  the  general 
himself  (Sumner)  was  directing  the  battle." 


AGE  35.]  BATTLE     OF     FAIR     OAKS.  229 

hours,  linger  took  no  part  in  the  battle,  contrary 
to  the  plans  which  had  been  agreed  upon :  Grouchy 
did  not  appear  at  Waterloo,  as  was  expected.  Sum- 
ner's  arrival  upon  the  field  at  six  is  paralleled  by 
that  of  Bliicher  at  Waterloo  at  about  the  same  hour. 
So  much  for  the  points  of  resemblance  between 
the  two  battles;  but  in  other  respects  that  of  Fair 
Oaks  illustrates  the  power  of  fortune  over  war. 
Had  linger' s  corps  attacked  us  on  the  left  flank  at 
the  same  time  that  Hill  and  Longstreet  did  in  front, 
we  could  hardly  have  escaped  destruction.  Thus 
the  rain  which  swelled  the  stream  and  occasioned 
the  attack  also  prevented  it  from  being  successful, 
by  making  impassable  the  road  over  which  linger 
was  directed  to  move.  We  had  also  another  piece 
of  good  fortune.  Smith's  corps,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  was  moved  along  the  Nine-Mile  road,  to  bo 
ready  to  be  employed  against  our  right  flank.  Gene 
ral  Johnston,  the  commander-in-chief,  was  with  this 
corps,  and,  of  course,  directed  its  movements.  He 
says  in  his  official  report  that  he  accompanied  this 
corps,  so  that  he  might  be  on  a  part  of  the  field  where 
he  could  observe  and  be  ready  to  meet  any  counter- 
movement  which  might  be  made  against  his  centre 
or  left,  and  then  adds,  "Owing  to  some  peculiar 
condition  of  the  atmosphere,  the  sound  of  the  mus 
ketry  did  not  reach  us.  I  consequently  deferred 
giving  the  signal  for  General  Smith's  advance  till 
four  o'clock."  Thus  the  advance  of  Smith's  corps 
was  delayed  two  hours;  and  precious  hours  they 
were  to  us,  because  they  enabled  Sumner  to  get  to 
the  field  and  save  us  from  being  cut  to  pieces. 
20 


230  BATTLE     OF     FAIR    OAKS.  [1862. 

General  Summer  had  crossed  the  river  by  the 
upper  of  the  two  bridges  which  he  had  built,  called 
the  Grape-vine  bridge;  the  lower,  called  the  Sun- 
clerland  bridge,  having  been  carried  awa}r.  But 
before  the  next  morning  the  Grape-vine  bridge 
was  also  carried  away  by  the  rising  flood.  "  This 
bridge,"  sa}"S  the  Prince  de  Joinville,  "saved  that 
day  the  whole  Federal  army  from  destruction." 

Such  are  the  momentous  consequences  in  war 
which  flow  from  causes  so  seemingly  trivial  as  the 
state  of  the  atmosphere,  the  rising  or  falling  of  a 
petty  stream,  a  sudden  tempest  of  rain,  or  the 
condition  of  a  road  over  which  artillery  must  be 
moved.  These  things  should  teach  civilian  critics 
a  wise  self-distrust,  and  a  tenderness  of  judgment 
towards  generals  who  have  had  the  misfortune  not 
to  succeed  in  winning  a  battle  or  taking  a  fortress. 

General  McClellan  has  been  blamed  for  not 
having  followed  up  the  enemy  after  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks,  and,  among  others,  by  General  Barnard, 
who  says,  in  his  Eeport,  "The  repulse  of  the  rebels 
at  Fair  Oaks  should  have  been  taken  advantage  of. 
It  was  one  of  those  '  occasions'  which,  if  not  seized, 
do  not  repeat  themselves.  We  now  know  the  state 
of  disorganization  and  dismay  in  which  the  rebel 
army  retreated.  We  now  know  it  could  have 
been  followed  into  Bichmond."  The  italics  are 
General  Barnard's  own.  Without  repeating  the  ob 
vious  remark  that  General  McClellan  should  be 
judged  by  what  was  known  then,  and  not  by  what 
wre  know  now,  it  may  be  stated  that  there  is  nothing 
to  justify  the  assertion  that  the  rebel  army  retreated 


AGE  35.]  BATTLE     OF    FAIR    OAKS.  231 

in  " disorganization"  and  "dismay,"  and  that  when 
General  Barnard  says,  "  we  know  it  could  have  been 
followed  into  Richmond,"  he  claims  the  authority 
of  omniscience.  The  reasons  why  the  enemy  were 
not  pursued  are  amply  and  satisfactorily  stated  in 
General  McClellan's  Report.  The  Grape-vine  and 
Sunderland  bridges  had  been  carried  away.  The  ap 
proaches  to  New  and  Mechanicsville  bridges,  higher 
up  the  stream,  were  overflowed;  and  both  of  them 
were  enfiladed  by  batteries  of  the  enemy.  To  have 
advanced  upon  Richmond,  the  troops  must  have  been 
marched  from  various  points  on  the  left  banks  of 
the  Chickahominy  to  Bottom's  Bridge,  and  over 
the  Williamsburg  road  to  Fair  Oaks,  upwards  of 
twenty  miles, — a  march  which,  as  the  roads  then 
were,  could  not  have  been  made  in  less  than  two 
days.  "  In  short,"  as  General  McClellan  says, — 

"  The  idea  of  uniting  the  two  wings  of  the  army  in  timo 
to  make  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  with  the  pros 
pect  of  overtaking  him  before  he  reached  Richmond,  only 
five  miles  distant  from  the  field  of  battle,  is  simply  absurd, 
and  was,  I  presume,  never  for  a  moment  seriously  enter 
tained  by  any  one  connected  with  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac."* 

*  General  Barnard,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  says,  "By  the  rise  of  the  Chicka 
hominy  the  two  bridges  built  by  General  Sumner  became  im 
practicable  by  (he  night  of  the  31st.  The  bridges  at  Bottom's 
Bridge  with  difficulty  were  preserved  from  destruction;  but  the 
rising  water  overflowed  the  adjacent  road,  and  soon  these 
bridges  became  useless  for  wagons  or  horses.  Fortunately,  the 
railroad  bridge  had  been  repaired;  arid  by  this  alone  the  left 


232  INTRENCH  MENTS     THROWN     UP.          [1862. 


CHAPTEE  YIII. 

FOR  about  three  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Fair 
Oaks  nothing  of  moment  took  place.  By  the  2d 
of  June  our  left  was  advanced  considerably  beyond 
the  lines  it  had  occupied  before  the  battle.  The 
position  at  Fair  Oaks  was  strengthened  by  a  line 
of  intrenchments  which  protected  the  troops  while 
they  were  at  work  upon  the  bridges,  gave  security 
to  the  trains,  liberated  a  large  fighting-force,  and 
afforded  a  safer  retreat  in  case  of  disaster.  To  form 
these  intrenchments  was  hard  work :  redoubts  and 
embankments  had  to  be  raised,  rifle-pits  to  be  dug, 
and  trees  in  great  numbers  to  be  cut  down;  and 
all  this  under  the  burning  sun  of  a  Virginia  June. 
General  McClellan  was  anxious  to  assume  the  of 
fensive  ;  it  was  his  policy  to  do  so,  as  the  enemy 
were  gaining  and  we  were  losing  by  the  mere  lapse 
of  time.  But  no  general  battle  could  be  risked 
until  the  two  wings  of  the  army  were  put  in  full 

wing  of  the  army  was  supplied.  By  means  of  planks  laid 
between  the  rails,  infantry,  and,  with  some  risk,  horses,  could 
pass.  This,  for  several  days,  was  the  only  communication  be 
tween  the  two  wings  of  the  army." — Report  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  vol.  i.  p.  401. 

The  case  in  defence  of  General  McClellan  can  hardly  be 
more  strongly  put  than  by  this  statement;  but  how  is  it  to 
be  reconciled  with  General  Barnard's  subsequently-expressed 


AGE  35.]  HEAVY    RAINS.  233 

communication  with  each  other,  and  that,  too,  by 
bridges  strong  enough  to  stand  a  flood  and  long 
enough  to  stretch  across  the  whole  bottom-land  of 
the  river.  These  necessary  works  were  delayed, 
and  the  labors  and  exposures  of  the  men  greatly 
increased,  by  the  incessant  rains.  General  McClel- 
lan's  communications  to  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  show  how  he  was  tried  and  baffled  by  the 
obstinately  bad  weather.  On  the  4th  of  June  he 
telegraphs  to  the  President,  "  Terrible  rain-storm 
during  the  night  and  morning;  not  yet  cleared  off. 
Chickahominy  flooded,  bridges  in  bad  condition;" 
and  on  the  next  day  he  says  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  "  Rained  most  of  the  night;  has  now  ceased, 
but  it  is  not  clear.  The  river  still  very  high  and 
troublesome."  On  the  7th  he  tells  the  Secretary, — 

"The  whole  face  of  the  country  is  a  perfect  bog,  en 
tirely  impassable  for  artillery,  or  even  cavalry,  except 
directly  in  the  narrow  roads,  which  renders  any  general 
movement,  either  of  this  or  the  rebel  army,  utterly  out 
of  the  question  until  we  have  more  favorable  weather/' 

Three  days  after,  in  another  despatch  to  the 
Secretary,  he  says, — 

"  I  am  completely  checked  by  the  weather.  The  roads 
and  fields  are  literally  impassable  for  artillery, — almost  so 
for  infantry.  The  Chickahominy  is  in  a  dreadful  state : 
we  have  another  rain-storm  on  our  hands. 

"  I  shall  attack  as  soon  as  the  weather  and  ground  will 
permit ;  but  there  will  be  a  delay,  the  extent  of  which 
no  one  can  foresee,  for  the  season  is  altogether  abnormal." 

The  heat  of  the  weather,  the  poisonous  miasma 

20* 


234  ACTIVITY     OF     THE    ENEMY.  [1862. 

which  the  sun  drew  up  from  the  saturated  soil,  and 
the  heavy  toils  of  the  men,  began  to  tell  sadly  upon 
the  general  health  of  the  army.  And  the  vigilant 
and  active  enemy  allowed  us  no  repose.  Little 
skirmishes  and  affairs  of  outposts  were  constantly 
occurring;  showers  of  shells  would  sometimes  sud 
denly  fall  upon  the  tents;  and  no  one  could  say 
whether  these  demonstrations  were  not  the  preludes 
to  serious  attacks.  Our  men  were  obliged  to  work 
at  the  intrenchments  and  upon  the  bridges  as  the 
Jews  builded  on  the  w^alls  of  Jerusalem  :  "  They 
which  builded  on  the  wall,  and  they  that  bare  bur 
dens,  with  those  that  laded,  every  one  with  one  of 
his  hands  wrought  in  the  work,  and  with  the  other 
hand  held  a  weapon.  For  the  builders,  every  one 
had  his  sword  girded  by  his  side,  and  so  builded."* 
General  McClellan  saw  with  nothing  less  than 
anguish  of  mind  the  golden  moments  of  opportu 
nity  slipping  away  from  him  unimproved,  and  his 
noble  army  slowly  wasting  by  disease  and  expo 
sure.  From  trustworthy  sources  of  information, 
he  had  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  were 
receiving  large  accessions  to  their  strength ;  and 
in  the  north,  like  an  ominous  cloud,  loomed  up  the 
corps  of  the  indefatigable  Jackson,  about  which 
frequent  rumors  began  to  fly  through  the  air. 
General  McClellan  knew  his  old  classmate  well 
enough  to  know  that  he  was  not  a  man  to  lose  any 
time,  and  that,  sooner  or  later,  he  would  be  a  for 
midable  element  of  danger  on  our  right  flank.  His 

*  Nehemiah  iv.  17,  18. 


AGE  35.]    GENERAL     MCDOWELL    EXPECTED.       235 

communications  to  the  Government  at  Washington 
are  full  of  earnest,  almost  passionate,  entreaties  for 
reinforcements,  and  in  them  he  restates  the  reasons 
why  he  deems  it  important  that  his  hands  should 
be  strengthened.  He  suggests  that  portions  of  the 
army  of  General  Halleck,  then  in  the  Southwest, 
might  be  detached  for  this  purpose.  The  replies 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  are  friendly  and  encou 
raging  in  tone.  On  the  llth  of  June  he  tells  General 
McClellan  that  McCall's  force,  forming  part  of  Mc 
Dowell's  corps,  was  on  its  way,  and  that  it  was  in 
tended  to  send  the  rest  of  McDowell's  corps  to  him 
as  speedily  as  possible.  General  McCall's  division, 
numbering  about  eleven  thousand  men,  arrived  oil 
the  12th  and  13th;  but  these  were  the  only  rein 
forcements  that  General  McClellan  received  till 
after  the  retreat  to  Harrison's  Landing. 

General  McDowell  was  at  this  time  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock,  with  about  forty  thousand  men,  in 
cluding  McCall's  division.  He  expected  to  join  Gene 
ral  McClellan,  and  was  most  desirous  of  doing  so; 
for  on  the  10th  of  June  he  wrote  to  the  latter,  say 
ing,  "  For  the  third  time  I  am  ordered  to  join  you, 
and  hope  this  time  to  get  through.  *  *  *  *  I 
wish  to  say  I  go  with  the  greatest  satisfaction,  and 
hope  to  arrive  with  my  main  body  in  time  to  be  of 
service.  McCall  goes  in  advance,  by  water.  I  will 
be  with  you  in  ten  days  with  the  remainder,  by 
Fredericksburg."  On  the  12th  he  wrote  again  to 
General  McClellan,  telling  him  that  he  shall  not  be 
with  him  on  so  early  a  day  as  he  had  previously 
announced,  but  still  expecting  to  join  him.  It 


236        GENERAL     STUART'S     EXPEDITION.     [1862. 

would  have  been  an  easy  four  days'  march  for  Mc 
Dowell's  corps  to  have  made  the  desired  junction 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  but  the  junction 
never  was  made,  and  on  the  27th  of  June  the  corps 
of  McDowell,  Fremont,  and  Banks  were  consoli 
dated  into  one  body,  called  the  Army  of  Virginia,  and 
put  under  the  command  of  General  Pope !  Whether 
this  disposition  of  McDowell's  force  was  in  conse 
quence  of  a  real  and  sudden  change  of  opinion  in 
the  councils  of  the  War  Department,  or  whether 
there  was  never  a  settled  purpose  that  he  should 
go  to  Richmond,  and  General  McClellan  was  only 
amused  with  hopes  never  meant  to  be  realized,  is  a 
matter  on  which  it  is  now  useless  to  speculate. 
There  would  be  more  of  contempt  in  the  one  case, 
and  more  of  indignation  in  the  other;  but  it  could 
make  little  difference  practically  with  General  Mc 
Clellan  whether  he  was  the  victim  of  want  of  de 
cision  or  want  of  frankness.  He  was  entitled  to 
fair  dealing,  and  the  country  was  entitled  to  con 
sistency  and  firmness.  In  the  management  of  great 
interests  like  these,  caprice  expands  to  the  dimen 
sions  of  cr,ime. 

On  the  13th  of  June  the  rebel  General  Stuart, 
with  fifteen  hundred  cavalry  and  four  pieces  of  ar 
tillery,  made  a  sudden  dash  upon  a  small  cavalry 
force  we  had  at  Hanover  Court-House,  and  over 
powered  them.  They  then  swept  on  to  Tunstall's 
Station  on  the  York  Eailroad,  made  an  attack  upon 
a  railway-train,  which  contrived  to  escape  in  spite 
of  obstructions  which  had  been  laid  upon  the  track, 
though  the  engineer  and  some  of  the  passengers 


AGE  35.]  GENERAL     STUART'S     EXPEDITION.    237 

were  killed.  A  detachment  was  sent  off  to  White 
House  to  destroy  stores,  and  the  main  body  pushed 
on  to  New  Kent  Court-House,  where  they  were 
soon  joined  by  their  friends,  and  remained  some 
hours.  At  night  they  crossed  the  Chickahominy 
and  made  their  way  into  the  Confederate  lines. 

This  must  be  admitted  to  have  been  a  dashing 
and  brilliant  expedition.  A  continuous  sweep  was 
made  clear  round  the  Federal  forces,  a  few  prisoners 
were  taken,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  valuable 
stores  was  destroyed.  The  material  losses  were 
not  much;  but  the  moral  results  were  of  conse 
quence.  It  encouraged  and  exhilarated  the  enemy; 
and,  above  all,  it  was  a  startling  revelation  to 
General  McClellan  of  the  weak  points  in  his  po 
sition,  and  of  the  danger  he  was  in  of  having  his 
communications  cut  and  his  supplies  by  rail  inter 
rupted. 

On  the  18th  of  June,  General  McClellan  had  made 
arrangements  to  have  transports,  with  supplies  of 
provisions  and  forage,  under  a  convoy  of  gunboats, 
sent  up  James  Eiver.  They  reached  Harrison's 
Landing  in  time  to  be  of  use  to  the  army  on  its 
arrival  there.  Two  considerations  had  led  him  to 
adopt  this  course.  First,  in  case  of  an  advance  on 
Richmond,  our  communications  with  the  depot  at 
the  "White  House  might  be  severed;  and,  second, 
he  had  already  begun  to  feel  that  the  increasing 
pressure  upon  his  right  might  force  him  to  make  a 
flank  movement  and  establish  a  new  base  of  opera 
tions  ron  the  James  Eiver. 

On  Wednesday,  June  25,  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 


238  ARMY     OF    THE     POTOMAC.  [1862. 

mac  was  thus  placed.  The  several  corps  of  Keyes, 
Heintzelman,  Sumner,  and  Franklin,'  comprising 
eight  divisions,  were  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy.  They  were  disposed  in  a  semicir 
cular  line  of  three  miles  in  length,  stretching  from 
White  Oak  Swamp  on  the  left  to  Golding's  house 
and  the  Chickahominy  on  the  right.  The  front  of 
this  line  was  strengthened  by  six  redoubts,  mount 
ing  from  five  to  nine  guns  each,  connected  by  rifle- 
pits,  or  barricades,  which  contained  numerous  em 
placements  for  artillery.  Extensive  "  slashings  "* 
were  made  in  front,  wherever  the  woods  approached 
too  near.  Head-quarters  were  at  Dr.  Trent's  house, 
in  rear  of  the  right,  and  near  Sumner's  upper 
bridge. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  river  were  Porter's  corps, 
comprising  two  divisions,  and  McCall's  Pennsyl 
vania  Reserves.  The  troops  were  disposed  along 
a  line  extending  from  IsTew  Bridge,  on  the  left,  to 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  on  the  right.  We  had  an  ad 
vanced  post,  composed  of  a  regiment  and  a  battery, 
on  the  heights  overlooking  Mechanicsville ;  and  a 
line  of  pickets  was  stretched  along  the  river  be 
tween  the  Mechanicsville  and  Meadow  bridges. 
Four  batteries  had  been  constructed  on  the  left 
bank,  on  the  ground  occupied  by  Porter;  and  these 
batteries  mounted  six  guns  each.  They  were  in- 

*  A  ''slashing  "  is  a  kind  of  defence  made  by  cutting  down 
trees  in  front  of  a  position,  two  or  three  feet  from  the  ground, 
and  allowing  them  to  fall.  Their  branches  thus  form  a  barrier 
against  the  advances  of  infantry,  and  a  space  is  opened  for 
the  play  of  artillery. 


AGE  35.]      BRIDGES   OVER   THE   CIIICKAIIOMINY.          239 

tended  to  operate  upon  the  enemy's  positions  and 
batteries  opposite,  or  to  defend  the  bridges  which 
connected  the  two  wings  of  the  army. 

Some  of  the  bridges  built  by  our  troops  were  of 
no  use  to  us,  because  the  enemy  held  the  debouches, 
or  ground  that  commanded  the  road,  on  the  right 
bank.  AVe  could  use,  on  the  25th  of  June,  the  fol 
lowing:  Bottom's  bridge,  in  rear  of  our  left,  and 
between  five  and  six  miles  from  its  front ;  the  rail 
road  bridge  ;  Simmer's  upper  bridge ;  Woodbury's, 
Alexander's,  and  Duane's  bridges.  These  last  af 
forded  a  very  direct  communication  between  the 
two  wings  of  the  army.  As  our  operations  against 
Richmond  were  conducted  along  the  roads  leading 
to  it  from  the  east  and  northeast,  Bottom's  bridge 
was  of  little  direct  service  to  us.  Most  of  the  sup 
plies  for  the  troops  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river 
were  brought  up  by  the  railroad  and  over  the  rail 
road  bridge. 

As  it  was  now  certain  that  the  army  was  not  to 
be  strengthened  by  any  reinforcements  from  Mc 
Dowell,  General  McClellan  resolved  to  do  the  best 
he  could  with  what  he  had.  He  had  covered  the 
front  of  his  position  with  defensive  works,  to  enable 
him  to  bring  the  greatest  possible  numbers  into 
action,  and  to  secure  the  army  against  the  conse 
quences  of  unforeseen  disaster.  As  Jackson  had 
kept  McDowell  from  joining  him,  he  hoped  that 
Jackson  might  also  be  kept  from  joining  Lee. 


240  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  [1862. 

THE    SEVEN    DAYS. 

On  the  25th  of  June,  a  forward  movement  of  the 
picket-line  of  the  left  was  ordered,  preparatory  to 
a  general  and  final  advance.  The  orders  were  suc 
cessfully  carried  out,  and  about  a  mile  of  ground 
was  gained,  with  small  loss.  The  advantage  thus 
secured  was  important,  as  by  it  both  the  corps  of 
Heintzelman  and  Sumner  were  placed  in  a  better 
position  for  supporting  the  main  attack,  which  it 
was  intended  General  Franklin  should  commence 
the  following  day.  During  this  day,  June  25,  in 
formation  came  that  the  enemy  had  received  rein 
forcements  from  Beauregard's  army,  and  that  Jack 
son  was  near  Hanover  Court-House  with  a  large 
body  of  troops. 

On  the  next  day,  Thursday,  the  26th,  General 
McClellan  had  intended  to  make  a  final  attack ;  but 
he  was  anticipated  by  the  enemy,  and  assailed  on 
his  right  by  a  strong  force  which  crossed  the  Chiek- 
ahominy  at  Meadow  bridge  and  near  Mechanics- 
ville.  It  appears  that  on  the  25th  a  council  of  the 
Confederate  generals  was  held  at  Eichmond,  and 
it  was  determined  that  while  Jackson  was  moving 
upon  the  right  flank  of  the  Federal  army  a  general 
and  simultaneous  attack  should  be  made  upon  the 
whole  line.  When  the  approach  of  the  enemy  was 
discovered  on  our  right,  our  pickets  were  called  in, 
and  the  regiment  and  battery  at  Mechanicsville 
were  withdrawn.  A  strong  position  was  taken  by 
our  troops  so  as  to  resist  the  threatened  attack.  It 
extended  along  the  left  bank  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek, 


THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


ii  slender  tributary  of  the  Chickahominy,  which 
runs  nearly  north  and  south.  The  front  line  was 
composed  of  McCall's  division  :  Seymour's  brigade 
held  the  left,  and  Rcynolds's  the  right.  Meade's 
brigade  was  in  reserve.  The  left  of  the  line  was 
covered  by  the  river,  the  right  by  two  brigades  of 
Morell's  division,  deployed  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
tecting  that  flank.  The  position  had  been  carefully 
prepared,  and  was  materially  strengthened  by 
"  slashings"  and  rifle-pits.  The  creek  in  front, 
bordered  by  beautiful  catalpa-trecs  in  flower,  was 
crossed  by  only  two  roads  practicable  for  artillery. 
It  was  to  force  these  roads  that  the  enemy  made 
especial  efforts.  Their  attack  began  at  three  P.M. 
along  the  whole  line,  and  a  determined  attempt 
was  made  at  the  same  time  to  carry  the  upper 
road.  General  Reynolds  succeeded  in  resisting 
this  attempt,  and  the  enemy  fell  back  for  a  while. 
Our  troops  then  had  a  breathing-space  for  a  couple 
of  hours, — though  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and  the 
skirmishing  did  not  cease.  The  passage  of  the 
lower  road  was  then  attempted;  but  here  also  Gene 
ral  Seymour  was  successful.  The  action  ceased  as 
the  darkness  gathered,  and  the  enemy  retired  at 
nine  o'clock  from  the  front  of  a  position  which  it 
had  assailed  in  vain  and  with  very  heavy  loss. 
We  had  been  successful  at  all  points;  and  the  troops 
that  lay  that  night  in  front  of  Richmond  will  never 
forget  the  enthusiasm  that  ran  like  wildfire  through 
our  lines,  from  the  heights  of  the  upper  Chicka 
hominy  to  the  lowlands  of  White  Oak  Swamp, 
when  the  news  of  the  success  was  brought  to  them, 


242  THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


[18G2. 


and,  amid  the  ringing  cheers  of  men.  the  bands, 
long  silent  by  command,  filled  the  air  with  strains 
of  triumphant  music. 

In  the  course  of  the  26th,  the  rapid  movement 
of  events,  and  especially  the  cloud  of  advancing 
forces  on  our  right,  every  moment  growing  darker 
and  more  menacing,  determined  General  McClellan 
to  put  into  immediate  execution  that  plan  of  trans 
ferring  his  base  of  operations  to  the  James  River 
which  he  had  been  meditating  for  some  days,  and 
in  view  of  which  he  had  already  directed  large 
supplies  of  forage  and  provisions  to  be  forwarded. 
The  task  was  one  of  no  common  difficulty.  The 
distance  between  the  points  of  departure  and  des 
tination  was  about  seventeen  miles.  An  army  of 
ninety  thousand  men,  including  cavalry  and  artil 
lery,  was  to  be  marched  this  distance;  and,  what 
was  much  more  difficult,  a  boundless  procession  of 
four  thousand  wagons,  carrying  supplies,  must  go 
with  it,  a  large  siege-train  must  be  transported,  and 
a  herd  of  twenty-five  hundred  oxen  must  be  driven. 
For  the  wagons,  the  train,  and  the  cattle  there  was 
but  one  road  available  :  luckily,  it  was  in  good  con 
dition.  But  it  ran  north  and  south,  and  between 
it  and  Richmond  there  were  several  roads  going 
east  and  west,  along  which  attacks  might  be  ex 
pected  from  an  active  and  vigilant  enemy.  Gene 
ral  McClellan,  in  short,  was  attempting  one  of  the 
most  difficult  and  dangerous  enterprises  in  war, — • 
ft  flank  movement  in  the  face  of  a  superior  force. 
But  there  was  no  help  for  it :  it  must  be  done. 

Time  was  now  an  element  of  the  greatest  import- 


Ac  u  35.]  T  H  E     S  E  YEN     DAY  S.  24o 

ance.  The  design  was  to  be  kept  concealed  from 
the  enemy  till  the  latest  possible  moment,  and  every 
instant  of  the  precious  interval  was  to  be  profitably 
employed.  Orders  were  immediately  telegraphed 
to  Colonel  Ingalls,  quartermaster  at  the  White 
House,  to  run  the  cars  till  the  last  moment,  filling 
them  with  provisions  and  ammunition,  to  load 
all  his  wagons  with  subsistence  and  send  them  to 
Savage's  Station,  to  forward  as  many  supplies  as 
possihle  to  James  Elver,  and  to  destroy  the  rest. 
These  commands  were  all  obeyed,  and  so  promptly 
and  skilfully  that  nearly  every  thing  was  saved, 
and  only  a  comparatively  small  amount  of  stores 
destroyed.* 

To  begin  auspiciously  the  contemplated  move 
ment,  it  was  necessary  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  as  long  as  possible,  to 
give  time  for  the  removal  of  the  siege-guns  and 
trains.  The  night  following  the  26th  of  June  was 
a  busy  one  on  the  right  of  our  army,  and  the  work 
of  removal  went  on  till  after  sunrise;  but  shortly 
before  daylight  it  was  sufficiently  advanced  to  per 
mit  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  Beaver  Dam 
Creek.  A  new  position  was  taken,  in  an  arc  of  a 
circle,  covering  the  approaches  to  our  bridges  of 
communication.  The  first  line  was  composed  of 
the  divisions  of  Morell  and  Sykes,  the  former  on 

*  The  Prince  de  Joinville  says  that  a  complete  railway  train, 
locomotive,  tender,  and  cars,  which  had  been  left  on  the  rails, 
was  seTit,  headlong  over  the  broken  bridge  into  the  river. 
Nothing  was  left  fur  the  enemy  but  three  siege-guns;  and 
these  were  the  only  siege-guns  he  captured. 


244  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  [1862. 

the  left,  the  latter  on  the  right.  The  division  of 
McCall  was  posted  in  reserve,  and  fifteen  companies 
of  cavalry  under  General  Cooke  were  in  rear  of 
the  left.  The  battle-ground  was  a  rolling  country, 
partly  wooded  and  partly  open,  extending  from  the 
descent  to  the  Chickahominy  on  the  left,  and  curv 
ing  around,  in  rear  of  Coal  Harbor,  towards  the 
river  again.  Our  artillery  was  posted  on  the  com 
manding  ground,  and  in  the  intervals  between  the 
divisions  and  brigades ;  and  the  slope  towards  the 
river,  on  our  left,  was  also  swept  by  the  fire  of  four 
batteries,  one  of  them  of  siege-guns,  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river.  General  Stoneman's  movable 
column,  comprising  most  of  our  cavalry  and  some 
picked  troops  of  the  other  arms,  which  had  been  cut 
off  by  the  rapid  advance  of  Jackson,  fell  back  on 
"VYhite  House,  and  rendered  no  assistance  during  the 
battle. 

Our  dispositions  were  completed  about  noon  of 
Friday,  June  27,  and  shortly  after  that  hour  the 
skirmishers  of  the  enemy  appeared,  advancing 
rapidly,  and  a  general  attack  was  made  upon  the 
whole  position.  The  engagement  soon  became  ex 
tremely  severe,  and  General  Porter  asked  for  rein 
forcements.  At  two  P.M.,  Slocum's  division  of  the 
fith  Corps  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river  and  sup 
port  him.  By  three  P.M.  the  pressure  of  the  supe 
rior  numbers  of  the  enemy  had  become  so  heavy 
that  all  the  reserves  had  been  moved  forward,  and 
our  line,  thus  strengthened,  met  and  resisted  re 
peated  and  desperate  attacks  along  the  whole  front. 
General  Slocum's  division  arrived  at  half-past  three, 


ACE  :Jj.]  THE     SEVEN     D  A  Y  S.  245 

and  was  distributed  along  the  weaker  portions  of 
our  line.  Our  troops,  including  this  division,  num 
bered  about  thirty-five  thousand  men;  and  it  is  be 
lieved  that  they  were  attacked  by  from  sixty  to 
seventy  thousand  of  the  enemy.  Many  of  our  men 
were  wearied  by  the  fighting  of  the  day  before, 
and  most  of  them  by  having  been  under  arms  for 
more  than  two  days.  The  pressure  of  the  superior 
numbers  of  the  enemy  wTas  very  hard  to  bear;  but 
it  was  borne  manfully,  and,  time  after  time,  on  the 
left  and  on  the  right,  our  troops  repulsed  the  deter 
mined  attacks  of  the  swarming  Confederates,  who 
charged  again  and  again  up  to  their  position. 
Every  effort  of  the  enemy  failed  to  break  our  lines 
until  about  seven  o'clock,  when  our  left  was  forced, 
and  the  whole  position  flanked  by  a  furious  attack 
of  fresh  troops.  The  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  was 
lost.  Our  men  fell  back  to  the  hill  in  the  rear,  over 
looking  the  bridge.  Two  brigades  from  the  2d 
Corps  arrived  most  opportunely  at  this  moment. 
They  checked  and  drove  back  the  stragglers,  and 
advanced  boldly  to  the  front.  Their  cheers  were 
heard  by  the  enemy;  and  the  knowledge  that  fresh 
troops  had  arrived,  the  terrible  losses  they  had  them 
selves  sustained,  and  the  gathering  darkness,  pre 
vented  them  from  following  up  their  advantage. 

The  battle  was  lost,  and  with  it  wre  lost  about 
nine  thousand  men  and  twenty  guns;  but  the  ob 
ject  for  which  it  was  fought  had  been  attained. 
The  enemy  was  checked,  and  the  needed  time  was 
gained.  Our  siege-guns  and  material  were  saved, 
and  the  right  wing,  under  cover  of  the  night,  joined 


246  THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


the  main  body  of  the  army  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  river.  The  rear-guard  crossed  at  'six  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  destroying  the  bridge  behind  them. 

Saturday,  June  28,  was  for  our  army  a  day  rather 
of  marching  and  working  than  of  fighting.  The 
enemy  were  exhausted  by  the  desperate  fight  of 
the  previous  day :  they  were  also  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  or  at  least  the  greater  part  of  them  were, 
and  the  bridges  were  destroyed,  so  that  they  must 
either  build  new  bridges  in  order  to  cross  the  river, 
or  else  fall  back  to  the  Mechanicsville  bridge.  Thus 
a  few  precious  hours  were  gained.  In  accordance 
with  orders  given  by  General  McClellan  to  his  corps 
commanders,  assembled  by  him  at  his  head-quar 
ters  on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  the  execution  of 
his  plan  for  a  flank  movement  to  the  James  River 
was  commenced  at  once,  under  his  own  direction. 

General  Keyes,  with  his  4th  Corps  and  its  artil 
lery  and  baggage,  crossed  the  White  Oak  Swamp 
bridge,  and  seized  strong  positions  on  the  opposite 
side,  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  other  troops  and 
trains.  General  lleintzelman  and  General  Sumncr, 
with  the  3d  and  2d  Corps,  remained  in  the  works. 
General  Franklin,  wThile  withdrawing  his  command 
from  their  position  in  the  works,  was  attacked  by 
artillery-firing  from  three  points,  and  an  attempt 
was  made  to  carry  a  part  of  his  line.  The  fighting 
here  was  sharp  for  a  little  while,  and  extremely 
damaging  to  the  enemy,  who  speedily  retired. 
This  was  the  only  fighting  of  the  day.  Men  were 
busy  loading  the  wagons  with  ammunition,  provi 
sions,  and  iiprc^sary  baggage,  and  destroying  all 


THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  247 


that  could  not  be  carried  off.  General  Porter,  with 
the  5th  Corps,  began  the  passage  of  the  White  Oak 
Swamp  during  the  day. 

On  Sunday,  the  29th,  the  troops  of  the  4th  Corps 
remained  in  their  position,  covering  the  road 
through  the  swamp,  until  relieved,  as  will  be  men 
tioned,  by  the  arrival  of  General  Slocum;  and  those 
of  the  5th  Corps  held  their  ground  beyond  the 
swamp,  covering  the  roads  leading  from  Richmond 
towards  the  line  of  retreat.  McCall's  division  also 
crossed  the  swamp,  and  took  a  proper  position  to 
aid  in  covering  the  general  movement. 

Day  broke  darkly  :  clouds  and  fog  hung  very 
low,  and  a  thick  mist  added  to  the  chccrlessncss  of 
the  morning.  It  was  a  sorry  sight  to  see  the  empty 
embrasures,  the  deserted  camps,  filled  but  the  night 
before,  and  for  so  many  previous  days,  with  guns 
and  fighting-men.  But  the  darkness  of  the  morn 
ing  was  good  for  troops  that  desired  to  steal  a 
march  on  the  enemy,  and  its  coolness  was  good  for 
men  that  were  to  fight. 

Sloeuni's  division  of  the  Gth  Corps  marched 
straight  back  to  Savage's  Station,  where  it  was  to 
be  posted  as  a  reserve  to  the  position  to  be  taken 
by  the  rear-guard;  but,  on  reaching  the  Station,  it 
received  orders  to  cross  the  swamp  and  relieve  the 
corps  of  G  eneral  Kcyes.  The  rear-guard,  composed 
of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps  and  Smith's  division  of  the 
Gth  Corps,  moved  from  the  works  at  daylight,  and 
marched  about  half-way  to  Savage's  Station,  halt 
ing  at  Allen's  farm,  where  a  line  Avas  formed  on 
both  sides  of  the  railroad,  towards  Richmond. 


THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


[1862. 


About  nine  o'clock  the  enemy  made  an  attack  with 
infantry  and  artillery,  and  renewed  the  attempt 
twice.  The  firing  of  both  sides  was  sharp  for  a 
while,  but  the  assault  was  repulsed  with  ease  by 
the  skirmish-line  of  Summer's  corps,  supported  by 
artillery,  and  our  loss  was  very  slight.  A  report 
that  the  enemy  had  repaired  the  bridges,  and 
crossed  the  Chickahominy  in  the  rear  of  our  posi 
tion  at  Allen's  farm,  was  brought  to  General  Stunner 
at  that  place,  and  he  at  once  fell  back  to  Savage's 
Station  and  united  his  command  with  Smith's  divi 
sion  of  the  6th  Corps,  which  General  Franklin,  by 
reason  of  the  same  report,  had  already  moved 
thither.  The  junction  took  place  a  little  after 
noon,  and  General  Summer  assumed  command  of 
the  forces  so  united. 

At  Savage's  Station  a  large  field  extended  to  the 
left  from  the  railroad,  and  the  ground  sloped  stead 
ily  downwards  towards  Richmond.  General  Sum 
mer  formed  his  line  in  this  field,  at  right  angles  to 
the  railroad.  The  rise  in  the  ground  gave  our 
troops  an  excellent  view  of  the  whole  position,  and 
was  favorable  for  the  posting  of  artillery.  Some 
regiments  were  also  placed  on  the  right  of  our  posi 
tion,  nearly  parallel  to  the  track,  so  as  to  watch  the 
apprehended  approach  of  the  enemy  from  the  left 
bank  of  the  river.  General  Heintzelman,  in  seem 
ing  violation  of  his  orders,  withdrew  from  his  posi 
tion  on  the  left  before  four  o'clock,  and  inarched  to 
the  swamp,  which  he  crossed  at  Erackett's  Ford. 
Thus  the  rear-guard  was  weakened  by  the  loss  of 
nearlv  fifteen  thousand  men.  and  the  situation  of 


ACE  35.  ]  T  II  E     S  E  V  E  N     D  A  Y  S .  1>40 

General  Simmer  appeared  critical.  His  position, 
however,  was  good,  and  the  troops  excellent.  The 
whole  of  the  2d  Corps,  said  to  be  the  only  corps  in 
the  army  which  has  never  to  this  day  lost  a  gun 
or  a  color,  was  there,  with  one  division  of  Franklin's 
corps.  About  four  o'clock  the  enemy  commenced 
his  attack  in  large  force  by  the  Williamsburg  road, 
which  here  runs  nearly  parallel  to  the  railroad. 
The  enemy's  left  was  supported  by  their  boasted 
iron-clad  railroad  battery,  mounted,  according  to 
their  newspapers,  with  a  rifled  thirty-two.  The 
attack  was  gallantly  met.  General  Burns,  com 
manding  the  front  line,  rendered  special  service. 
The  reserves  were  successively  sent  forward,  and 
the  action  continued  with  great  obstinacy  till  after 
eight  in  the  evening,  when  the  enemy  were  driven 
from  the  field  and  into  the  woods  beyond,  where 
our  deployed  companies,  which  were  speedily 
thrown  forward,  found  the  ground  thickly  strewn 
with  the  bodies  of  the  sufferers.  The  position  wo 
had  gained  in  this  brilliant  and  picturesque  engage 
ment  was  held  till  the  road  in  the  rear  was  cleared; 
and  during  the  ensuing  hours  of  darkness,  all  the 
troops  crossed  the  White  Oak  Swamp  bridge,  and 
Simmer's  last  brigade,  commanded  by  General 
French,  destroyed  the  bridge  at  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning. 

During  the  same  night,  the  4th  Corps,  followed 
by  the  5th,  was  moving  towards  the  river,  and  on 
the  morning  of  Monday,  June  30,  General  Keyes 
had.  arrived  there  in  safety.  He  took  up  a  position 
below  Turkey  Creek  bridge,  with  his  left  resting 


250  THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


on  the  river.  General  Porter  posted  the  5th  Corps 
so  as  to  prolong  Keyes's  line  to  the  right  and 
cover  the  Charles  City  road  to  Eichmond.  Gene 
ral  Franklin,  with  his  own  corps,  Richardson's 
division  of  the  2d  Corps,  and  Naglec's  brigade, 
held  the  passage  of  White  Oak  Swamp.  The  posi 
tion  of  the  remaining  troops  was  changed  at  times 
during  the  day ;  but  it  is  enough  to  say  that  they 
were  so  disposed  as  to  hold  the  ground  in  front  of 
the  road  connecting  Franklin's  position  with  Por 
ter's  right,  so  as  to  cover  the  movement  of  the 

O          ' 

trains  in  the  rear.  General  McClellan  occupied 
himself  in  examining  the  whole  line,  rectifying  the 
position  of  the  troops,  and  expediting  the  passage 
of  the  trains. 

The  fierce  battle  fought  on  Monday,  Juno  SO,  is 
known  by  the  name  of  the  battle  of  Glendale,  or 
Xelson's  Farm.  It  is  a  little  difficult  to  be  under 
stood,  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the  troops 
of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps  were  so  divided  that  the 
army  may  be  said  on  that  day  to  have  been  without 
its  corps  organization,  and  to  have  been  an  army  of 
divisions,  and  those  divisions,  in  several  instances, 
were  separated  from  their  usual  connection.  In  the 
second  place,  though  the  sharpest  fighting  was  in 
or  near  Glendale,  yet  there  was  fighting  along  a  line 
of  about  five  miles,  extending  from  White  Oak 
Swamp  to  Malvern  Hill,  and  lasting  from  noon  till 
after  dark. 

The  first  attack  was  made  on  Franklin's  posi 
tion,  which  was  assailed  by  a  concentrated  fire  of 
artillery.  A  very  fierce  and  obstinate  artillery- 


AGE  35.J  THE    SEVEN     DAYS.  251 

combat  took  place  hero,  and  there  was  also  some 
infantry-lighting.  Our  men  suffered  severely;  but 
repeated  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  cross  the  swamp 
were  unsuccessful,  and  General  Franklin  held  the 
position  till  after  dark. 

Some  two  hours  after  the  attack  just  mentioned 
Avas  commenced,  a  strong  column  moved  down  the 
Charles  City  road,  near  which,  on  its  right,  Gene 
ral  Slocum  was  posted.  General  Kearney's  divi 
sion  of  the  3d  Corps  connected  with  General  Slo- 
cum's  left.  General  McCall,  with  the  Pennsylva 
nia  Reserves,  prolonged  our  line  to  the  left,  cross 
ing  the  New  Market  road,  and  General  Hooker's 
division  of  the  3d  Corps  was  on  the  left  of  McCall. 
General  Simmer,  with  Sedgwick's  division  in  re 
serve,  was  in  rear  of  McCall,  on  the  Quaker  road. 
The  first  attempt  of  the  enemy  wTas  made  on  Slo- 
cum's  left;  but  it  was  checked  by  his  artillery, 
and  abandoned.  Then,  passing  to  their  right,  the 
enemy  made  a  fierce  onslaught  on  General  McCall. 
His  division  speedily  gave  way,  with  loss  of  gene 
ral  officers  and  guns,  and  the  enemy  pressed  on 
so  vigorously  that  their  musketry  proved  fatal  on 
the  Quaker  road.  The  centre  of  our  army  was 
nearly  pierced,  the  main  road  of  communication  al 
most  in  the  enemy's  power.  At  this  critical  moment 
Surnner  hurried  to  the  front  some  regiments  of 
Sedgwick's  division,  just  returned  at  the  double 
quick  from  "White  Oak  Swamp,  to  which  they  had 
been  marched  in  order  to  support  Franklin.  A  gal 
lant  advance  was  made;  Sumner's  artillery  opened 
sharply.  The  advance  of  the  enemy  was  checked, 


252  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  [18G2. 

some  ground  was  regained,  and  some  guns  were  re 
taken.  Hooker,  moving  to  his  right,  aided  in  the 
repulse.  The  gap  caused  by  the  giving  way  of  Mo- 
Call's  command  was  speedily  closed,  and  our  line 
of  retreat  was  once  more  securely  held.  Another 
effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  on  Kearney's  left ; 
but  this  also  was  repulsed,  with  heavy  loss.  The 
enemy's  attack  thus  failed  at  all  points;  but  our 
success  was  costly.  We  lost  heavily  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  in  guns.  All,  or  nearly  all,  of  Mo- 
Call's  guns  were  left  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  same  day,  at  about  five  P.M.,  an  attack 
was  made  on  General  Porter's  left  flank,  near  Mal- 
vern  Hill.  It  was  met  by  the  concentrated  fire  of 
about  thirty  guns  on  the  hill,  by  the  fire  from  the 
gunboats  on  the  river,  and  by  the  infantry-fire  of 
"Warren's  brigade.  The  enemy  was  soon  forced  to 
retreat,  with  the  loss  of  two  guns.  Thus,  on  tho 
right,  in  the  centre,  and  on  the  left,  the  fierce  and 
persistent  efforts  of  the  enemy  had  failed;  but  our 
trains  were  not  yet  in  safety,  and  our  communica 
tions  not  yet  secure,  so  that  more  marching  and 
more  fighting  were  still  before  tho  brave  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  The  troops  distributed  along  the 
line  between  "White  Oak  Swamp  and  Malvern  Hill 
fell  back  to  the  latter  place  during  the  night,  and 
were  posted  there,  as  they  arrived,  by  General  Bar 
nard,  who  received  his  instructions  from  the  general 
commanding. 

On  Tuesday,  July  1,  the  sun  rose  on  a  scene  such 
as  few  but  soldiers  see,  and  soldiers  rarely.  The 
whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  massed  on  the 


AGESJ).]  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  253 

slopes  of  Malvcrn  Hill.  It  is  an  open  plateau,  and 
extends  about  a  mile  and  a  half  in  width  and  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  in  depth.  On  the  highest  ground 
there  is  an  old-fashioned  Virginia  house,  of  brick, 
in  one  story.  Trees  standing  thickly  supply  it 
with  grateful  shade.  Behind  the  house,  the  ground 
falls  away  as  abruptly  as  at  the  Highlands  of  the 
Hudson,  and  the  delighted  eye  ranges  over  miles 
and  miles  of  level  country,  profusely  clothed  with 
an  almost  tropical  vegetation,  and  watered  by  the 
James,  the  Appomattox,  and  Turkey  Creek.  It  is 
a  scene  of  rare  loveliness  and  peace;  and  gunboats, 
seemingly  sleeping  at  their  moorings  on  the  gleam 
ing  river,  half  seen  through  the  screen  of  foliage, 
added  on  that  day  to  the  air  of  repose  which  brooded 
over  the  whole  landscape.  But  no  stronger  con 
trast  could  be  presented  than  by  the  scene  in  front. 
On  those  broad  slopes,  in  triple  concentric  lines, 
with  the  guns  in  the  intervals  and  on  the  higher 
ground  in  the  rear,  the  weary  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  was  rapidly  ranging  itself.  The  general  com 
manding,  and  other  general  officers,  were  making 
the  circuit  of  the  position  and  superintending  the 
movements  of  the  troops,  and,  as  by  magic,  the 
great  army  came  into  the  order  of  battle.  Cavalry 
escorts,  the  lancers  with  their  red  pennons  flutter 
ing  beneath  the  glittering  points  of  their  weapons, 
gave  animation  to  the  scene. 

The  line  taken  up  by  our  army  was  something 
more  than  the  half  of  a  circle.  The  left  rested  on 
the  hill  near  the  river,  and  the  line  curved  round 
the  hill  and  backwards,  through  a  wooded  country, 


254  THE     SEVEN     DAi'S, 


[1862, 


towards  u  point  below  Iluxall's,  on  the  James. 
The  flotilla  was  so  moored  as  to  protect  our  left 
flank  and  command  the  approaches  from  Bich- 
mond.  Porter's  corps  was  on  the  left;  next  camu 
Couch's  division  of  the  4th  Corps,  then  HeinUel- 
man's  corps,  then  Sumner's,  then  Franklin's,  and, 
on  the  extreme  right,  Keyes,  with  the  remainder 
of  the  4th  Corps.  The  remains  of  McCall's  division 
were  in  reserve,  and  stationed  in  the  rear  of  Porter 
and  Couch.  The  right,  where  the  troops  were  less 
compact  than  elsewhere,  was  strengthened  by 
tl  slashings"  and  barricades. 

The  enemy  began  to  feel  along  our  lines  early 
in  the  day,  and  annoyed  our  troops  by  artillery-fire 
from  various  points.  Batteries  appeared,  and  fired, 
and  disappeared  only  to  present  themselves  again  at 
u  new  point,  and  so  keep  our  wearied  troops  from 
preparing  by  rest  for  the  coming  struggle.  About 
three  o'clock  the  real  battle  began.  A  heavy  fire 
of  artillery  opened  on  Couch's  division  and  the  left 
of  Kearney's,  which  was  connected  with  the  right  of 
Couch's;  and  a  brisk  attack  of  infantry  on  Couch's 
front  speedily  followed.  The  enemy,  disregarding 
the  fire  of  our  artillery,  pressed  steadily  on  till  they 
were  within  short  musket-range.  Then  Couch's 
men,  who  had  been  lying  down,  sprang  to  their 
feet,  and  delivered  a  fire  which  destroyed  the  order 
of  the  enemy  and  drove  them  back  in  confusion. 
Their  attack  thus  failed  utterly,  and  the  advantage 
gained  was  improved  by  an  advance  of  our  men 
for  nearly  half  a  mile,  which  gave  them  a  better 
position. 


THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  ZOO 

About  two  hours  of  comparative  quiet  followed 
this  discomfiture  of  the  enemy,  during  which  the 
general  surveyed  the  whole  line,  and  every  thing 
was  made  ready  for  the  coming  attack,  and  kept  so. 
It  was  begun  at  six  o'clock;  and  Porter  and  Couch 
received  it.  The  whole  artillery  of  the  enemy  sud 
denly  opened  upon  them,  and  brigade  after  brigade 
came  rushing  forward  to  carry  their  position,  but 
only  to  meet  the  crushing  fire  of  a  determined  in 
fantry,  and  the  tempest  of  grape,  canister,  and 
shell  that  poured  upon  them  from  our  massed  artil 
lery,  with  the  enormous  projectiles  that  came  howl 
ing  over  the  pleasant  woods  and  fields  from  the 
great  guns  on  the  river.  Until  dark — and  the  bat 
tle  was  when  the  days  are  longest — the  enemy  per 
sisted  in  their  desperate  efforts,  but  to  no  purpose. 
It  was  a  day  of  useless  slaughter  for  them,  but  of 
comparatively  trifling  loss  for  us.  The  darkness 
fell  like  a  curtain,  to  close  and  conceal  the  sublime 
spectacle  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill. 

With  the  last  shots  fired  by  the  artillery,  after 
nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  this  day,  the  fight 
ing  of  the  "  Seven  Days"  ended.  The  troops  had 
little  rest  that  night,  for  a  further  movement  was 
ordered  as  soon  as  the  enemy  were  finally  repulsed. 
By  the  morning  of  the  following  day  the  whole 
army  was  marching  rapidly  towards  Harrison's 
Landing,  on  the  James  River.  As  there  was  but 
one  main  road,  it  was  necessary  to  crowd  it  to  its 
utmost  capacity  with  artillery  and  cavalry,  while 
the  infantry  went  on  each  side.  A  heavy  rain 
soon  began  to  fall, — such  a  rain  as  is  only  felt  in  the 


-00  THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 

South  :  the  road  first  became  slippery,  then  muddy, 
then  deep  with  mud.  Through  this' clinging  soil 
the  weary  horses  dragged  their  loads,  while  on 
each  side  the  living  stream  of  infantry  forced  its 
toilsome  way  through  the  thick  and  dripping  un 
derbrush  which  bordered  the  road.  Fortunately, 
the  distance  was  not  great,  and  the  troops  poured 
rapidly  into  the  vast  plain  011  the  river,  and  sank 
to  rest  upon  its  trampled  wheat,  their  journey 
ended,  their  great  task  accomplished.  The  woods  of 
the  Peninsula  were  on  one  side  of  them,  beautiful 
in  their  midsummer  luxuriance,  and  perhaps  con 
cealing  indefatigable  enemies;  but  on  the  other 
was  the  broad  river,  bearing  on  its  calm  waters  the 
powerful  gunboats  which  displayed  the  flag  of  our 
navy,  and,  thanks  to  the  provident  foresight  of  the 
general  commanding,  bearing  also  countless  ves 
sels  filled  with  the  ammunition  and  equipments, 
the  food  and  the  clothing,  of  which  our  troops  stood 
HO  much  in  need. 

Mr.  Emil  Schalk, — a  severe  military  critic,  and 
chary  of  praise, — speaking  of  the  retreat  from  the 
Chickahominy  to  the  James  River,  says,  "This 
plan  of  defence  reflects  the  highest  credit  and  honor 
on  the  general  who  conceived  and  carried  it  out."* 
Such  is  the  opinion,  it  is  believed,  of  all  competent 
judges,  whether  soldiers  by  profession,  or  civilians 
who  have  made  the  art  of  war  a  special  subject  of 
study.  It  was  a  military  movement  of  great  danger 
and  difficulty,  extending  over  several  days,  marked 


*  Campaigns  of  1862  and  1803,  p.  179. 


THE     8  E  V  EN     DA  Y  S.  257 


throughout  by  admirable  combinations  and  disposi 
tions,  —  in  which  nothing  was  overlooked,  nothing 
was  forgotten,  and  not  a  single  mistake  was  made. 
The  sagacious  foresight,  the  calm  self-reliance,  the 
thorough  professional  knowledge,  the  vigilant  eye, 
of  the  commanding  general  formed  the  power  by 
which  the  whole  breathing  mass  of  courage  and  en 
durance  wras  guided  and  propelled.  And  the  conduct 
of  the  army  was,  to  borrow  General  McClellan's  own 
expression,  "superb."  The  whole  retreat  was  one 
unbroken  strain  upon  their  physical  energies  and 
moral  force.  They  had  to  march  all  night  and 
fight  all  day.  The  nervous  exhaustion  produced 
by  toil  and  want  of  sleep  was  aggravated  by  the 
excessive  heat  of  the  weather,  by  which  many  a 
manly  frame  was  prostrated.  The  enemy  were 
brave,  vigilant,  well  handled,  superior  in  numbers, 
and  confident  of  success;  but  only  at  Gaines's  Mill 
was  any  decisive  advantage  gained.  At  every 
point,  at  every  moment,  the  Confederates  had  met 
organized  courage,  disciplined  valor,  the  dauntless 
front  of  men  who  trusted  in  themselves  and  trusted 
in  their  commander;  and  at  Malverii  Hill  the  closing 
hours  of  danger  and  suffering  were  illumined  by  the 
blaze  of  victory,  like  the  rich  red  sunset  which  ends 
a  day  of  storm  and  cloud.  And  not  only  had  oitr  men 
fought  admirably,  but  they  had  toiled  patiently  and 
intelligently.  Guns  were  to  be  removed,  wagons 
and  teams  were  to  be  helped  along,  here  a  piece  of 
road  was  to  be  mended,  and  there  trees  were  to  be 
cut  down  to  obstruct  the  enemy's  passage;  and  for 
all  these  labors  the  officers  found  quick  faculty, 

22* 


258  THE     SEVEN     DAYS. 


[1SC2. 


serviceable  hands,  and  a  willing  spirit.  When  it 
is  remembered  that  the  carriages  and  teams  belong 
ing  to  the  army,  stretched  out  in  one  line,  would 
have  reached  nearly  forty  miles,  we  can  understand 
that  nothing  could  have  insured  their  safe  removal 
in  the  face  of  an  enemy  but  that  universal  training 
of  the  brain  and  hand  found  among  a  people  who 
are  all  taught  to  handle  indifferently  the  pen,  the 
axe,  the  gun,  and  the  spade. 

The  general  in  command,  when  the  James  River 
had  been  reached,  had  a  right  to  look  around  with 
just  pride  upon  the  army  now  sheltered  and  safe. 
On  the  28th,  in  the  bitterness  of  his  soul,  he  had 
said,  in  a  telegraphic  message  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  "If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly 
that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you,  or  to  any  other 
persons  in  Washington.  You  have  done  your  best 
to  sacrifice  this  army."  That  army  he  had  saved; 
and  the  army  was  conscious  of  it.  But  there 
was  nothing  of  triumph  in  his  own  mind;  for  their 
safety  had  been  won  at  fearful  cost.  Our  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  from  the  26th  of  June  to 
the  1st  of  July  reached  the  mournful  aggregate  of 
fifteen  thousand.  Of  the  sick  and  wounded,  many 
had  of  necessity  been  left  behind,  but  with  a  proper 
complement  of  surgeons  and  attendants  and  a  boun 
tiful  supply  of  rations  and  medical  stores. 

Arid  there  was  another  consideration  which  might 
have  deepened  the  sadness  of  his  mind,  if  he  had 
allowed  his  thoughts  to  dwell  upon  it  at  such  a 
moment.  He  had  conducted  an  important  move 
ment  with  a  skill  and  success  which  an  intelligent 


Ac, K  ^ J.]  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  250 

military  judgment  could  understand  and  appre 
ciate;  but  still  that  movement  was  a  retreat.  This 
wras  the  great  fact  present  to  the  public  mind.  Ho 
had  been  compelled  to  abandon  his  position  before 
liichmond;  the  place  was  not  taken :  he  was  a  gene 
ral  in  command  of  a  large  army,  and  had  failed  to 
accomplish  the  object  of  his  own  hopes.  The  facts 
and  events  which  had  rendered  a  retrograde  move 
ment  necessary  required  some  reflection  to  make 
them  understood  and  some  candor  to  make  them  felt. 
His  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  of  the  bitter 
ness  and  unscrupulousness  of  party,  was  enough  to 
reveal  to  him  the  harsh  judgments,  the  misconstruc 
tions,  the  injustice,  the  cruel  insinuations,  the  ca 
lumnious  charges,  to  which  he  had  exposed  him 
self  by  the  crime  of  failure, — that  crime  which 
the  public  is  so  slow  to  forgive.  He  must  have 
foreseen  how  the  pert  phrase-makers  of  the  land — 
who  conduct  campaigns  so  admirably  in  their  arm 
chairs,  and  dispose  of  brigades  and  divisions  as 
easily  as  they  fold  and  label  their  letters — would 
strive  to  mangle  him  with  their  pens, — weapons  more 
cruel  than  the  tiger's  claw  or  the  serpent's  tooth, — 
and  point  out  what  he  should  have  done,  and  should 
not  have  done,  to  have  escaped  the  shame  and  dis 
grace  of  retreating  before  a  rebel  foe.  Sir  John 
Moore,  dying  in  the  arms  of  victory  at  the  close 
of  a  successful  retreat,  said,  "  I  hope  the  people  of 
England  will  be  satisfied :  I  hope  my  country  will 
do  me  justice."  His  country,  in  time,  did  justice 
to  that  great  man.  Sooner  or  later,  the  world 
comen  round  to  gee  the  truth  and  do  (ho  right; 


2GO  THE     SEVEN     DAYS.  [1362. 

and  for  the  coming  of  that  time  General  MeClellan 
can  afford  to  wait. 

But  the  saddest  of  all  experiences  for  a  command 
ing  general  is  to  lose  the  confidence  of  his  army. 
That  cup  was  never  put  to  General  McClellan's  lips. 
His  soldiers  were  intelligent  enough  to  understand 
what  he  had  done,  and  generous  enough  to  be  grate 
ful  to  him  for  it.  They  had  witnessed  his  toils  and 
exposures,  his  calm  self-reliance,  his  resolute  front, 
his  unaltered  brow:  they  had  seen  him  perplexed 
but  not  cast  down,  anxious  but  not  despairing. 
The  approach  of  danger,  the  burden  of  responsi 
bility,  had  called  forth  reserved  powers  and  unre- 
vealed  energies.  Their  common  perils,  their  com 
mon  labors,  the  trying  scenes  they  had  passed 
through,  the  safety  they  had  secured,  had  created 
new  ties  of  sympathy  between  the  commanding 
general  and  his  noble  army.  No  muttered  curses 
fell  upon  his  ear,  no  sullen,  averted  countenances 
met  his  eye;  but,  as  he  rode  along  their  lines,  shouts 
of  welcome  instead,  and  faces  glowing  with  honest 
joy,  passed  a  judgment  upon  his  course  that  en 
abled  him  to  meet  with  composure  the  sneers  of 
the  scoffer,  the  malice  of  partisan  falsehood,  and 
the  rash  censures  of  presumptuous  half-knowledge. 


AGE  35.]  ADDRESS     TO     THE     ARMY. 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

THE  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during 
the  months  of  July  and  August,  18G2,  may  be  told 
in  a  few  words.  During  their  retrograde  move 
ment  to  the  banks  of  the  James,  the}r  had  been 
fearfully  weakened  by  losses  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners ;  but  they  were  not  in  the  least  de 
moralized.  They  had  conducted  themselves  in  a 
way  to  move  the  admiration  and  win  the  gratitude 
of  their  commander ;  arid  from  a  full  heart,  on  the 
4th  of  July,  he  issued  to  them  the  following  ad 
mirable  and  heartful  address  : — 

" HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,     | 
CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  July  4,  1862.  j 

"  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  : — Your  achieve 
ments  of  the  last  ten  days  have  illustrated  the  valor  and 
endurance  of  the  American  soldier.  Attacked  by  supe 
rior  forces,  and  without  hope  of  reinforcements,  you  have 
succeeded  in  changing  your  base  of  operations  by  a  flank 
movement,  always  regarded  as  the  most  hazardous  of 
military  expedients.  You  have  saved  all  your  material, 
all  your  trains  and  all  your  guns,  except  a  few  lost  in 
battle,  taking  in  return  guns  and  colors  from  the  enemy. 
Upon  your  march,  you  have  been  assailed  clay  after  day, 
with  desperate  fury,  by  men  of  the  same  race  and  nation, 
skilfully  massed  and  led.  Under  every  disadvantage  of 
number,  and  necessarily  of  position  also,  you  have  in 
every  conflict  beaten  back  your  foes  with  enormous  slaugh 
ter.  Your  conduct  ranks  you  among  the  celebrated  ar- 


202  LETTER     TO     THE     PRESIDENT. 


mies  of  history.  No  one  will  now  question  that  each  of 
you  may  always  with  pride  say,  '  I  belong  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.'  You  have  reached  the  new  base,  com 
plete  in  organization  and  unimpaired  in  spirit.  The 
enemy  may  at  any  moment  attack  you.  We  are  prepared 
to  meet  them.  I  have  personally  established  your  lines. 
Let  them  come,  and  we  will  convert  their  repulse  into  a 
final  defeat.  Your  Government  is  .strengthening  you 
with  the  resources  of  a  great  people.  On  this,  our  nation's 
birthday,  we  declare  to  our  foes,  who  are  rebels  against 
the  best  interests  of  mankind,  that  this  army  shall  enter 
the  capital  of  the  so-called  Confederacy,  that  our  national 
Constitution  shall  prevail,  and  that  the  Union,  which  can 
alone  insure  internal  peace  and  external  security  to  each 
State,  'must  and  shall  be  preserved/  cost  what  it  may  in 
time,  treasure,  and  blood. 

"  GEORGE  B. 


The  high  spirit  which  breathes  through  this  ad 
dress,  animates  also  his  communications  with  the 
Government  at  Washington.  He  informs  the  Presi 
dent,  in  a  despatch  of  July  7,  that  his  men  were  in 
splendid  spirits  and  "  anxious  to  try  it  again;"  and 
in  this  anxiety  he  himself  distinctly  shared. 

Having  a  brief  interval  of  comparative  leisure, 
he  drew  up  and  addressed  to  the  President  a  letter, 
under  date  of  July  7,  containing  certain  views  re 
garding  the  conduct  of  the  war,  which,  in  his  judg 
ment,  were  essential  to  its  objects  and  success. 
The  letter  is  as  follows  : — 

"IlEAP-QrAHTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  ) 

CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA.,  July  7,  1862.  J 
''MR.  PRESIDENT: — You  have  been  fully  informed  that 
the  rebel  army  is  in  our  front,  with  the  purpose  of  over- 


L  E  T  T  E  il     TO     T  HE     1>  R  E  S  1 1)  E  N  T. 


whelming  us  by  attacking  our  position  or  reducing  us  by 
blocking  our  river-communications.  I  cannot  but  regard 
our  condition  as  critical,  and  I  earnestly  desire,  in  view 
of  possible  contingencies,  to  lay  before  your  Excellency, 
for  your  private  consideration,  my  general  views  concern 
ing  the  existing  state  of  the  rebellion,  although  they  do 
not  strictly  relate  to  the  situation  of  this  army  or  strictly 
come  within  the  scope  of  my  official  duties.  These  views 
amount  to  convictions,  and  are  deeply  impressed  upon 
my  mind  and  heart.  Our  cause  must  never  be  abandoned ; 
it  is  the  cause  of  free  institutions  and  self-government. 
The  Constitution  and  the  Union  must  be  preserved,  what 
ever  may  be  the  cost  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood.  If  se 
cession  is  successful,  other  dissolutions  are  clearly  to  be 
seen  in  the  future.  Let  neither  military  disaster,  political 
faction,  nor  foreign  war  shake  your  settled  purpose  to 
enforce  the  equal  operation  of  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  people  of  every  State. 

"  The  time  has  come  when  the  Government  must  de 
termine  upon  a  civil  and  military  policy  covering  the 
•whole  ground  of  our  national  trouble. 

"  The  responsibility  of  determining,  declaring,  and  sup 
porting  such  civil  and  military  policy,  and  of  directing 
the  whole  course  of  national  affairs  in  regard  to  the  re 
bellion,  must  now  be  assumed  and  exercised  by  you,  or 
our  cause  will  be  lost.  The  Constitution  gives  you  power 
sufficient  even  for  the  present  terrible  exigency. 

"This  rebellion  has  assumed  the  character  of  war: 
as  such  it  should  be  regarded,  and  it  should  be  conducted 
upon  the  highest  principles  known  to  Christian  civiliza 
tion.  It  should  not  be  a  war  looking  to  the  subjugation 
of  the  people  of  any  State,  in  any  event.  It  should  not 
be  at  all  a  war  upon  population,  but  against  armed  forces 
and  political  organizations.  Neither  confiscation  of  pro 
perty,  political  executions  of  persons,  territorial  organi- 


204  LETTER    TO    THE    PRESIDENT.  [1862. 

zation  of  States,  or  forcible  abolition  of  slavery,  should 
be  contemplated  for  a  moment. 

"  In  prosecuting  the  war,  all  private  property  and  un 
armed  persons  should  be  strictly  protected,  subject  only 
to  the  necessity  of  military  operations ;  all  private  pro 
perty  taken  for  military  use  should  be  paid  or  receipted 
for ;  pillage  and  waste  should  be  treated  as  high  crimes, 
all  unnecessary  trespass  sternly  prohibited,  and  offensive 
demeanor  by  the  military  towards  citizens  promptly  re 
buked.  Military  arrests  should  not  be  tolerated,  except 
in  places  where  active  hostilities  exist ;  and  oaths,  not 
required  by  enactments  constitutionally  made,  should  be 
neither  demanded  nor  received. 

"  Military  government  should  be  confined  to  the  pre 
servation  of  public  order  and  the  protection  of  political 
right.  Military  power  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere 
with  the  relations  of  servitude,  either  by  supporting  or 
impairing  the  authority  of  the  master,  except  for  re 
pressing  disorder,  as  in  other  cases.  Slaves,  contraband 
under  the  act  of  Congress,  seeking  military  protection, 
should  receive  it.  The  right  of  the  Government  to  ap 
propriate  permanently  to  its  own  service  claims  to  slave- 
labor  should  be  asserted,  and  the  right  of  the  owner  to 
compensation  therefor  should  be  recognized.  This  prin 
ciple  might  be  extended,  upon  grounds  of  military  neces 
sity  and  security,  to  all  the  slaves  within  a  particular  State, 
thus  working  manumission  in  such  State ;  and  in  Missouri, 
perhaps  in  Western  Virginia  also,  and  possibly  even  in 
Maryland,  the  expediency  of  such  a  measure  is  only  a  ques 
tion  of  time.  A  system  of  policy  thus  constitutional  and 
conservative,  and  pervaded  by  the  influences  of  Christian 
ity  and  freedom,  would  receive  the  support  of  almost  all 
truly  loyal  men,  would  deeply  impress  the  rebel  masses  and 
all  foreign  nations,  and  it  might  be  humbly  hoped  that  it 
would  commend  itself  to  the  favor  of  the  Almighty. 

"Unless  the  principles  governing  the  future  conduct 


LETTER  TO  THE  PRESIDE  N  T.      265 


of  our  struggle  shall  bo  made  known  and  approved,  the 
effort  to  obtain  requisite  forces  will  be  almost  hopeless. 
A  declaration  of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery, 
will  rapidly  disintegrate  our  present  armies.  The  policy 
of  the  Government  must  be  supported  by  concentrations 
of  military  power.  The  national  forces  should  not  bo 
dispersed  in  expeditions,  posts  of  occupation,  and  nu 
merous  armies,  but  should  bo  mainly  collected  into  masses 
and  brought  to  bear  upon  the  armies  of  the  Confederate 
States.  Those  armies  thoroughly  defeated,  the  political 
structure  which  they  support  would  soon  cease  to  exist. 

"In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy  which  you  may 
form,  you  will  require  a  commander-in-chief  of  the  army, 
one  who  possesses  your  confidence,  understands  your 
views,  and  who  is  competent  to  execute  your  orders,  by 
directing  the  military  forces  of  the  nation  to  the  accom 
plishment  of  the  objects  by  you  proposed.  I  do  not  ask 
that  place  for  myself.  I  am  willing  to  serve  you  in  such 
position  as  you  may  assign  me,  and  I  will  do  so  as  faith 
fully  as  ever  subordinate  served  superior. 

"I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity;  and,  as  I  hope  for 
forgiveness  from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter  with 
sincerity  towards  you  and  from  love  for  my  country. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  3  fajor-  General  commanding. 
"His  Excellency  A.  LINCOLN",  President." 

In  regard  to  this  communication,  two  questions 
have  arisen.  First,  AVas  it  proper  for  General  Mc- 
Clcllan  to  write  such  a  letter?  This  would  seem  to 
bo  answered  by  the  statement  that  he  had  pre 
viously  asked  and  obtained  the  President's  permis 
sion  to  do  so.  On  the  20th  of  June  he  had  said,  in 
a  despatch,  "  I  would  be  glad  to  have  permission 


266  LETTER    TO     THE     PRESIDENT. 


[1862. 


to  lay  before  your  Excellency,  by  letter  or  tele 
graph,  my  views  as  to  tbe  present  state  of  military 
affairs  throughout  the  country ;"  and  the  next  day 
the  President  replied,  in  language  marked  by  that 
personal  kindness  which  generally  characterized 
his  communications,  "If  it  Avould  not  divert  too 
much  of  your  time  and  attention  from  the  army 
under  your  immediate  command,  I  would  be  glad 
to  have  your  views  as  to  the  present  state  of  mili 
tary  affairs  throughout  the  whole  country,  as  you 
say  you  would  be  glad  to  give  them." 

Second,  Are  the  views  which  General  McClellan 
Bets  forth  in  his  communication  sound  and  wise  in 
point  of  fact?  Upon  this  question  much  has  been 
and  will  be  said  on  both  sides;  but  whatever  is  said 
on  one  side  will  do  but  little  towards  convincing 
the  other.  In  short,  it  raises  the  issues  on  which 
the  country  began  to  be  divided  soon  after  the  war 
broke  out,  and  on  which  it  is  now  rent  in  twain. 
Every  man  has  made  up  his  fagots  on  these  ques 
tions  and  bound  them  round  with  the  cords  of  pas 
sion  and  prejudice;  and  it  is  useless  to  attempt  to 
disturb  them.  Time,  w^hich  determines  all  things, 
will  sooner  or  later  determine  whether  General 
McClellan  was  right  or  wrong. 

As  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  General 
McClellan's  opinion  that  it  ought  not  to  be  with 
drawn,  but  that  it  should  be  promptly  reinforced 
and  thrown  again  upon  Richmond.  In  his  judg 
ment,  it  was  our  policy  to  concentrate  here  every 
thing  we  could  spare  from  less  important  points, 
in  order  to  make  a  successful  demonstration  against 


AGE  35.]     GENERAL    IIALLEOK    GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.      267 

the  enemy  in  his  most  vital  and  important  point. 
The  Government  was  undecided  in  its  plans.  On 
the  4th  of  July  the  President  had  informed  Gene 
ral  McClellan  that  it  was  impossible  to  reinforce 
him  so  as  to  enable  him  to  resume  the  offensive 
within  a  month  or  six  weeks,  and  that  therefore 
for  the  present  a  defensive  policy  was  his  only  care, 
— adding,  "  Save  the  army,  first,  where  you  are, 
if  you  can,  and,  secondly,  by  removal,  if  you 
must." 

On  the  llth  of  July,  one  of  the  recommendations 
contained  in  General  McClellan's  letter  of  July  7 
to  the  President  was  adopted,  by  the  appointment 
of  Major-General  Hallcck  to  the  post  of  General-in- 
Chief  of  the  entire  army  of  the  United  States. 
This  was  the  position  held  by  General  McClellan 
before  he  left  Washington  to  conduct  the  Peninsular 
campaign.  Its  duties  had  subsequently  been  per 
formed  by  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War;  and 
it  was  understood  that  they  had  a  military  adviser, 
in  the  person  of  Major-General  Hitchcock. 

The  disposition  to  be  made  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  one  of  the  first  subjects  to  which  the 
attention  of  the  general-in -chief  was  called  on  his 
arrival  in  Washington ;  and,  in  order  to  observe 
for  himself  its  condition,  he  made  a  visit  to  Har 
rison's  Landing,  leaving  Washington  on  the  24th 
of  July  and  returning  on  the  27th.  The  result  of 
this  visit  was  that  General  Hallcck,  after  full  con 
sultation  with  his  officers,  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  strengthen  the 
Army  of  the  Peninsula  with  the  reinforcements 


268  GENERAL     II  A  L  L  E  C  K  '  S     ORDER. 


[1302. 


which  General  McClcllan  required,  and  he  there 
fore  determined  to  withdraw  it  to  some  position 
where  it  could  unite  with  that  of  General  Pope, 
who  was  now  in  command  of  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia.  But  this  decision  was  not  immediately 
made  known  to  General  McClcllan,  who  on  the 
30th  of  July  received  a  despatch  from  General 
Halleck  saying-  that,  in  order  to  enahle  him  to 
move  in  any  direction,  it  was  necessary  to  relieve 
him  of  his  sick,  and  that  arrangements  had  been 
made  accordingly,  adding,  ';I  hope  you  will  send 
them,  away  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  advise  me 
of  their  removal."  General  McClellan  began  im 
mediately  to  execute  this  order,  but  pressed  the 
general-in-chief  to  inform  him  of  the  views  of  the 
Government  in  regard  to  the  future  disposition  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  because  if  a  forward 
movement  were  contemplated  many  of  the  sick 
could  be  of  service  at  the  depots,  and  he  could  not 
decide  what  cases  to  send  off  unless  he  knew  what 
was  to  be  done  with  the  army. 

On  the  3d  of  August,  Coggin's  Point,  on  the 
south  side  of  the  James,  was  occupied  by  our  troops, 
and  Colonel  Averill,  at  the  head  of  three  hundred 
cavalry,  attacked  and  dispersed  a  cavalry  force  of 
the  enemy  four  hundred  and  fifty  in  number,  at 
Sycamore  Church,  on  the  main  road  from  Peters 
burg  to  Suffolk,  four  miles  from  Cole's  House.  On 
the  5th  of  August,  General  Hooker  attacked  a  very 
considerable  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  sta 
tioned  at  Malvern  Hill,  carried  the  position,  and 
drove  the  enemy  back  to  Xewmarket,  four  miles 


Ao  K  30.]  A  II  M  Y     Vf  1  T  H  D  R  A  W  N .  209 

distant;  and  on  the  same  day  Colonel  Averill  re 
turned  from  a  reconnoissance  in  the  direction  of 
Savage's  Station  towards  .Richmond,  in  the  course 
of  which  lie  had  encountered  the  10th  Virginia 

o 

Cavalry  near  White  Oak  Swamp  bridge  and  driven 
them  hack  some  distance  towards  Richmond.  These 
military  demonstrations  were  made  with  the  ex 
pectation,  or  at  least  the  hope,  that  an  offensive 
movement  upon  Richmond  would  still  be  the  policy 
of  the  Government. 

On  the  3d  of  August,  the  decision  of  the  Govern 
ment  was  distinctly  communicated  to  General 
McClellan  in  a  despatch  from  General  Halleck,  in 
which  he  said,  "  It  is  determined  to  withdraw 
your  army  from  the  Peninsula  to  Acquia  Creek. 
You  will  take  immediate  means  to  effect  this, 
covering  the  movement  the  best  you  can.  Its  real 
object  and  withdrawal  should  be  concealed  even 
from  your  own  officers."  This  was  a  heavy  blow 
to  General  McClellan;  and  he  earnestly  protested 
against  it  in  a  long  telegraphic  despatch,  dated 
August  4,  to  which  General  Halleck  replied  in  a 
letter  dated  August  6. 

General  McClcllan's  arguments  against  the  re 
moval  of  the  army  and  in  favor  of  an  offensive 
movement,  as  presented  in  his  despatch,  are  briefly 
as  follows.  The  army  was  in  excellent  discipline 
and  condition,  and  in  a  favorable  position,  being 
only  twenty-five  miles  from  Richmond,  and  they 
would  not  be  likely  to  have  a  battle  till  they  were 
within  ten  miles  of  it. 

At  Acquia    Creek    they   would   be    seventy-five 

23* 


270     GENERAL     McCLELLAN'S    DE  SP  AT  C  II.  [1862. 

miles  from  Kichmond,  with  only  land-transporta 
tion  all  the  way. 

The  step  would  demoralize  the  army,  and  have 
a  most  depressing  effect  upon  the  people  of  the 
North,  and  might  induce  foreign  Powers  to  recog 
nize  our  adversaries. 

The  communication  concludes  thus: — 

"  It  may  be  said  that  there  are  no  reinforcements  avail 
able.  I  point  to  Burnside's  force, — to  that  of  Pope,  not 
necessary  to  maintain  a  strict  defensive  in  front  of  Wash 
ington  and  Harper's  Ferry, — to  those  portions  of  the 
Army  of  the  West  not  required  for  a  strict  defensive 
there.  Here,  directly  in  front  of  this  army,  is  the  heart 
of  the  rebellion  :  it  is  here  that  all  our  resources  should 
be  collected  to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine  tho 
fate  of  the  nation. 

"All  points  of  secondary  importance  elsewhere  should 
be  abandoned,  and  every  available  man  brought  here.  A 
decided  victory  here,  and  the  military  strength  of  the 
rebellion  is  crushed.  It  matters  not  what  partial  reverses 
we  may  meet  with  elsewhere :  here  is  the  true  defence 
of  Washington  ;  it  is  here,  on  the  banks  of  the  James, 
that  the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be  decided. 

"  Clear  in  my  convictions  of  right,  strong  in  the  con 
sciousness  that  I  have  ever  been,  and  still  am,  actuated 
solely  by  the  love  of  my  country,  knowing  that  no  ambi 
tious  or  selfish  motives  have  influenced  me  from  the  com 
mencement  of  this  war,  I  do  now  what  I  never  did  in 
my  life  before  :  I  entreat  that  this  order  may  be  rescinded. 

"  If  my  counsel  does  not  prevail,  I  will  with  a  sad  heart 
obey  your  orders  to  the  utmost  of  my  power,  directing 
to  the  movement,  which  I  clearly  foresee  will  be  one  of 
the  utmost  delicacy  and  difficulty,  whatever  skill  I  may 
possess.  Whatever  the  rosult  may  be — and  may  God  grant 


GENERAL     IIALLECK-'S     REPLY.  271 


that  I  am  mistaken  in  my  forebodings! — I  shall  at  least 
have  the  internal  satisfaction  that  I  have  written  and 
spoken  frankly,  and  have  sought  to  do  the  best  in  my 
power  to  avert  disaster  from  my  country." 

The  considerations  urged  by  General  Halleck  in 
reply  were  as  follows  :— 

The  enemy's  forces  in  and  around  Eichmond  were 
estimated  at  two  hundred  thousand.  General  Pope's 
army  was  only  forty  thousand;  the  Army  of  the  Pe 
ninsula,  effective  force,  about  ninety  thousand.  The 
relative  position  of  the  enemy  towards  them  was 
such  that  his  command  and  that  of  Pope  must  be 
united;  and  they  could  not  be  united  by  land  with 
out  exposing  both  to  destruction.  It  was  a  military 
impossibility  to  send  Pope's  forces  by  water  to  the 
Peninsula;  and  thus  the  only  alternative  was  to 
send  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  to  Pope. 

A  simple  change  of  position  to  a  new  and  by  no 
means  distant  base  wTould  not  demoralize  an  army 
in  excellent  discipline,  unless  the  officers  themselves 
should  assist  in  that  demoralization, — which  he  is 
satisfied  they  would  not. 

The  political  effect  of  the  withdrawal  might  at 
first  be  unfavorable;  but  the  public  were  beginning 
to  understand  the  necessity  of  it,  and  they  would 
have  more  confidence  in  a  united  army  than  in  its 
separated  fragments. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  furnish  the  requisite 
reinforcements  under  several  weeks. 

To  keep  the  army  in  its  present  position  until  it 
could  be  reinforced  wrould  almost  destroy  it,  in  the 
sickly  region  whore  it  then  was.  In  the  mean  time, 


REMOVAL     BEGUN. 


General  Pope's  forces  would  be  exposed  to  the 
heavy  blows  of  the  enemy,  without  the  slightest 
hope  of  assistance  from  General  McClellan. 

A  majority  of  the  highest  officers  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  were  decidedly  in  favor  of  the 
movement. 

All  General  McClellan's  plans  required  reinforce 
ments;  but  reinforcements  could  not  be  had. 

There  was  nothing,  of  course,  for  General  Mc 
Clellan  to  do  but  to  submit,  and  obey  the  orders  of 
his  superior, — which  he  did  with  a  heavy  heart. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  removal  of  the  sick,  in  com 
pliance  with  the  order  of  July  30,  was  going  on  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  though  somewhat  interrupted 
by  another  order,  of  August  G,  directing  the  imme 
diate  shipment  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  several 
batteries  of  artillery  to  Burnside's  command  at 
Acquia  Creek.  The  order  of  August  3d  also  re 
quired  the  transportation  of  a  great  amount  of 
material.  All  this  was  obviously  a  work  of  time; 
but  in  spite  of  this,  in  spite  of  General  McClellan's 
repeated  and  emphatic  assertions  to  the  contrary, 
General  llalleck's  mind  became  possessed  with  the 
notion  that  the  removal  of  the  sick  had  not  been 
begun  when  the  order  was  first  received,  and 
that  the  whole  business  of  transportation  was  not 
pushed  on  so  rapidly  as  it  should  have  been.  But 
General  McClellan  never  received  from  the  Ad 
ministration  "  that  forbearance,  patience,  and  con 
fidence"  for  which  he  had  asked, — and  which 
every  soldier  has  a  right  to  ask, — but  always  had 
a  countenance  of  suspicion  and  distrust  turned 


AGE  35.]  REMOVAL     NOT     DELAYED.  27o 

towards  him.  He  had  now  twelve  thousand  sick  and 
wounded  to  transport,  besides  cavalry,  artillery, 
wagons,  baggage,  and  supplies.  He  was  working 
day  and  night  to  speed  their  removal;  he  was 
in  a  situation  that  demanded  kind  consideration, 
for  he  was  the  leader  of  an  enterprise  which  had 
failed,  whose  hopes  had  been  crossed,  whose  plans 
for  the  future  had  been  arrested,  who  was  obeying 
faithfully  orders  which  he  deemed  unwise;  and 
surely  he  did  not  need  at  such  a  moment  the  further 
discipline  of  a  despatch  like  this,  under  date  of 
August  9  : — "  Considering  the  amount  of  transporta 
tion  at  your  disposal,  your  delay  is  not  satisfactory  : 
you  must  move  with  all  possible  celerity." 

The  plain  statements  in  General  McClellan's  Re 
port,  and  the  letters  of  the  Quartermaster  and  As 
sistant  Quartermaster,  which  are  also  to  be  found 
there,  are  sufficient  to  vindicate  him  completely 
from  the  charge  of  negligence  or  delay  in  trans 
porting  his  materials  and  men.  Indeed,  in  an 
issue  like  that  between  him  and  the  commander-in- 
chief  the  testimony  of  General  McClellan  must  be 
held  to  be  decisive.  Here  was  a  certain  work  to 
be  done,  the  removal  of  a  certain  number  of  per 
sons,  sick  and  well,  and  a  certain  amount  of  stores, 
supplies,  and  warlike  materials  from  one  point  to 
another.  The  time  within  which  the  task  could  be 
accomplished  depended  upon  several  elements  which 
were  wholly  matters  of  fact, — such  as  the  number 
of  vessels,  their  capacity,  their  speed,  the  state  of 
the  water  in  the  river,  and  the  wharf-accommoda 
tions  at  the  points  of  departure  and  arrival, — upon 


274  REMOVAL     NOT     DELAYED. 


[1862. 


all  which  General  McClcllan  had,  and  General 
Halleck  had  not,  the  means  of  being  exactly  in 
formed.  Thus,  it  was  General  McClellan's  know 
ledge  against  General  Halleck's  surmise  or  con 
jecture.  General  Halleck,  sitting  in  his  office  at 
Washington,  might  have  thought  that  there  was 
unreasonable  delay;  but  General  McClellan  alone 
could  have  known  what  was  the  proportion  between 
the  work  to  be  done  and  the  means  to  do  it. 

General  McClellan,  happily  for  his  peace  of  mind 
and  health  of  body,  is  not  a  man  of  irritable  tem 
perament,  and  so  he  could  possess  his  soul  in  pa 
tience  under  the  rash  expressions  of  General  Hal- 
leek's  impatience,  which,  too.  may  have  had  the 
excuse  of  being  prompted  by  patriotic  zeal  and 
professional  activity;  but  this  excuse  cannot  be 
offered  on  behalf  of  a  deliberate  wrong.  In  a  letter 
subsequently  written  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
General  Halleck  says,  "  The  evacuation  of  Har 
rison's  Landing,  however,  was  not  commenced  till 
the  14th,  eleven  days  after  it  was  ordered."  The 
authority  for  this  statement — which  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  that  General  McClellan  had  re 
fused  or  delayed  for  eleven  days  to  execute  a  mili 
tary  order — is  a  despatch  from  the  latter,  under 
date  of  August  14,  which  says, — 

"  Movement  has  commenced, — by  land  and  water. 
All  the  sick  will  be  away  by  to-morrow  night.* 
Every  thing  being  done  to  carry  out  your  orders." 
At  the  date  of  this  despatch,  nearly  all  the  sick,  a 

*  This  would  have  been  absolutely  impossible  if  nearly  all 
of  them  were  not  already  gone. 


AGE  Co.]  GENERAL    IIALLECK's    CHARGE    NOT    TRUE.    275 

large  iimount  of  supplies  and  materials,  a  regiment 
of  cavalry,  and  five  batteries  of  artillery  had  been 
removed,  and  the  phrase  "  movement  has  com 
menced"  referred  obviously  to  the  movement  of 
the  main  army;  and  yet  General  Halleck  sets  his 
hand  and  gives  his  official  sanction  to  a  statement 
•which  distinctly  conveys  the  impression  that  none 
of  these  things  had  been  done  at  that  time  !  Com 
ment  is  unnecessary,  as  strong  facts  do  not  need 
the  aid  of  strong  language.* 

*A  passage  between  General  Halleck  and  General  McClel- 
lan  is  worthy  of  being  preserved  in  a  note,  as  one  of  the  curi 
osities  of  official  life.  On  the  12th  of  August,  General  McClel- 
lan's  head-quarters  were  at  Berkeley,  seventy  miles  from  James 
town  Island,  the  nearest  telegraph-office.  Being  desirous  of 
having  more  speedy  and  full  explanation  of  the  condition  of 
affairs  in  the  army  than  he  could  get  by  sending  a  steamer  to 
Jamestown  Island  and  waiting  ten  hours  for  a  reply,  he  pro 
posed  to  go  in  person  to  the  office,  and  so  informed  General 
Halleck  at  the  close  of  a  despatch  of  the  12th.  He  accordingly 
went  to  Jamestown  Island,  but  on  arriving  there  found  there 
was  an  interruption  in  the  electric  current,  so  that  he  was 
obliged  to  continue  on  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  across  the  Chesa 
peake  Bay  to  Cherry-Stone  Inlet,  on  the  "Eastern  Shore." 
He  arrived  there  late  in  the  evening,  and  immediately  sent  the 
following  dispatch  : — 

"CHERRY-STONE,  August  13,  1862,  11.30  P.M. 
"  Please  come  to  the  office;  wish  to  talk  to  you.     What  news 
from  Pope?  "  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

Major-  General. 
"Major-General  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Washington." 

The  next  day,  at  half-past  twelve,  he  sent  another  despatch, 
as  follows:  — 


276  TROOPS     IN     MOTION.  [1662. 

On  the  16th  of  August  all  the  troops  Avere  in 
motion  by  land  and  water,  and  late  in  the  afternoon 

"CHERRY-STONE  INLET,  August  14,  18G2,  12.30  A.M. 

"Started  to  Jamestown  Island  to  talk  with  you;  found  cable 
broken,  and  came  here.  Please  read  my  long  telegram.  All 
quiet  at  camp.  Enemy  burned  wharves  at  City  Point  yester 
day.  No  rebel  pickets  within  eight  (8)  miles  of  Coggin's 
Point  yesterday. 

"Richmond  prisoners  state  that  large  force  with  guns  left 
Richmond  northward  on  Sunday. 

"G.  B.   McCLELLAN, 

"  Major-  General. 
"Major-General  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Washington" 
To  which  the  following  reply  was  received: — 

"WASHINGTON,  August  14,  1862,  1.40  A.M. 
"I  have  read  your  despatch.  There  is  no  change  of  plans. 
You  will  send  up  your  troops  as  rapidly  as  possible.  There  is 
no  difficulty  in  landing  them.  According  to  your  own  accounts, 
there  is  now  no  difficulty  in  withdrawing  your  forces.  Do  so 
•with  all  possible  rapidity. 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  Major -General. 
"  Major-General  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

Before  General  McClellan  had  time  to  decipher  and  reply  to 
this  despatch,  the  telegraph-operator  in  Washington  informed 
him  that  General  Halleck  had  taken  his  hat  and  walked  out 
of  the  office  without  another  word  or  message !  General 
McClellan  then  telegraphed  thus  : — 

"  CHERRY-STONE  INLET,  August  14,  18G2,  1.40  A.M. 

"Your  orders  will  be  obeyed.  I  return  at  once.  I  had 
hoped  to  have  had  a  longer  and  fuller  conversation  with  you, 
after  travelling  so  far  for  the  purpose. 

"  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

' '  Major-  General. 
<c  Major-General  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Washington,  D.  (7." 


AGE  35.]  REMOVAL    COMPLETED.  277 

of  that  day,  when  the  last  man  had  disappeared 
from  the  deserted  camps,  General  McClellan  fol 
lowed  with  his  personal  staff  in  the  track  of  tho 
grand  Army  of  the  Potomac,  "  bidding  farewell," 
as  he  says  in  his  Keport,  uto  the  scenes  still  covered 
with  the  marks  of  its  presence,  and  to  be  ever  memo 
rable  in  history  as  the  vicinity  of  its  most  brilliant 
exploits."  On  the  20th  the  army  was  at  Yorktown, 
Fortress  Monroe,  and  Newport  News,  ready  to  em 
bark  for  whatever  might  be  its  destination. 

A  brief  extract  from  General  McClellan's  Eeport 
at  this  point  may  be  here  fittingly  introduced : — 

"  As  the  campaign  on  the  Peninsula  terminated  here, 
I  cannot  close  this  part  of  my  report  without  giving  an 
expression  of  my  sincere  thanks  and  gratitude  to  the 
officers  and  men  whom  I  had  the  honor  to  command. 

"  From  the  commencement  to  the  termination  of  this 
most  arduous  campaign,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  always 
evinced  the  most  perfect  subordination,  zeal,  and  alacrity 
in  the  performance  of  all  the  duties  required  of  it. 

"  The  amount  of  severe  labor  accomplished  by  this  army 
in  the  construction  of  intrenchments,  roads,  bridges,  &c. 
was  enormous ;  yet  all  the  work  was  performed  with  the 
most  gratifying  cheerfulness  and  devotion  to  the  interests 
of  the  service. 

"  During  the  campaign  ten  severely  contested  and  san 
guinary  battles  had  been  fought,  besides  numerous 
small  engagements,  in  which  the  troops  exhibited  the 
most  determined  enthusiasm  and  bravery.  They  submit 
ted  to  exposure,  sickness,  and  even  death,  without  a  mur 
mur.  Indeed,  they  had  become  veterans  in  their  coun 
try's  cause,  and  richly  deserved  the  warm  commendation 
of  the  Government. 

24 


278   DEPARTURE    P  0 11    ACQUIA    CREEK.          [];;G2. 

"  It  was  in  view  of  these  facts  that  this  seemed  to  me  an 
appropriate  occasion  for  the  general-in-chief  to  give,  in 
general  orders,  some  appreciative  expression  of  the  ser 
vices  of  the  army  while  upon  the  Peninsula.  Accord 
ingly,  on  the  18th,  1  sent  him  the  following  despatch : — 

"'HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  ) 
August  18.  1862,  11  P.M.  j 

" '  Please  say  a  kind  word  to  my  army,  that  I  can  repeat 
to  them  in  general  orders,  in  regard  to  their  conduct  at 
Yorktown,  Williamsburg,  West  Point,  Hanover  Court- 
House,  and  on  the  Chickahominy,  as  well  as  in  regard  to 
the  (7)  seven  days,  and  the  recent  retreat. 

"  '  No  one  has  ever  said  any  thing  to  cheer  them  but 
myself.  Say  nothing  about  me.  Merely  give  my  men 
and  officers  credit  for  what  they  have  done.  It  will  do 
you  much  good,  and  will  strengthen  you  much  with  them, 
if  you  issue  a  handsome  order  to  them  in  regard  to  what 
they  have  accomplished.  They  deserve  it. 

"'G.  B.  MCCLELLAN-, 

"  '  Major- General. 

"'Major-General  HALLECK, 

"'  Washington,  D.  C.' 

"  As  no  reply  was  received  to  this  communication,  and 
no  order  was  issued  by  the  general-in-chief,  I  conclude 
that  my  suggestion  did  not  meet  with  his  approbation." 

Immediately  on  reaching  Fortress  Monroe,  Gene 
ral  McClellan  gave  directions  for  strengthening  the 
defences  of  Yorktown,  so  as  to  resist  any  attack  from 
the  direction  of  Richmond,  and  left  General  Keyes, 
Avith  his  corps,  to  perform  the  work  and  tempora 
rily  to  garrison  the  place.  On  the  evening  of  the  23d 
he  sailed  with  his  staff  for  Acquia  Creek,  where  ho 
arrived  on  the  following  morning  and  reported  for 


AGE  35.]  ALEXANDRIA. 

orders.  On  the  2Gth  he  was  ordered  to  Alexan 
dria,  and  reached  there  the  same  day.  In  the 
mean  time  the  corps  of  Heintzelman  and  Porter 
had  sailed  from  Newport  News  and  Yorktown,  on 
the  19th,  20th,  and  21st,  to  join  General  Pope's 
army ;  and  those  of  Franklin  and  Simmer  followed 
a  day  or  two  after. 

General  McClellan  remained  at  Alexandria  till 
the  close  of  the  march.  A  brisk  intercourse  by 
telegraph  was  kept  tip  between  him  and  the 
commander-in-chief  with  reference  to  General 
Pope's  movements  and  the  defence  of  "Washington; 
but  no  specific  duty  was  assigned  to  him,  and  his 
brave  army  was  by  parcels  detached  from  him,  and 
sent  to  take  part  in  movements  in  regard  to  which 
it  is  easy  to  see  he  had  the  gravest  misgivings.  Few 
experiences  in  life  are  more  trying  than  to  seo 
things  going  wrong  and  have  no  power  to  prevent 
it.  The  following  extract  from  a  despatch  sent 
from  the  camp  near  Alexandria,  on  the  30th  of 
August,  while  the  disastrous  second  battle  of  Bull 
Kan  was  going  on,  shows  how  much  he  felt  and 
how  much  he  suppressed : — 

"  I  cannot  express  to  you  the  pain  and  mortification  I 
have  experienced  to-day  in  listening  to  the  distant  sound 
of  the  firing  of  my  men.  As  I  can  be  of  no  further  use 
here,  I  respectfully  ask  that,  if  there  is  a  probability  of 
the  conflict  being  renewed  to-morrow,  I  may  he  permit 
ted  to  go  to  the  scene  of  battle  with  my  staff,  merely  to 
be  with  my  own  men,  if  nothing  more:  they  will  light 
none  the  worse  for  my  being  with  them.  If  it  is  not 
deemed  best  to  intrust  me  with  the  command  even  of 


280  ORDER    FROM    THE    WAR    DEPARTMENT.         [1SC2. 

my  own  army,  I  simply  ask  to  be  permitted  to  share  their 
fate  on  the  field  of  battle/' 

On  the  30th,  the  following  order  was  issued  from 
the  War  Department : — 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  August  30,  1862. 

"  The  following  are  the  commanders  of  the  armies  ope 
rating  in  Virginia : — 

"  General  Burnside  commands  his  own  corps,  except 
those  that  have  been  temporarily  detached  and  assigned 
to  General  Pope. 

"  General  McClellan.  commands  that  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  that  has  not  been  sent  forward  to 
General  Pope's  command. 

"  General  Pope  commands  the  Army  of  Virginia  and 
all  the  forces  temporarily  attached  to  it.  All  the  forces 
are  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Halleck,  gene- 
ral-in-chief. 

"  E.  D.  TOWXSEXD, 
"  Assistant  Adjutant- General." 

The  practical  effect  of  this  order  was  that  Gene 
ral  McClellan  had  no  control  over  anybody,  except 
his  staff,  some  hundred  men  in  camp  near  Alexan 
dria,  and  a  few  troops  at  Fortress  Monroe. 


CHAPTEE  X. 

THE  campaign  of  General  Pope  in  Virginia  was 
closed  with  the  disastrous  battle  of  August  30, 
1862,  fought  on  the  ill-omened  field  of  Bull  Run, 


PRESIDENT     LINCOLN.  281 


and  with  that  of  Chantilly,  two  days  after,  in  which 
our  success  was  dearly  bought  by  the  loss  of  two 
of  the  best  officers  in  the  service,  General  Stevens 
and  General  Kearney.  On  the  1st  of  September 
General  McClellan  went  into  Washington,  where  he 
had  an  interview  with  General  Halleck,  who  in 
structed  him  verbally  to  take  command  of  the 
defences  of  the  place,  with  authority  expressly  lim 
ited  to  the  works  and  their  garrisons,  and  not  ex 
tending  to  the  troops  in  front  under  General  Pope. 
On  the  same  day  General  McClellan  waited  upon 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  at  the  house  of 
General  Halleck,  and  in  obedience  to  a  message 
from  him.  He  was  then  and  there  told  by  the  Presi 
dent  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  not  cheerfully  co-operating 
with  and  supporting  General  Pope,  and  was  asked 
to  use  his  influence  in  correcting  this  state  of  things. 
General  McClellan  replied  that  the  information 
could  not  be  true,  and  that  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  whatever  might  be  their  estimate  of  General 
Pope,  would  obey  his  orders  and  do  their  duty. 
'But  this  did  not  satisfy  the  President,  who  seemed 
much  moved  during  the  interview;  and,  at  his  ear 
nest  arid  reiterated  request,  General  McClellan  tele 
graphed  to  General  Porter  as  follows : — 

"WASHINGTON,  September  1,  1SG2. 

"  I  ask  of  you,  for  my  sake,  that  of  the  country,  and 
the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  you  and  all  my 
friends  will  lend  the  fullest  and  most  cordial  co-operation 
to  General  Pope  in  all  the  operations  now  going  on.  The 
destinies  of  our  country,  the  honor  of  our  army,  are  at 


282  GENERAL    PORTER.  [1362. 

stake,  and  all  depends  now  upon  the  cheerful  co-opera 
tion  of  all  in  the  field.  This  week  is  the  crisis  of  our  fate. 
Say  the  same  thing  to  my  friends  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  that  the  last  request  I  have  to  make  of 
them  is  that,  for  their  country's  sake,  they  will  extend 
to  General  Pope  the  same  support  they  ever  have  to  me. 

"  I  am  in  charge  of  the  defences  of  Washington,  and 
am  doing  all  I  can  to  render  your  retreat  safe,  should 
that  become  necessary. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAX. 

"  Major-General  PORTER." 

General  Porter  sent  the  following  reply  :  — 


COURT-HOUSE,  10  A.M.,  September  2,  1862. 
"  You  may  rest  assured  that  all  your  friends,  as  well  as 
every  lover  of  his  country,  will  ever  give,  as  they  have 
given,  to  General  Pope  their  cordial  co-operation  and  con 
stant  support  in  the  execution  of  all  orders  and  plans. 
Our  killed,  wounded,  and  enfeebled  troops  attest  our 
devoted  duty. 

"F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-  General. 
"General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
"  Washington." 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  General  McClelland 
message,  unexplained,  is  open  to  the  obvious  infer 
ence  that  he  had  some  doubt  whether  General  Por 
ter  and  the  troops  under  him  would  be  faithful  in 
the  discharge  of  their  duty  to  the  nation  and  its 
cause;  but  no  such  impression  ever  crossed  his 
mind,  and  what  he  did  was  done  solely  at  the  Pre 
sident's  request. 

On  the  same  day,  September  2,  the  roads  leading 


AGE  35.]     GEN.  MCCLELLAN    AGAIN    IN    COMMAND.      283 

into  Washington  from  the  west  began  to  be  filled 
with  the  broken  fragments  of  a  defeated  and  de 
moralized  army,  like  a  lee  shore  strewn  with  the 
wreck  of  a  noble  fleet.  Ambulances  moved  slowly 
along  with  their  mournful  freight  of  wounded  men. 
Groups  and  squads  of  straggling  soldiers  appeared, 
weary  and  footsore,  some  slightly  hurt,  and  all  dis 
pirited,  some  sadly  silent,  and  some  uttering  curses 
and  threats.  The  emergency  of  the  case  required 
immediate  action;  and  in  view  of  the  attachment  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  their  late  commander, 
and  of  their  unabated  confidence  in  him,  the  Pre 
sident  of  the  United  States  did  the  best  and  wisest 
thing  he  could  have  done  under  the  circumstances: 
he  turned  to  General  McClellan  for  help.  In  a  per 
sonal  interview,  he  begged  of  the  latter  to  reassume 
command  of  the  forces,  make  provisions  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  capital,  and  act  according  to  the  best 
of  his  judgment  for  the  common  cause.  Xot  readily, 
not  without  a  good  deal  of  anxious  misgiving,  did 
General  McClellan  yield;  but  he  did  yield  at  last" 
He  accepted  the  trust,  and  instantly  began  the  dis 
charge  of  its  duties  with  his  wonted  energy.  Aides 
were  sent  out  to  the  commanders  of  divisions,  with 
instructions  to  move  their  commands  to  designated 
points.  On  the  very  day  of  his  reappointment, 
General  McClellan  was  himself  in  the  saddle,  giving 
personal  directions  to  portions  of  the  advancing 
army;  and  the  next  day  he  was  at  Alexandria, 
rectifying  the  positions  of  the  troops  and  issuing 
necessary  orders. 

The  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  soon 


284  JOY     OF     THE     ARMY.  [1862. 

as  they  learned  that  their  beloved  commander  was 
to  lead  them  again,  took  heart  once  'more.  Confi 
dence  returned.  "Hope  elevated  and  joy  bright 
ened  their  crests."  Missing  men  reappeared,  the 
broken  fragments  of  divisions  and  brigades  were 
reunited,  order  reigned  anew  in  the  lately  disordered 
files,  and  the  shattered  and  demoralized  host  began 
instantly  to  assume  the  method  and  proportions  of 
an  army,  with  "degree,  priority,  and  place."  Be 
fore  the  close  of  that  very  2d  of  September,  such 
dispositions  were  made  as  insured  the  successful 
defence  of  Washington  against  any  attack  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Potomac.* 

*  "To-day,  by  order  of  the  President,  General  McClellan  has 
again  assumed  the  supreme  command  of  the  army.  Imme 
diately  after  accepting  the  chief  command  of  all  the  Union 
forces  in  the  neighborhood  of  Washington,  General  McClellau 
proceeded  to  inspect  the  troops  and  fortifications  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river.  This  occupied  him  until  after  midnight. 
His  reception  by  the  officers  and  soldiers  was  marked  by  the 
most  unbounded  enthusiasm.  In  every  camp  his  arrival  was 
greeted  by  hearty  and  prolonged  cheering,  and  manifestations 
of  the  wildest  delight.  Many  of  the  soldiers  who  fought  under 
him  in  the  hardest  battles  of  the  war  wept  with  joy  at  again 
having  for  their  commander  one  upon  whom  they  could  place 
implicit  reliance.  Already  his  hurried  visit  to  our  camps  has 
wrought  a  remarkable  change  in  the  soldiers.  His  presence 
seemed  to  act  magically  upon  them  :  despondency  is  replaced 
by  confidence,  and  all  are  glad  that  McClellan  will  hereafter 
direct  them." — EUiis  Leaves  from  the  Diary  of  an  Army  Surgeon, 
p.  214. 

' '  To-riight  the  Union  army  will  all  be  concentrated  in  the  works 
around  this  city,  and  General  McClellan  has  already  assumed 
the  position  of  commander- in-chief  of  all  the  forces  in  the  field 


Ac  E  .15.]  MARCH     0  F     THE     A  R  M  Y. 

But  this  was  not  the  intention  of  the  enemy;  for 
on  the  3d  he  had  disappeared  from  the  front  of 
Washington,  and  the  information  received  of  his 
movements  indueed  the  belief  that  he  intended  to 
cross  the  Upper  Potomac  into  Maryland.  This 
made  an  active  campaign  necessary  in  order  to 
cover  Baltimore,  prevent  the  invasion  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  clear  Maryland;  and  measures  were  im 
mediately  taken  accordingly.  General  Banks  was 
left  in  command  of  the  defences  of  Washington ; 
and  on  the  4th  of  September  a  forward  movement 
of  the  army  was  commenced,  and  General  McClel- 
lan  himself  left  the  capital  and  took  the  field  on 
the  7th.  At  this  time  it  was  known  that  the  mass 
of  the  rebel  army  had  passed  up  the  south  side  of 
the  Potomac,  in  the  direction  of  Leesburg,  and  that 
a  portion  had  crossed  into  Maryland ;  but  whether 
they  intended  to  send  over  their  whole  force  with  a 
view  to  turn  Washington  by  a  flank  movement  down 
the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac,  or  to  move  on  Bal 
timore,  or  to  invade  Pennsylvania,  were  matters  of 
uncertainty.  This  constrained  General  McClellan  to 
proceed  with  great  caution  for  a  few  days,  and  so  move 
as  to  keep  both  Baltimore  and  Washington  covered, 
and  at  the  same  time  hold  the  troops  in  readiness 
to  follow  the  enemy  if  he  went  into  Pennsylvania. 

The  general  course  of  the  march  was  in  a  north 
westerly  direction,  the  points  of  destination  being 
the  city  of  Frederick,  in  Maryland,  and  its  vicinity. 

in  this  part  of  the  country.  The  announcement  of  this  Tatter 
fact  has  been  hailed  with  acclamations  of  infinite  deligut  by 
nearly  the  whole  population." — Same,  p.  218. 


28G  MARCH     OF     THE     ARMY.  [1SC2. 

The  army  moved  in  five  columns,  stretching  across 
the  region  embraced  between  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Potomac.  The  left  always 
rested  on  the  river,  and  the  extreme  right  was  as 
far  out  as  Cooksville.  On  the  14th  of  September, 
Burnside  and  Sumner,  each  with  two  corps,  were 
at  South  Mountain,  Franklin's  corps  and  Couch's 
division  were  at  Burkettsville,  and  Sykes's  division 
was  at  Middletown. 

As  soon  as  General  McClellan  had  left  Washing 
ton,  an  active  intercourse  by  telegraph-wires  began 
to  be  kept  up  between  him  and  the  authorities  there, 
especially  the  President  of  the  United  States  and 
the  conimander-in-chicf.  The  communications  sent 
to  General  McClellan  are  tinged  with  a  questioning 
and  complaining  spirit,  showing  that  he  no  more 
enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Administration  than 
during  the  campaign  in  Virginia,  and  forcing  upon 
him  the  conviction  that  his  appointment  was  rather 
extorted  from  them  in  deference  to  the  strong  senti 
ment  of  the  army  than  as  a  spontaneous  movement 
of  their  own.  General  Halleck's  mind  was  dark 
ened  with  apprehensions  for  the  safety  of  the  capi 
tal,  and  he  feared  that  General  McClellan's  move 
ments  were  too  precipitate,  and  that  he  was  ex 
posing  his  front  and  rear.  Upon  these  views  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  General  McClellan  remarks,  in 
his  Eeport, — 

"  The  importance  of  moving  with  all  due  caution,  so 
as  not  to  uncover  the  national  capital  until  the  enemy's 
position  and  plans  were  developed,  was,  1  believe,  fully 
appreciated  by  me  ;  and,  as  my  troops  extended  from  the 


AGE  35.]  G  E  N  E 11  A  I,     II  A  L  L  E  C  K  '  S     T  i:  S  T  I  M  O  N  Y.  287 

Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  to  the  Potomac,  with  the 
extreme  left  flank  moving  along  that  stream,  and  with 
strong  pickets  left  in  rear  to  watch  and  guard  all  the 
available  fords,  I  did  not  regard  my  left  or  rear  as  in  any 
degree  exposed.  But  it  appears  from  the  foregoing  tele 
grams  that  the  general-in-chief  was  of  a  different  opinion, 
and  that  my  movements  were,  in  his  judgment,  too  pre 
cipitate  not  only  for  the  safety  of  "Washington,  Jbut  also 
for  the  security  of  my  left  and  rear. 

"  The  precise  nature  of  these  daily  injunctions  against  a 
precipitate  advance  may  now  be  perceived.  The  general- 
in-chief,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  says,  '  In  respect  to  General  McClel- 
lan's  going  too  fast,  or  too  far  from  Washington,  there  can 
he  found  no  such  telegram  from  me  to  him.  He  has  mis 
taken  the  meaning  of  the  telegrams  I  sent  him.  I  tele 
graphed  him  that  he  was  going  too  far,  not  from  Wash 
ington,  but  from  the  Potomac,  leaving  General  Lee  the 
opportunity  to  come  down  the  Potomac  and  get  between 
him  and  Washington.  I  thought  General  McClellan 
should  keep  more  on  the  Potomac,  and  press  forward  his 
left  rather  than  his  right,  so  as  the  more  readily  to  relieve 
Harper's  Ferry/ 

"As  I  can  find  no  telegram  from  the  general-in-chief 
recommending  me  to  keep  my  left  flank  nearer  the  Po 
tomac,  I  am  compelled  to  believe  that  when  he  gave  this 
testimony  he  had  forgotten  the  purport  of  the  telegrams 
above  quoted,  and  had  also  ceased  to  remember  the  fact, 
well  known  to  him  at  the  time,  that  my  left,  from  the 
time  I  left  Washington,  always  rested  on  the  Potomac,  and 
that  my  centre  was  continually  in  position  to  reinforce 
the  left  or  right,  as  occasion  might  require.  Had  I  ad 
vanced  my  left  flank  along  the  Potomac  more  rapidly 
than  the  other  columns  marched  upon  the  roads  to  the 
right,  I  should  have  thrown  that  flank  out  of  supporting 
distance  of  the  other  troops,  and  greatly  exposed  it.  And 


£88  MOVEMENTS    OF    THE    CO  N  FEDERATE  S.  [1SC2. 

if  I  had  rn arched  the  entire  army  in  one  column  along  the 
banks  of  the  river,  instead  of  upon  five  different  parallel 
roads,  the  column,  with  its  trains,  would  have  extended 
about  fifty  miles,  and  the  enemy  might  have  defeated  the 
advance  before  the  rear  could  have  reached  the  scene  of 
action.  Moreover,  such  a  movement  would  have  unco 
vered  the  communications  with  Baltimore  and  Wash 
ington  on  our  right,  and  exposed  our  left  and  rear.  I 
presume  it  will  be  admitted  by  every  military  man  that 
it  was  necessary  to  move  the  army  in  such  order  that  it 
could  at  any  time  be  concentrated  for  battle ;  and  I  am 
of  opinion  that  this  object  could  not  have  been  accom 
plished  in  any  other  way  than  the  one  employed.  Any 
other  disposition  of  our  forces  would  have  subjected  them 
to  defeat  in  detached  fragments." 

In  the  mean  time  the  Confederate  army  had  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  two  fords  near  Point  of  Rocks,  en 
tered  Maryland,  and  marched  as  far  as  Frederick, 
which  they  reached  and  occupied  on  the  6th.  The 
main  body  of  the  army  encamped  for  some  days  on 
a  line  between  Frederick  and  the  Potomac  River. 
Recruiting-offices  were  opened  in  the  city,  and  citi 
zens  invited  to  enlist ;  but  very  few  recruits  were 
obtained.  An  address  was  issued  to  the  people 
of  Maryland  by  General  Lee,  but  no  enthusiastic 
response  was  made ;  and  the  Confederate  leaders 
were  much  disappointed  at  the  coldness  and  in 
difference  with  which  they  were  received. 

On  the  10th,  General  Lee  began  to  evacuate 
Frederick,  and,  taking  the  road  to  Hagerstown, 
crossed  the  Catoctin  Mountains,  passed  through  the 
valley  in  which  Middletown  is  situated,  and  drew 
up  his  forces  along  the  crest  of  South  Mountain,  to 


AGE  SJ.]  BATTLE  OF  SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.     289 

await  the  advance  of  General  McClellan.  At  the 
same  time  he  detached  a  portion  of  his  force, 
amounting  to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  sent 
them,  under  command  of  General  Jackson,  to  Har 
per's  Ferry,  by  the  Williamsport  road.  On  the  13th, 
the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy's  army  was  found  in 
strong  position  at  Turner's  Gap  of  the  South  Moun 
tain,  over  which  the  main  road  from  Frederick  to 
Hagerstown  is  carried;  and  preparations  were  made 
for  an  attack  the  next  morning.  The  position  of 
the  Confederates  was  very  strong  on  the  sides  and 
summit  of  the  mountain,  both  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  gap.  The  battle  began  on  the  morning 
of  the  14th,  but  was  some  hours  merely  an  artillery 
duel,  with  no  very  decisive  results,  though,  on  the 
whole,  with  gain  to  our  side.  At  three,  our  line  of 
battle  was  formed,  and  orders  were  given  to  move 
the  whole  forward,  and  take  or  silence  the  enemy's 
batteries.  They  were  executed  with  enthusiasm 
and  complete  success.  Our  right,  centre,  and  left 
advanced  simultaneously  towards  the  enemy,  un 
broken  by  a  fire  from  two  pieces  of  cannon  which 
played  upon  our  columns  for  upwards  of  an  hour 
before  they  were  silenced  by  our  batteries.  The 
right  wing,  where  General  Hooker  was  in  command, 
was  first  engaged,  and  the  left  followed  at  no  long 
interval.  The  tactics  and  order  of  battle  were 
simple,  and  substantially  the  same  all  along  the 
line.  Steadily,  without  pause  or  wavering,  our 
gallant  troops  pressed  up  the  slope,  and  delivered 
heavy  volleys  of  musketry  as  they  came  within 
range.  It  was  for  some  time  a  hot  and  steady  fight 


290  CRAMPTON'S  PASS.  [1302. 

of  man  against  man,  company  against  company, 
regiment  against  regiment.  The  woods,  the  ledges 
of  rock,  all  the  natural  lines  of  attack  and  defence, 
were  for  some  time  blazing  with  steady  sheets  of 
dazzling  flame  and  ringing  with  sharp  volleys. 
But  our  line  moved  on  with  the  sweeping  and  irre 
sistible  force  of  a  mighty  flood,  and  the  Confede 
rates  soon  began  to  waver  and  give  way.  They 
were  driven  up  to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and 
thence  down  on  the  other  side.  A^six  o'clock  the 
enemy  had  been  beaten  from  all  their  positions, 
and  we  held  undisturbed  poss_ej3sj.pj£5£jj[ie_  heights. 
The"  battle  of  South  Mountain  reflected  hi«Hi 

O 

honor  upon  the  officers  and  men  who  took  part  in 
it.  The  judicious  plans  of  the  general  commanding 
were  admirably  and  successfully  carried  out.  Our 
numbers  were  probably  somewhat  larger  than  the 
enemy's;  but  this  advantage  was  more  than  counter 
balanced  by  his  superiority  in  position,  on  the  crest 
and  sides  of  a  hill,  with  woods  and  rocky  ledges  for 
shelter  and  defence,  and  broken  ground  everywhere 
to  embarrass  the  movements  of  our  troops. 

Our  losses  were  three  hundred  and  twelve  killed, 
twelve  hundred  and  thirty-four  wounded,  twenty- 
two  missing.  Among  the  killed  was  General  Eeno, 
a  brave  and  valuable  officer,  who  was  General 
McClellan's  classmate  at  West  Point. 

At  the  same  time  with  the  battle  of  South  Moun 
tain,  an  engagement  took  place  at  Crampton's  Pass, 
between  a  division  under  General  Franklin  and  a 
portion  of  the  Confederate  army.  The  enemy  were 
found  in  the  rear  of  Burkettsville,  at  the  base  of 


AGE  35.]    SURRENDER    OF    HARPER'S   FERRY.    291 

the  mountain,  with  infantry  posted  in  force  on  both 
sides  of  the  road,  and  artillery  in  strong  positions 
to  defend  the  approaches  to  the  Pass.  They  were 
forced  from  their  positions  by  a  steady  charge  of 
our  line,  and  driven  up  the  slope,  and  at  the  end  of 
three  hours'  fighting  the  crest  was  carried,  and  the 
enemy  fled  down  the  mountain  on  the  other  side. 

On  the  12th  of  September,  the  Confederate  force 
under  General  Jackson,  which  had  been  detached 
for  the  purpose,  appeared  before  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  on  the  15th  the  unfortunate  and  humiliating 
surrender  of  that  position  took  place, — the  Union 
cavalry  having,  on  the  night  of  the  14th,  cut  their 
way  through  the  enemy's  line  and  reached  Green- 
castle,  Pa.,  in  safety  the  next  morning.  The  un 
toward  surrender  of  this  post  awakened  a  very 
strong  feeling  throughout  the  country,  and  a  court 
of  inquiry  was  immediately  summoned  to  investi 
gate  the  circumstances.  The  court  met  in  Wash 
ington  on  the  25th  of  September,  and  their  report 
was  published  early  in  November.  It  gives  a  de 
tailed  narrative  of  the  surrender,  and  states  the 
conclusion  that  "  the  incapacity"  of  Colonel  Miles, 
the  commanding  officer  (who,  happily  for  him,  was 
killed  during  the  assault),  "  amounting  almost  to 
imbecility,  led  to  the  shameful  surrender  of  this 
important  post."  The  report  also  strongly  reflects 
upon  "  the  military  incapacity"  of  Colonel  Ford,  the 
officer  second  in  command,  in  consequence  of  which 
he  was  dismissed  from  the  service  of  the  United 
States. 

But  the  military   commission    diverges  a  little 


292       SURRENDER     OF     II  A  R  P  E  R  '  S    FERRY. 

from  its  legitimate  path  of  inquiry,  and  lends  itself 
to  the  persistent  hostility  with  which  General  Mc- 
Clellan  was  pursued  by  the  general-in-chief.  in  the 
paragraphs  following : — 

"The  commission  has  remarked  freely  on  Colonel  Miles, 
an  old  officer,  who  has  been  killed  in  the  service  of  his 
country  ;  and  it  cannot,  from  any  motives  of  delicacy,  re 
frain  from  censuring  those  in  high  command  when  it 
thinks  such  censure  deserved. 

"  The  general-in-chief  has  testified  that  General  McClel- 
lan,  after  having  received  orders  to  repel  the  enemy  in 
vading  the  State  of  Maryland,  marched  only  six  miles  per 
day,  on  an  average,  when  pursuing  this  invading  enemy. 

''The  general-in-chief  also  testifies  that,  in  his  opinion, 
he  could  and  should  have  relieved  and  protected  Har 
per's  Ferry  ;  and  in  this  opinion  the  commission  fully 
concur." 

Upon  these  charges  General  McClellan  quietly 
and  pertinently  remarks  in  his  Report. — 

"  I  have  been  greatly  surprised  that  this  commission,  in 
its  investigations  never  called  upon  me,  nor  upon  any 
officer  of  my  staff,  nor,  so  far  as  I  know,  upon  any  officer 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  able  to  give  an  intelligent 
statement  of  the  movements  of  that  army.  But  another 
paragraph  in  the  same  report  makes  testimony  from  such 
sources  quite  superfluous.  It  is  as  follows  : — 

" '  By  a  reference  to  the  evidence  it  will  be  seen  that,  at 
the  very  moment  Colonel  Ford  abandoned  Maryland 
Heights,  his  little  army  was  in  reality  relieved  by  Gene 
rals  Franklin's  and  Sumner's  corps  at  Crampton's  Gap, 
within  seven  miles  of  his  position.' 

"The  corps  of  Generals  Franklin  and  Sumner  were  a 
part  of  the  army  which  I  at  that  time  had  the  honor  to 


ACB35.]    SURRENDER    OF    HARPER'S    FERRY.     293 

command,  and  they  were  acting  under  my  orders  at 
Crampton's  Gap  and  elsewhere;  and  if,  as  the  commis 
sion  states,  Colonel  Ford's  '  little  army  was  in  reality 
relieved'  by  those  oflicers,  it  was  relieved  by  me." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  general-in-chief  tes 
tifies  arid  the  commission  reports  on  an  issue  not 
then  legitimately  on  trial ;  and  that  is,  the  rate  at 
which  the  army  of  General  McClellan  marched 
during  the  Maryland  campaign.  Good  haters 
should  have  good  memories;  and  the  general-in- 
chief  had  apparently  forgotten,  when  he  was  cen- 
Buring  General  McClellan  before  the  commission 
for  moving  only  six  miles  a  day,  that  only  a  short 
time  before  he  had  been  apprehensive  that  the 
army  was  going  too  fast,  and  was  thus  uncovering 
Washington  as  well  as  exposing  its  own  front  and 
rear. 

Why,  in  point  of  fact,  the  army  moved  no  more 
than  six  miles  a  day  may  be  easily  explained. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  not  distinctly  known 
where  the  rebel  army  was  going,  and  it  was  neces 
sary  to  proceed  cautiously,  so  as  to  keep  watch 
upon  it  and  be  ready  to  anticipate  and  foil  any 
sudden  movement.  In  the  second  place,  the  in-- 
vading  army  was  well  organized,  well  disciplined," 
led  by  a  skilful  commander,  and  flushed  with  vic 
tory,  whereas  our  own  was  demoralized  by  a  re 
cent  defeat  and  by  a  sudden  change  in  command; 
and  these  slow  marches  were  necessary  for  organ 
ization  and  consolidation,  and  to  establish  true  re 
lations  between  the  soldiers  and  their  new  leader. 

But    to    return    to    the    surrender   of    Harper's 


294       SURRENDER    OF    HARPER    S    FERRY. 

Ferry.  Before  General  McClellan  left  Washington, 
he  recommended  to  the  proper  authorities  that  tho 
garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  should  he  withdrawn 
hy  way  of  Hagcrstown  to  aid  in  covering  the  Cum 
berland  Valley,  or  that,  taking  up  the  pontoon 
bridge  and  obstructing  the  railroad  bridge,  it  should 
fall  back  to  the  Maryland  Heights  and  there  hold 
out  to  the  last.  This  was  unquestionably  judicious 
advice;  but  it  was  not  deemed  proper  to  adopt 
either  of  the  plans  suggested.  The  garrison  was 
not  withdrawn, — as  would  have  been  the  wiser 
course,  for  the  position  was  of  no  value  as  a 
strategic  point,  as  the  enemy's  troops  then  stood, 
— nor  were  measures  taken  to  protect  them  from 
capture. 

It  was  not  until  the  12th  that  General  McClellan 
was  directed  to  assume  command  of  the  garrison  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  as  soon  as  he  should  open  commu 
nication  with  that  place ;  but  when  this  order  was  re 
ceived,  all  communication  from  the  direction  he  was 
approaching  was  cut  off.  Nothing,  therefore,  was  left 
to  be  done  but  to  endeavor  to  relieve  the  garrison. 
Artillery  was  ordered  to  be  fired  by  our  advance, 
at  frequent  intervals,  as  a  signal  that  relief  was 
at  hand ;  and  these  reports,  as  was  afterwards 
ascertained,  were  distinctly  heard  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  It  was  confidently  expected  that  Colonel 
Miles  would  hold  out  till  our  forces  had  carried  the 
mountain-passes  and  were  in  a  condition  to  send  a 
detachment  to  his  relief;  and  this  he  assuredly 
might  have  done,  had  he  been  competent  to  the 
important  command  intrusted  to  him.  And  it  was 


Ac  E  33.]    S  U  R  R  E  N  I)  V.  II    OF    II  A  R  I'  E  R  '  S    F  E  R  R  Y.     29,J 

with  a  view  of  relieving  the  garrison  at  Harper's 
Ferry  that  Franklin's  column  was  ordered  to  move 
through  Crampton's  Pass,  in  front  of  Burkctts- 
villo,  while  the  centre  and  right  marched  upon 
Turner's  Pass  in  front  of  Middletown. 

On  the  14th  a  verbal  message  from  Colonel  Miles 
reached  General  McClcllan,  which  was  the  first 
authentic  intelligence  the  latter  had  received  as  to 
the  condition  of  things  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Tho 
messenger  reported  as  to  the  position  of  our  force 
there,  and  stated  that  Colonel  Miles  instructed  him 
to  say  that  he  could  hold  out  \vith  certainty  two 
days  longer.  General  McClcllan  directed  him  to 
make  his  way  back,  if  possible,  with  the  informa 
tion  that  he  was  rapidly  approaching  and  felt  con 
fident  that  he  could  relieve  the  place.  It  does  not 
appear  that  this  message  ever  reached  Colonel 
Miles. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  General  McClellan 
addressed  a  letter  to  Colonel  Miles,  giving  him  in 
structions  and  information,  assuring  him  that  tho 
centre  was  making  every  effort  to  relieve  him,  and 
entreating  him  to  hold  out  to  the  last  extremity. 
Three  copies  of  this  letter  were  sent  by  three  dif 
ferent  couriers  on  three  different  routes,  but  none 
of  them  succeeded  in  reaching  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  previous  day,  September  13,  General 
McClellan  had  sent  to  General  Franklin  a  letter 
of  detailed  instructions  as  to  his  movements,  and 
further  orders  were  despatched  on  the  following 
clay. 

The  results  of  the  battle  of  South  Mountain — 


296  BATTLE     OF     ANTIETAM.  [1802. 

considering  Franklin's  attack  on  Crampton's  Pass 
as  a  part  of  one  general  and  concerted  plan — re 
sponded  exactly  to  General  McClellan's  hopes  and 
wishes;  and  the  close  of  the  action,  on  the  evening 
of  the  14th,  found  General  Franklin's  advance 
"within  six  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry.  A  despatch 
was  sent  to  him  from  head-quarters  during  the 
night  of  the  14th,  containing  instructions  as  to  his 
movements  in  case  he  should  succeed  in  opening 
communication  with  Colonel  Miles;  and  this  would 
have  been  done  had  the  place  held  out  for  twenty- 
four  hours  longer.  But  the  surrender  was  made 
at  eight  A.M.  on  the  15th. 

Upon  a  fair  examination  of  the  case,  it  cannot 
be  maintained  that  General  McClellan  is  guilty 
of  the  charge  made  by  the  general-in-chief,  and 
sanctioned  by  the  Committee  of  Inquiry,  that  he 
failed  to  relieve  and  protect  Harper's  Ferry,  having 
the  power  to  do  so. 

THE    BATTLE    OF   ANTIETAM. 

The  pursuit  of  the  enemy  followed  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  South  Mountain,  and  on  the  15th 
they  were  found  strongly  posted  behind  Antietam 
Creek,  near  Sharpsburg.  Our  troops  were  not  up 
in  sufficient  force  to  begin  the  attack  on  that  day. 
The  ground  occupied  by  the  Confederates  was  a 
rugged  and  wooded  plateau,  descending  to  the 
banks  of  the  Antietam,  which  is  here  a  deep 
stream,  with  few  fords,  and  crossed  by  three  stone 
bridges.  On  all  favorable  points  the  enemy's  ar- 


AGE":.]  BATTLE     OF     ANTIETAJU.  1^97 

tillcry  was  posted;  and  their  reserves,  hidden  from 
view  by  the  hills  on  which  their  line  of  battle  was 
formed,  could  manoeuvre  without  being  seen  by 
our  army,  and,  from  the  shortness  of  their  line, 
could  easily  reinforce  any  point  which  needed 
strengthening.  Their  position,  stretching  across 
the  space  included  between  the  Potomac  and  the 
Antietam,  their  flanks  and  rear  protected  by  these 
streams,  was  very  strong,  and  it  had  the  further 
advantage  of  masking  their  numbers  frcm  our  ob 
servation. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  it  was  discovered 
that  the  enemy  had  changed  the  position  of  his 
batteries;  and  the  whole  forenoon  was  spent  in 
reconnoitring,  in  examining  the  ground,  finding 
fords,  clearing  the  approaches,  and  hurrying  up 
the  ammunition  and  supply  trains,  which  had  been 
delayed  by  the  rapid  march  of  the  troops.  About 
daylight  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery 
on  our  guns  in  position,  which  was  promptly  re 
turned.  Their  fire  was  silenced  for  the  time,  but  it 
was  frequently  renewed  during  the  day. 
•—"General  McClellan's  plan  was  to  attack  tho 
enemy's  left  with  the  corps  of  Hooker  and  Mans 
field,  supported  by  Simmer's,  and,  if  necessary,  by 
Franklin's;  and,  in  case  of  success  at  this  point,  to 
move  Eurnside's  corps  against  the  enemy's  ex 
treme  right,  and,  having  carried  their  position,  to 
press  along  the  crest  towards  our  right,  and,  when 
ever  either  of  these  flank  movements  should  bo 
successful,  to  advance  our  centre  with  all  the  forces 
then  disposable.  The  general  in  command  himself 


298  BATTLE     OF     ANTIETAM. 


occupied  a  ridge  on  the  centre,  where  Porter's 
corps,  including  Sykes's  division,  was  stationed  as 
a  reserve. 

About  three  o'clock,  General  Hooker  crossed  the 
Antietam  by  the  bridge  on  the  Hagerstown  road 
and  an  adjacent  ford,  and  soon  gained  the  crest  of 
the  hill  on  the  right  bank  of  the  stream.  He  then 

O 

turned  to  the  left,  and  followed  down  the  ridge, 
under  a  sharp  fire  of  musketry,  which  lasted  till 
dark. 

During  the  night,  General  Mansfield's  corps 
crossed  the  Antietam  by  the  same  bridge  and  ford 
used  by  Hooker's. 

At  daylight  on  the  17th,  General  Hooker  at 
tacked  the  enemy's  forces  before  him,  and  drove 
them  from  the  open  field  in  front  of  the  first  line 
of  woods  into  a  second  line  of  woods  beyond.  But 
out  of  this  second  line  a  very  destructive  fire  was 
poured  from  a  body  of  fresh  troops,  before  which 
our  own  forces  recoiled.  General  Mansfield's  corps 
was  now  ordered  up,  and  came  promptly  into  ac 
tion;  and  for  about  two  hours  the  tide  of  battle 
swayed  to  and  fro  with  varying  fortunes.  The 
scene  of  the  heaviest  fighting  was  a  piece  of 
ploughed  land,  nearly  enclosed  by  woods,  and 
entered  by  a  corn-field  in  the  rear,  on  the  crest  of 
the  hill.  Three  or  four  times  this  position  was 
taken  and  lost,  and  the  ground  was  thickly  strewn 
with  the  bodies  of  the  dead.  Early  in  the  fight, 
the  gallant  veteran  General  Mansfield  was  mor 
tally  wounded.  General  llartsuff,  of  Hooker's 
corps,  and  General  Crawford,  of  Mansfield's  corps, 


AGE  :;5.]  BATTLE    OF    ANTIETAM.  299 

were  both  wounded,  the  former  scvercl}'.  Between 
nine  and  ten,  General  Hooker,  who  had  shown  ex 
cellent  conduct  and  the  most  brilliant  courage,  was 
shot  through  the  foot,  and,  after  having  fainted 
with  pain,  was  obliged  to  leave  the  field. 

At  this  time  General  Simmer's  corps  reached 
this  portion  of  the  field,  and  became  hotly  engaged ; 
but  it  suffered  severely  from  a  heavy  fire  of  mus 
ketry  and  shell  from  the  enemy's  breast-works  and 
batteries,  and  portions  of  the  line  were  compelled 
to  withdraw.  General  Sedgwick  and  General  Dana 
were  seriously  wounded,  and  taken  from  the  field. 
On  the  left,  General  Richardson  wras  mortally 
wounded,  and  General  Meagher  disabled  by  the 
fall  of  his  horse,  shot  under  him. 

At  one  o'clock  the  aspect  of  affairs  on  our  right 
flank  was  not  promising.  Our  troops  had  suffered 
severely,  and  our  loss  in  officers  had  been  frightful. 
Portions  of  our  force  were  scattered  and  demoral 
ized,  and  the  corn-field  before  mentioned  was  in 
the  enemy's  possession.  We  were  in  no  condition 
to  assume  the  offensive,  and  hardly  able  to  hold 
the  positions  we  had  gained.  At  this  time  General 
Franklin  arrived  upon  the  field  with  fresh  troops; 
and  while  one  of  his  divisions,  under  Slocum,  was 
sent  forward  on  the  left  to  the  support  of  French 
and  Richardson,  another,  tinder  Smith,  was  ordered 
to  retake  the  woods  and  corn-fields  which  had  been 
so  hotly  contested  during  the  day.  This  order  was 
executed  in  the  most  gallant  style,  and  in  ten 
minutes  the  enemy  were  driven  out  and  our  troops 
were  in  undisturbed  possession  of  the  whole  field. 


800  BATTLE     OF    ANTIETAM.  [1S62. 

This  was  substantially  the  close  of  the  battle  on  our 
right,  though  the  artillery  on  both  sides  maintained 
a  fire  for  some  time  longer.  It  was  not  deemed 
safe  for  Franklin's  corps  to  push  on  any  farther, 
because  the  rest  of  our  troops  had  suffered  too  se 
verely  to  be  relied  upon  as  an  efficient  reserve.  The 
battle  had  been  fought  with  desperate  courage  on 
both  sides,  but  the  advantage,  on  the  whole,  was 
with  us.  \But  we  had  lost  too  many  men,  and  were 
too  much  exhausted,  to  make  any  new  attack,  and 
the  enemy  were  not  able  to  assume  the  offensive. 

Meanwhile,  Burnside  had  been  engaged  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  Federal  position  in  attempting  to 
cross  the  lower  stone  bridge, — a  structure  strongly 
defended  by  infantry  and  artillery.  After  two  un 
successful  attacks,  it  was  finally  carried  by  assault, 
and  the  Confederates  driven  to  a  range  of  hills  in 
the  rear,  where  their  batteries  played  upon  our 
troops  with  damaging  effect.  A  halt  was  then 
made  until  three  o'clock,  when  urgent  orders  were 
sent  from  head-quarters  to  General  Burnside  to 
push  forward  his  force  and  carry  these  heights  at 
any  cost.  The  advance  was  then  gallantly  resumed, 
the  enemy  driven  from  his  guns,  and  the  heights  car 
ried.  By  this  time  it  was  nearly  dark,  and  strong 
reinforcements  having  just  then  reached  the  enemy 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  attacked  Burnside's  troops  on 
the  left  flank,  and  forced  them  to  retire  to  a  lower 
line  of  hills  nearer  the  bridge.  During  this  move 
ment  General  Eodman  was  mortally  wounded. 

All  day  long  General  Porter's  reserve  corps  filled 
the  interval  between  the  right  wing  and  General 


AGE  35.] 


BATTLE    OF    A  N  TIE  T  AM. 


301 


Burnsidc's  command,  guarding  the  main  approach 
from  the  enemy's  position  to  our  trains  of  supply. 
It  had  been  necessary  to  maintain  this  part  of  our 
line  in  strong  force,  lest  the  enemy,  taking  ad 
vantage  of  an  exhibition  of  weakness  there,  should 
pierce  our  centre,  gain  our  rear,  and  capture  or 
destroy  our  supply-trains.  General  Burnsidc,  at 
the  close  of  the  day,  hotly  pressed  by  the  enemy, 
had  sent  an  urgent  request  for  reinforcements ;  but 
they  could  not  be  had,  and  he  was  ordered  to  hold 
his  ground,  or  at  least  the  bridge,  till  dark.  At 
one  moment,  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon, 
the  position  on  our  right  was  so  critical  that  two 
brigades  from  Porter's  corps  were  ordered  to  re 
inforce  our  troops  on  that  wing;  but,  after  confer 
ence  with  General  Sumncr,  the  order  was  counter 
manded  while  in  the  course  of  execution. 

Our  entiroforce  engaged  at  Antictam  was_aL&Urk 
eighty-seven  thousand  men.  That  of  the  Confede 
rates  was  less  at  the  beginning,  but  they  were  re 
inforced  during  the  day  by  Jackson's  command 
from  Harper's  Ferry;  and  during  the  afternoon  the 
numbers  were  probably  about  equal.  Our  loss  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  wTas  twelve  thousand 
four  hundred  and  nine ;  that  of  the  Confederates 
was  at  least  as  great. 

Thirteen  guns,  thirty-nine  colors,  upwards  of 
fifteen  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  and  more 
than  six  thousand  prisoners  were  our  trophies  of 
success  in  the  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  An- 
tietam.  "Not  a  gun  or  a  color  was  lost  by 
army. 

2ft 


I 


our 


802  BATTLE     OF    ANTIETAM.  [1862. 

Early  on  the  18th  the  Confederates  sent  in  a  fia 


e 


of  truce,  asking  permission  to  bury  their  dead  who 
had  fallen  between  the  lines  of  the  two  armies. 
The  request  was  granted.  General  McClellan  says, 
in  his  .Report,  after  a  detailed  account  of  the  battle, — 

"Night  closed  the  long  and  desperately-contested 
battle  of  the  17th.  Nearly  two  hundred  thousand  men 
and  five  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  for  fourteen 
hours  engaged  in  this  memorable  battle.  We  had  at 
tacked  the  enemy  in  a  position  selected  by  the  experi 
enced  engineer  then  in  person  directing  their  operations. 
We  had  driven  them  from  their  line  on  one  flank,  and 
secured  a  footing  within  it  on  the  other.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  notwithstanding  the  moral  effect  incident 
to  previous  reverses,  had  achieved  a  victory  over  an  ad 
versary  invested  with  the  prestige  of  recent  success.  Our 
soldiers  slept  that  night  conquerors  011  a  field  won  by 
their  valor  and  covered  with  the  dead  and  wounded  of 
the  enemy. 

"The  night,  however,  brought  with  it  grave  responsi 
bilities.  Whether  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  18th  or  to 
defer  it,  even  with  the  risk  of  the  enemy's  retirement, 
was  the  question  before  me. 

"After  a  night  of  anxious  deliberation,  and  a  full  and 
careful  survey  of  the  situation  and  condition  of  our  army, 
and  the  strength  and  position  of  the  enemy,  I  concluded 
that  the  success  of  an  attack  on  the  18th  was  not  certain.  I 
am  aware  of  the  fact  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
a  general  is  expected  to  risk  a  battle  if  he  has  a  reason 
able  prospect  of  success ;  but  at  this  critical  juncture  I 
should  have  had  a  narrow  view  of  the  condition  of  the 
country  had  I  been  willing  to  hazard  another  battle  with 
less  than  an  absolute  assurance  of  success.  At  that  mo 
ment — Virginia  lost,  Washington  menaced,  Maryland  in- 


AGE  35.]  BATTLE    OF    ANTIETAM.  303 

vaded — the  national  cause  could  afford  no  risks  of  defeat. 
One  battle  lost,  and  almost  all  would  have  been  lost. 
Lee's  army  might  then  have  marched  as  it  pleased  on 
Washington,  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  or  New  York.  It 
could  have  levied  its  supplies  from  a  fertile  and  undevas- 
tated  country,  extorted  tribute  from  wealthy  and  popu 
lous  cities,  and  nowhere  east  of  the  Alleghanies  was 
there  another  organized  force  able  to  arrest  its  march/7 

He  then  proceeds  to  set  forth  some  of  the  con 
siderations  which  led  him  to  doubt  the  certainty  of 
success  in  attacking  before  the  19th. 

The  troops  were  greatly  overcome  by  the  ex 
haustion  of  the  recent  battles,  and  the  long  day  and 
night  marches  of  the  previous  three  days. 

The  supply-trains  were  in  the  rear,  and  many  of 
the  troops  had  suffered  from  hunger.  They  required 
rest  and  refreshment. 

One  division  of  Simmer's  and  all  of  Hooker's 
corps,  on  the  right,  after  fighting  valiantly  for 
many  hours,  had  been  driven  back  in  disorder,  and 
were  somewhat  demoralized. 

Our  losses  had  been  very  heavy. 

Many  of  our  heaviest  batteries  had  consumed  all 
their  ammunition,  and  they  could  not  be  supplied 
till  late  on  the  18th. 

Large  reinforcements  which  were  immediately 
expected  had  not  arrived. 

Supplies  of  forage  had  to  be  brought  up  and 
issued,  and  infantry-ammunition  distributed. 

The  18th  was,  therefore,  spent  in  collecting  the 
dispersed,  giving  rest  to  the  fatigued,  burying  the 
dead,  and  the  necessary  preparations  for  a  renewal 


304    MESSAGE    FROM    GENERAL    IIALLECK.    [1862. 

of  the  battle.  Orders  were  given  for  an  attack  at 
daylight  on  the  19th.  But  during  the  night  of  the 
18th  the  enemy  abandoned  their  position,  and 
crossed  the  Potomac  into  Yirginia,  just  two  weeks 
from  the  day  they  had  entered  Maryland.  As  their 
line  was  near  the  river,  the  evacuation  presented 
little  difficulty,  and  was  effected  before  daylight. 

On  the  19th,  General  McClellan  sent  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  a  telegraphic  report  as  follows  : — 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  Maryland  is  entirely 
freed  from  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  who  has  been 
driven  across  the  Potomac.  No  fears  need  now  be  enter 
tained  for  the  safety  of  Pennsylvania.  I  shall  at  once 
occupy  Harper's  Ferry." 

On  the  following  day  this  despatch  was  re 
ceived  : — 

"WASHINGTON,  September  20,  1862.  2  P.M. 
"  We  are  still  left  entirely  in  the  dark  in  regard  to  your 
own  movements  and  those  of  the  enemy.     This  should 
not  be  so.     You  should  keep  me  advised  of  both,  so  far 
as  you  know  them. 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief. 
"Major-General  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

In  reply  to  this  curt  and  ungracious  message, 
General  McClellan,  after  giving  the  information 
sought,  as  far  as  it  was  in  his  power  to  do,  said, — 

"  I  regret  that  you  find  it  necessary  to  couch  every  de 
spatch  I  have  the  honor  to  receive  from  you  in  the  spirit 
of  fault-finding,  and  that  you  have  not  yet  found  leisure 


AGE  35.]       GENERAL     HOOKER     PRAISED.  305 

to  say  one  word  in  commendation  of  the  recent  achieve 
ments  of  this  army,  or  even  to  allude  to  them/' 

On  the  same  19th  of  September,  in  the  midst  of 
his  onerous  cares  and  labors,  General  McClellan 
found  time  to  send  another  despatch  to  the  corn- 
man  der-iri-chief,  as  an  act  of  prompt  justice  to  a 
brave  officer.  It  was  as  follows  : — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  September  19. 
"  As  an  act  of  justice  to  the  merits  of  that  most  excellent 
officer,  Major-General  Joseph  Hooker,  who  was  eminently 
conspicuous  for  his  gallantry  and  ability  as  a  leader  in 
several  hard-fought  battles  in  Virginia,  and  who  in  the 
battle  of  Antietam  Creek,  on  the  17th  inst.,  was  wounded 
at  the  head  of  his  corps  while  leading  it  forward  in  ac 
tion,  I  most  urgently  recommend  him  for  the  appoint 
ment  of  brigadier-general  in  the  United  States  Army,  to 
fill  the  vacancy  created  by  the  death  of  the  late  Brigadier- 
General  Mansfield.  This  would  be  but  a  fit  reward  for 
the  service  General  Hooker  rendered  his  country.  I  feel 
sure  his  appointment  would  gratify  the  whole  army. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

' '  Major-  General. 
"Major-General  II.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Chief." 

This  suggestion  was  adopted,  and  General  Hooker 
was  made  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army 
of  the  United  States,  his  commission  bearing  date 
September  2,  1862.  ^ ^^^ 

The  result  of  the  victories  at  South   Mountain] 
and  Antietam  was  to  drive  the  enemy  from  Mary-    I 
land,  to  secure  Pennsylvania  from  invasion,  and  to 
put  Harper's  Ferry  once  more  into  our  possession. 

26* 


306       GOVERNOR  BRADFORD'S  ORDER.     [is62. 

This  was  much  to  have  been  done  in  a  fortnight's 
time  by  an  army  in  the  shattered  and  demoralized 
condition  that  General  McClelland  was  in  when  he 
took  it  in  hand  on  the  second  day  of  September. 
How  strong  a  sense  of  the  value  of  these  services 

o 

was  felt  by  those  who  were  most  nearly  interested 
may  be  learned  by  an  executive  order  of  the  Gover 
nor  of  Maryland,  as  follows : — 

"  STATE  OF  MARYLAND,  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
ANNAPOLIS,  September  29,  1362.  } 

"The  expulsion  of  the  rebel  army  from  the  soil  of 
Maryland  should  not  be  suffered  to  pass  without  a  proper 
acknowledgment,  and  the  cordial  thanks  of  her  authori 
ties  to  those  who  were  chiefly  instrumental  in  compelling 
that  evacuation. 

"I  would  tender,  therefore,  on  behalf  of  the  State  of 
Maryland,  to  Major-General  McClellan,  and  the  gallant 
officers  and  men  under  his  command,  my  earnest  and 
hearty  thanks  for  the  distinguished  courage,  skill,  and 
gallantry  with  which  the  achievement  was  accomplished. 
It  reflects  a  lustre  upon  the  ability  of  the  commander-in- 
chief,  and  the  heroism  and  endurance  of  his  followers, 
that  the  country  everywhere  recognizes,  and  that  even 
our  enemies  are  constrained  to  acknowledge. 

"  A.  W.  BRADFORD. 

"  By  the  Governor : 

"  WM.  B.  HILL, 

"  Secretary  of  State," 


AGE  35.]  A    GRAVE    QUESTION.  307 


CHAPTEE  XI. 

IT  now  became  a  grave  question  with  General 
McClellan  whether  or  not  he  should  pursue  the  re 
treating  enemy  into  Virginia.  Our  losses  had  been 
heavy ;  the  army  was  greatly  exhausted  by  hard 
work,  fatiguing  marches,  hunger,  and  want  of  sleep. 
Many  of  the  troops  were  new  levies;  and,  though 
they  had  fought  well,  they  had  not  the  steadiness 
and  discipline  that  were  needed  for  an  expedition  so 
formidable.  The  means  of  transportation  at  our  dis 
posal,  on  the  19th  of  September,  were  not  enough  to 
furnish  a  single  day's  subsistence  in  advance.  Un 
der  these  circumstances,  General  McClellan  did  not 
deem  it  wise  to  cross  the  river  with  his  army,  over 
a  deep  and  difficult  ford,  in  pursuit  of  a  retreating 
enemy,  and  thus  place  between  himself  and  his  base 
of  supplies  a  stream  liable  at  any  time  to  rise  above 
a  fording  stage. 

This  decision  was  made  known  to  the  authorities 
at  Washington,  and  they  were  duly  informed  of  the 
movements  of  our  own  troops,  and  of  those  of  the 
enemy,  as  far  as  the  latter  could  be  ascertained.  The 
commander-in-chicf,  to  whom,  in  general,  the  com 
munications  were  addressed,  was  urged  to  push  for 
ward  all  the  old  troops  that  could  be  dispensed  with 
around  Washington  and  other  places,  so  that  tho 
old  skeleton  regiments  might  be  filled  up  at  once, 
and  officers  appointed  to  supply  the  numerous  exist- 


308  PRESIDENT    LINCOLN'S     VISIT.          [1862. 

ing  vacancies.  The  work  of  reorganizing,  drilling, 
and  supplying  the  army  was  began  at  the  earliest 
moment.  The  different  corps  were  stationed  along 
the  river  in  the  best  position  to  cover  and  guard 
the  fords.  Reconnoissances  upon  the  Virginia  side 
of  the  Potomac,  for  the  purpose  of  learning  the 
enemy's  positions  and  movements,  were  frequently 
made.  This  was  a  trying  and  exhausting  service 
for  our  cavalry,  with  which  the  army  was  inade 
quately  supplied. 

On  the  first  day  of  October  the  President  of  the 
United  States  paid  a  visit  to  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  and  remained  several  days,  during  which  time 
he  passed  through  the  different  encampments,  re 
viewed  the  troops,  and  went  over  the  battle-fields 
of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam.  During  this 
visit,  General  McClellan  explained  to  him  fully,  in 
conversation,  the  movements  of  the  army  since  it 
had  Ibft  Washington,  and  gave  the  reasons  why  the 
enemy  was  not  pursued  after  he  had  crossed  the 
Potomac. 

The  twenty-second  day  of  September,  1862,  was  a 
memorable  day  in  the  history  of  the  war  and  the 
history  of  the  country ;  for  on  that  day  the  Presi 
dent  issued  his  proclamation  in  which  he  an 
nounced  that  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1863, 
all  persons  held  as  slaves  within  any  State,  or  any 
designated  part  of  a  State,  the  people  whereof 
should  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United 
States,  should  be  thenceforth  and  forever  free. 
All  discussion  of  the  expediency  of  this  proclama 
tion,  or  of  its  legal  effect,  would  be  inopportune;  but 


AGE  35.]     PRESIDENT'S   PROCLAMATION.        809 

it  will  be  admitted,  alike  by  those  who  approve  and 
those  who  disapprove  it,  that  it  gave  a  new  charac 
ter  to  the  war  and  changed  its  objects.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  add  that  this  proclamation  became 
at  once,  throughout  the  country,  a  subject  of  ear 
nest  debate  and  vehement  controversy,  which  have, 
indeed,  continued  to  the  present  time.  From  the 
character  of  the  men  composing  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  who  were  voters  and  citizens  as  well  as 
soldiers,  accustomed  to  read  the  newspapers  and 
talk  politics,  it  was  obvious  that  the  same  division 
of  opinion  upon  the  President's  proclamation  would 
be  found  among  them  as  was  found  in  the  public 
at  large ;  and  there  was  danger  that  this  conflict 
of  views  might  impair  that  unity  of  action  and 
patriotic  zeal  which  are  so  essential  to  the  success 
of  all  military  movements.  General  McClellan  felt 
himself  called  upon  to  remind  the  officers  and  sol 
diers  under  his  command  of  the  relations  between 
the  civil  authorities  and  the  military  forces  of  the 
country,  and  of  the  duties  of  the  latter  in  regard 
to  the  political  questions  of  the  day  and  the  path 
of  civil  policy  marked  out  by  the  Government ; 
and  he  may  have  done  this  with  the  more  prompt 
ness  and  emphasis  from  the  fact  that  he  was  known 
not  to  belong  to  that  party  by  whose  influence  the 
proclamation  had  been  extorted  from  a  too-yielding 
President.  With  these  views,  the  following  gene 
ral  order  was  issued,  which  may  unhesitatingly  be 
pronounced  admirable  alike  in  substance  and  in 
form,  animated  by  a  high-toned  patriotism,  defining 
with  precision  the  line  where  the  duty  of  the  citi- 


310          GENERAL     M  c  C  L  E  L  L  A  N  '  S     ORDER.         [1862. 

zen  ends  and  the  duty  of  the  soldier  begins,  and 
giving  to  every  candid  mind  an  assurance  that 
General  McClellan  himself  would  serve  his  coun 
try  as  faithfully  and  zealously  in  the  future  as  he 
had  done  in  the  past : — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,          ) 
CAMP  NEAR  SHARPSBURG,  MARYLAND,  October  7,  1862.  j 

General  Order  No.  163. 

"  The  attention  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  is  called  to  General  Order  No.  139,  War 
Department,  publishing  to  the  army  the  President's  pro 
clamation  of  September  22. 

"A  proclamation  of  such  grave  moment  to  the  nation, 
officially  communicated  to  the  army,  affords  to  the  gene 
ral  commanding  an  opportunity  of  defining  specifically  to 
the  officers  and  soldiers  under  his  command,  the  relation 
borne  by  all  persons  in  the  military  service  of  the  United 
States  towards  the  civil  authorities  of  the  Government. 

"The  Constitution  confides  to  the  civil  authorities, 
legislative,  judicial,  and  executive,  the  power  and  duty 
of  making,  expounding,  and  executing  the  federal  laws. 
Armed  forces  are  raised  and  supported  simply  to  sustain 
the  civil  authorities,  and  are  to  be  held  in  strict  subordi 
nation  thereto  in  all  respects. 

"  This  fundamental  rule  of  our  political  system  is  essen 
tial  to  the  security  of  our  republican  institutions,  and 
should  be  thoroughly  understood  and  observed  by  every 
soldier.  The  principle  upon  which,  and  the  object  for 
which,  armies  shall  be  employed  in  suppressing  rebellion, 
must  be  determined  and  declared  by  the  civil  authori 
ties  ;  and  the  chief  executive,  who  is  charged  with  the 
administration  of  the  national  affairs,  is  the  proper  and 
only  source  through  which  the  needs  and  orders  of  the 
Government  can  be  made  known  to  the  armies  of  the 
nation. 


AGE  35.]      GENERAL     McCLELLAN's     ORDER.        311 

"  Discussions  by  officers  and  soldiers  concerning  public 
measures  determined  upon  and  declared  by  the  Govern 
ment,  when  carried  once  beyond  temperate  and  respect 
ful  expressions  of  opinion,  tend  greatly  to  impair  and 
destroy  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  troops,  by  substi 
tuting  the  spirit  of  political  faction  for  that  firm,  steady, 
and  earnest  support  of  the  authority  of  the  Government, 
which  is  the  highest  duty  of  the  American  soldier.  The 
remedy  for  political  errors,  if  any  are  committed,  is  to  be 
found  only  in  the  action  of  the  people  at  the  polls. 

"  In  thus  calling  the  attention  of  this  army  to  the  true 
relation  between  the  soldier  and  the  Government,  the 
general  commanding  merely  adverts  to  an  evil  against 
which  it  has  been  thought  advisable,  during  our  whole 
history,  to  guard  the  armies  of  the  republic,  and  in  so 
doing  he  will  not  be  considered  by  any  right-minded  per 
son  as  casting  any  reflection  upon  that  loyalty  and  good 
conduct  which  has  been  so  fully  illustrated  upon  so  many 
battle-fields. 

"  In  carrying  out  all  measures  of  public  policy,  this 
army  will,  of  course,  be  guided  by  the  same  rules  of 
mercy  and  Christianity  that  have  ever  controlled  their 
conduct  towards  the  defenceless. 

"By  order  of  Major-General  McClellan. 

JAMES  A.  HARDEE, 

"  Lieut. -  Col.,  Aide-de- Camp,  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 
"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAX, 

"  Major- General  commanding.'' 

The  seeming  inactivity  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  after  the  battle  of  Antictam  was  a  disappoint 
ment  to  the  public,  and  an  annoyance  to  the  Ad 
ministration.  It  was  expected  that  Lee's  retreat 
ing  forces  would  be  instantly  and  vigorously  pur 
sued,  arid  a  new  path  to  Richmond  opened  through 
his  broken  columns. 


312        ADVANCE    ORDERED    BY    THE    PRESIDENT.     [1862. 

The  earnest  desire  of  the  Administration  for  a 
forward  movement  at  length  took  the  form  of  a 
positive  and  peremptory  order,  which  was  received 
on  the  7th  of  October,  and  is  as  follows  : — 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  October  6,  1862. 

"I  am  instructed  to  telegraph  you  as  follows.  The 
President  directs  that  you  cross  the  Potomac  and  give 
battle  to  the  enemy,  or  drive  him  south.  Your  army 
must  move  now,  while  the  roads  are  good.  If  you  cross 
the  river  between  the  enemy  and  Washington,  and  cover 
the  latter  by  your  operations,  you  can  be  reinforced  with 
thirty  thousand  men.  If  you  move  up  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  not  more  than  twelve  thousand  or  fifteen 
thousand  can  be  sent  to  you.  The  President  advises  the 
interior  line  between  Washington  and  the  enemy,  but 
does  not  order  it.  He  is  very  desirous  that  your  army 
move  as  soon  as  possible.  You  will  immediately  report 
what  line  you  adopt,  and  when  you  intend  to  cross  the 
river ;  also  to  what  point  the  reinforcements  are  to  be 
sent.  It  is  necessary  that  the  plan  of  your  operations  be 
positively  determined  on,  before  orders  are  given  for 
building  bridges  and  repairing  railroads.  I  am  directed 
to  add  that  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  General-in- 
Chief  fully  concur  with  the  President  in  these  instructions. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 
"  General-in-Chief. 

"  Major-General  McC/LELLAN." 

This  order  was  not  immediately  carried  out,  for 
a  forward  movement  at  that  moment  was  an  im 
possibility,  and,  had  it  been  insisted  upon,  General 
McClellan  must  at  once  have  resigned  his  com 
mand;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  it  was  disobeyed,  for  every  possible  effort  was 


THE    ARMY     IN     NEED     OF     REST.  31:.} 

made  to  comply  with  its  directions,  and  the  genc- 
ral-in-chief  was  day  by  day  informed  of  the  progress 
that  was  making,  and  of  the  reasons  why  the  de 
sired  advance  was  delayed. 

These  reasons  arc  set  forth  in  full  in  General 
McClellan's  Report,  and  arc  substantiated  by  the 
testimony  of  the  chief  quartermaster,  Colonel  In- 
galls,  and  of  other  officers.  The  army  was  wholly 
deficient  in  cavalry,  and  a  large  part  of  our  troops 
were  in  want  of  shoes,  clothing,  blankets,  knap 
sacks,  and  shelter-tents.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  presence  of  the  Confederates  in 
Maryland,  and  the  imperative  necessity  of  driving 
them  out,  had  made  excessive  demands  upon  the 
strength  and  endurance  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  It  was  one  of  those  cases  in  which  nervous 
energy  is  called  upon  to  do  the  work  of  muscular 
strength  :  for  a  while  the  claim  is  answered,  but 
sooner  or  later  the  time  of  reaction  must  come. 
After  the  battle  of  Antietam  a  natural  exhaustion 
followed  the  unnatural  excitement  which  had  been 
kept  up  for  a  fortnight  previous.  Had  the  army 
been  furnished  with  clothing  and  supplies,  a  rest 
of  some  days  would  still  have  been  required  before 
a  forward  movement  would  have  been  expedient  or 
even  safe;  but,  in  consequence  of  the  deficiencies 
above  mentioned,  a  yet  further  delay  was  compelled. 

The  order  to  cross  the  Potomac  was  dated  on 
the  Gili  of  October,  as  lias  been  seen,  but  the  move 
ment  did  not  begin  till  the  20th;  and  during  the 
intermediate  period  the  Administration  and  Gene 
va!  McClcllan  were  fairly  at  issue.  The  case  on 
27 


814  DEFICIENCY     IN     SUPPLIES.  [1862. 

behalf  of  the  latter  may  be  found  stated  in  his 
Report;  that  on  behalf  of  the  Administration,  in  the 
report  of  the  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  and  in  the  appendix  to  the  testi 
mony  of  General  Halleck,  and  is  summed  up  in  a 
letter  of  his,  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
dated  October  28,  1862,  which  was  published  in 
the  newspapers  of  the  day  at  the  same  time  with 
the  order  for  removing  General  McClellan.  With 
out  going  into  minute  detail,  without  spreading 
the  whole  evidence  upon  the  record,  the  points  of 
difference  were  these  : — 

General  McClellan  says  that  the  army  is  deficient 
in  clothing  and  supplies  of  all  kinds,  and  especially 
in  horses,  that  requisitions  for  the  needed  articles 
had  been  duly  made  upon  the  War  Department  at 
Washington,  but  that  in  point  of  fact  they  had  not 
been  received,  and  that  until  they  were  received  it 
was  not  possible  for  the  army  to  advance. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Administration,  repre 
sented  by  the  general-in-chicf,  says  that  all  General 
McClellan's  requisitions  had  been  promptly  referred 
to  the  proper  functionaries,  that  all  the  supplies 
asked  for,  horses  included,  had  been  procured  and 
forwarded  without  delay,  and  that  it  was  not  pos 
sible  that  the  army  could  have  been  in  the  desti 
tute  condition  alleged.  A  long  letter  from  General 
Meigs,  the  Quartermaster-General,  is  given  in  sup 
port  of  these  positions. 

It  is  easy  to  sec  that  the  statements  of  the  Ad 
ministration  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  state 
ments  of  General  McClellan.  The  former  sav. 


AGE  35.]    GENERAL     MET  OS    NOT    BLAMED.  315 

substantially,  that  certain  supplies  were  put  on 
board  freight-trains  at  Washington  to  be  forwarded 
to  an  army  stationed  at  different  points  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Harper's  Ferry,  forty  or  fifty 
miles  off.  General  McClellan  says  that  these  arti 
cles  were  not  received;  and  if  credible  and  unim- 
peached  witnesses,  speaking  upon  matters  within 
their  knowledge,  are  to  be  believed,  he  proves  it. 
It  is  obvious  that  proof  that  articles  have  been 
received  is  not  made  when  it  is  shown  that  they 
have  been  despatched  to  their  point  of  destination. 
General  McClellan,  be  it  remembered,  is  only  de 
fending  or  justifying  himself  for  not  advancing, 
and  is  not  making  any  complaint  against  the  Admin 
istration,  or  against  any  officer,  civil  or  military,  at 
Washington.  This  distinctly  appears  by  the  fol 
lowing  despatch,  which  was  published  in  connection 
with  General  Hallcck's  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  before  referred  to,  as  a  document  in  justifica 
tion  of  General  McClellan's  removal : — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  Oct.  22,  1862. 

"Your  despatch  of  this  date  is  received.  I  have 
never  intended  in  any  letter  or  despatch  to  make  any 
accusation  against  yourself  or  your  department  for  not 
furnishing  or  forwarding  clothing  as  rapidly  as  it  was 
possible  for  you  to  do.  I  believe  that  every  thing  has 
been  done  that  could  be  done  in  this  respect.  The  idea 
that  I  have  tried  to  convey  was  that  certain  portions  of 
the  command  were  without  clothing,  and  the  army  could 
not  move  until  it  was  supplied.  tt^  R  MC-CLELLAN. 

"To  BRIG.-GEX.  MEIGS, 

"  Quarter  master- General" 


316  LETTER    OF    GENERAL     MEIGS.  [1S62. 

That  supplies  sent  from  Washington  in  season 
were  not  seasonably  received  by  General  McClcllan 
is  further  shown  by  the  letter  of  General  Meigs 
before  referred  to,  wThich  is  one  of  the  documents 
in  the  case  on  the  side  of  the  Administration. 
At  the  commencement  of  this  letter  he  says  that 
"all  the  articles  of  clothing  called  for  by  requisition 
from  General  McClellan's  head-quarters  were  not 
only  ordered,  but  had  been  shipped,  on  the  14th  of 
October," — a  date,  it  will  be  observed,  eight  days 
later  than  the  day  on  which  the  army  had  been 
ordered  to  cross  the  Potomac;  but  in  subsequent 
portions  of  the  letter  statements  and  admissions 
are  made  which  show  that  further  delays  may  have 
taken  place  in  the  transportation,  and  that  indeed 
they  did.  Some  of  these  are  transcribed  without 
further  comment : — 

"This  department  cannot  control  the  trains  upon  rail 
roads  of  which  the  War  Department  has  not  taken  the 
management  into  its  own  hands." 

''The  railroad  companies  complain  that  cars  are  not 
unloaded  at  their  destinations,  and  that  their  sidings  are 
occupied  with  cars  which  are  needed  for  forwarding  sup 
plies.  I  presume  that  the  missing  articles  are  in  some  of 
these  cars,  or  that  they  have  been  unloaded  and  have  not 
yet  reached  the  particular  corps  or  detachment  for  which 
they  are  intended." 

"The  fact  is  that  no  railroad  can  provide  facilities  for 
unloading  cars  and  transacting  the  business  attending 
the  supply  of  an  army  of  the  size  of  General  McClellan's 
in  a  short  time  or  in  a  contracted  space.  Sidings,  switches, 
depots,  and  turn-outs  do  not  exist,  and  cannot  be  laid  clown 
at  once,  for  such  a  traffic." 


AGE  35.]      GENERAL    IIAUPT's    CIRCULAR.         o!7 

"The  railroads  are  heavily  taxed,  and  transportation 
has  been  delayed.  A  case  is  reported  in  which  horses 
remained  fifty  hours  on  the  cars  without  food  or  water." 

There  is  yet  another  piece  of  evidence  showing 
that  there  had  been  delays  in  the  transportation 
of  supplies  to  the  army  of  General  McClellan.  In 
August,  1862,  the  superintendence  and  management 
of  all  the  railways  used  by  the  Government  for 
military  purposes  were  intrusted  to  Brigadier-Gene 
ral  Haupt,  a  competent  and  energetic  officer.  On 
the  10th  of  November,  five  days  after  the  date  of 
the  order  removing  General  McClellan,  he  ad 
dressed,  from  Washington,  a  circular  letter  to  post- 
quartermasters,  commissaries,  officers  and  agents 
of  military  railroads,  from  which  we  make  a  few 
extracts : — 

"GENTLEMEN: — The  exceedingly  critical  condition  of 
affairs  compels  me  to  address  to  you  this  circular,  and  to 
endeavor,  with  all  the  earnestness  and  force  of  language 
I  can  command,  to  explain  some  of  the  difficulties  con 
nected  with  military  railroad  transportation,  and  ask 
your  co-operation  and  assistance  in  forwarding  supplies. 

"The  army  is  dependent  for  its  supplies  upon  a  single- 
track  railroad,  in  bad  condition,  without  sidings  of  suffi 
cient  length,  without  wood,  with  a  short  supply  of  water, 
and  with  insufficient  equipments.  This  road  is  taxed 
with  an  amount  of  business  equal  to  the  ordinary  freights 
of  a  large  city, — an  amount  four  times  as  large  as  it  has 
ever  before  been  called  on  to  accommodate,  and  twice  as 
large  as  I  reported  to  General  McClellan  its  capacity  for 
transportation. 

"There  cannot  be  the  most  distant  prospect  of  keeping 
(ho  .'irmy  ^uppliod  \vitVmnt  constant, uninterrupted  movo- 


318  WANT     OF     HORSES.  [1862. 

mcnt  of  trains  day  and  night.  The  delicate  machinery 
of  the  road  must  not  be  deranged  by  any  detention  or 
interference.  It  must  be  directed  by  one  mind,  and  one 
only. 

-x-          •&  •*  -x-  *  -x-          •&  •& 

"Again  I  say  that,  if  the  army  is  to  be  supplied,  the 
condition  which,  in  its  importance,  transcends  all  others, 
is  that  no  delay — not  even  a  minute — should  be  allowed 
to  occur  in  unloading  cars,  if  it  can  be  avoided.  Move 
ment,  unceasing  movement,  in  the  trains,  is  our  only 
salvation.  Without  it,  the  army  must  either  retreat  or 
starve." 

The  above  extracts  alone  are  enough  to  make 
out  General  McClellan's  case ;  for  they  show  that 
the  road  upon  which  the  army  was  exclusively  de 
pendent  for  supplies  was  taxed  beyond  its  capacity, 
and  that  there  was  a  want  of  system  in  its  manage 
ment  by  which  unnecessary  delays  were  incurred  ; 
and  this  was  all  General  McClelian  ever  asked  the 
Administration  to  believe. 

In  the  opinion  of  General  McClelian,  the  most 
important  want  in  the  army  was  the  want  of  horses, 
— not  merely  for  cavalry  and  artillery,  but  for  trans 
portation.  From  the  commencement  the  army  had 
been  deficient  in  cavalry;  and  after  the  battle  of 
Antietam  constant  reconnoissances  upon  the  Vir 
ginia  side  of  the  river,  to  learn  the  enemy's  position 
and  movements,  had  broken  down  the  greater  part 
of  the  cavalry-horses.  A  violent  disease,  attacking 
the  hoof  and  tongue,  soon  after  broke  out  among 
the  animals,  and  at  one  time  put  nearly  four  thou 
sand  of  them  out  of  condition  for  service.  To  such 


AGE  35.]    NUMBER    OP    HORSES    REQUIRED.        olO 

an  extent  had  the  cavalry  arm  become  reduced,  that 
when  the  Confederate  general  Stuart  made  his  raid 
into  Pennsylvania,  on  the  llth  of  October,  with  two 
thousand  men,  penetrating  as  far  as  Chambersburg, 
General  McClellan  could  only  mount  eight  hundred 
men  to  follow  him.  Few  civilians  have  any  notion 
of  the  number  of  horses  which  are  required  by  an 
army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men.  Indeed,  wo  may 
go  further,  and  say  that  few  civilians  have  any  dis 
tinct  notion  of  what  an  army  of  a  hundred  thou 
sand  men  is.  We  repeat  the  words  mechanically, 
as  we  repeat  the  distances  of  the  solar  system, 
without  any  very  definite  impressions  of  numbers 
and  mass  in  one  case,  or  of  space  in  the  other.  The 
following  extract  from  General  McClellan's  Report 
will,  we  presume,  be  read  with  some  surprise  by 
most  of  our  readers,  as  well  as  with  interest. 

"In  a  letter  dated  October  14,  18G2,  the  general-in- 
chief  says, — 

"  '  It  is  also  reported  to  me  that  the  number  of  animals 
with  your  army  in  the  field  is  about  thirty-one  thousand. 
It  is  believed  that  your  present  proportion  of  cavalry  and 
of  animals  is  much  larger  than  that  of  any  other  of  our 
armies/ 

"  What  number  of  animals  our  other  armies  had,"  says 
General  McClellan,  "I  am  not  prepared  to  say;  but  mili 
tary  men  in  European  armies  have  been  of  the  opinion 
that  an  army,  to  be  efficient,  while  carrying  on  active 
operations  in  the  field,  should  have  a  cavalry  force  equal 
in  numbers  to  from  one-sixth  to  one-fourth  of  the  inr 
fantry  force.  My  cavalry  did  not  amount  to  one-twentieth 
part  of  the  army,  and  hence  the  necessity  of  giving  every 
one  of  my  cavalry-soldiers  a  serviceable  horse. 


320         NUMBER     OF     HORSES     REQUIRED.         [lSf>2. 

"Cavalry  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  antenna:  of  an 
army.  It  scouts  all  the  roads  in  front,  on  the  flanks,  and 
in  the  rear  of  the  advancing  columns,  and  constantly 
feels  the  enemy.  The  amount  of  labor  falling  upon  tins 
arm  during  the  Maryland  campaign  was  excessive. 

"To  persons  not  familiar  with  the  movements  of  troops, 
and  the  amount  of  transportation  required  for  a  large 
army  marching  away  from  water  or  railroad  communica 
tions,  the  number  of  animals  mentioned  by  the  general- 
in-cliicf  may  have  appeared  unnecessarily  large ;  but  to 
a  military  man,  who  takes  the  trouble  to  enter  into  an 
accurate  and  detailed  computation  of  the  number  of 
pounds  of  subsistence  and  forage  required  for  such  an 
army  as  that  of  the  Potomac,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
thirty-one  thousand  animals  were  considerably  less  than 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  an  advance. 

"As  we  were  required  to  move  through  a  countiy  which 
could  not  be  depended  upon  for  any  of  our  supplies,  it 
became  necessary  to  transport  every  thing  in  wagons,  and 
to  be  prepared  for  all  emergencies.  I  did  not  consider  it 
safe  to  leave  the  river  without  subsistence  and  forage  for 
ten  days. 

"The  official  returns  of  that  date  show  the  aggregate 
strength  of  the  army  for  duty  to  have  been  about  one 
hundred  and  ten  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  This  did 
not  include  teamsters,  citizen-employees,  officers'  servants, 
&c.,  amounting  to  some  twelve  thousand  men,  which  gives 
a  total  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  thousand  men. 

"The  subsistence  alone  of  this  army  for  ten  days 
required  for  its  transportation  eighteen  hundred  and 
thirty  wagons,  at  two  thousand  pounds  to  the  wagon, 
and  ten  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighty  animals. 

"Our  cavalry-horses  at  that  time  amounted  to  five 
thousand  and  forty-six,  and  our  artillery-horses  to  six 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty-six. 

"To  transport  full  for;ige  for  those  twenty-two  thou- 


AGK  :'.5.j  W  A N  T    OF     II  0 11  S  E  S.  JJ21 

sand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-two  animals  for  ten  days 
required  seventeen  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty- 
two  additional  animals ;  and  this  forage  would  only  sup 
ply  the  entire  number  (forty  thousand  six  hundred  and 
ninety-four)  of  animals  with  a  small  fraction  over  half- 
allowance  for  the  time  specified. 

"It  will  be  observed  that  this  estimate  does  not  em 
brace  the  animals  necessary  to  transport  quartermasters' 
supplies,  baggage,  camp-equipage,  ambulances,  reserve 
ammunition,  forage  for  officers'  horses,  &c.,  which  would 
greatly  augment  the  necessary  transportation. 

"  It  may  very  truly  be  said  that  we  did  make  the  march 
with  the  means  at  our  disposal ;  but  it  will  be  remembered 
that  we  met  with  no  serious  opposition  from  the  enemy, 
neither  did  we  encounter  delays  from  any  other  cause. 
The  roads  were  in  excellent  condition,  and  the  troops 
marched  with  the  most  commendable  order  and  celerity. 

"If  we  had  met  with  a  determined  resistance  from  the 
enemy,  and  our  progress  had  been  very  much  retarded 
thereby,  we  would  have  consumed  our  supplies  before 
they  could  have  been  renewed.  A  proper  estimate  of  my 
responsibilities  as  the  commander  of  that  army  did  not 
justify  me  in  basing  my  preparations  for  the  expedition 
upon  the  supposition  that  I  was  to  have  an  uninterrupted 
march.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  my  duty  to  be  prepared 
for  all  emergencies ;  and  not  the  least  important  of  my 
responsibilities  was  the  duty  of  making  ample  provision 
for  supplying  my  men  and  animals  with  rations  and 
forage/' 

In  regard  to  the  supply  of  horses,  and  the  con 
flicting  views  of  General  JNIcClellan  and  the  Admin 
istration  thereupon,  one  or  two  points  are  worthy 
of  notice.  General  JMeigs,  in  a  letter  written  on 
the  14th  of  October  and  addressed  to  the  general- 


WANT     OF     HORSES.  [1802. 

in-chief,  states,  "  There  have  been  issued,  therefore, 
to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  since  the  battles  in 
front  of  Washington,  to  replace  losses,  (9254)  nine 
thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty-four  horses/' 
From  this  statement  a  reader  would  naturally  infer 
that  this  number  had  been  sent  to  the  army  under 
General  McClellan ;  but  it  appears  from  a  report 
of  Colonel  Myers,  the  chief  quartermaster  with, 
that  army,  that  only  (3813)  three  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  thirteen  came  to  the  forces  with  which 
General  McClellan  was  ordered  to  follow  and  at 
tack  the  enemy,  and  that  these  were  not  enough 
to  supply  the  places  of  the  animals  disabled  by 
sickness  and  overwork;  and  General  McClellan  dis 
tinctly  states  that  on  the  21st  of  October,  after  de 
ducting  the  force  engaged  in  picketing  the  river, 
he  had  but  about  a  thousand  serviceable  cavalry- 
horses. 

General  Halleck,  in  a  letter  to  General  McClellan 
dated  October  14.  1802,  in  reply  to  a  despatch  of 
the  12th,  says,— 

"  In  regard  to  horses,  you  say  that  the  present  rate  of 
supply  is  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  per  week  for  the 
entire  army  here  and  in  front  of  Washington.  1  find 
from  the  records  that  the  issues  for  the  last  six  weeks 
have  been  eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty-four, 
making  an  average  per  week  of  one  thousand  four  hun 
dred  and  fifty-nine/' 

The  same  charge  is  repeated  in  his  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  October  28,  and  is  also  found 
in  General  Meigs's  letter  of  October  14.  In  tho 


AGE  35.]  QUESTION     OF     FACT.  823 

original  despatch  to  which  General  Halleck's  letter 
is  a,  reply,  one  thousand  and  fifty  (1050),  and  not 
one  hundred  and  fifty,  is  the  number  stated;  and, 
as  it  was  written  out  in  letters  in  full,  it  is  difficult 
to  sec  how  the  telegraphic  operator  could  have 
made  a  mistake  in  transmitting  the  message.  The 
gross  injustice  done  to  General  McClellan  in  thus 
holding  him  up  to  the  public  as  guilty  either  of  de 
liberate  untruth  or  of  enormous  carelessness,  need 
not  be  commented  upon. 

The  question  between  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  and  General  McClellan  was  a  question  of 
fact.  Neither  the  President  nor  the  general-in- 
chief  nor  the  Secretary  of  War  would  have  insisted 
upon  the  army's  advancing  without  shoes,  clothing, 
and  horses ;  but  it  was  charged,  or  at  least  inti 
mated,  that  the  army,  in  point  of  fact,  was  suffi 
ciently  supplied  with  them  all,  and  that  the  alleged 
want  of  them  was  a  mere  pretext  put  forward  by 
the  general  in  command  to  excuse  his  slowness,  in 
dolence,  or  lack  of  zeal  in  the  cause.  Upon  this 
issue  we  may  repeat,  what  was  said  before  as  to  the 
charge  of  needless  delay  in  forwarding  the  troops 
from  Harrison's  Bar,  that  General  McClellan  stands 
upon  the  ground  of  knowledge  and  the  Adminis 
tration  upon  the  ground  of  inference.  The  testi 
mony  of  one  credible  witness  swearing  affirmatively 
to  what  he  knows  outweighs  that  of  twenty  who 
can  only  contradict  him  by  a  process  of  deductive 
reasoning.  The  case  cannot  be  put  more  simply 
01*  more  forcibly  than  lias  been  done  by  General 
McClellan  himself  in  his  Report : — 


324  GENERAL    McCLELLAN's    STATEMENT.    [1862. 

"  The  general-in-chief,  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  the  28th  of  October,  says,  '  In  my  opinion,  there 
has  been  no  such  want  of  supplies  in  the  army  under 
General  McClellan  as  to  prevent  his  compliance  with  the 
orders  to  advance  against  the  enemy/ 

"  Notwithstanding  this  opinion  expressed  by  such  high 
authority,  I  am  compelled  to  say  again  that  the  delay  in 
the  reception  of  necessary  supplies  up  to  that  date  had 
left  the  army  in  a  condition  totally  unfit  to  advance 
against  the  enemy  ;  that  an  advance  under  the  existing 
circumstances  would,  in  my  judgment,  have  been  attended 
with  the  highest  degree  of  peril,  with  great  suffering  and 
sickness  among  the  men,  and  with  imminent  danger  of 
being  cut  off  from  our  supplies  by  the  superior  cavalry 
force  of  the  enemy,  and  with  no  reasonable  prospect  of 
gaining  any  advantage  over  him. 

"  I  dismiss  this  subject  with  the  remark  that  I  have 
found  it  impossible  to  resist  the  force  of  my  own  convic 
tions,  that  the  commander  of  an  army,  who  from  the 
time  of  its  organization  has  for  eighteen  months  been  in 
constant  communication  with  its  officers  and  men,  the 
greater  part  of  the  time  engaged  in  active  service  in  the 
field,  and  who  has  exercised  this  command  in  many  bat 
tles,  must  certainly  be  considered  competent  to  determine 
whether  his  army  is  in  proper  condition  to  advance  on 
the  enemy  or  not;  and  he  must  necessarily  possess  greater 
facilities  for  forming  a  correct  judgment  in  regard  to  the 
wants  of  his  men  and  the  condition  of  his  supplies  than 
the  general-in-chief  in  his  office  at  Washington  City." 

Injustice  to  General  McClellan,  and  that  it  may  be 
understood  that  he  was  not  at  all  open  to  the  charge 
of  disobedience  of  orders,  it  should  be  stated  that 
the  President's  peremptory  instructions  of  October 
6,  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the 


AGE  35.]  NO     TIME     LOST. 

enemy  or  drive  him  south,  were  never  distinctly 
repented.  From  the  moment  of  receiving  them, 
General  McClellan  set  himself  diligently  at  work 
to  get  his  army  in  condition  to  obey  them;  and 
from  day  to  day,  almost  from  hour  to  hour,  he  sent 
to  \Yashington  reports  of  his  condition  and  pro 
gress.  His  telegraphic  despatches  between  Sep 
tember  6  and  November  7,  mostly  addressed  to 
the  general-in-chief,  were  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
eight  in  number;  and  no  stronger  proof  can  be  ad 
duced  of  his  attention  to  his  duties,  and  of  his 
earnest  desire  that  the  Government  should  be  fully 
informed  alike  of  the  state  of  his  own  army,  and 
of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  he  could 
learn  them.  As  the  orders  to  cross  the  river  were 
not  renewed,  General  McClellan  had  a  right  to  sup 
pose  that  the  Administration  were  satisfied  that  he 
was  straining  every  nerve  to  get  the  army  in  order 
for  a  forward  movement,  and  on  that  account  for 
bore  to  repeat  the  command.  But  the  evidence  oil 
this  point  is  not  merely  negative,  but  positive,  as  ap 
pears  from  the  following  extract  from  his  Report : — 

"  Knowing  the  solicitude  of  the  President  for  an  early 
movement,  and  sharing  with  him  fully  his  anxiety  for 
prompt  action,  on  the  21st  of  October  I  telegraphed  to 
the  general-in-chief  as  follows  : — 

"<  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  ) 
October  21,  1862.  j 

"'Since  the  receipt  of  the  President's  order  to  move 
on  the  enemy,  I  have  been  making  every  exertion  to  got 
this  army  supplied  with  clothing  absolutely  necessary  for 
marching. 

28 


>26  NO     TIME     LOST. 


[1862. 


"  'This,  I  am  happy  to  say,  is  now  nearly  accomplished. 
I  have  also,  during  the  same  time,  repeatedly  urged  upon 
you  the  importance  of  supplying  cavalry  and  artillery 
horses  to  replace  those  broken  down  by  hard  service;  and 
steps  have  been  taken  to  insure  a  prompt  delivery. 

"  '  Our  cavalry,  even  when  well  supplied  with  horses,  is 
much  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  in 
efficiency  has  proved  itself  superior.  So  forcibly  has  this 
been  impressed  upon  our  old  regiments  by  repeated  suc 
cesses,  that  the  men  are  fully  persuaded  that  they  are 
equal  to  twice  their  number  of  rebel  cavalry. 

"  'Exclusive  of  the  cavalry  force  now  engaged  in  picket 
ing  the  river,  I  have  not  at  present  over  about  one  thou 
sand  (1000)  horses  for  service.  Officers  have  been  sent  in 
various  directions  to  purchase  horses,  and  I  expect  them 
soon.  Without  more  cavalry-horses,  our  communications, 
from  the  moment  we  march,  would  be  at  the  mercy  of 
the  large  cavalry  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  it  would  not  be 
possible  for  us  to  cover  our  flanks  properly,  or  to  obtain 
the  necessary  information  of  the  position  and  movements 
of  the  enemy,  in  such  a  way  as  to  insure  success.  My 
experience  has  shown  the  necessity  of  a  large  and  efficient 
cavalry  force. 

"  '  Under  the  foregoing  circumstances,  I  beg  leave  to  ask 
\vhether  the  President  desires  me  to  march  on  the  enemy 
at  once,  or  to  await  the  reception  of  the  new  horses,  every 
possible  step  having  been  taken  to  insure  their  prompt 
arrival.  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAX, 

"  '  Major-  General  commanding. 

"  'Major-General  H.  "W.  HALLECK, 

" ' General-in-Chief ]  WasJdngtonS 

"On  the  same  day  .General  Ilalleck  replied  as  fol 
lows: — 

" '•  WASHINGTON,  October  21,  1862,  ?>  r.  M., 
"'Your  telegram  of  12  M.  has  been  submitted  to  the 


AGE  35.]  MO  VEMENT    SPEEDED.  327 

President.     He  directs  me  to  say  that  he  has  no  change 
to  make  in  his  order  of  the  Gth  instant. 

"  'If  you  have  not  been,  and  are  not  now,  in  condition 
to  obey  it,  you  will  be  able  to  show  such  want  of  ability. 
The  President  does  not  expect  impossibilities  ;  but  he  is 
very  anxious  that  all  this  good  weather  should  not  be 
wasted  in  inactivity.  Telegraph  when  you  will  move, 
and  on  what  lines  you  propose  to  march. 

"'H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

"  Major-General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN/  " 

General  Halleck's  reply  is  ambiguous,  wary,  cold; 
but  General  McClellan  had  a  right  to  draw  from  it 
the  inference  which  he  says  he  did,  as  follows : — 

"  From  the  tenor  of  this  despatch  I  conceived  that  it 
was  left  for  my  judgment  to  decide  whether  or  not  it  was 
possible  to  move  with  safety  to  the  army  at  that  time  ; 
and  this  responsibility  I  exercised  with  the  more  confi 
dence  in  view  of  the  strong  assurances  of  his  trust  in  me, 
as  commander  of  that  army,  with  which  the  President 
had  seen  fit  to  honor  me  during  his  last  visit. 

"The  cavalry  requirements,  without  which  an  advance 
would  have  been  in  the  highest  degree  injudicious  and 
unsafe,  were  still  wanting. 

"  The  country  before  us  was  an  enemy's  country,  where 
the  inhabitants  furnished  to  the  enemy  every  possible 
assistance;  providing  food  for  men  and  forage  for  ani 
mals,  giving  all  information  concerning  our  movements, 
and  rendering  every  aid  in  their  power  to  the  enemy's 
cause. 

"  It  was  manifest  that  we  should  find  it,  as  we  subse 
quently  did,  a  hostile  district,  where  we  could  derive  no 
aid  from  the  inhabitants  that  would  justify  dispensing 
with  the  active  co-operation  of  an  efficient  cavalry  force. 
Accordingly,  I  fixed  upon  the  1st  of  November  as  the 


328  MOVEMENT    BEGUX.  [1862. 

earliest  date  at  which  the  forward  movement  could  well 
be  commenced.'7 

The  above  inference  is  strengthened  by  a  subse 
quent  despatch  from  General  Halleck,  dated  Octo 
ber  26,  in  which  lie  says, — 

"  Since  you  left  Washington,  I  have  advised  and  sug 
gested  in  relation  to  your  movements ;  but  I  have  given 
you  no  orders.  I  do  not  give  you  any  now.  The  Govern 
ment  has  intrusted  you  with  defeating  and  driving  back 
the  rebel  army  in  your  front.  I  shall  not  attempt  to 
control  you  in  the  measures  you  may  adopt  for  that  pur 
pose.  You  are  informed  of  my  views;  but  the  President 
has  left  you  at  liberty  to  adopt  them  or  not,  as  you  may 
deem  best/' 

On  the  26th  of  October  the  army  began  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  and  by  the  2d  of  JSTovember  all  the 
corps  were  on  the  right  bank,  marching  to  the 
South,  on  a  line  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  had 
been  selected  by  General  McClellan  partly  because 
it  would  secure  him  the  largest  accession  of  force 
and  partly  because  the  President  had  always  been 
in  favor  of  it.  His  purpose  was  to  march  his  army 
to  a  point  where  it  could  derive  its  supplies  from 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railway,  and  where  it  could  be 
held  in  hand  ready  for  action  or  movement  in  any 
direction. 

On  the  7th  of  Xovember  the  several  corps  of  the 
army  were  at  or  near  TTarrenton,  and,  as  General 
McClellan  says,  "in  admirable  condition  and  spirits. 
I  doubt  whether  during  the  whole  period  that  I  had 
the  honor  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 


AGE  35.]    GENERAL    McCLELLAN    REMOVED.          oL?i> 

it  was  in  such  excellent  condition  to  fight  a  great 
battle. "  Of  the  Confederate  army,  Longstreet's 
corps  was  in  front  at  Culpepper,  and  the  remaining 
portion  was  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  near  Chester's 
and  Thornton's  Gaps.  General  McClellan's  plan 
was  to  separate  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  and  either  beat  Longstreet  separately,  or 
force  him  to  fall  back  at  least  upon  Gordons villc 
so  as  to  effect  his  junction  with  the  rest  of  the 
army.  In  the  event  of  a  battle  he  felt  confident 
of  a  brilliant  victory.  Late  on  the  evening  of  the 
7th,  the  following  orders  were  delivered  to  him 
by  General  Buckingham  : — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,        ) 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  November  5,  1862.  J 

"GENERAL: — On  the  receipt  of  the  order  of  the  Pre 
sident  sent  herewith,  you  will  immediately  turn  over 
your  command  to  Major-General  Burnside,  and  repair  to 
Trenton,  N.  J.,  reporting  on  your  arrival  at  that  place  by 
telegraph  for  further  orders. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"II.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 
"  Major-General  MCCLELLAN." 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  November  5,  1SG2. 
"General  Orders  No.  182. 

"By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
it  is  ordered  that  Major-General  McClellan  be  relieved 
from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
that  Major-General  Burnside  take  the  command  of  that 
army. 

"By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  : 

"E.  D.  TOWXSEXD,  Adjutant- General." 


IIALLECK'S   REPORT.       [is62. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  reasons  for  this  summary  and  abrupt  dis 
missal  of  General  McClellan,  strange  to  say,  have 
never  been  distinctly  and  officially  given  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  The  President,  in  his 
annual  message  to  Congress,  only  twenty-six  days 
later  than  the  date  of  his  order  of  removal,  says 
nothing  upon  the  subject. 

The  general-in-chief,  in  his  Report,  addressed  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  says,  "  From  the  17th  of 
September  till  the  26th  of  October,  McClellan's 
main  army  remained  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Potomac,  in  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg  and  Har 
per's  Ferry.  The  long  inactivity  of  so  large  an 
army  in  the  face  of  a  defeated  foe  and  during  the 
most  favorable  season  for  rapid  movements  and  a 
vigorous  campaign,  was  a  matter  of  great  disap 
pointment  and  regret.  Your  letter  of  the  27th 
arid  my  reply  on  the  28th  of  October,  in  regard  to 
the  alleged  causes  of  this  unhappy  delay,  I  here 
with  submit,  marked  Exhibit  Ko.  5.  In  reply  to 
the  telegraphic  order  of  the  Gth  of  October,  quoted 
in  my  letter  of  the  28th,  above  referred  to,  Gene 
ral  McClellan  disapproved  of  the  plan  of  crossing 
the  Potomac  south  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  said  that 
he  would  cross  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  advance  upon 
AYinchester.  He,  however,  did  not  begin  to  cross 
till  the  26th  of  October,  and  then  at  Berlin. 

"  The  passage  occupied  several  days,  and  was 


ACE  3J.J       GENERAL    IIALLECKSREPORT.  Oo 

completed  about  the  3d  of  November.  What 
caused  him  to  change  his  views,  or  what  his  plan 
of  campaign  was,  I  am  ignorant ;  for  about  this 
time  he  ceased  to  communicate  with  me  in  regard 
to  his  operations,  sending  his  reports  directly  to 
the  President.*  On  the  5th  instant  I  received 


*  This  is  a  curious  sentence,  and  deserves  a  little  examina 
tion.  The  date  of  the  document  on  which  it  appears  is  Decem 
ber  2,  18G2,  and  the  general-in-chief  says  that  on  that  day  he 
was  ignorant  of  General  McClellan's  plans  because  the  latter, 
from  a  date  about  a  month  previous,  had  ceased  to  communi 
cate  with  him  personally  and  had  sent  his  reports  directly  to 
the  President.  Are  we  to  understand  that  the  relations 
between  the  President  and  the  gcneral-in-chief  were  such 
during  the  whole  month  of  November,  1802,  that  the  latter 
never  saw,  never  was  informed  of,  the  communications  ad 
dressed  to  the  former  by  the  general  commanding  the  largest 
army  in  the  field?  But,  if  the  statement  does  not  mean  this, 
it  is  a  mere  gratuitous  effusion  of  spite  against  General  Mc- 
Clellan.  If  it  means  this,  will  any  body  believe  it? 

Again,  "about  this  time"  General  McClellan  ceased  to  com 
municate  with  the  general-in-chief.  About  what  time?  Two 
dates  had  just  before  been  mentioned, — October  20  and  Novem 
ber  3;  and  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  which  of  the  two  was 
meant.  If  it  were  the  latter,  General  McClellan  could  not 
have  had  time  to  send  many  communications  to  anybody  after 
that  day,  as  he  was  deprived  of  his  command  on  the  7th  :  if  it 
were  the  former,  then  the  statement  is  not  true;  for  in  the  ap 
pendix  to  General  Ilalleck's  testimony,  as  published  by  the 
Congressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  there  ap 
pear  no  less  than  six  despatches  addressed  to  him  by  General 
McClellan  after  October  20. 

General  McClellan's  communications  to  the  President  were 
generally  in  reply  to  inquiries  or  suggestions  from  the  latter, 
whose  restless  and  meddlesome  spirit  was  constantly  moving 


332       NO   CAUSE   ASSIGNED    TOR    THE    REMOVAL.     [1662. 

the  written  order  of  the  President  relieving  Gene 
ral  McClellan  and  placing  General  Burnsiile  in  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  order 
was  transmitted  by  a  special  messenger,  who  de 
livered  it  to  General  McClellan  at  Eectortown  on 
the  7th/' 

Here  it  will  be  seen  that  no  reason  is  assigned 
for  what  the  general-in-chief  chooses  to  call  "  re 
lieving"  General  McClellan;  but,  from  the  whole 
evidence  before  him,  the  reader  is  left  to  infer  that 
he  was  removed  because  he  had  disobeyed  the 
orders  of  the  President  without  cause  or  excuse. 
The  orders  in  question,  to  cross  the  river  and 
attack  the  enemy,  were  given  on  the  6th  of  Oc 
tober,  the  forward  movement  began  on  the  26th 
of  the  same  month,  and  the  removal  of  General 
McClellan  was  made  on  the  5th  of  .November, 
when  the  army  were  thirty  or  forty  miles  on 
their  march,  in  splendid  condition  and  high  spirits. 

him  to  ask  questions,  obtrude  advice,  and  make  comments 
upon  military  matters,  which  were  as  much  out  of  his  sphere 
as  they  were  beyond  his  comprehension. 

It  is  true  that  General  McClellan  did  not  communicate  his 
plans  of  the  campaign  either  to  the  President  or  the  general- 
in-chief;  but  surely  he  is  to  be  commended  for  this.  The  suc 
cess  of  a  military  movement  often  depends  upon  its  being  kept 
an  entire  secret  from  the  enemy.  General  McClellan  had 
learned  by  experience  the  danger  of  revealing,  even  in  official 
conversation,  his  future  operations;  and  it  would  have  been  an 
increased  risk  if  he  had  made  the  telegraph-wire  a  confidant. 

The  whole  passage  is  characteristic  of  the  inventive  in 
genuity  which  has  been  shown,  from  first  to  last,  in  devising 
pretexts  to  find  fault  with  General  McClellan. 


AGE  35.]       REMOVED    FOR    POLITICAL   REASONS.  Oo3 

In  other  words,  an  officer  is  removed  for  disobey 
ing  orders  not  only  one  month  after  they  were 
given,  but  eleven  days  after  he  had  begun  to  obey 
them!  The  Administration  must  have  great  con 
fidence  in  the  credulity  of  the  public  if  they  sup 
pose  this  will  be  received  as  the  real  cause  why 
General  McClellan.  was  deprived  of  his  command. 
Had  this  been  done  immediately  after  the  6th  of 
October,  or  at  least  soon  after,  the  pretext  would 
have  had  some  show  of  seeming. 

The  real  reasons  for  which  General  McClellan 
was  removed  were  political,  and  not  military.  They 
are  to  be  found  in  the  wide  difference  of  views 
between  his  letter  of  July  7,  1SG2,  written  at  Har 
rison's  Landing,  on  the  policy  and  conduct  of  the 
war,  and  the  President's  Proclamation  of  Septem 
ber  22.  That  letter  incurred  for  General  McClellan 
the  unrelenting  hostility  of  the  political  party 
which  constrained  the  President  to  issue  the  Pro 
clamation ;  and  the  same  influences,  or  "pressure," 
which  procured  the  document  in  question,  com 
pelled  the  removal  of  General  McClellan.  And 
that  a  strong  "  pressure"  was  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  President  is  unquestionable ;  for  on  the  13th 
of  September,  in  an  interview  with  a  deputation 
from  Chicago,  when  urged  to  issue  a  proclama 
tion  of  emancipation,  he  distinctly  declined  it, 
saying,  among  other  things,  "  What  good  would 
a  proclamation  of  emancipation  from  me  do,  espe 
cially  as  we  are  now  situated  ?  I  do  not  want 
to  issue  a  document  that  the  whole  world  will  see 
must  necessarily  be  inoperative,  like  the  Pope's  bul!. 


834  THESE    NO    JUSTIFICATION. 


[13G2. 


against  the  comet.  Would  my  word  free  the  slaves, 
when  I  cannot  even  enforce  the  Constitution  in  the 
rebel  States?  Is  there  a  single  court  or  individual 
that  would  be  influenced  by  it  there  ?  And  what 
reason  is  there  to  think  it  would  have  any  greater 
effect  upon  the  slaves  than  the  late  law  of  Con 
gress  which  I  approved,  and  which  offers  protection 
and  freedom  to  the  slaves  of  rebel  masters  who 
come  within  our  lines  ?  Yet  I  cannot  learn  that 
the  law  has  caused  a  single  slave  to  come  over  to 
us."  It  is  hardly  possible  to  suppose  that  in  the 
short  space  of  eleven  days  the  mind  of  the  Pre 
sident  had  undergone  a  process  of  natural  conver 
sion  upon  a  point  of  such  vital  moment. 

But  General  McClellan's  political  opinions,  and 
his  manly  avowal  of  them,  afford  no  justifica 
tion  for  his  removal  from  the  command  of  the 
army.  lie  had  shown  by  word  and  deed  that  he 
would  do  his  duty  as  a  soldier,  within  his  sphere, 
whatever  political  policy  the  Administration  might 
adopt  or  whatever  political  aspects  the  war  might 
assume.  This  was  all  the  Administration  had  a 
right  to  ask.  That  he  had  the  confidence  and  affec 
tion  of  his  army  is  beyond  question.  His  removal 
was  due  to  a  fact  stated  affirmatively — though  put 
in  the  form  of  a  question  to  General  McDowell — • 
by  a  member  of  the  Congressional  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  December  2G,  1801, — that 
"  there  is  a  political  element  connected  with  this 
war  which  must  not  be  overlooked."  There  has 
indeed  been  such  an  "clement"  from  the  beginning 
in  the  conduct  of  this  war;  it  never  has  been 


AGE  35.]  FAREWELL    ADDRESS.  o35 

"  overlooked,"  but  has  always  been  prominent,  and 
set  in  the  front  of  the  battle,  and  Luis  been  the 
fruitful  source  of  mistakes  and  disasters  to  our 
cause.  In  the  present  instance  it  led  to  the  dan 
gerous  experiment  of  changing  commanders  in 
front  of  an  enemy;  and  the  bitter  experience  of 
Fredcricksburg  was  the  direct  result. 

The  first  act  of  General  McClcllan  on  receiving 
the  order  relieving  him  of  command  was  to  draw 
up  a  farewell  address  to  the  army,  as  follows, — 
which  was  read  to  them  at  dress-parade  on  the 
10th  :— 

"  JlKAP-Ql'ARTERS  ARMY  OP  THE   PoTOMAr,     ] 

CAMP  NEAR  HKCTORTOAVX,  November  7,  1862.  ) 
"  OFFICERS  AND  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  : — 

"An  order  of  the  President  devolves  upon  Major-Gene 
ral  Burnside  the  command  of  this  army.  In  parting 
from  you,  I  cannot  express  the  love  and  gratitude  I  bear 
you.  As  an  army  you  have  grown  up  under  my  care.  In 
you  I  have  never  found  doubt  or  coldness.  The  battles 
you  have  fought  under  my  command  will  proudly  live  in 
our  nation's  history.  The  glory  you  have  achieved,  our 
mutual  perils  and  fatigues,  the  graves  of  our  comrades 
fallen  in  battle  and  by  disease,  the  broken  forms  of  those 
whom  wounds  and  sickness  have  disabled, — the  strongest 
associations  which  can  exist  among  men, — unite  us  still 
hy  an  indissoluble  tie.  "VVe  shall  ever  he  comrades  in 
supporting  the  Constitution  of  our  country  and  the  nation 
ality  of  its  people. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCOLELLAX, 

"  Major-General,   U.  /S'.  A.." 

On  Saturday,  Xoveniber  S,  General  McClcllan 
was  busily  occupied  in  making  the  arrangements 


336  TAKES    LEAVE    OF    THE    ARMY.  [1802. 

necessary  for  transferring  his  command  to  General 
Burnside.  The  two  generals,  between  whom  the 
personal  relations  were  entirely  friendly,  were  in 
consultation  for  several  hours. 

At  nine  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  the 
9th,  General  McClellan  took  leave  of  his  staff 
officers  by  appointment.  It  was  a  touching  and 
impressive  scene.  A  large  fire  of  logs  was  blazing 
within  the  enclosure  formed  by  the  tents  of  the 
head-quarters.  General  McClellan  stood  just  inside 
of  his  marquee,  the  curtains  of  which  were  parted 
and  drawn  up.  As  the  officers  of  his  staff  ap 
proached,  he  grasped  each  warmly  by  the  hand, 
and,  with  a  few  words  of  friendly  greeting,  ushered 
him  inside.  The  tent  was  soon  filled,  and  many 
were  compelled  to  remain  outside.  Filling  a  glass 
of  wine,  General  McClellan  raised  it,  and  said,  "  To 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  to  which  an  officer 
present  added,  "and  to  its  old  commander."  An 
hour  or  two  of  social  converse  passed,  and  the 
officers  took  leave  of  their  beloved  commander, — 
sadly,  sorrowfully. 

Monday,  the  10th,  was  occupied  in  visiting  the 
various  camps  and  bidding  farewell  to  his  troops. 
A  person  present  at  this  scene  has  thus  described 
it: — "As  General  McClellan,  mounted  upon  a  fine 
horse,  attended  by  a  retinue  of  fine-looking  military 
men,  riding  rapidly  through  the  ranks,  gracefully 
recognized  and  bade  a  farewell  to  the  army,  the 
cries  and  demonstrations  of  the  men  were  beyond 
bounds, — wild,  impassioned,  and  unrestrained.  Dis 
regarding  all  military  forms,  they  rushed  from  their 


AGE  35.]  LEAVES    WARREN  TON.  oo7 

ranks,  and  thronged  around  him  with  the  bitterest 
complaints  against  those  who  had  removed  from 
command  their  beloved  leader/' 

As  he  rode  up  to  the  head-quarters  of  General 
Fitz-John  Porter,  he  was  met  by  a  large  delega 
tion  of  officers  in  that  command,  and  addressed  by 
General  Butterneld,  who,  in  a  few  well-chosen 
words,  alluded  to  the  affection  existing  between 
General  McClellan  and  his  officers,  and  stated  that 
those  on  behalf  of  whom  he  spoke  were  there  to 
bid  him  a  personal  farewell.  In  reply,  General  Mc 
Clellan  said,  "  I  hardly  know  what  to  say  to  you, 
my  friends,  officers  associated  with  me  so  long  in 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I  can  only  bid  you 
farewell.  History  will  do  justice  to  the  deeds  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  if  the  present  generation 
does  not.  I  feel  as  if  I  had  been  intimately  con 
nected  with  each  and  all  of  you.  Nothing  is  moro 
binding  than  the  friendship  of  companions  in  arms. 
May  you  all  in  future  preserve  the  high  reputation 
of  our  army,  and  serve  all  as  well  and  faithfully  as 
you  have  served  me.  I  will  say  farewell  now,  if  I 
must  say  it.  Good-bye  :  God  bless  you." 

On  the  llth,  General  McClellan  left  Warrenton. 
On  reaching  Warrenton  Junction,  a  salute  was 
fired.  The  troops,  who  had  been  drawn  up  in  line, 
afterwards  broke  their  ranks;  the  soldiers  crowded 
around  him,  and  many  eagerly  called  for  a  few 
parting  words.  He  said,  in  response,  while  stand 
ing  on  the  platform  of  the  railroad-station,  "  I  wish 
you  to  stand  by  General  Burnside  as  you  have  stood 
by  me,  ar.4  all  will  be  well." 


338  RECEPTION     AT    TRENTON.  [1862. 

He  reached  Washington,  but,  without  stopping, 
went  to  the  station  of  the  Philadelphia  Kailroad, 
and  proceeded  to  the  latter  city  in  the  train  which 
started  at  five  P.M.  He  arrived  at  Philadelphia 
about  midnight,  and  was  there  greeted  with  music 
and  cheers  from  a  crowd  assembled  to  welcome  him. 
He  appeared  upon  the  platform,  and  said, — 

"Fellow-citizens  of  Philadelphia,  I  thank  you  for  your 
kindness.  I  have  parted  with  your  brothers  and  sons  in 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  too  recently  to  make  a  speech. 
Our  parting  was  sad.  I  can  say  nothing  more  to  you ;  and 
I  do  not  think  you  ought  to  expect  a  speech  from  me." 

He  arrived  at  Trenton,  his  point  of  destination, 
at  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  12th. 

On  the  evening  of  the  13th,  an  address  of  welcome 
was  made  to  General  McClellan,  on  behalf  of  the 
citizens  of  Trenton,  by  Andrew  Dutcher,  Esq.  A 
large  number  of  interested  and  sympathizing  spec 
tators  were  present.  In  reply,  he  said, — 

"My  friends, — for  I  feel  that  you  are  all  my  friends, — 
I  stand  before  you  not  as  a  maker  of  speeches,  not  as  a 
politician,  but  as  a  soldier.  I  came  among  you  to  seek 
quiet  and  repose,  and  from  the  moment  I  came  among 
you  I  have  received  nothing  but  kindness  ;  and,  although 
I  came  among  you  a  stranger,  I  am  well  acquainted  with 
your  history.  From  the  time  I  took  command,  your  gal 
lant  sons  were  with  me,  from  the  siege  of  Yorktown 
to  the  battle  of  Antietam.  I  was  with  them,  and  wit 
nessed  their  bravery,  and  that  of  the  ever-faithful  and 
ever-true  Taylor  and  the  intrepid  and  flashing  Kearney. 
One  word  more.  While  the  army  is  fighting,  you,  as  citi 
zens,  should  see  that  the  war  is  prosecuted  for  the  preser- 


AGE  30.]  VISIT    TO    BOSTON. 

ration  of  the  Union  and  the  Constitution,  for  your  nation 
ality  and  rights  as  citizens." 

Since  the  time  of  his  removal  from  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General  McClellan 
has  not  had  any  military  duties  assigned  to  him, 
but  has  been  living,  unemployed,  the  life  of  a  pri 
vate  citizen.  At  this  moment  of  writing  (July,  1864), 
he  resides  at  Orange,  in  the  State  of  New  Jersey, 
where  his  home  has  been  for  some  months  past. 

In  the  winter  of  1863,  General  McClellan,  accom 
panied  by  his  wife  and  two  or  three  officers  of  his 
staff,  paid  a  visit  to  Boston,  arriving  there  on  the 
29th  of  January  and  remaining  till  the  8th  of 
February.  He  came  upon  the  invitation  of  seve 
ral  gentlemen,  not  all  of  one  political  party, 
but  all  uniting  in  their  desire  to  testify  to  him  in 
person  their  gratitude  for  his  services  and  the 
esteem  in  which  they  held  him  as  an  officer  and  a 
citizen.  Though  the  visit  was  thus  strictly  private, 
the  general  and  earnest  desire  of  the  people  to  see 
him  gave  to  it  something  of  the  nature  of  a  public 
reception.  His  movements  were  followed  and  his 
steps  watched  by  earnest  and  interested  crowds, 
who  greeted  him,  whenever  he  was  seen,  with 
hearty  enthusiasm.  His  time  was  busily  employed 
in  visiting  the  points  of  attraction  in  Boston  and 
its  neighborhood,  and  in  receiving  those  social  at 
tentions  which  were  tendered  to  him  with  a  most 
liberal  hand.  His  visit  must  have  been  highly  grati 
fying  to  him;  and  it  is  certain  that  he  left  a  most 
agreeable  impression  upon  all  who  met  him,  from 


340  VISIT    TO     BOSTON.  [ISO::. 

his  quiet  and  simple  manners,  and  his  careful 
abstinence  from  self-reference  and  complaints  of 
others.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  he  had  qualified 
himself  to  command  others  by  first  learning  to 
command  himself. 

During  his  stay  in  Boston  a  very  handsome 
sword  was  presented  to  him ;  and  the  value  of  the 
testimonial  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  cost, 
amounting  to  several  hundred  dollars,  was  defrayed 
by  a  subscription  limited  to  one  dollar  from  each 
person.  Among  the  subscribers — to  their  honor 
be  it  said — were  not  a  few  members  of  the  Eepubli- 
can  party,  who,  while  they  supported  the  Adminis 
tration,  were  willing  to  acknowledge  its  mistakes. 
The  inscription  which  the  sword  bore,  "Pro  rege 
eaype,  pro  patria  semper,"  excited  an  amount  of 
discussion  and  comment  in  the  newspaper  press  in 
which  future  observers  will  recognize  an  amusing 
instance  of  the  importance  which  trifles  may  assume 
when  viewed  through  a  properly  magnifying 
medium. 

While  in  Boston,  he  was  invited  to  visit  Concord, 
Kew  Hampshire,  Portland  and  Augusta,  in  Maine, 
and  other  places;  but  he  was  not  able  to  accept 
any  of  these  gratifying  invitations. 

In  October,  1863.  the  State  election  in  Pennsyl 
vania  took  place.  Governor  Curtin  was  the  Repub 
lican  candidate  for  Governor,  and  Judge  Woodward 
the  Democratic.  The  election  was  contested  with 
great  ardor,  and  all  over  the  country  much  interest 
was  felt  in  the  result.  It  was  thought  that  the  vote 
of  the  soldiers,  who  were  coming  into  the  State 


ACK  36.]  LETTER  IN  FAVOR  OF  JUDGE  WOODWARD.        341 

in  great  numbers,  was  of  much  importance,  and 
would,  perhaps,  decide  the  contest.  They  were  all 
devoted  to  General  McClellan ;  but  an  impression 
was  spread  among  them  that  he  was  in  favor  of 
Governor  Curtin.  A  correspondent  of"  The  Press," 
a  leading  political  journal,  had  so  stated.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  was  deemed  by  the  friends 
of  Judge  Woodward  highly  important  that  this 
erroneous  impression  should  be  removed  by  a  dis 
tinct  contradiction  under  General  McClellan's  own 
hand.  Accordingly,  one  of  Judge  Woodward's 
friends  left  Philadelphia  on  Sunday  evening,  Octo 
ber  11, — the  day  of  the  election  being  Tuesday, 
October  13, — and  went  to  Orange,  Xew  Jersey, 
and  laid  the  whole  matter  before  General  McClel 
lan.  The  result  was  the  following  letter: — 

"  ORANGE,  NEW  JERSEY,  October  12,  1863. 
"  Hon.  CHARLES  J.  IXGERSOLL,  Philadelphia. 

"  DEAR  SIR  : — My  attention  has  been  called  to  an  article 
in  the  Philadelphia  'Press/  asserting  that  I  had  written 
to  the  managers  of  a  Democratic  meeting  at  Allentown, 
disapproving  the  objects  of  the  meeting,  and  that,  if  I 
voted  or  spoke,  it  would  be  in  favor  of  Governor  Curtin. 
I  am  informed  that  similar  assertions  have  been  made 
throughout  the  State.  It  has  been  my  earnest  endeavor 
heretofore  to  avoid  participating  in  party  politics,  and  I 
am  determined  to  adhere  to  this  course. 

"  But  it  is  obvious  that  I  cannot  longer  maintain  silence 
under  such  misrepresentations. 

"  I  therefore  request  you  to  deny  that  I  have  written 
any  such  letter  or  entertained  any  such  views  as  those 
attributed  to  me  in  the  Philadelphia  'Press,'  and  I  de 
sire  to  state,  clearly  and  distinctly,  that,  having  some  few 


LETTER  IN  FAVOR  OF  JUDGE  WOODWARD. 


days  ago  had  a  full  conversation  with  Judge  Woodward, 
I  find  that  our  views  agree,  and  I  regard  his  election  as 
Governor  of  Pennsylvania  called  for  by  the  interests  of 
the  nation, 

"  I  understand  Judge  Woodward  to  be  in  favor  of  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  with  all  the  means  at  the  com 
mand  of  the  loyal  States,  until  the  military  power  of  the 
rebellion  is  destroyed.  I  understand  him  to  be  of  the 
opinion  that,  while  the  war  is  waged  with  all  possible 
decision  and  energy,  the  policy  directing  it  should  be  in 
consonance  with  the  principles  of  humanity  and  civiliza 
tion,  working  no  injury  to  private  rights  and  property  not 
demanded  by  military  law  among  civilized  nations ;  and, 
finally,  I  understand  him  to  agree  with  me  in  the  opinion 
that  the  sole  great  objects  of  this  war  are  the  restoration 
of  the  unity  of  the  nation,  the  preservation  of  the  Consti 
tution,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  laws  of  the  country. 

"  Believing  that  our  opinions  entirely  agree  on  these 
points,  I  would,  were  it  in  my  power,  give  to  Judge 
Woodward  my  voice  and  my  vote. 

"  I  am,  very  respectfully,  yours, 

"GEORGE  B.  MC-CLELLAX." 

The  above  letter  was  immediately  telegraphed 
to  Philadelphia,  but  it  was  not  published  till  late 
in  the  afternoon  of  Monday,  the  12th,  and  then  it 
was  freely  denounced  as  a  forgery ;  and  thus  it 
failed  to  exert  the  influence  upon  the  election  which 
it  might  have  done  had  it  appeared  earlier. 

General  McClellan  must  have  been  nattered  by 
the  amount  and  character  of  the  discussion  which 
this  letter  called  forth,  since  it  proved  how  much 
weight  was  attached  to  his  name  and  opinion. 
There  are  occasions  in  the  life  of  every  public  man 


riRST     NEW     YORK     CAVALRY. 


in  which  he  Avill  be  blamed  whether  he  docs  a  cer 
tain  act  or  declines  to  do  it;  and  this  was  one 
of  those  occasions.  Those  who  were  loudest  in 
denouncing  him  for  writing  and  publishing  the 
letter  would  have  been  entitled  to  a  better  hearing 
had  they  uttered  a  word  of  censure  upon  the  shame 
ful  fraud  which  drew  it  forth  from  a  man  always 
disinclined  to  embrace  opportunities  for  public  dis 
play,  and  who  now  only  exercised  the  undoubted 
right  of  every  freeman. 

On  the  18th  of  February,  18G4,  an  incident 
occurred  in  the  city  of  New  York,  which  showed 
how  much  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
were  attached  to  their  old  commander.  On  that 
day,  an  official  reception  was  given  by  the  munici 
pal  authorities  to  the  veterans  of  the  First  New 
York  Cavalry,  at  which  General  McClellan,  under 
whom  they  had  served,  was  present.  When  the 
approach  of  their  old  commander  wTas  announced, 
the  soldiers  rushed  to  the  door  to  meet  him;  and 
as  he  entered  the  room  they  crowded  round  him 
so  that  he  could  hardly  walk.  After  an  inter 
change  of  greetings  between  him  and  the  officers, 
Colonel  McJReynolds,  who  commanded  the  regi 
ment,  spoke  as  follows  : — 

"  SOLDIERS  : — But  a  short  time  ago  the  chairman  of  this 
occasion  did  us  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  the 
First  New  York  Cavalry  were  the  last  on  the  Chicka- 
hominy  and  the  first  to  reach  the  James  River.  It  was  a 
proud  announcement,  gentlemen,  and  it  was  true.  I 
now  have  the  honor,  and  the  great  pleasure,  to  announce 
io  you  that  the  noble  chieftain  who  led  the  Army  of  the 


344  SPEECH    AT    NEW    YORK.  [1SG4. 

Potomac  on  that  occasion,  that  matchless  chieftain,  Gene 
ral  George  B.  McClellan — [cheers  lasting  several  minutes], 
— I  do  not  blame  you  for  your  enthusiasm, — General 
George  B.  McClellan,  has  honored  you  with  his  presence. 
If  you  will  keep  still  for  a  moment,  I  have  no  doubt  he 
will  speak  to  you." 

General  McClellan  replied,  as  follows : — 

"M\*  FRIENDS  AXD  COMRADES: — I  came  here  not  to  make 
a  speech  to  you,  but  to  welcome  you  home,  and  express 
to  you  the  pride  I  have  always  felt  in  watching  your 
career,  not  only  when  you  were  with  me,  but  since  I  left 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  while  you  have  been  fighting 
battles  under  others,  and  your  old  commander.  I  can 
tell  you  now,  conscientiously  and  truly,  I  am  proud  of 
you  in  every  respect.  There  is  not  one  page  of  your 
record — not  a  line  of  it — of  which  you,  your  State,  and 
your  country  may  not  be  proud.  I  congratulate  you  on 
the  patriotism  that  so  many  of  you  have  evinced  in  your 
desire  to  re-enter  the  service.  I  hope,  I  pray,  and  I  know 
that  your  future  career  will  be  as  glorious  as  your  past. 
I  have  one  other  hope ;  and  that  is  that  we  may  yet  serve 
together  some  day  again." 

Loud  cheers  followed  the  conclusion  of  this 
speech,  and  officers  and  men  cried  out,  "  We'll  fol 
low  you  anywhere,  general !" 

After  a  speech  from  Major  Harkins,  General 
McClellan  took  leave  with  a  few  words  of  farewell, 
the  soldiers  cheering  and  crowding  round  him  as 
he  went  out  of  the  room. 

General  McClellan  has  recently  appeared  before 
the  public,  with  much  honor  to  himself,  in  a  lite 
rary  capacity.  In  the  autumn  of  1863,  the  officers 


A  fir.  37.]     BATTLE    MONUMENT    AT    WEST    POINT.  o45 

of  the  army  stationed  at  West  Point  formed  an 
association  for  erecting  at  that  post  a  monument 
in  commemoration  of  such  officers  of  the  regular 
army  as  shall  have  fallen  in  the  service  during  the 
present  war.  The  permission  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  erect  the  proposed  monument  at  West  Point 
was  obtained,  and  letters  were  addressed  to  com 
manding  generals  and  others,  describing  the  pro 
ject  and  soliciting  co-operation.  Many  favorable 
replies  were  received;  and  in  January,  18G4,  a 
general  circular  was  sent  to  the  officers  of  the  army, 
setting  forth  the  plan  and  asking  subscriptions. 
The  response  to  this  appeal  was  so  universal, 
prompt,  and  earnest  that  the  committee  who  had 
the  enterprise  in  charge  felt  authorized  to  make 
choice  of  a  site  for  the  proposed  monument  and 
have  it  consecrated  by  appropriate  religions  cere 
monies.  Trophy  Point,  on  the  northern  brow  of 
the  plain  on  which  West  Point  stands,  was  accord 
ingly  selected,  and  the  15th  of  June,  18G4,  was 
named  as  the  day  for  its  dedication.  General 
McClcllan  was  requested  to  deliver  the  oration. 

On  the  appointed  day  the  site  for  the  proposed 
monument  was  consecrated  by  appropriate  religious 
services.  The  oration  by  General  McClellan  was 
heard  with  great  interest  and  deep  attention  by  a 
very  large  audience,  and,  after  its  delivery,  was 
immediately  published  in  many  of  the  Democratic 
newspapers  of  the  country.  It  was  much  com 
mended  by  all  who  had  the  opportunity  to  read  it 
and  were  unprejudiced  enough  to  avail  themselves 
of  such  opportunity,  for  its  high-toned  patriotism, 


346  SPEECH    AT    LAKE    GEORGE.  [1864. 

its  judicious  choice  of  topics,  its  natural  eloquence, 
and  manly  energy  of  style.* 

In  the  course  of  a  brief  excursion  which  followed 
the  delivery  of  the  address  above  alluded  to.  Gene 
ral  McClellan  received  many  gratifying  proofs  of 
the  affectionate  attachment  felt  for  him  by  the  peo 
ple  of  the  country  generally,  and  of  the  lively  inte 
rest  with  which  they  follow  his  movements.  On 
the  evening  of  the  18th  of  June,  at  Fort  William 
Henry,  on  the  banks  of  Lake  George,  he  was  sere 
naded  ;  and,  at  the  close  of  the  music,  having  been 
introduced  by  Judge  Brown  to  the  numerous  party 
which  had  assembled  to  pay  their  respects  to  him, 
he  addressed  them,  as  follows: — 

"  I  thank  you,  my  friends,  for  this  welcome  and  pleasing 
evidence  of  your  regard.  It  is  a  most  happy  termination 
of  the  delightful  week  I  have  passed  in  the  midst  of  this 
beautiful  region,  among  such  warm  and  friendly  hearts. 
When  men  come,  as  you  have  done,  some  many  miles 
from  the  mountains  and  valleys,  it  means  something 
more  than  empty  compliment  or  idle  courtesy.  At  all 
events,  I  so  regard  it,  and  understand  this  sudden  gather 
ing  of  men  who  are  in  truth  the  strength  of  the  nation 
as  intended  to  show  your  love  and  gratitude  to  the  gal 
lant  men  who  have  so  long  fought  under  my  command, 


*  On  account  of  the  striking  merits  both  of  substance  and 
form  of  this  discourse, — and  it  is  of  no  more  than  moderate 
length, — it  is  inserted  in  the  Appendix  in  full,  in  the  belief 
that,  General  McClellan's  friends  will  be  glad  to  possess,  in  a 
shape  less  fleeting  than  that  of  a  newspaper  or  pamphlet,  a 
production  so  strongly  stamped  with  the  characteristics  of  his 
mind  and  character. 


Ac E  37.]          SPEECH    A  T    L  A  K  E    G  E  0  R  G  E.  347 

and  as  an  evidence  to  any  who  may  dare  to  doubt,  whether 
abroad,  at  home,  or  in  the  rebellious  States,  that  the  people 
of  this  portion  of  the  country  intend  to  support  to  the 
last  the  Union  of  our  great  nation,  the  sacredness  of  its 
Constitution  and  laws,  against  whoever  may  attack  them. 
I  do  not  flatter  myself  that  this  kind  demonstration  is  a 
mark  of  personal  regard  to  me,  but  that  it  means  far 
more  than  that.  You  add  to  the  cogent  arguments  af 
forded  by  the  deeds  of  your  sons  and  brothers  in  the  field 
the  sanction  and  weight  of  your  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
.justice  and  vital  importance  of  the  real  cause  for  which 
we  are  fighting,  and  the  cause  which  should  never  be 
perverted  or  lost  sight  of. 

"It  has  been  my  good  fortune  to  have  had  near  me  in 
very  trying  times  many  of  your  near  relations.  In  truth, 
there  must  be  among  you  now  men  who  went  with  me 
through  the  memorable  seven  days  of  battle  that  com 
menced  just  two  years  ago  to-day.  It  is  only  just  that  I 
should  thank  you  now  for  the  valor  and  patriotism  of 
your  sons  and  brothers  who  were  with  me  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  from  Yorktown  to  Antietam.  Yet  how 
could  they  be  other  than  brave  and  patriotic?  for  they 
first  saw  the  light  amid  scenes  classical  in  our  earliest 
history,  and  sprang  from  ancestors  who  won  and  held 
their  mountains  in  hundreds  of  combats  against  the  In 
dians,  the  French,  and  the  English.  After  a  gallant  de 
fence  of  the  now  ruined  ramparts  of  William  Henry,  the 
blood  of  many  of  your  grandsires  moistened  the  very 
ground  on  which  you  now  stand,  in  a  butchery  permitted 
by  the  cruel  apathy  of  Montcalm,  who,  two  years  after 
wards,  suffered  for  his  crimes  in  the  great  battle  under  the 
walls  of  Quebec,  where  others  of  your  ancestors  bore  a 
most  honorable  part.  Ticonderoga,  Crown  Point,  Sara 
toga,  are  all  names  made  sacred  to  you  by  the  bravery 
of  your  fathers,  who  there  made  illustrious  the  name  of 
American  troops. 


348  EXTRACT    FRO  31    REI'ORT. 

"In  this  latter  and  more  dreadful  v.*ar  you  and  yours 
have  proved  worthy  of  the  reputation  of  your  predeces 
sors.  And,  whatever  sacrifice  may  yet  be  necessary,  I  am 
confident  that  you  will  never  consent  willingly  to  be 
citizens  of  a  divided  and  degraded  nation,  but  that  you 
will  so  support  the  actions  of  your  fellow-countrymen 
in  the  field  that  we  shall  be  victorious,  and  again  have 
peace  and  a  reunited  country,  when  the  hearts  of  the 
North  and  South  shall  again  beat  in  unison,  as  they  did 
in  the  good  old  times  of  the  Revolution,  when  our  Union 
and  Constitution  shall  be  as  firm  as  the  mountains  which 
encircle  this  lovely  lake,  and  the  future  of  the  Republic 
shall  be  as  serene  as  the  waters  of  Horicon  when  no 
breeze  ripples  its  surface/' 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  final  chapter  of  the  biography  of  General 
McClellan  can  find  no  more  appropriate  opening 
than  the  concluding  pages  of  his  He-port,  in  which 
lie  o-ives  a  brief  abstract  of  the  history  and  fortunes 

O  *J 

of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  comprising  what  they 
did,  what  they  failed  to  do,  and  the  reasons  for 
both. 

"In  this  Report  I  have  confined  myself  to  a  plain  nar 
rative  of  such  facts  as  are  necessary  for  the  purposes  of 
history. 

"Where  it  was  possible,  I  have  preferred  to  give  these 
facts  in  the  language  of  despatches,  written  at  the  time  of 
their  occurrence,  rather  than  to  attempt  a  new  relation. 

'•The  reports  of  the  subordinate  commanders,  hereto 


EXTRACT  FROM  REPORT.         349 

annexed,  recite  what  time  and  space  would  fail  me  to 
mention  here, — those  individual  instances  of  conspicuous 
bravery  and  skill  by  which  every  battle  was  marked.  To 
them  1  must  especially  refer;  for  without  them  this  nar 
rative  would  be  incomplete,  and  justice  fail  to  be  done. 
But  I  cannot  omit  to  tender  to  my  corps  commanders, 
and  to  the  general  officers  under  them,  such  ample  re 
cognition  of  their  cordial  co-operation  and  their  devoted 
services  as  those  reports  abundantly  avouch. 

"I  have  not  sought  to  defend  the  army  which  I  had 
the  Honor  to  command,  nor  myself,  against  the  hostile 
criticisms  once  so  rife. 

"It  has  seemed  to  me  that  nothing  more  was  required 
than  such  a  plain  and  truthful  narrative  to  enable  those 
whose  right  it  is  to  form  a  correct  judgment  on  the  im 
portant  matters  involved. 

"This  Report  is,  in  fact,  a  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

"During  the  period  occupied  in  the  organization  of 
that  army,  it  served  as  a  barrier  against  the  advance  of  a 
lately  victorious  enemy  while  the  fortification  of  the 
capital  was  in  progress ;  and,  under  the  discipline  which 
it  then  received,  it  acquired  strength,  education,  and 
some  of  that  experience  which  is  necessary  to  success  in 
active  operations,  and  which  enabled  it  afterwards  to  sus 
tain  itself  under  circumstances  trying  to  the  most  heroic 
men.  Frequent  skirmishes  occurred  along  the  lines,  con 
ducted  with  great  gallantry,  which  inured  our  troops  to 
the  realities  of  war. 

"The  army  grew  into  shape  but  slowly;  and  the  delays 
which  attended  on  the  obtaining  of  arms,  continuing  late 
into  the  winter  of  18G1-62,  were  no  less  trying  to  the 
soldiers  than  to  the  people  of  the  country.  Even  at  the 
time  of  the  organization  of  the  Peninsular  campaign, 
some  of  the  finest  regiments  were  without  rifles ;  nor 
were  the  utmost  exertions  on  the  part  of  the  military 

30 


350  EXTRACT    FROM    HE  PORT. 

authorities  adequate  to  overcome  the  obstacles  to  active 
service. 

"When,  at  length,  the  army  was  in  condition  to  take 
the  field,  the  Peninsular  campaign  was  planned  and  en 
tered  upon  with  enthusiasm  by  officers  and  men.  Had 
tiiis  campaign  been  followed  up  as  it  was  designed,  I 
cannot  doubt  that  it  would  have  resulted  in  a  glorious 
triumph  to  our  arms  and  the  permanent  restoration  of 
the  power  of  the  Government  in  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina,  if  not  throughout  the  revolting  States.  It  was, 
however,  otherwise  ordered ;  and,  instead  of  reporting  a 
victorious  campaign,  it  has  been  my  duty  to  relate  the 
heroism  of  a  reduced  army,  sent  upon  an  expedition 
into  an  enemy's  country,  there  to  abandon  one  and 
originate  another  and  new  plan  of  campaign,  which 
might  and  would  have  been  successful  if  supported  with 
appreciation  of  its  necessities,  but  which  failed  because 
of  the  repeated  failure  of  promised  support  at  the  most 
critical  and,  as  it  proved,  the  most  fatal  moments.  That 
heroism  surpasses  ordinary  description.  Its  illustration 
must  be  left  for  the  pen  of  the  historian  in  times  of  calm 
reflection,  when  the  nation  shall  be  looking  back  to  the 
past  from  the  midst  of  peaceful  days. 

"For  me,  now,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  my  comrades 
were  victors  on  every  field  save  one ;  and  there  the 
endurance  of  a  single  corps  accomplished  the  object  of 
its  fighting,  and,  by  securing  to  the  army  its  transit 
to  the  James,  left  to  the  enemy  a  ruinous  and  barren 
victory. 

"The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  first  reduced  by  the 
withdrawal  from  my  command  of  the  division  of  General 
Blenker,  which  was  ordered  to  the  Mountain  Depart 
ment,  under  General  Fremont.  We  had  scarcely  landed 
on  the  Peninsula  when  it  was  further  reduced  by  a  de 
spatch  revoking  a  previous  order  giving  me  command  of 
Fortress  Monroe,  and  under  which  I  had  expected  to 


EXTRACT  FROM  REPORT.         351 

take  ten  thousand  men  from  that  point  to  aid  in  our 
operations.  Then,  when  under  fire  before  the  defences 
of  Yorktown,  we  received  the  news  of  the  withdrawal  of 
General  McDowell's  corps  of  about  thirty-five  thousand 
men.  This  completed  the  overthrow  of  the  original  plan 
of  the  campaign. 

"About  one-third  of  my  entire  army  (five  divisions  out 
of  fourteen;  one  of  the  nine  remaining  being  but  little 
larger  than  a  brigade)  was  thus  taken  from  me.  Instead 
of  a  rapid  advance  which  I  had  planned,  aided  by  a  flank 
movement  up  the  York  River,  it  wras  only  left  to  besiege 
Yorktown.  That  siege  was  successfully  conducted  by  the 
army;  and  \vhen  these  strong  wyorks  at  length  yielded  to 
our  approaches,  the  troops  rushed  forward  to  the  san 
guinary  but  successful  battle  of  Williamsburg,  and  thus 
opened  an  almost  unresisted  advance  to  the  banks  of  tho 
Chickahorniny.  Richmond  -lay  before  them,  surrounded 
with  fortifications,  and  guarded  by  an  army  larger  than 
our  own  ;  but  the  prospect  did  not  shake  the  courage  of 
the  brave  men  who  composed  my  command.  Relying 
still  on  the  support  which  the  vastness  of  our  under 
taking  and  the  grand  results  depending  on  our  success 
seemed  to  insure  us,  we  pressed  forward.  The  weather 
was  stormy  beyond  precedent.  The  deep  soil  of  tho 
Peninsula  was  at  times  one  vast  morass.  The  Chicka- 
hominy  rose  to  a  higher  stage  than  had  been  known  for 
years  before.  Pursuing  the  advance,  the  crossings  were 
seized,  and  the  right  wing  extended  to  effect  a  junction 
with  reinforcements  now  promised  and  earnestly  desired, 
and  upon  the  arrival  of  which  the  complete  success  of 
the  campaign  seemed  clear. 

"The  brilliant  battle  of  Hanover  Court-House  was 
fought,  which  opened  the  way  for  the  First  Corpsv — with 
the  aid  of  which,  had  it  come,  we  should  then  have  gone 
into  the  enemy's  capital.  It  never  came.  The  bravest 
army  could  not  do  more,  under  such  overwhelming  dis- 


352          EXTRACT  FROM  REPORT. 

appointment,  than  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  then  did. 
Fair  Oaks  attests  their  courage  and  endurance  when  they 
hurled  back,  again  and  again,  the  vastly  superior  masses 
of  the  enemy.  But  mortal  men  could  not  accomplish 
the  miracles  that  seemed  to  have  been  expected  of  them. 
But  one  course  was  left, — a  flank  march,  in  the  face  of  a 
powerful  enemy,  to  another  and  better  base, — one  of  the 
most  hazardous  movements  in  war.  The  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  holding  its  own  safety,  and  almost  the  safety 
of  our  cause,  in  its  hands,  was  equal  to  the  occasion. 
The  seven  days  are  classical  in  American  history, — those 
clays  in  which  the  noble  soldiers  of  the  Union  and  Con 
stitution  fought  an  overwhelming  enemy  by  day,  and 
retreated  from  successive  victories  by  night,  through  a 
week  of  battle,  closing  the  terrible  scenes  of  conflicts  with 
the  ever-memorable  victory  at  Malvern,  where  they  drove 
back,  beaten  and  shattered,  the  entire  Eastern  army  of 
the  Confederacy,  and  thus  secured  for  themselves  a  place 
of  rest  and  a  point  for  a  new  advance  upon  the  capital 
from  the  banks  of  the  James.  Richmond  was  still  within 
our  grasp,  had  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  been  reinforced 
and  permitted  to  advance.  But  counsels  which  I  cannot 
but  think  subsequent  events  proved  unwise  prevailed  in 
Washington,  and  we  were  ordered  to  abandon  the  cam 
paign.  Never  did  soldiers  better  deserve  the  thanks  of  a 
nation  than  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  the  deeds  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign ;  and,  although  that  meed  was  with 
held  from  them  by  the  authorities,  I  am  persuaded  they 
have  received  the  applause  of  the  American  people. 

"The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  recalled  from  within 
sight  of  Richmond,  and  incorporated  with  the  Army  of 
Virginia.  The  disappointments  of  the  campaign  on  the 
Peninsula  had  not  damped  their  ardor  nor  diminished 
their  patriotism.  They  fought  well,  faithfully,  gallantly, 
under  General  Pope,  yet  were  compelled  to  fall  back  on 
Washington,  defeated  and  almost  demoralized. 


i;  XT  It  ACT    FROM    REPORT.  oO.> 

"  The  enemy,  no  longer  occupied  in  guarding  his  own 
capital,  poured  his  troops  northward,  entered  Maryland, 
threatened  Pennsylvania,  and  even  Washington  itself. 
Elated  by  his  recent  victories,  and  assured  that  our  troops 
were  disorganized  and  dispirited,  he  was  confident  that 
the  seat  of  war  was  now  permanently  transferred  to  the 
loyal  States,  and  that  his  own  exhausted  soil  was  to  be 
relieved  from  the  burden  of  supporting  two  hostile  ar 
mies.  But  he  did  not  understand  the  spirit  which  ani 
mated  the  soldiers  of  the  Union.  T  shall  not,  nor  can  I, 
living,  forget  that,  when  I  was  ordered  to  the  command 
of  the  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  the  soldiers 
with  whom  I  had  shared  so  much  of  the  anxiety  and 
pain  and  suffering  of  the  war  had  not  lost  their  confi 
dence  in  me  as  their  commander.  They  sprang  to  my 
call  with  all  their  ancient  vigor,  discipline,  and  courage. 
I  led  them  into  Maryland.  Fifteen  days  after  they  had 
fallen  back,  defeated,  before  Washington,  they  vanquished 
the  enemy  on  the  rugged  heights  of  South  Mountain,  pur 
sued  him  to  the  hard-fought  field  of  Antietam,  and  drove 
him,  broken  and  disappointed,  across  the  Potomac  into 
Virginia. 

"The  army  had  need  of  rest.  After  the  terrible  expe 
riences  of  battles  and  marches,  with  scarcely  an  interval 
of  repose,  which  they  had  gone  through  from  the  time 
of  leaving  for  the  Peninsula,  the  return  to  Washington, 
the  defeat  in  Virginia,  the  victor}-  at  South  Mountain, 
and  again  at  Antietam,  it  was  not  surprising  that  they 
were  in  a  large  degree  destitute  of  the  absolute  necessa 
ries  to  effective  duty.  Shoes  were  worn  out  ;  blankets 
were  lost  ;  clothing  was  in  rags:  in  short,  the  army  was 
unfit  for  active  service,  and  an  interval  for  rest  and 
equipment  was  necessary.  When  the  slowly-forwarded 
supplies  came  to  us,  I  led  the  army  across  the  river, 
renovated  and  refreshed,  in  good  order  and  discipline, 
Mid  followed  the  retreating  foe  to  a  position  where  I  was 


854          EXTRACT  FROM  REPORT. 

confident  of  decisive  victory, — when,  in  the  midst  of  the 
movement,  while  my  advance-guard  was  .actually  in  con 
tact  with  the  enemy,  I  was  removed  from  the  command. 

"I  am  devoutly  grateful  to  God  that  my  last  campaign 
with  this  brave  army  was  crowned  with  a  victory  which 
saved  the  nation  from  the  greatest  peril  it  had  then  un 
dergone.  I  have  not  accomplished  my  purpose  if  by 
this  Report  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  not  placed  high 
on  the  roll  of  the  historic  armies  of  the  world.  Its  deeds 
ennoble  the  nation  to  which  it  belongs.  Always  ready 
for  battle,  always  firm,  steadfast,  and  trustworthy,  I 
never  called  on  it  in  vain ;  nor  will  the  nation  ever  have 
cause  to  attribute  its  want  of  success  under  myself,  or 
under  other  commanders,  to  any  failure  of  patriotism  or 
bravery  in  that  noble  body  of  American  soldiers. 

"No  man  can  justly  charge  upon  any  portion  of  that 
army,  from  the  commanding  general  to  the  private,  any 
lack  of  devotion  to  the  service  of  the  United  States 
Government  and  to  the  cause  of  the  Constitution  and 
the  Union.  They  have  proved  their  fealty  in  much  sor 
row,  suffering,  danger,  and  through  the  very  shadow  of 
death.  Their  comrades,  dead  on  all  the  fields  where  we 
fought,  have  scarcely  more  claim  to  the  honor  of  a 
nation's  reverence  than  the  survivors  to  the  justice  of 
a  nation's  gratitude." 

To  this  mournful,  eloquent,  and  modest  summing 
up  of  the  case  there  is  not  much  to  be  added. 
At  the  close  of  the  biography  of  a  distinguished 
military  commander,  the  reader  naturally  looks  for 
an  analysis  and  exposition  of  his  military  genius, 
and,  if  not  a  comparison  with  the  great  generals  of 
other  countries  and  other  times,  at  least  some  state 
ment  of  his  merits,  some  enumeration  of  his  claims. 
But  there  is  an  obvious  embarrassment  in  thus  deal- 


EFFECT    OF    CIVIL    W  A  R.  «5o5 

ing  with  one  who  is  still  living,  and  may  chance  to 
read  the  pages  in  which  his  military  character  is 
delineated.  What  is  just  praise  when  spoken  of  the 
dead  may  sound  like  flattery  when  spoken  of  tho 
living.  In  the  interview  between  Solon  and  Croesus, 
so  beautifully  narrated  by  Herodotus,  the  king  was 
told  by  his  wise  guest  that  no  man  could  be  called 
happy  until  a  fortunate  life  had  been  closed  by  a 
peaceful  death ;  for  that  so  long  as  a  man  was  alive 
he  was  the  sport  and  prey  of  fortune,  and  no  one 
could  tell  what  the  future  had  in  store  for  him.  In 
like  manner,  no  accurate  estimate  can  be  made  of  the 
worth  and  services  of  a  soldier  or  statesman  until 
the  seal  of  death  is  set  upon  his  rounded  life  and 
there  is  no  more  for  him  any  earthly  future.  Far 
distant,  we  trust,  is  the  day  when  it  will  be  season 
able  to  take  the  gauge  and  dimensions  of  General 
McClellan's  powers  and  accomplishments  and  assign 
to  him  his  due  place  on  the  roll  of  departed  worth. 
And  there  are  other  reasons  why  we  must  bo 
content  to  wait  for  a  calm  and  dispassionate  esti 
mate  of  General  McClellan's  services  and  merits. 
A  civil  Avar  was  raging  when  he  was  dismissed 
from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  it  is  raging  still;  and  the  end  seems  neither 
near  nor  certain.  A  nation  engaged  in  so  fierce 
a  struggle  as  ours  is  in  no  condition  to  weigh, 
to  examine,  to  compare,  and  to  decide, — as  a  lake 
lashed  into  fury  by  the  tempest  can  return  no  true 
image  of  the  sky  that  bends  over  it.  The  passions 
which  civil  war  fosters  and  creates  forbid  the  exer 
cise  of  a  judicial  understanding.  A  court  of  jus- 


•j  oG  !•  o  L  i  T  i  c  A  L   i'  ii  i:  J  i:  D  i  c  E  . 

lice  must  needs  adjourn  if  a  battle  be  going  on  under 
its  windows.  All  our  energies,  all  our  faculties,  are 
absorbed  in  action,  and  all  questions  that  require 
deliberation  must  be  postponed  to  a  more  quiet 
season.  We  cannot  afford  to  listen.  The  only 
pause  we  can  brook  is  such  brief  interval  of  repose 
as  exhausted  nature  demands.  Before  justice  can 
be  done  him,  General  McClellan  must  wait  for  more 
peaceful  times  and  minds  less  agitated  and  absorbed. 
To-day  we  adjourn  the  hearing,  as  Neptune,  in  the 
JEneid,  adjourned  the  punishment  of  his  rebellious 
winds,  because  of  the  instant  need  of  stilling  the 
tempest  they  had  raised  : — 

"  Quos  ego — sed  motos  prsestat  componere  fluctus." 

Besides,  at  this  moment  a  considerable  portion 
of  his  countrymen  have  their  minds  barred  against 
all  arguments  and  considerations  in  defence  of 
General  McClellan,  by  political  prejudice.  To  deny 
him  all  military  capacity  is  part  of  the  creed  of  a 
great  political  party.  Most  supporters  of  the  pre 
sent  Administration  hold  it  to  be  a  point  of  duty  to 
disparage  and  decry  him.  This  is  no  strange  phe 
nomenon.  Parallel  cases  may  be  found  in  the  his 
tory  of  every  country  in  which  public  opinion  is 
allowed  free  expression.  There  was  a  time — and 
the  period  lasted  for  years — in  which  every  whig- 
statesman  in  England  felt  bound  to  call  in  question 
the  military  genius  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,* 


*  Lord  Brougham  says  that  some  very  eminent  statesmen 
constantly  and  greatly  misjudged  the  Duke  of  Wellington  till 


CHARGES    AGAINST    GENERAL    MCCLELLAN.        oO< 

and  just  so  the  Bourbons  and  their  followers  con 
stantly  denied  the  military  greatness  of  Bona 
parte. 

But  General  McClcllan  has  been  so  unjustly 
treated  and  so  unscrupulously  slandered  that 
something  more  is  required,  simply  as  a  matter 
of  truth  and  fair  dealing,  in  vindication  and  de 
fence  of  him.  After  what  has  passed,  silence 
might  seem  like  acquiescence  in  charges  which  are 
as  false  as  they  are  injurious.  It  is  no  fault  of 
General  McClellan  that  events  have  taken  such  a 
turn  that  it  is  impossible  to  write  a  life  of  him 
without  taking  a  somewhat  controversial  attitude. 

O 

A  few  remarks  arc,  consequently,  submitted,  which 
are  in  the  nature  of  a  comment  upon  some  points 
of  the  evidence  presented  in  the  preceding  pages. 

First  of  all :  there  are  some  persons  who  deny 
to  General  McClcllan  all  merit  whatever  as  a  com 
mander,  maintaining  that  he  has  neither  the  ca 
pacity  to  plan  a  campaign  nor  to  fight  a  battle,  and 
that  every  thing  successfully  done  by  him  was 
either  the  work  of  others  or  the  result  of  pure  acci 
dent.  "With  such  persons  it  is  useless  to  reason,  as 
to  do  so  would  be  simply  a  waste  of  time.  Xo  ar 
guments  or  considerations  would  have  any  power 
to  shake  an  impression  like  this.  Men  who  hold 
this  opinion  of  the  conqueror  of  Malvern  Hill  and 
Antietam  are,  in  the  intellectual  lino,  legitimate 


the  publication  of  his  Despatches,  when  they  at  once,  and  iu 
the  strongest  terms,  declared  how  grievously  they  had  erred. 
• — Statesmen  of  the  Time  of  George  ///.,  ii.  p,  355. 


ol)8        CHARGES    AGAINST    GENERAL    Mt'CLELLAX. 

descendants  of  those  subjects  of  George  the  Third 
who  used  to  maintain  that  Xapoleon  Bonaparte  was 
deficient  in  the  quality  of  personal  courage.  A 
prejudice  of  this  kind  is  as  much  proof  against 
reason  as  the  diseased  fancy  of  a  hypochondriac  who 
believes  that  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  or  that  he 
is  followed  everywhere  by  a  blue  dog.  i:  You  must 
have  observed,"  said  Mr.  Grenville,  in  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Pitt,  "  that  of  all  impressions  the  most  difficult 
to  be  removed  are  those  which  have  no  reason  to 
support  them;  because  against  them  no  reason  can 
be  applied." 

But  there  are  other  persons,  more  reasonable, 
more  discriminating,  who,  while  they  allow  General 
McClellan  to  be  an  accomplished  and  meritorious 
officer,  capable  of  doing  excellent  service  in  a  sub 
ordinate  sphere,  hold  also  the  opinion  that  when  at 
the  head  of  an  army  his  good  qualities  are  neu 
tralized  by  his  slowness,  his  over-cautiousness,  his 
want  of  dash,  his  inability  to  take  advantage  of  the 
sudden  opportunities  which  the  fortune  of  war  pre 
sents.  The  force  of  this  objection  is  in  some  mea 
sure  neutralized  by  the  fact  that  it  is  so  common 
in  military  history.  The  popular  mind  is  always 
eager  for  results  in  Avar,  and  ignorant  of  the  con 
ditions  essential  to  success.  Without  citing  any 
further  examples,  Washington  and  Wellington,* 

*  "This  spirit  of  faction,  however,  was  not  confined  to  one 
side.  There  was  a  ministerial  person  at  this  time,  who,  in  his 
dread  of  the  opposition,  wrote  to  Lord  Wellington  complain 
ing  of  his  inaction,  and  calling  upon  him  to  do  something  that 
would  excite  a  puMic  sensation  ;  any  thing,  provided  blood 


CHARGE    OF    SLOWNESS.  o59 

while  their  campaigns  were  going  on,  were  con 
stantly  censured  tor  their  slowness.  It  is  a  charge 
easily  made,  and  not  easily  answered;  for  the  de 
fence  must  often  rest  upon  a  variety  of  considera 
tions  which  the  critic  is  too  impatient  to  listen  to. 
General  McClellan  is,  by  nature  and  temperament, 
wisely  cautious,  prudent,  and  deliberate, — the  re 
verse  of  rash  and  impulsive;  and  these  traits  are, 
of  course,  shown  in  his  military  career.  He  never 
incurs  great  risks  or  plays  a  desperate  game.  He 
is,  besides,  a  humane  man,  very  careful  of  the 
lives  of  his  soldiers,  and  not  needlessly  shedding 
human  blood.  And,  lastly,  he  is  a  man  of  moral 
tirmness  and  just  self-reliance,  who  will  never  be 
induced  by  popular  clamor  to  take  a  step  which  ho 
deems  unwise,  or  forego  a  precaution  which  he 
deems  necessary.  A  man  like  this  at  the  head  of 
an  army  will  often  incur  the  charge  of  slowness 
and  inertness,  and  the  charge  will  be  made  most 
positively  by  those  who  are  the  least  qualified  to 
form  a  correct  judgment  in  the  premises.  Public 
opinion — that  is,  contemporaneous  public  opinion — 
is  not  of  any  great  value  on  a  question  like  this. 
Ignorance  and  prejudice  are  both  obstacles  in  the 
way  to  a  correct  understanding  of  military  mea 
sures  and  military  men.  A  battle  won  is  a  fact 
which  all  can  understand;  but  comparatively  few 
are  competent  to  determine  how  much  merit  is  due, 


was  spilt.  A  calm  but  severe  rebuke,  and  the  cessation  of  alt 
friendly  intercourse  with  the  writer,  discovered  the  general's 
abhorrence  of  this  detestable  policy." — NAPIER. 


360  INDECISION    AND     UNREADINESS. 

or  rather  how  little  blame  should  be  attached,  to  the 
general  who  has  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  a  battle. 
Upon  a  charge  of  slowness  and  over-cautiousness 
General  McClellan  has  a  right  to  be  tried  by  his 
peers, — that  is,  by  the  officers  of  the  regular  army, 
and  especially  by  those  who  have  served  under 
him.  To  their  judgment  he  can  confidently  ap 
peal,  and  by  their  verdict  he  is  ready  to  stand  or 
fall. 

Indecision  and  unreadiness  are,  no  doubt,  defects 
of  mind  or  infirmities  of  temperament,  arising  from 
not  having  any  plans  of  conduct,  or  from  not  carry 
ing  them  out  with  promptness  In  either  case, 
they  are  traits  which  taint  the  whole  being,  and 
lay  their  paralyzing  touch  upon  all  the  currents  of 
life.  A  sluggish,  dawdling,  and  dilatory  man  may 
have  spasms  of  activity,  but  he  never  acts  continu 
ously  and  consecutively  with  energetic  quickness. 
When  in  a  commanding  general  we  see  a  campaign, 
or  a  military  enterprise,  marked  by  rapidity  of 
movement,  by  plans  promptly  formed  and  vigor 
ously  executed,  and  when  in  the  same  man  we  see 
at  another  time  pauses,  delays,  which  bring  upon 
him  the  reproach  of  slowness,  it  is  fair  to  infer  that 
his  conduct  in  the  latter  case  is  the  result  of  a  cau 
tious  and  far-seeing  wisdom,  which  comprehends  all 
the  difficulties  of  the  position,  and  knows  that  the 
more  haste  the  less  speed,  so  far  as  the  matter  in 
hand  is  concerned.  The  evidence  as  to  general 
character  is  important  in  an  issue  like  this. 

Let  us  apply  these  principles  to  General  McClel- 
lan's  military  career. 


NOT   JUSTLY    CHARGEABLE    WITH    SLOWNESS.     361 

Iii  the  first  place,  no  one  has  ever  pretended,  no 
one  can  pretend,  that  he  is  a  military  commander 
who  acts  without  previously-formed  plans,  without 
having  determined  beforehand  wThat  he  shall  do 
and  how  he  shall  do  it.  On  the  contrary,  he  is 
peculiarly  and  singularly  thoughtful  of  the  future, 
carefully  meditating  every  step  of  his  progress, 
and  vigilant  in  providing  against  all  possible  con 
tingencies.  Upon  this  point  the  evidence  is  irre 
sistible  and  overwhelming. 

But,  say  General  McClellan's  assailants  and  de 
tractors,  though  his  plans  are  judicious  and  care 
fully  formed,  he  lacks  quickness  and  vigor  in  carry 
ing  them  out;  he  is  slow  in  the  saddle;  he  does 
not  take  time  by  the  forelock;  he  lets  opportu 
nities  slip  by  which  never  come  a  second  time. 
But  what  is  the  evidence  to  support  these  charges  ? 
Look  at  his  campaign  in  Western  Virginia  in  1861, 
— a  part  of  his  military  career  conveniently  ignored 
by  his  enemi.es.  Here  he  had  a  separate  command, 
a  defined  field  of  action,  and  was  not  hampered 
and  trammelled  by  interference  from  Washington ; 
and  do  we  see  any  signs  of  indecision  and  want  of 
promptness  here?  On  the  contrary,  we  observe 
the  happiest  combination  of  judgment  in  design 
and  vigor  in  execution  :  one  skilful  and  powerful 
blow  was  instantly  followed  by  another,  and  the 
result  was  absolute  and  permanent  military  success. 

Then  look  at  the  brilliant  and  crowded  period 
between  the  second  and  seventeenth  days  of  Sep 
tember,  1862.  On  the  former  of  these  dates,  the 
forces  in  and  around  Washington  were  little  better 
:;i 


862     NOT   JUSTLY    CHARGEABLE    WITH    SLOWNESS. 

than  a  tumultuary  and  disorganized  mob;  and 
within  forty-eight  hours,  as  if  at  the  touch  of  a 
magician's  wand,  they  were  converted  into  an 
effective  and  disciplined  army.  Within  a  fortnight 
from  the  time  of  their  leaving  Washington,  they 
had  marched  fifty  miles,  fought  two  battles,  gained 
two  victories,  driven  out  of  Maryland  a  foe  flushed 
with  recent  success,  given  a  sense  of  security  to 
Washington,  and  raised  the  spirits  of  every  patriot 
in  the  land  Was  there  anytime  lost  here?  Is 
there  any  evidence  here  of  want  of  decision,  want 
of  energy,  want  of  promptness?  Surely  not,  but 
all  the  reverse. 

But  all  this  is  neutralized  and  made  of  no  effect 
because,  after  the  battle  of  Antietam,  he  did  not 
cross  the  Potomac,  pursue  Lee's  retreating  army, 
and  utterly  destroy  it!  Nothing  but  ignorance  or 
prejudice,  one  or  both,  could  make  this  delay  a 
ground  for  disparaging  General  McClellan's  mili 
tary  reputation.  Are  we  to  suppose  that  the  man 
who  for  fifteen  days  had  been  acting  with  the  most 
extraordinary  energy  and  vigor  was  suddenly  so 
paralyzed,  so  smitten  with  procrastination,  that  he 
folded  up  his  hands,  went  to  sleep,  and  from  mere  in 
dolence  forbore  to  gather  the  new  laurels  which  were 
within  reach  of  his  hand  if  he  had  only  stretched 
it  out?  Such  sudden  change  is  inconsistent  with 
the  laws  of  human  nature.  Men  are  not  one  week 
brimful  of  fiery  energy  and  the  next  eaten  up  by 
the  rust  of  inaction.  The  pause  made  after  the 
battle  of  Antietam  must  be  interpreted  by  the 
fortnight  of  crowded  and  intense  action  which 


FAILURE     TO     TAKE     RICHMOND.  3()3 

preceded  it;  and  to  an  unprejudiced  and  instructed 
mind  it  is  vindicated  by  the  soundest  military  rea 
soning. 

But  he  failed  to  take  Richmond,  it  is  said.  This 
is  true ;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  this  failure  was 
no  fault  of  his.  To  what  causes  it  was  due  is  set 
forth  in  the  preceding  pages,  and  especially  in  the 
concluding  portion  of  General  McClellan's  Report, 
copied  into  this  chapter.  lie  never  would  have 
undertaken  to  capture  Richmond  with  a  force  so 
small  as  that  to  which  he  was  finally  reduced  by 
the  interference  of  the  Administration  with  his 
plans,  and  their  broken  faith.  It  is  no  disparage 
ment  to  a  general  that,  having  only  ninety  thou 
sand  men,  he  did  not  succeed  in  an  enterprise  which 
he  had  undertaken  upon  the  assurance  that  he 
should  have  a  hundred  and  forty  thousand.  Be 
sides,  he  was  forbidden  to  go  on  with  it,  and  his 
army  sent  to  General  Pope;  with  what  result  need 
not  be  repeated.  The  Peninsular  campaign  of 
1862,  as  planned,  was  General  McClellan's;  as  exe 
cuted,  it  was  that  of  the  President  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War:  and  upon  them  the  responsibility  of 
failure  must  rest.  Had  they  kept  their  faith,  had 
they  sent  to  General  McClellan  the  reinforcements 
which  again  and  again  had  been  promised  him,  and 
which  he  again  and  again  demanded,  there  is  very 
little  question  that  Richmond  would  have  been 
taken.  The  military  chances  were  greatly  in  favor 
of  such  a  result. 

Of  course,  as  Richmond  in  point  of  fact  was  not 
captured,  the  enemies  of  General  McClellan  may 


3G4    GENERAL    M^CLELLAN    NOT    DEFEATED. 

say  that  it  would  not  have  been,  even  if  he  had  had 
all  the  forces  he  asked  for  or  desired.  An  asser 
tion  like  this  cannot  be  denied  point-blank.  To 
bandy  opinions  about  the  past  is  only  one  whit  less 
unprofitable  than  to  bandy  predictions  about  the 
future.  All  that  can  be  affirmed  is  that  General 
McClellan's  plans  were  such  that,  in  all  human 
probability,  success  would  have  followed  had  he 
been  permitted  to  carry  them  out. 

So  much  may  be  said  by  way  of  defence  of  Gene 
ral  McClellan  against  the  charges  most  commonly 
brought  against  him,  and  in  rebuttal  of  the  evi 
dence  put  in  on  the  other  side;  but  there  are  some 
considerations  which  are  in  the  nature  of  distinct 
and  positive  testimony  in  his  behalf,  on  which  it  is 
but  just  to  him  to  say  a  few  words. 

In  the  first  place,  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill,  in  which  some  thirty- 
five  thousand  men  retired,  without  disorder  or 
demoralization,  before  twice  their  number,  no  army 
led  by  General  McClellan,  or  that  was  under  his 
control,  has  ever  been  defeated.  This  is  a  significant 
and  important  fact,  and  all  the  more  so  from  the 
comparisons  which  are  forced  upon  every  unbiassed 
mind  by  the  unjust  treatment  which  General  Mc 
Clellan  has  received  at  the  hands  of  the  Adminis 
tration.  In  August,  1862,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  was  taken  from  him  and  intrusted  to  General 
Pope;  and  the  consequence  was  the  disaster  at 
Bull  Run  on  the  30th  of  the  same  month,  the 
second  misfortune  to  our  arms  on  that  ill-omened 
field.  In  November  of  the  same  year  he  was 


LOVE    OF     HIS    SOLDIERS.  3G5 

''  relieved"  of  the  command  of  the  same  army, 
and  General  Burnside  was  put  in  his  place;  and 
then  came  the  mournful  defeat  at  Fredericks- 
burg  on  the  13th  of  December.  Here  is  Malvern 
Hill  against  Bull  Run;  here  are  South  Mountain 
and  Antietam  against  Frcdericksburg.  But  Gene 
ral  McClellan  was  practically  dismissed  from  the 
army,  with  every  mark  of  ignominy  and  disgrace, 
and  General  Burnside  and  General  Pope  are  now, 
and  always  have  been,  in  honorable  and  responsi 
ble  military  commands.  We  have  nothing  to  do 
with  these  two  last-named  officers,  nor  do  we 
care  to  discuss  the  policy  of  the  Administration 
towards  them;  but  it  is  unjust  and  unreasonable 
that  the  tenderness  and  consideration  which  have 
been  so  liberally  extended  to  them  should  be  so 
utterly  withheld  from  General  McClellan,  and  that 
he  should  be  disgraced  for  his  victories  while  they 
are  rewarded,  or  at  least  forgiven,  for  their  defeats. 
He  asks  no  favors;  but  he  has  a  right  to  demand 
consistency  and  justice. 

In  the  next  place,  General  McClellan  has  always 
had  the  love  arid  trust  of  the  soldiers  he  has 
commanded,  and,  with  a  few  exceptions,  has  en 
joyed  the  respect,  confidence,  and  affection  of 
the  officers  who  have  served  under  him.  At  this 
moment  his  name  is  a  tower  of  strength  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This  is  an  important 
fact,  a  weighty  piece  of  evidence  in  his  behalf. 
Upon  the  merits  of  a  general  in  command,  the 
opinion  of  the  army  which  serves  under  him  is  of 
far  more  value  than  the  opinion  of  the  public.  The 


866  STRATEGY. 

former  cannot  bo  deceived  or  imposed  upon  "by  a 
reputation  inude  to  order  by  politicians,  editors, 
and  army-correspondents.  The  judgment  of  the 
army  is  like  the  judgment  of  experts  in  a  patent- 
case,  or  of  nautical  men  in  an  insurance-case.  The 
consequences  of  incapacity  are  too  serious  to  per 
mit  any  delusion  or  mystification  on  the  subject. 
And  the  value  of  this  favorable  judgment  is  en 
hanced  by  the  high  standard  of  intelligence  in  our 
army,  by  the  fact  that  the  rank  and  file,  in  gene 
ral,  is  made  up  of  men  who  read,  write,  think, 
and  discuss  their  civil  and  military  leaders.  They 
know,  by  personal  experience,  his  skill,  judgment, 
and  wisdom. 

It  is  beyond  question  that  General  McClellan  is 
an  accomplished  officer,  wrell  read  in  his  profession, 
and  master  of  such  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war 
as  can  be  learned  from  books.  And  many  of  those 
who  deny  to  him  the  praise  of  rapid  and  brilliant 
execution  in  the  field  admit  his  merit  in  that  de 
partment  of  the  art  of  war  which  is  called  strategy, 
as  distinguished  from  tactics.  "  Strategy,"  says 
Jomini,  "is  the  art  of  properly  directing  masses 
upon  the  theatre  of  war,  whether  for  the  invasion 
of  a  country  or  for  the  defence  of  one's  own/' 
It  includes  the  choice  of  a  fixed  base  of  operations, 
of  zones  and  lines  of  operations,  of  strategic  lines, 
and  of  vital  geographical  points  to  occupy  offen 
sively  or  to  cover  defensively;  or,  in  popular  lan 
guage,  it  is  the  planning  and  laying  out  beforehand 
of  a  campaign.  It  supposes  an  intimate  knowledge 


STRATEGY.  t>b  i 

of  the  physical  features  of  the  country  comprised 
within  the  zone  of  operations,  and  a  prophetic  sa 
gacity  in  determining  and  selecting  those  decisive 
strategic  points  the  possession  of  which  insures 
the  control  of  a  region  important  to  hold.  It  selects 
the  spots  where  magazines  of  supplies  should  be 
formed,  as  well  as  where  permanent  fortifications 
should  be  constructed.  The  strategist  is  to  the  tac 
tician  what  the  architect  is  to  the  builder.  Biiicher 
and  Xey,  among  others,  were  instances  of  men  of 
the  most  brilliant  conduct  on  the  field  of  battle  who 
had  no  power  of  strategy,  no  capacity  of  organ 
izing  a  campaign  or  of  directing  the  movements  of 
detached  bodies  of  troops  so  as  to  bring  them  to 
bear  upon  a  given  point  at  the  same  time.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Archduke  Charles,  who  as  a  stra 
tegist  had  no  rival  but  Napoleon  himself,  is  thought 
to  have  sometimes  shown  a  want  of  quickness  and 
decision  on  the  field  of  battle.  That  General  Mc- 
Clcllan  is  capable  of  planning  and  organizing  a 
campaign,  of  designating  movements  to  be  executed 
by  others,  can  be  doubted  by  no  man  of  candid 
mind  who  will  read  his  memorandum  on  the  con 
duct  of  the  war,  addressed  to  the  President,  and 
to  be  found  in  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  present  work, 
and  his  letters  of  instruction  to  Generals  llalleck, 
Duell,  Sherman,  and  Butler,  contained  in  his  Heport. 
Strategy  is  the  most  important  department  of  the 
art  of  war,  and  strategical  skill  is  the  highest  and 
rarest  function  of  military  genius.  To  handle  troops 
well  on  the  field  of  battle,  to  retain  self-possession 


8S  II  Hi  II     PERSONAL    CHARACTER. 

amid  "all  the  currents  of  a  heady  fight,"  to  take 
advantage  of  any  mistake  made  by  the  enemy,  to 
repair  the  mischances  and  disasters  in  his  own 
ranks,  requires  a  man  of  no  common  capacity;  but 
yet  higher  powers  are  demanded  of  him  who  at  the 
head  of  a  great  army  executes  a  series  of  move 
ments,  extending  over  several  weeks  perhaps,  which 
finally  compel  an  adversary  to  give  battle  at  a  point 
and  under  conditions  which  insure  his  defeat.  The 
superiority  of  the  Archduke  Charles  in  this  the 
most  intellectual  part  of  his  profession  has  given 
him  the  second  place  on  the  roll  of  honor  of  the 
great  generals  in  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolu 
tion. 

But  General  McClellan  has  shown  great  moral 
qualities  in  his  career  of  public  service,  which  are 
elements  of  what  may  be  called  character,  in  dis 
tinction  from  pure  intellectual  force.  The  spotless 
purity  of  his  private  life  has  never  been  called  in 
question.  The  rancor  of  partisan  or  personal  ma 
lignity  has  never  accused  him  of  pecuniary  corrup 
tion,  of  rapacity,  of  turning  his  official  opportunities 
to  his  own  gain  or  the  gain  of  others.  Xo  swarm 
of  unworthy  favorites  or  needy  dependants  has  ever 
buzzed  around  him.  His  record  is  without  a  blot; 
his  hands  are  without  a  stain.  His  name  has  never 
been  mixed  up  with  disreputable  or  doubtful  trans 
actions.  The  charges  against  him  are  aimed  at 
him  solely  in  his  military  capacity.  And  this  is 
not  merely  negative  praise.  The  life  of  a  soldier 
is  a  life  of  moral  danger  and  exposures,  as  well  as 
physical;  and  only  the  noblest  and  purest  natures 


HIGH     PERSONAL    QUALITIES.  309 

entirely  escape  reproach.*  There  are  no  eyes  so 
sharp  as  the  eyes  of  hatred;  and  now,  for  two  long 
years,  has  General  McClellan  been  watched  and 
scanned  by  these,  in  hope  to  find  some  speck  or 
flaw  in  his  record;  but  vain  has  been  the  quest, 
fruitless  the  search.  As  a  shield  of  steel  dazzles 
and  blinds  the  eye,  so  does  the  spotless  purity 
of  his  character  repel  the  envious  and  sinister 
glance.  No  slanderer,  however  base,  no  courtier, 
however  fawning,  has  ever  dared  to  accuse  him 
of  intemperance,  licentiousness,  rapacity,  or  pro 
fanity  :  nay,  more,  he  has  never  been  even  sus 
pected  of  them.  No  unscrupulous  partisan  sheet 
has  ever  insinuated  or  hinted  at  any  such  charges ; 
no  reckless  platform-orator  has  ever  suggested  any 
thing  of  the  kind ;  it  has  never  been  whispered 
round  a  camp-fire,  or  a  dinner-table,  or  in  a  com 
mittee-room,  a  base  Congressional  mess,  or  a  baser 
legislative  lobby.  The  moral  instincts  of  tho 
American  people  are  sound  and  good;  and  they 
have  an  instinctive  and  well-founded  perception  of 
General  McClellan's  moral  worth  which  is  proof 
against  all  the  insinuations  of  malice,  all  the  devices 
of  calumny.  The  hold  he  has  upon  their  hearts  is 
due  to  their  strong  sense  of  his  integrity,  his  sin 
cerity,  his  disinterestedness,  his  loyalty  to  duty,  his 
moral  purity,  his  unspotted  life ;  and  it  is  a  hold 
which  cannot  be  lost  or  shaken. 


T  never  knew  a  Wnrryer  yet,  but  thee, 

From  wine,  tobacco,  debts,  dice,  oaths,  so  free." 

Thomas  Carlton  1o  Captain  Joint  Smith. 


870  SELF-COMMAND. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  training  and  education 
of  a  soldier  tend  to  make  a  man  keenly  sensitive 
on  the  point  of  honor,  and  to  feel  a  stain  on  his 
professional  reputation  like  a  wound.  Observe  the 
way  in  which  the  Administration  has  dealt  with 
him.  First,  he  was  made  general-in-chief  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  then  reduced  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  then  de 
graded  to  the  post  of  a  quartermaster  at  Alex 
andria,  then  suddenly  and  in  fright  made  com 
mander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  once  more, 
then  dismissed  from  that  command  as  unceremo 
niously  and  abruptly  as  one  flings  a  torn  envelope 
into  a  waste-paper  basket ;  and  all  within  a  single 
year.  Such  capricious  changes  are  more  like  the 
shifting  scenes  of  a  novel  or  drama  than  like  real 
life.  But,  wounding  as  such  treatment  must  have 
been,  we  hear  no  complaint  from  General  McClel- 
lan.  He  makes  no  appeal  to  the  public,  no  pro 
test  against  injustice,  no  demand  for  sympathy. 
If  any  expressions  of  impatience  are  wrung  from 
him,  it  is  because  of  his  army,  and  not  because 
of  any  thing  done  to,  or  suffered  by,  himself. 
lie  submits  in  silence  to  the  will  of  the  Adminis 
tration;  he  discharges  faithfully  the  duties  of  every 
position  devolved  upon  him;  he  asks  only  for  the 
privilege  of  serving  his  country.  During  the  long 
period  of  his  enforced  idleness,  not  one  word  of 
complaint  has  been  heard  from  him :  he  has  made 
no  proclamation  of  his  wrongs,  no  denunciation  of 
those  who  have  wronged  him.  Yet  this  is  not  an 
au:e  of  self-renunciation  and  self-sacrifice  : — 


POLITICAL    HATRED.  871 

"Now  our  life  is  only  drcst 

For  show, — mean  handiwork  of  craftsman,  cook, 
Or  groom!   We  must  run  glittering  like  a  brook 
In  the  open  sunshine,  or  we  are  unblest." 

Our  times  arc  times  of  self-assertion  and  self-vin 
dication:  men  push  their  own  claims,  vaunt  their 
own  services,  sound  their  own  trumpets.  The  vir 
tues  of  manly  silence,  of  dignified  self-command, 
of  magnanimous  fortitude,  which  General  McClellan 
has  shown,  are  to  be  the  more  valued  because  of  their 
rarity. 

And  yet  the  future  historian  of  the  crowded 
period  in  which  we  live  will  have  to  record  the 
fact  that  the  services  of  this  accomplished  officer, 
patriotic  citizen,  and  good  man  were  denied  to  his 
country  during  a  civil  war  unparalleled  in  history 
alike  for  the  magnitude  of  its  movements  and  the 
intensity  of  the  passions  by  which  it  was  sustained, 
in  which  all  the  energies  of  the  people  were  taxed 
to  the  utmost  limit  of  endurance,  and  not  only 
their  wealth,  but  their  best  blood,  was  poured  out 
on  behalf  of  the  Union  and  the  Constitution  with 
a  noble  devotion  which  caused  every  patriot  heart 
to  swell  with  pride  and  admiration.  And  he  will 
also  record  the  further  fact  that,  during  the  long 
period  in  which  this  man  was  languishing  in  in 
action,  civilian  generals,  grossly  and  notoriously  in 
competent,  were  allowed  to  play  at  the  game  of  war, 
for  political  stakes,  with  the  lives  of  our  bravest 
and  best  for  their  counters.  Such  historian  will 
find  in  the  events  which  he  relates  fresh  illustration 
of  the  bitterness  of  political  hatred,  the  ferocity  of 


372  SOURCES    OF    SUPPORT. 

partisan  zeal,  and  the  rank  growth  of  low  passions 
in  high  places;  for  a  sullen  and  smouldering  hate, 
which  never  goes  out  and  never  bursts  forth  into 
a  generous  blaze,  is  a  low  passion,  which  debases 
and  degrades  the  breast  which  it  haunts.     And  he 
"will  draw  from   them  the  further  moral  that  there 
is  a  harmony  and  consistency  in  the  works  of  Na 
ture.     The  venom  that  chills  and  curdles  the  warm 
current  of  life  in  man  is  secreted  only  in  creeping 
and    cold-blooded    creatures;     and   the  inveterate 
malignity  that  never  forgets  or  forgives  is  found 
only  in  base  and  ignoble  natures,  whose  aims  are 
selfish,  whose  means   are   indirect,  cowardly,  and 
treacherous.     Anger  is  a  fierce  and  sudden  flume, 
which  may  be  kindled  in  the  noblest  breasts;   but 
in  these  the  slow  droppings  of  an  unforgiving  tem 
per  never  take  the  shape   and  consistency  of  en 
during  hatred.     The  natural  instincts  of  a  generous 
heart  shrink  from  an  inveterate  hater  as  the  child 
shrinks  from  the  snake  in  his  path.     The  enemies 
of  General  McClellan,  in  the  persistency  and  malig 
nity  of  their  attacks,  furnish  a  key  to  unlock  their 
own  characters.     As  for  him,  "  he  will  remember," 
to  borrow  what  Burke  said  of  Fox,  "that  obloquy 
is  a  necessary  ingredient  in  the  composition  of  all 
true  glory;  he  will  remember  that  it  was  not  only 
in  the  .Roman  customs,  but  it  is  in  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  things,  that  calumny  and  abuse  are 
essential  parts  of  triumph.     These   thoughts  will 
support  a  mind  which  exists  only  for  honor,  under 
the  burden  of  temporary  reproach."     And  if  de 
traction   has  been  the  meed  of  patriotic  faith,  if 


SOURCES     OF     SUPPORT.  373 

persecution  has  been  the  reward  of  arduous  ser 
vice,  if  calumny  has  followed  desert,  General 
McClellan  must  find  comfort  in  the  reflection  that 
his  is  no  new  experience,  but  that  every  genera 
tion  has  had  similar  examples  of  the  power  of  the 
weak  over  the  strong,  and  the  triumph,  sometimes 
transient  and  sometimes  enduring,  of  the  low  and 
base  over  the  high  and  noble.  How  soon  the 
future  is  to  right  the  wrongs  of  the  past,  cannot  be 
predicted;  but  he  is  sure  what  the  verdict  of  time 
will  be,  and  thus  ho  may  wait  patiently  till  it 
shall  be  rendered. 


32 


APPENDIX. 


ORATION  DELIVERED  BY  GENERAL  McCLELLAN  AT 
WEST  POINT,  JUNE  15,  13G4,  AT  THE  DEDICATION  OP 
THE  SITE  OF  A  MONUMENT  PROPOSED  TO  BE  ERECTED 
IN  MEMORY  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 
WHO  SHALL  HAVE  FALLEN  IN  BATTLE  DURING  THE 
PRESENT  WAR. 

ALL  nations  have  days  sacred  to  the  remembrance  of 
joy  and  of  grief.  They  have  thanksgivings  for  success, 
fasting  and  prayers  in  the  hour  of  humiliation  and  de 
feat,  triumphs  and  paeans  to  greet  the  living  and  laurel- 
crowned  victor.  They  have  obsequies  and  eulogies  for  the 
warrior  slain  on  the  field  of  battle.  Such  is  the  duty  we 
are  to  perform  to-day.  The  poetry,  the  histories,  the 
orations  of  antiquity,  all  resound  with  the  clang  of  arms; 
they  dwell  rather  upon  rough  deeds  of  war  than  the 
gentle  arts  of  peace.  They  have  preserved  to  us  the 
names  of  heroes,  and  the  memory  of  their  deeds,  even  to 
this  distant  day.  Our  own  Old  Testament  teems  with  the 
narrations  of  the  brave  actions  and  heroic  deaths  of  Jew 
ish  patriots,  while  the  New  Testament  of  our  meek  and 
suffering  Saviour  often  selects  the  soldier  and  his  weapons 
to  typify  and  illustrate  religious  heroism  and  duty.  These 
stories  of  the  actions  of  the  dead  have  frequently  sur 
vived,  in  the  lapse  of  ages,  the  names  of  those  whose  fall 
was  thus  commemorated  centuries  ago.  But,  although 
we  know  not  now  the  names  of  all  the  brave  men  who 
fought  and  fell  upon  the  plain  of  Marathon,  in  the  pass 
of  Thermopylae,  and  on  the  hills  of  Palestine,  we  have 
not  lost  the  memory  of  their  examples.  As  long  as  the 


37ti  APPENDIX  I 

warm  blood  courses  the  veins  of  man,  as  long  as  the 
human  heart  beats  high  and  quick  at  the  recital  of  brave 
deeds  and  patriotic  sacrifices,  so  long  will  the  lesson  still 
incite  generous  men  to  emulate  the  heroism  of  the  past. 

Among  the  Greeks,  it  was  the  custom  that  the  fathers 
of  the  most  valiant  of  the  slain  should  pronounce  the 
eulogies  of  the  dead.  Sometimes  it  devolved  upon  their 
great  statesmen  and  orators  to  perform  this  mournful 
duty.  Would  that  a  new  Demosthenes  or  a  second  Peri 
cles  could  arise  and  take  my  place  to-day !  for  he  would 
find  a  theme  worthy  of  his  most  brilliant  powers,  of  his 
most  touching  eloquence.  I  stand  here  now,  not  as  an 
orator,  but  as  a  whilom  commander,  and  in  the  place  of 
the  fathers,  of  the  most  valiant  dead, — as  their  comrade, 
too,  on  many  a  hard-fought  field  against  domestic  and 
foreign  foe, — in  early  youth  and  mature  manhood, — moved 
by  all  the  love  that  David  felt  when  he  poured  forth  his 
lamentations  for  the  mighty  father  and  son  who  fell  on 
Mount  Gilboa.  God  knows  that  David's  love  for  Jona 
than  was  no  more  deep  than  mine  for  the  tried  friends 
of  many  long  and  eventful  years,  whose  names  are  to  be 
recorded  upon  the  structure  that  is  to  rise  upon  this  spot. 
Would  that  his  more  than  mortal  eloquence  could  grace 
my  lips  and  do  justice  to  the  theme  ! 

We  have  met  to-day,  my  comrades,  to  do  honor  to  our 
own  dead ;  brothers  united  to  us  by  the  closest  and  dear 
est  ties,  who  have  freely  given  their  lives  for  their  country 
in  this  war, — so  just  and  righteous,  so  long  as  its  purpose 
is  to  crush  rebellion  and  to  save  our  nation  from  the  in 
finite  evils  of  dismemberment.  Such  an  occasion  as  this 
should  call  forth  the  deepest  and  noblest  emotions  of  our 
nature, — pride,  sorrow,  and  prayer :  pride  that  our  country 
has  possessed  such  sons  ;  sorrow  that  she  has  lost  them  ; 
prayer  that  she  may  have  others  like  them, — that  we  and 
our  successors  may  adorn  her  annals  as  they  have  done, 
and  that  when  our  parting  hour  arrives,  whenever  and 


ORATION    AT    WKST    POINT.  377 

however  it  may  be,  our  souls  may  be  prepared  for  the 
great  change. 

"\Ve  have  assembled  to  consecrate  a  cenotaph,  which 
shall  remind  our  children's  children,  in  the  distant  future, 
of  their  fathers'  struggles  in  the  days  of  the  great  rebel 
lion.  This  monument  is  to  perpetuate  the  memory  of  a 
portion  only  of  those  who  have  fallen  for  the  nation  in 
this  unhappy  war:  it  is  dedicated  to  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  regular  army.  Yet  this  is  done  in  no  class 
or  exclusive  spirit,  and  in  the  act  we  remember  with  reve 
rence  and  love  our  comrades  of  the  volunteers,  who 
have  so  gloriously  fought  and  fallen  by  our  sides.  Each 
State  will,  no  doubt,  commemorate  in  some  fitting  way 
the  services  of  its  sons  who  abandoned  the  avocations  of 
peace  and  shed  their  blood  in  the  ranks  of  the  volunteers. 
How  richly  they  have  earned  a  nation's  love,  a  nation's 
gratitude,  with  what  heroism  they  have  confronted  death, 
have  wrested  victory  from  a  stubborn  foe,  and  have  illus 
trated  defeat',  it  well  becomes  me  to  say  ;  for  it  has  been 
my  lot  to  command  them  on  many  a  sanguinary  field.  I 
know  that  I  but  echo  the  feeling  of  the  regulars,  when 
I  award  the  high  credit  they  deserve  to  their  brave  breth 
ren  of  the  volunteers. 

But  we  of  the  regular  army  have  no  States  to  look  to 
for  the  honors  due  our  dead.  We  belong  to  the  whole 
country,  and  can  neither  expect  nor  desire  the  General 
Government  to  make  a  perhaps  invidious  distinction  in 
our  favor.  We  are  few  in  number,  a  small  band  of  com 
rades,  united  by  peculiar  and  very  binding  ties  ;  for  with 
many  of  us  our  friendships  were  commenced  in  boyhood, 
when  we  rested  here  in  the  shadow  of  the  granite  hills 
which  look  down  upon  us  where  we  stand  ;  with  others 
the  ties  of  brotherhood  were  formed  in  more  mature 
years,  while  fighting  among  the  rugged  mountains  and 
the  fertile  valleys  of  Mexico,  within  hearing  of  the  eter 
nal  waves  of  the  Pacific,  or  in  the  lonely  grandeur  of  the 


dtO  APPENDIX : 

great  plains  of  the  far  West.  With  all,  our  love  and  con 
fidence  have  been  cemented  by  common  dangers  and 
sufferings,  on  the  toilsome  march,  in  the  dreary  bivouac, 
amid  the  clash  of  arms,  and  in  the  presence  of  death 
on  scores  of  battle-fields.  West  Point,  with  her  large 
heart,  adopts  us  all, — graduates  and  those  appointed  from 
civil  life,  officers  and  privates.  In  her  eyes  we  are  all  her 
children,  jealous  of  her  fame  and  eager  to  sustain  her 
world-wide  reputation.  Generals  and  private  soldiers, 
men  who  have  cheerfully  offered  our  all  for  our  dear 
country,  we  stand  here  before  this  shrine,  ever  hereafter 
sacred  to  our  dead,  equals  and  brothers  in  the  presence 
of  the  common  death  which  awaits  us  all,  perhaps  on  the 
same  field  and  at  the  same  hour.  Such  are  the  ties  which 
unite  us, — the  most  endearing  which  exist  among  men  ; 
such  the  relations  which  bind  us  together, — the  closest 
of  the  sacred  brotherhood  of  arms. 

It  has  therefore  seemed,  and  it  is,  fitting  that  we  should 
erect  upon  this  spot,  so  sacred  to  us  all,  an  enduring 
monument  to  our  dear  brothers  who  have  preceded  us  on 
the  path  of  peril  and  of  honor  which  it  is  the  destiny  of 
many  of  us  to  tread. 

What  is  this  regular  army  to  which  we  belong  ? 

Who  were  the  men  whose  death  merits  such  honors 
from  the  living? 

What  is  the  cause  for  which  they  have  laid  down  their 
lives  ? 

Our  regular  or  permanent  army  is  the  nucleus  which, 
in  time  of  peace,  preserves  the  military  traditions  of  the 
nation,  as  well  as  the  organization,  science,  and  instruction 
indispensable  to  modern  armies.  It  may  be  regarded  as 
coeval  with  the  nation.  It  derives  its  origin  from  the  old 
continental  and  State  lines  of  the  Revolution,  whence, 
with  some  interruptions  and  many  changes,  it  has  attained 
its  present  condition.  In  fact,  we  may  with  propriety  go 
even  bevond  the  Revolution  to  seek  the  roots  of  our 


ORATION    AT    WEST    POINT.  "i7H 

genealogical  tree  in  the  old  French  wars ;  for  the  cis-At- 
lantic  campaigns  of  the  seven  years'  war  were  not  con 
fined  to  the  "  red  men  scalping  each  other  by  the  great 
lakes  of  North  America/'  and  it  was  in  them  that  our 
ancestors  first  participated  as  Americans  in  the  large 
operations  of  civilized  armies.  American  regiments  then 
fought  on  the  banks  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Ohio, 
on  the  shores  of  Ontario  and  Lake  George,  on  the  islands 
of  the  Caribbean  and  in  South  America.  Louisburgh, 
Quebec,  Duquesne,  the  Moro,  and  Porto  Bello,  attest  the 
valor  of  the  provincial  troops ;  and  in  that  school  were 
educated  such  soldiers  as  WASHINGTON,  PUTNAM,  LEE, 
MONTGOMERY,  and  GATES.  These,  and  men  like  GREENE, 
KNOX,  WAYNE,  and  STEUBEN,  were  the  fathers  of  our  per 
manent  army ;  and  under  them  our  troops  acquired  that 
discipline  and  steadiness  which  enabled  them  to  meet 
upon  equal  terms,  and  often  to  defeat,  the  tried  veterans 
of  England.  The  study  of  the  history  of  the  Revolution, 
and  a  perusal  of  the  despatches  of  WASHINGTON,  will  con 
vince  the  most  skeptical  of  the  value  of  the  permanent 
army  in  achieving  our  independence  and  establishing  the 
civil  edifice  which  we  are  now  fighting  to  preserve. 

The  War  of  1812  found  the  army  on  a  footing  far  from 
adequate  to  the  emergency ;  but  it  was  rapidly  increased, 
and  of  the  new  generation  of  soldiers  many  proved  equal 
to  the  requirements  of  the  occasion.  Lundy's  Lane, 
Chippewa,  Queenstown,  Plattsburgh,  New  Orleans, — all 
bear  witness  to  the  gallantry  of  the  regulars. 

Then  came  an  interval  of  more  than  thirty  years  of 
external  peace,  marked  by  many  changes  in  the  organi 
zation  and  strength  of  the  regular  army,  and  broken  at 
times  by  tedious  and  bloody  Indian  wars.  Of  these  the 
most  remarkable  were  the  Black  Hawk  War,  in  which  our 
troops  met  unflinchingly  a  foe  as  relentless  and  far  more 
destructive  than  the  Indians, — that  terrible  scourge,  the 
cholera;  and  the  tedious  Florida  War.  where  for  so  many 


*>SO  APPKXDIX  : 

years  the  Seminoles  eluded  in  the  pestilential  swamps 
our  utmost  efforts,  and  in  which  were  •  displayed  such 
traits  of  heroism  as  that  commemorated  by  yonder  monu 
ment  to  DADE  and  his  command, — "when  all  fell,  save 
three,  without  an  attempt  to  retreat."  At  last  came  the 
Mexican  "War,  to  replace  Indian  combats  and  the  mono 
tony  of  the  frontier  service  ;  and  for  the  first  time  in  many 
years  the  mass  of  the  regular  army  was  concentrated,  and 
took  the  principal  part  in  the  battles  of  that  remarkable 
and  romantic  war.  Palo  Alto,  Resaca,  and  Fort  Brown 
were  the  achievements  of  the  regulars  unaided  ;  and  as  to 
the  battles  of  Monterey,  Buena  Vista,  Vera  Cruz,  Cerro 
Gordo,  and  the  final  triumphs  in  the  valley,  none  can 
truly  say  that  they  could  have  been  won  without  the  regu 
lars.  When  peace  crowned  our  victories  in  the  capital 
of  the  Montezumas,  the  army  was  at  once  dispersed  over 
the  long  frontier  and  engaged  in  harassing  and  danger 
ous  wars  with  the  Indians  of  the  plains.  Thus  thirteen 
long  years  were  spent,  until  the  present  war  broke  out, 
and  the  mass  of  the  army  was  drawn  in,  to  be  employed 
against  a  domestic  foe. 

I  cannot  proceed  to  the  events  of  the  recent  past  and 
the  present  without  adverting  to  the  gallant  men  who 
were  so  long  of  our  number,  but  who  have  now  gone  to 
their  last  home ;  for  no  small  portion  of  the  glory  of  which 
we  boast  was  reflected  from  such  men  as  TAYLOR,  WORTH, 
BRADY,  BROOKS,  TOTTEX,  and  DUXCAX. 

There  is  a  sad  story  of  Venetian  history  that  has  moved 
many  a  heart,  and  often  employed  the  poet's  pen  and 
the  painter's  pencil.  It  is  of  an  old  man  whose  long  life 
was  gloriously  spent  in  the  service  of  the  state  as  a  war 
rior  and  a  statesman,  and  who,  when  his  hair  was  white 
and  his  feeble  limbs  could  scarce  carry  his  bent  form 
towards  the  grave,  attained  the  highest  honors  that  a 
Venetian  citizen  could  reach.  He  was  Doge  of  Venice. 
Convicted  of  treason  against  the  state,  he  not  only  lost 


ORATION    AT    >VEST    POINT.  uSl 

his  life,  but  suffered  besides  a  penalty  which  will  enduro 
as  long  as  the  name  of  Venice  is  remembered.  The  spot 
where  his  portrait  should  have  hung  in  the  great  hall  of 
the  doge's  palace  was  veiled  with  black,  and  there  still 
remains  the  frame,  with  its  black  mass  of  canvas;  and 
this  vacant  frame  is  the  most  conspicuous  in  the  long  line 
of  effigies  of  illustrious  doges ! 

Oh  that  such  a  pall  as  that  which  replaces  the  portrait 
of  MARINO  FALIERO  could  conceal  from  history  the  names 
of  those,  once  our  comrades,  who  are  now  in  arms  against 
the  flag  under  which  we  fought  side  by  side  in  years  gone 
by  !  But  no  veil  can  cover  the  anguish  that  fills  our  hearts 
when  we  look  back  upon  the  sad  memory  of  the  past 
and  recall  the  affection  and  respect  we  entertained  towards 
men  against  whom  it  is  our  duty  to  act  in  mortal  combat. 
Would  that  the  courage,  ability,  and  steadfastness  they 
have  displayed  had  been  employed  in  the  defence  of  the 
"  Stars  and  Stripes'7  against  a  foreign  foe,  rather  than  in 
this  gratuitous  and  unjustifiable  rebellion,  which  could 
not  be  so  long  maintained  but  for  the  skill  and  energy 
of  those  our  former  comrades  ! 

But  we  have  reason  to  rejoice  that  upon  this  day,  so 
sacred  and  so  eventful  for  us,  one  grand  old  mortal  monu 
ment  of  the  past  still  lifts  high  his  head  amongst  us,  and 
graces  by  his  presence  the  consecration  of  this  tomb  of 
his  children.  We  may  well  be  proud  that  we  have  been 
commanded  by  the  hero  who  purchased  victory  with  his 
blood  near  the  great  waters  of  Niagara,  who  repeated  and 
eclipsed  the  achievements  of  CORTEZ, — who,  although  a 
consummate  and  confident  commander,  ever  preferred, 
when  duty  and  honor  would  permit,  the  olive-branch  of 
peace  to  the  blood-stained  laurels  of  war,  and  who  stands, 
at  the  close  of  a  long,  glorious,  and  eventful  life,  a  living 
column  of  granite  against  which  have  beaten  in  vain  alike 
the  blandishments  and  the  storms  of  treason.  His  name 
will  ever  be  one  of  our  proudest  boasts  and  most  moving 


•->82  APPENDIX  : 

inspirations.  In  long-distant  ages,  when  this  incipient 
monument  has  become  venerable,  moss-clad,  and  perhaps 
ruinous,  when  the  names  inscribed  upon  it  shall  seem,  to 
those  who  pause  to  read  them,  indistinct  mementos  of 
an  almost  mythical  past,  the  name  of  WINTIELD  SCOTT 
will  still  be  clear-cut  upon  the  memory  of  them  all,  like 
the  still  fresh  carving  upon  the  monuments  of  long-for 
gotten  Pharaohs. 

But  it  is  time  to  approach  the  present. 

In  the  war  which  now  shakes  the  land  to  its  foundation, 
the  regular  army  has  borne  a  most  honorable  part.  Too 
few  in  numbers  to  act  by  themselves,  regular  regiments 
have  participated  in  every  great  battle  in  the  East  and 
in  most  of  those  west  of  the  Alleghanies.  Their  terrible 
losses  and  diminished  numbers  prove  that  they  have  been 
in  the  thickest  of  the  fights,  and  the  testimony  of  their 
comrades  and  commanders  shows  with  what  undaunted 
heroism  they  have  upheld  their  ancient  renown.  Their 
vigorous  charges  have  often  won  the  day ;  and  in  defeat 
they  have  more  than  once  saved  the  army  from  destruc 
tion  or  terrible  losses  by  the  obstinacy  with  which  they 
resisted  overpowering  numbers.  They  can  refer  with 
pride  to  the  part  they  played  upon  the  glorious  fields  of 
Mexico,  and  exult  at  the  recollection  of  what  they  did  at 
Manassas,  Gaines's  Mill,  Malvern,  Antietam,  Shiloh,  Stone 
River,  Gettysburg,  and  the  great  battles  just  fought  from 
the  Rapidan  to  the  Chickahominy.  They  can  also  point 
to  the  officers  who  have  risen  among  them  and  achieved 
great  deeds  for  their  country  in  this  war, — to  the  living 
warriors  whose  names  are  on  the  nation's  tongue  and 
heart,  too  numerous  to  be  repeated  here,  yet  not  one  of 
whom  I  would  willingly  omit. 

But  perhaps  the  proudest  episode  in  the  history  of  the 
regular  army  is  that  touching  instance  of  fidelity  on  the 
part  of  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates,  who, 
treacherously  made  prisoners  in  Texas,  resisted  every 


OIIATION    AT    WEST    POINT.  333 

temptation  to  violate  their  oath  and  desert  their  flag. 
Offered  commissions  in  the  rebel  service,  money  and  land 
freely  tendered  them,  they  all  scorned  the  inducements 
held  out  to  them,  submitted  to  every  hardship,  and,  when 
at  last  exchanged,  avenged  themselves  on  the  field  of 
battle  for  the  unavailing  insult  offered  their  integrity. 
History  affords  no  brighter  example  of  honor  than  that 
of  these  brave  men,  tempted,  as  I  blush  to  say  they  were, 
by  some  of  their  former  officers,  who,  having  themselves 
proved  false  to  their  flag,  endeavored  to  seduce  the  men 
who  had  often  followed  them  in  combat  and  who  had 
naturally  regarded  them  with  respect  and  love. 

Such  is  the  regular  army, — such  its  history  and  antece 
dents, — such  its  officers  and  men.  It  needs  no  herald  to 
trumpet  forth  its  praises ;  it  can  proudly  appeal  to  the 
numerous  fields,  from  the  tropics  to  the  frozen  banks  of 
the  St.  Lawrence,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  ferti 
lized  by  the  blood  and  whitened  by  the  bones  of  its  mem 
bers.  But  I  will  not  pause  to  eulogize  it.  Let  its  deeds 
speak  for  it :  they  are  more  eloquent  than  tongue  of 
mine. 

Why  are  we  here  to-day  ? 

This  is  not  the  funeral  of  one  brave  warrior,  nor  even 
of  the  harvest  of  death  on  a  single  battle-field,  but  these 
are  the  obsequies  of  the  best  and  bravest  of  the  children 
of  the  land,  who  have  fallen  in  actions  almost  numberless, 
many  of  them  among  the  most  sanguinary  and  desperate 
of  which  history  bears  record.  The  men  whose  names 
and  deeds  we  now  seek  to  perpetuate,  rendering  them 
the  highest  honor  in  our  power,  have  fallen  wherever 
armed  rebellion  showed  its  front, — in  far-distant  New 
Mexico,  in  the  broad  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  on  the 
bloody  hunting-grounds  of  Kentucky,  in  the  mountains 
of  Tennessee,  amid  the  swamps  of  Carolina,  on  the  fertile 
fields  of  Maryland,  and  in  the  blood-stained  thickets  of 
Virginia.  They  w$rc  of  all  the  grades, — from  the  general 


SS4  APPENDIX: 

officer  to  the  private ;  of  all  ages, — from  the  gray-haired 
veteran  of  fifty  years'  service,  to  the  beardless  youth ;  of 
all  degrees  of  cultivation, — from  the  man  of  science  to  the 
uneducated  boy.  It  is  not  necessary,  nor  is  it  possible,  to 
repeat  the  mournful  yet  illustrious  roll  of  dead  heroes 
whom  we  have  met  to  honor.  Nor  shall  I  attempt  to 
name  all  of  those  who  most  merit  praise, — simply  a  few 
who  will  exemplify  the  classes  to  which  they  belong. 

Among  the  last  slain,  but  among  the  first  in  honor  and 
reputation,  was  that  hero  of  twenty  battles, — JOHN  SEDG- 
WICK, — gentle  and  kind  as  a  woman,  brave  as  a  brave  man 
can  be,  honest,  sincere,  and  able :  he  was  a  model  that 
all  may  strive  to  imitate,  but  whom  few  can  equal.  In 
the  terrible  battles  which  just  preceded  his  death,  he  had 
occasion  to  display  the  highest  qualities  of  a  commander 
and  a  soldier ;  yet,  after  escaping  the  stroke  of  death 
when  men  fell  around  him  by  thousands,  he  at  last  met 
his  fate,  at  a  moment  of  comparative  quiet,  by  the  ball 
of  a  single  rifleman.  He  died  as  a  soldier  would  choose 
to  die, — with  truth  in  his  heart,  and  a  sweet,  tranquil 
smile  upon  his  face.  Alas  !  our  great  nation  possesses  few 
such  sons  as  true  JOHN  SEDGWICK. 

Like  him  fell,  too,  at  the  very  head  of  their  corps,  the 
white-haired  MANSFIELD,  after  a  long  career  of  usefulness, 
illustrated  by  his  skill  and  cool  courage  at  Fort  Brown, 
Monterey,  and  Buena  Vista,  JOHN  F.  KEYNOLDS,  and  RENO, 
both  in  the  full  vigor  of  manhood  and  intellect, — men 
who  have  proved  their  ability  and  chivalry  on  many  a 
field  in  Mexico  and  in  this  civil  war, — gallant  gentlemen, 
of  whom  their  country  had  much  to  hope,  had  it  pleased 
God  to  spare  their  lives.  LYON  fell  in  the  prime  of  life, 
leading  his  little  army  against  superior  numbers,  his  brief 
career  affording  a  brilliant  example  of  patriotism  and 
ability.  The  impetuous  KEARNEY,  and  such  brave  gene? 
rals  as  RICHARDSON,  WILLIAMS,  TERRILL,  STEVENS,  WEED, 
NG,  SAUNDERS,  and  HAYES,  lost  their  lives  while  in  the 


ORATION    AT    WEST    POINT.  SS5 

midst  of  a  career  of  usefulness.  Young  BAYARD,  so  like 
the  most  renowned  of  his  name,  that  "knight  above  fear 
arid  above  reproach/'  was  cut  off  too  early  for  his  country, 
and  that  excellent  staff-officer,  Colonel  GARESCHE,  fell 
while  gallantly  doing  his  duty. 

No  regiments  can  spare  such  gallant,  devoted,  and  able 
commanders  as  ROSSELL,  DAVIS,  GOVE,  SIMMONS,  BAILEY, 
PUTNAM,  and  KINGSBURY, — all  of  whom  fell  in  the  thickest 
of  the  combat, — some  of  them  veterans,  and  others  young 
in  service,  all  good  men  and  well-beloved. 

Our  batteries  have  partially  paid  their  terrible  debt  to 
fate  in  the  loss  of  such  commanders  as  GREBLE,  the  first 
to  fall  in  this  war,  BEXSOX,  HAZZARD,  SMEAD,  DE  HART, 
HAZLITT,  and  those  gallant  boys,  KIRBY,  WOODRUFF,  DIM- 
MICK,  and  CUSHLNG  ;  while  the  engineers  lament  the  pro 
mising  and  gallant  WAGNER  and  CROSS. 

Beneath  remote  battle-fields  rest  the  corpses  of  the 
heroic  McRcA,  REED,  BASCOM,  STONE,  SWEET,  and  many 
other  company  officers. 

Besides  these  were  hosts  of  veteran  sergeants,  corporals, 
and  privates,  who  had  fought  under  SCOTT  in  Mexico,  or 
contended  in  many  combats  with  the  savages  of  the  far 
West  and  Florida,  and,  mingled  with  them,  young  soldiers 
who,  courageous,  steady,  and  true,  met  death  unflinch 
ingly,  without  the  hope  of  personal  glory.  These  men, 
in  their  more  humble  sphere,  served  their  country  with 
as  much  faith  and  honor  as  the  most  illustrious  generals, 
and  all  of  them  with  perfect  singleness  of  heart.  Although 
their  names  may  not  live  in  history,  their  actions,  loyalty, 
and  courage  will  live.  Their  memories  will  long  be  pre 
served  in  their  regiments;  for  there  were  many  of  them 
who  merited  as  proud  a  distinction  as  that  accorded  to 
the  ''first  grenadier  of  France,"  or  to  that  Russian  soldier 
who  gave  his  life  for  his  comrades. 

But  there  is  another  class  of  men  who  have  gone  from 
us  since  this  war  commenced,  whose  fate  it  was  not  to  die 
::.'; 


886  APPENDIX  : 

in  battle,  but  who  are  none  the  less  entitled  to  be  men? 
tloned  here.  There  was  SUMNER,  a  brave,  honest,  chival 
rous  veteran,  of  more  than  half  a  century's  service,  who 
had  confronted  death  unflinchingly  on  scores  of  battle 
fields,  had  shown  his  gray  head  serene  and  cheerful  where 
death  most  revelled,  who  more  than  once  told  me  that 
he  believed  and  hoped  that  his  long  career  would  end 
amid  the  din  of  battle :  he  died  at  home  from  the  effects 
of  the  hardships  of  his  campaigns. 

That  most  excellent  soldier,  the  elegant  C.  F.  SMITH, 
whom  many  of  us  remember  to  have  seen  so  often  on 
this  plain,  with  his  superb  bearing,  escaped  the  bullet  to 
fall  a  victim  to  the  disease  which  has  deprived  the  army 
of  so  many  of  its  best  soldiers. 

JOHN  BUFORD,  cool  and  intrepid;  MITCHEL,  eminent  in 
science ;  PLUMMER,  PALMER,  arid  many  other  officers  and 
men,  lost  their  lives  by  sickness  contracted  in  the  field. 

But  I  cannot  close  this  long  list  of  glorious  martyrs 
without  paying  a  sacred  debt  of  official  duty  and  personal 
friendship.  There  was  one  dead  soldier  who  possessed 
peculiar  claims  upon  my  love  and  gratitude.  He  was  an 
ardent  patriot,  an  unselfish  man,  a  true  soldier,  the  beau 
ideal  of  a  staff  officer :  he  was  my  aide-de-camp,  Colonel 

COLBURN. 

There  is  a  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  the  death  and  ser 
vices  of  these  glorious  men  which  we  should  read  for  the 
present  and  future  benefit  of  the  nation.  War  in  these 
modern  days  is  a  science,  and  it  should  now  be  clear  to 
the  most  prejudiced  that  for  the  organization  and  com 
mand  of  armies,  and  the  high  combinations  of  strategy, 
perfect  familiarity  with  the  theoretical  science  of  war  is 
requisite.  To  count  upon  success  when  the  plans  or  exe 
cution  of  campaigns  are  intrusted  to  men  who  have  no 
knowledge  of  war,  is  as  idle  as  to  expect  the  legal  wisdom 
of  a  STORY  or  a  KENT  from  a  skilful  physician. 

But  what  is  the  honorable  and  holv  cause  for  which 


ORATION    AT    WEST    POINT.  887 

these  men  laid  down  their  lives,  and  for  which  the  nation 
still  demands  the  sacrifice  of  the  precious  blood  of  so 
many  of  her  children  ? 

Soon  after  the  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  it  was 
found  that  the  confederacy,  which  had  grown  up  during 
that  memorable  contest,  was  fast  falling  to  pieces  from 
its  own  weight.  The  central  power  was  too  weak  ;  it 
could  only  recommend  to  the  different  States  such  mea 
sures  as  seemed  best  ;  and  it  possessed  no  real  power  to 
legislate,  because  it  lacked  the  executive  force  to  compel 
obedience  to  its  laws.  The  national  credit  and  self-re 
spect  had  disappeared,  and  it  was  feared  by  the  friends 
of  human  liberty  throughout  the  world  that  ours  was 
but  another  added  to  the  long  list  of  fruitless  attempts 
at  self-government.  The  nation  was  evidently  upon  the 
brink  of  ruin  and  dissolution,  when,  some  eighty  years 
ago,  many  of  the  wisest  and  most  patriotic  of  the  land 
met  to  seek  a  remedy  for  the  groat  evils  which  threatened 
to  destroy  the  great  work  of  the  Revolution.  Their  ses 
sions  were  long,  and  often  stormy :  for  a  time  the  most 
sanguine  doubted  the  possibility  of  a  successful  termina 
tion  to  their  labors.  But  from  amidst  the  conflict  of 
sectional  interests,  of  party  prejudices,  and  of  personal 
selfishness,  the  spirit  of  wisdom  and  conciliation  at  length 
evoked  the  Constitution,  under  which  we  have  lived  so 
long. 

It  was  not  formed  in  a  day,  but  was  the  result  of 
patient  labor,  of  lofty  wisdom,  and  of  the  purest  patriot 
ism.  It  was  at  last  adopted  by  the  people  of  all  the 
States, — although  by  some  reluctantly, — not  as  being 
exactly  what  all  desired,  but  as  being  the  best  possible 
under  the  circumstances.  It  was  accepted  as  giving  us  a 
form  of  government  under  which  the  nation  might  live 
happily  and  prosper,  so  long  as  the  people  should  con 
tinue  to  be  influenced  by  the  same  sentiments  which  actu 
ated  those  who  formed  it,  and  which  would  not  be  liable 


•Vi3  APPENDIX  : 

to  destruction  from  internal  causes,  so  long  as  the  people 
preserved  the  recollection  of  the  miseries  arid  calamities 
which  led  to  its  adoption. 

Under  this  beneficent  Constitution  the  progress  of  the 
nation  was  unexampled  in  history.  The  rights  and  liber 
ties  of  its  citizens  were  secure  at  home  and  abroad  ;  vast 
territories  were  rescued  from  the  control  of  the  savage 
and  the  wild  beast  and  added  to  the  domain  of  civilization 
and  the  Union.  The  arts,  the  sciences,  and  commerce, 
grew  apace :  our  flag  floated  upon  every  sea,  and  we  took 
our  place  among  the  great  nations  of  the  earth. 

But  under  the  smooth  surface  of  prosperity  upon  which 
we  glided  swiftly,  with  all  sails  set  before  the  summer 
breeze,  dangerous  reefs  were  hidden,  which  now  and  then 
caused  ripples  upon  the  surface  and  made  anxious  the 
more  cautious  pilots.  Elated  by  success,  the  ship  swept 
on,  the  crew  not  heeding  the  warnings  they  received,  for 
getful  of  the  dangers  they  escaped  in  the  beginning  of 
the  voyage,  and  blind  to  the  hideous  maelstrom  which 
gaped  to  receive  and  destroy  them.  The  same  elements 
of  discordant  sectional  prejudices,  interests,  and  institu 
tions  which  had  rendered  the  formation  of  the  Consti- 
tution  so  difficult,  threatened  more  than  once  to  destroy 
it.  But  for  a  long  time  the  nation  was  so  fortunate  as  to 
possess  a  series  of  political  leaders  who  to  the  highest 
abilities  united  the  same  spirit  of  conciliation  which  ani 
mated  the  founders  of  the  Republic ;  and  thus  for  many 
years  the  threatened  evils  were  averted.  Time  and  long- 
continued  good  fortune  obliterated  the  recollection  of  the 
calamities  and  wretchedness  of  the  years  preceding  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Men  forgot  that  concilia 
tion,  common  interest,  and  mutual  charity  had  been  the 
foundation  and  must  be  the  support  of  our  government, 
— as  is,  indeed,  the  case  with  all  governments  and  all  the 
relations  of  life.  At  length  men  appeared  with  whom 
sectional  and  personal  prejudices  and  interests  outweighed 


ORATION    AT    WEST    POINT.  3SJ) 

all  considerations  for  the  general  good.  Extremists  of 
one  section  furnished  the  occasion,  eagerly  seized  as  a 
pretext  by  equally  extreme  men  in  the  other,  for  aban 
doning  the  pacific  remedies  and  protection  afforded  by 
the  Constitution  and  seeking  redress  for  possible  future 
evils  in  war  and  the  destruction  of  the  Union. 

Stripped  of  all  sophistry  and  side  issues,  the  direct 
cause  of  the  war,  as  it  presented  itself  to  the  honest  and 
patriotic  citizens  of  the  North,  was  simply  this.  Certain 
States,  or  rather  a  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  certain 
States,  feared,  or  professed  to  fear,  that  injury  would  result 
to  their  rights  and  property  from  the  elevation  of  a  par 
ticular  party  to  power.  Although  the  Constitution  and 
the  actual  condition  of  the  government  provided  them 
with  a  peaceable  and  sure  protection  against  the  appre 
hended  evil,  they  preferred  to  seek  security  in  the  de 
struction  of  the  government  which  could  protect  them, 
and  in  the  use  of  force  against  the  national  troops  holding 
t  national  fortress. 

To  efface  the  insult  offered  our  flag,  to  save  ourselves 
from  the  fate  of  the  divided  republics  of  Italy  and  South 
America,  to  preserve  our  government  from  destruction, 
to  enforce  its  just  power  and  laws,  to  maintain  our  very 
existence  as  a  nation, — these  were  the  causes  that  com 
pelled  us  to  draw  the  sword. 

Rebellion  against  a  government  like  ours,  which  con 
tains  the  means  of  self-adjustment  and  a  pacific  remedy 
for  evils,  should  never  be  confounded  with  a  revolution 
against  despotic  power,  which  refuses  redress  of  wrongs. 
Such  a  rebellion  cannot  be  justified  upon  ethical  grounds  ; 
and  the  only  alternative  for  our  choice  is  its  suppression, 
or  the  destruction  of  our  nationality.  At  such  a  time  as 
this,  and  in  such  a  struggle,  political  partisanship  should 
be  merged  in  a  true  and  brave  patriotism,  which  thinks 
only  of  the  good  of  the  whole  country. 

ft  was  in  this  cause  and  with  these  motives    that  so 


;J90  APPENDIX: 

many  of  our  comrades  gave  their  lives  ;  and  to  this  we  are 
all  personally  pledged  in  all  honor  and.  fidelity.  Shall 
such  a  devotion  as  that  of  our  dead  comrades  be  of  no 
avail  ?  Shall  it  be  said  in  after-ages  that  we  lacked  the 
vigor  to  complete  the  work  thus  begun  ? — that,  after  all 
these  noble  lives  freely  given,  we  hesitated,  and  failed  to 
keep  straight  on  until  our  land  was  saved?  Forbid  it, 
Heaven,  and  give  us  firmer,  truer  hearts  than  that ! 

O  spirits  of  the  valiant  dead,  souls  of  our  slain  heroes, 
lend  us  your  own  indomitable  will,  and,  if  it  be  permitted 
you  to  commune  with  those  still  chained  by  the  trammels 
of  mortality,  hover  around  us  in  the  midst  of  danger  and 
tribulation,  cheer  the  firm,  strengthen  the  weak,  that 
none  may  doubt  the  salvation  of  the  Republic  and  the 
triumph  of  our  grand  old  flag  ! 

In  the  midst  of  the  storms  which  toss  our  ship  of  state, 
there  is  one  great  beacon-light  to  which  we  can  ever  turn 
with  confidence  and  hope.  It  cannot  be  that  this  great 
nation  has  played  its  part  in  history;  it  cannot  be  that 
our  sun,  which  arose  with  such  bright  promises  for  the 
future,  has  already  set  forever.  It  must  be  the  intention 
of  the  overruling  Deity  that  this  land,  so  long  the  asylum 
of  the  oppressed,  the  refuge  of  civil  and  religious  liberty, 
shall  again  stand  forth  in  bright  relief,  united,  purified, 
and  chastened  by  our  trials,  as  an  example  and  encourage 
ment  for  those  who  desire  the  progress  of  the  human 
race.  It  is  not  given  to  our  weak  intellects  to  understand 
the  steps  of  Providence  as  they  occur:  we  comprehend 
them  only  as  we  look  back  upon  them  in  the  far-distant 
past. 

So  is  it  now. 

We  cannot  unravel  the  seemingly  tangled  skein  of  the 
purposes  of  the  Creator:  they  are  too  high  and  far-reach 
ing  for  our  limited  minds.  But  all  history  and  his  own 
revealed  word  teach  us  that  his  ways,  although  inscruta 
ble,  are  ever  righteous.  Let  us,  then,  honestly  and  man- 


ORATION    AT    WEST    Pol. NT.  :>Hl 

fully  play  our  part,  seek  to  understand  and  perform  our 
whole  duty,  and  trust  unwaveringly  in  the  beneficence 
of  the  God  who  led  our  ancestors  across  the  sea,  and  sus 
tained  them  afterward  amid  dangers  more  appalling  even 
than  those  encountered  by  his  own  chosen  people  in 
their  great  exodus.  He  did  not  bring  us  here  in  vain, 
nor  has  he  supported  us  thus  far  for  naught.  If  we  do 
our  duty  and  trust  in  him,  he  will  not  desert  us  in  our 
need. 

Firm  in  our  faith  that  God  will  save  our  country,  we 
now  dedicate  this  site  to  the  memory  of  brave  men,  to 
loyalty,  patriotism,  and  honor. 


INDEX. 


ALISOV,  Sir  A.,  quoted,  202. 
Antietam,  battle  of,  296. 
Arbuckle,  Fort,  38,  39. 
Archduke  Charles,  122,  367. 
Armies  of  Europe,  report  on,  70. 
Averill,  Col.,  268,  269. 

BALL'S  BLUFF,  disaster  at,  114. 

Banks,  Gen.,  114,  164,  209,  211,  236. 

Barnard,  Gen.,  175,  189,  230,  231. 

Blenker,  Gen.,  165. 

Bliicher,  Marshal,  3G7. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  33,  35,  122,  22S, 

357,  358. 

Bradford,  Gov.,  306. 
Brougham,  Lord,  quoted,  356. 
Brown,  Judge,  346. 
Buckingham,  Gen.,  329. 
Budberg,  Baron  de,  62. 
Buell,  Gen.,  118. 
Bull  Pasture   Mountain,  battle   near, 

208. 

Bull  Run,  second  battle  of,  280. 
Burke,  Edmund,  quoted,  372. 
Burns,  Gen.,  249. 

Burnside,  Gen.,  280,  286,  300,  301,  336. 
Butler,  Gen.,  119,  121. 

CAMEROX,  Secretary  of  War,  135. 
Carrick's  Ford,  fight  at,  101. 
Casey,  Gen.,  223,  225. 
Cerro  Gordo,  battle  of,  18. 
Chantilly,  battle  of,  281. 
Chapultopec,  battle  of,  27. 
Churubusco,  battle  of,  27. 
Clarendon,  Lord,  61. 
Columbus,  56. 

Committee,  Congressional,  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  114,  128-131,  135, 

Contr'eras'  battle  of,  25. 

Corpus  Christi,  42,  43. 

Confederate  army  at  the  close  of  1SG1, 

133. 

Cooke,  Gen.,  244. 
Cooper,  J.  F.,  33. 
Cossacks,  78. 

Couch,  Gen.,  223,  225,  254,  286. 
Cox,  Gen.,  98, 103. 
Crampton's  Pass,  battle  of,  290. 
Crawford,  Dr.,  10. 
Crawford,  Gen.,  298. 
Cross  Keys,  battle  at,  215. 
Cm-tin,  Gov.,  340,  341. 

BAN- A,  Gen.,  299. 

Darling,  Fort,  attack  on,  197. 

Davis.  President,  60,  181,  195. 


Dclafield,  Col.,  59. 
Dennison,  Gov.,  85. 
Dix,  Gen.,  114. 
Duryea,  Gen.,  212. 
Dutcher,  Andrew,  338. 

ELLIS,.  Dr.,  quoted,  284, 285. 
El  Peilon,  23,  24. 
Estvan,  quoted,  186, 188. 
Ewell,  Gen.,  213. 

FAIR  OAKS,  battle  of,  223. 

Ford,  Col.,  291. 

Franklin,  Gen.,  181, 191,  248,  250,  251, 

254,  286,  295,  296,  299. 
Fremont,  Gen.,  165,  207,  215,  236. 
French,  Gen.,  299. 

GAINES'S  MILL,  battle  of,  245. 
Galveston,  41. 

Garnett,  Gen.,  92,  93,  99, 101, 102. 
Geary,  Gen.,  211. 
Glendale,  battle  of,  250. 
Goldsborough,  Admiral,  171. 
Gomard's  Manual,  36. 
Grenville,  Mr.,  quoted,  358. 

HALLECK,  Gen.,  made  commander-m- 

chicf,  267. 

despatch  to  Gen.  McClellan,  269. 
correspondence  with  Gen.  McClel 
lan,  271. 

unjust   charge   against  Gen.  Mc 
Clellan,  274. 
telegraphic  conversation  withGen. 

McClellan,  275,  276. 
despatch  to  Gen.  McClellan,  304. 
official  order  to   Gen.  McClellan. 

312. 

letter  to  Gen.  McClellan,  322. 
telegrams  to  Gen.  McClellan,  326, 

328. 

order  of  dismissal  to  Gen.  Mc 
Clellan,  official  report  comment 
ed  upon,  ii-IO,  331. 

Hanover  Court-House,  battle  at,  220. 
Hardee,  Gen.,  311. 
Ilarkins,  Major,  344. 
Harper's  Ferry  surrendered,  291. 
Harrison's  Landinir,  255. 
ITartsuff,  Gen.,  29S. 
Ilaupt,  Gen.,  317. 
Heiiitzelman,  Gen.,  128,  185,  223-225, 

240,  246,  248,  254,  279. 
Herodotus,  incident  from,  355. 
Hill,  Gen.,  102. 
Hitchcock,  Gen.,  2C7. 
I  lodges,  Liout.,  48,  52. 

393 


INDEX. 


Hooker,  Gen.,  185,  223,  251,  252,  268, 

289,  297-299,  305. 
Kuger,  Gen.,  194-,  228,  229. 

IXGALLS,  Col.,  243,  313. 

JACKSON,  Gen.,  208,  209,  212-215,  234. 
Johnston,  Gen.,  181,  195,  227,  229. 
Joinville,  Prince  de,  quoted,  157,  182, 
192,  223,  226,  230,  243. 

KEARNEY,  Gen.,  185,  223,  251,  252,  281. 
Keightley's  History  quoted,  140. 
Kellermann,  Marshal,  202. 
Kelley,  Col.,  88,  91,  92. 
Kenley,  Col.,  209-211. 
Keyes,  Gen.,  189,  223,  224,  246,  247.  249, 
250,  254,  278. 

LAXDER,  Gen.,  91. 
Latrobe,  J.  H.  B.,  quoted,  125. 
Lecomto,  Col.,  quoted,  170,  189,  218,  228. 
Lee,  Gen.  R.  E.,  181,  195,  288. 
Lincoln,    President,    order    on     Gen. 

Scott's  resignation.  115. 
message   to   Congress,  Dec.  1861, 

127,  137. 
Issues    an    order    for    a    general 

movement,  138. 
directs  the  plan  of  the  campaign, 

139. 

letter  to  Gen.  McClellan,  141. 
issues  an  order  dividing  the  army 

into  corps,  153. 

issues  an  order  for  the  disposition 

and  movement  of  the  army,  155. 

removes  Gen.  McClellan  from  the 

post  of  commandcr-in-chicf,  159. 

interview  with  Gen.  McClellan,  1C5. 

transfers     Blenker'a    division    to 

Fremont,  166. 

letter  to  Gen.  McClellan,  178,  206. 
suspends  Gen.  McDowell's  move 

ment,  207. 

despatches  to  Gen.  McClellan,  218. 
interview  with    Gen.   McClellan, 

2S1,  2o3. 

visits  the  Armyof  the  Potomac,308. 
removes  Gen.  McClellan  from  com 

mand,  329. 

proclamation  of  Sept.  22,  1862,  333. 
Longstreet,  Gen.,  22  L 
Lovejoy,  Owen,  resolutions  offered  by, 

190. 
Lyons,  Sir  Edward,  61 


.X  HILL,  baitlo  of,  253,  254. 
Mansfield,  Gen.,  208. 
Marcy,  Capt.,  37-41. 
McCall,  Gen.,  235,  241,  244,  251,  252,  254. 
McClellan,  Arthur,  C:ipt.,  9. 
McClellan,  George,  Dr..  9. 
McClellan,  J.  II.  I].,  Dr.,  9,  CO. 


McClellan,  G.  B.,  birth  and  early  educa 
tion,  9. 

enters  West  Point,  10. 

enters  the  army  as  second  lieu 
tenant  of  engineers,  13. 

letter  to  his  brother,  14. 

sails  for  Mexico,  15. 

takes  part  in  the  siege  of  Yera 
Cruz,  10. 

at  Cerro  Gordo,  18. 

adventure  at  Amozoque.  19. 

reconnoissances  by,  23,  24. 

services  in  the  Mexican  War,  25-30. 

leaves  Mexico  for  West  Point,  34. 

brevetted  tirst  lieutenant  and  cap 
tain,  34,  35. 

lecture  on  Napoleon's  campaign 
of  1814,  35. 

letter  to  his  brother,  36. 

prepares  a  manual  of  bayonet  ex 
ercise,  36. 

ordered  to  Fort  Delaware,  37. 

joins  Capt.  Marcy  in  an  expedi 
tion  to  explore  the  Red  River,37. 

attached  to  the  staff  of  Gen.  P.  F. 
Smith,  41. 

letter  to  his  brother,  41. 

letters  from  Texas,  42,  43. 

surveys  the  coast  of  Texas,  43. 

makes  a  report  to  Gen.  Totten,  45. 

ordered  on  the  Pacific  Railroad 
survey,  45. 

letter  to  his  mother,  48. 

letter  to  his  brother,  52. 

explores  the  Yakiina  Pass,  54. 

reports  to  Gov.  Stevens,  54. 

reports  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  55. 

returns  home,  56. 

sent  on  a  secret  expedition  to  the 
West  Indies,  56. 

draws  up  two  reports  on  the  pro 
montory  and  bay  of  Samana,  58. 

draws  up  report  on  railway,  58. 

made  captain  in  the  First  Cavalry 
Regiment,  59. 

sent  on  a  commission  to  observe 
the  Crimean  War,  5'J. 

sails  from  Boston,  61. 

arrives  in  St.  Petersburg,  C3. 

letter  from  St.  Petersburg,  63. 

arrival  at  Balaklava,  67. 

arrival  at  Paris,  09. 

return  home,  CO. 

report  on  the  armies  of  Europe,  70, 
80. 

resigns  his  commission,  81. 

made  vice-president  of  the  Illinois 
Central  Railroad,  81. 

marriage,  82. 

president  of  the  Ohio  &  Mississippi 
Railroad,  82. 

miijor-jreneral  of  Ohio  "Militia 
Volunteers/'  C5. 


INDEX. 


395 


McClel  Ian,  G.B.,  placed  in  charge  of  the 

"  Department  of  the  Ohio,"  85. 

issuer  a  proclamation  to  Western 

Virginia,  88. 

address  to  his  soldiers,  90. 

letter  to  Gen.  Scott,  94. 

proclamation,  95. 

address  to  soldiers,  96. 

despatch  to  Col.  Townscnrl,  100. 

address  to  his  soldiers,  102. 

summoned  to  Washington,  103. 

begins  to  organize  the  army,  105. 

addresses  a  memorandum  on  the 
war  to  the  President,  106. 

appointedcommandcr-in-chief,116. 

issues  an  order  thereupon,  116. 

receives  a  sword  from  the  city  of 
Philadelphia,  117. 

letters  of  instruction  to  Gen.  Ilal- 
leck  and  Gen.  Buell,  118. 

letters  of  instruction  to  Gen.  Sher 
man  and  Gen.  Butler,  119. 

difficulties  of  his  position,  121. 

interview  with  the  Secretary  of 
War,  136. 

explains  his  plans  to  the  Presi 
dent,  136. 

letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  142. 

goes  to  Harper's  Ferry,  151. 

consults  with  division  command 
ers,  152. 

goes  to  Manassas  and  Ccntreville, 
158. 

removed  from  the  post  of  com- 
mander-in-chief,  159. 

addresses  a  note  to  the  President, 
160. 

issues  an  address  to  his  soldiers, 162. 

gives  instructions  to  Gen.  Banks 
and  Gen.  Wadsworth,  164. 

explains  his  plans  to  the  War  De 
partment,  164. 

meets  President  Lincoln,  16/5. 

writes  letter  to  Gen.  Banks,  167. 

reaches  Fortress  Monroe,  169. 

deprived  of  control  over  Gen. 
Wool's  command,  170. 

McDowell's  corps  detached  from 
him,  171. 

besieges  Yorktown,  175. 

at  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  187. 

thanked  by  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  190. 

telegraphs  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  from  Williamsburg,  203. 

telegraphs  to  the  President,  203, 
20(5. 

receives  despatches  from  the 
President,  218. 

at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  225, 228. 

telegraphs  to  the  President,  233. 

telegraphs  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  233. 


McClellan,  G.  B.,  joined  by  McCall,  235. 
begins  movement  to  James  River, 

242. 
meeting  of  his  corps  commanders, 

246. 
exertions  during  the"Seven  Days," 

250,  253. 

at  the  battle  of  Malvorn  Hill,  253. 
telegraphs   to    the    Secretary   of 

War,  258. 
address    to   his   soldiers,  July  4, 

1862,  261. 

telegraph  to  the  President,  262. 
letter   to   the   President,   July  7, 

1862,  262. 
protests  against   the  removal  of 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  269. 
begins  removal  of  the  army,  272. 
differences  between  him  aud  Gen. 

Halleck,  273,  274. 
leaves  James  River,  277. 
arrives  at  Acquia  Creek,  278. 
telegraphs  to  Gen.  Ilalleck,  278. 
arrives  at  Alexandria,  279. 
telegraph  to  Gen.  Halleck,  280. 
reduced  in  his  command,  280. 
interviews  with  Gen.  Halleck  and 

the  President,  281. 
telegraphs  to  Gen.  F.  Porter,  281. 
reassumes  command  of  the  Army 

of  the  Potomac,  283. 
effect  upon  the  soldiers,  284. 
takes  the  field,  285. 
extracts  from  report,  286,  292. 
not  responsible  for  surrender  of 

Harper's  Ferry,  296. 
at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  297. 
extract  from  report,  302. 
tele-raphs  to  Gen.  Halleck,  304. 
thanked  by  Gov.  Bradford,  300. 
general  order  on  the  President's 

Proclamation  of  Sept.  22, 1862, 

310. 

difference    with   the   Administra 
tion,  313,  314. 
letter  to  Gen.  Meigs,  315. 
extracts  from  report,  319,  324. 
letter  to  Gen.  Halleck,  325. 
extract  from  report,  327. 
removed   from    the   command  of 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  329. 
why  removed,  333. 
farewell  address  to  the  army,  335. 
takes  leave  of  his  officers  and  tho 

army,  336,  337. 
reception    at     Philadelphia    and 

Trenton,  338. 
visit  to  Boston,  339. 
letter  on  behalf  of  Judge  Wood 
ward.  341. 
nt  the  reception  of  tho  First  New 

York  Cavalry,  343. 
oration  at  West  Point,  345. 


39(3 


INDEX. 


McClellan,  G.B.,  speech  at  LakeGeorge, 
346. 

extract  from  report.  3-18. 

defended  against  the  charge   of 
slowness,  358-363. 

generally  successful,  364. 

beloved  by  his  soldiers,  365. 

a  master  of  strategy,  306. 

moral  qualities,  368. 

unjustly  treated,  371-373. 
McDowell,  Gen.,  172,  204-207,  212-214, 

216.  218,  221,  235,  236. 
McReynolds,  Col.,  343. 
Meagher,  Gen.,  299. 
Meigs,  Gen..  314-316,  321,322. 
Mcrrimac,  156,  194,  198-201. 
Mexicalcingo,  23,  24. 
Mexico,  city  of,  23,  2S,  31,  34. 
Miles,  Col.,  291,  294,  295. 
Milroy,  Gen.,  208. 
Molino  del  Roy,  battle  of,  27. 
Mordecai,  Major,  59. 
Morell,  Gen.,  241. 
Morris,  Gen.,  91,  95, 102. 
Mowry,  Lieut.,  48,  51. 
Myers,  Col.,  322. 

NAGLEE,  GEN.,  250. 

Napier,  Sir  Win.,  quoted,  180,  358. 

Nelson,  Lord,  33. 

Nelson's  Farm,  battle  of,  250. 

Key,  Marshal,  367. 

Nicholas,  Emperor  of  Russia,  66. 

PALO  ALTO,  battle  of,  13. 

Panmure,  Lord,  61. 

Paris,  69.' 

Paskievitch,  Prince,  62. 

Podregal,  25. 

Po-rrani,  Col.,  98,  99. 

Philippi,  fight  at,  91. 

Pierpoint,  Gov.,  92. 

Pope,  Gen.,  236,  279,  280. 

Porter,  Gen.  F.,  130,  191,  220,  244,  250, 

252,  254,  279,  283,  300,  301,  337. 
Puebla,  19,  20. 

RADETSKY,  MARSHAL,  68. 

Kaglan.  Lord,  61. 

Reno,  Gen.,  290. 

Renshaw,  Lieut.,  56. 

Resaca  de  la  Palma,  battle  of,  13. 

Reynolds,  Gen.,  241. 

Richardson,  Gen.,  128,  191,  226,  227, 

250. 

Rich  Mountain,  battle  of,  99. 
Rodgers.  Capt.  J.,  197. 
Rodman,  Gen.  300. 
Rosecrans,  Gen.,  95,  98.  99,  103. 
Russey,  Col.  de,  10. 


?AMANA,  Bay  of,  56. 

8an  Antonio,  24. 


San  Cosme  garita,  28. 
Saunders,  Major,  37. 
Schalck,  Emil,  quoted,  256. 
Schenck,  Gen.,  208. 
Schomburgk,  Sir  R.  H.,  quoted,  57. 
Scott,  Gen.,  23,  25,  31,  36,  115, 116. 
Sebastopol,  71. 

Sedgwick,  Gen.,  191,  227,  251,  299. 
"  Seven  Days,"  the,  240. 
Seymour,  Gen.,  241. 
Sherman,  Geu.,  119. 
Shields,  Gen.,  208. 
Simpson,  Sir  George,  67. 
Slocum,  Gen.,  244,  247,  251. 
Smith,  Gen.  P.  F.,  25,  27,  41-43. 
Smith,  Major,  28,  30. 
Stanton,  E.  M.,  made  Secretary  of  War, 
135. 

letter  to  Gen.  Lander,  149. 

letter  to  the  editor  of  the  New 
York  "Tribune,"  149. 

letter  to  Gen.  McClellan,  162,  204. 

instructions    to   Gen.    McDowell, 
205. 

telegram  to  the  Governor  of  Mas 
sachusetts,  212. 
Stevens,  Gen.,  46,  54,  281. 
Stone,  Gen.,  114. 
Stonernan,  Gen.,  181,  244. 
St.  Petersburg,  63.  66. 
Stuart,  Gen.,  236. ' 
Sumner,  Gen.,  226,  230,  240,  246,  248, 

251,  254,  286,  301. 
Surnter,  Fort,  82. 
Sykes,  Gen.,  243. 

TAYLOR,  Gen.,  15. 
Totten,  Gen.,  17,  20,  43. 
Towiisend,  Geu.,  329. 

VANCOUVER,  FORT,  47. 

Tera  Crux,  siege  of,  16. 

Vienna,  68. 

Vincennes,  69. 

Virginia,  embarrassing  position  of,  86. 

Virginia,  "Western,  87. 

WADE,  B.  F.,  136. 
Walker,  S.  C.,  10. 

Washington  City,  how  defended,  167. 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  33,  356. 
West  Point,  Va.,  battle  near,  191. 
West  Point,  N.  Y.,  monument  conse 
crated  at,  345. 

Williamsburg,  battle  of,  181. 
Winchester,  battle  near,  208. 
Woodward,  Judge,  341. 
Wool,  Gen.,  170,  194,  208. 
Worth,  Gen.,  19,  24. 

|  YORKTOWX  evacuated,  181. 
I  ZOUAVES,  76. 


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